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ABSTRACT
The thesis addressed two research questions: 1) Why has
community care of long term mentally ill people been so 
difficult to implement? and 2) Do Community Mental Health 
Teams (CMHT s) provide an intellectually viable and 
practically sustainable model of service provision? These 
questions were approached by an analysis of the wider 
literature and a multi-method case study evaluation of an 
innovative CMHT in one inner city area of London from 1979- 
1992. The thesis concentrated on interchanges between theory, 
policy and local practice.
It was found that community care of the long term mentally ill 
was difficult to implement during the 1980 s because adoption 
of new approaches depended on their delayed acceptance by the 
psychiatric profession and even then, the required social and 
environmental approaches to care were only partially adopted. 
Policy became dominated by professional and managerial 
influences and clients continued to have a low political 
profile. Administrative inadequacies were severe and deep 
rooted and there were unreconcilable differences between 
Health and Social Services. The collectivist ethos of CMHT s 
was undermined.
The CMHT approach can provide a practically sustainable 
approach to service provision when certain conditions are 
met. The CMHT service must: be comprehensive, or supported by 
a full range of complementary services in the local community; 
receive genuine political commitment to the long term mentally 
ill client group and an on-going level of adequate funding; be 
introduced with a clear acknowledgement of where lead 
responsibilities rest; and harness the enthusiasm of 
professionals and catalytic individuals. The CMHT approach is 
a system of care and in so far as a new care model emerged 
during the 1980 s, it was the Care Programme Approach. Yet the 
CMHT approach provided a vital source of experimental energy 
during the 1980 s and now needs to be formally recognised by 
central government as a valuable vehicle for change.
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INTRODUCTION
This thesis is about community care services for people with 
severe and long standing mental health problems (termed the 
"Long Term Mentally 111"). The issue has been forced onto the 
political agenda in recent years by the gradual closure of the 
larger state institutions, major concerns about the numbers of 
homeless people with severe mental health problems and the 
growth in this population's representation in the prisons and 
probationary services. Incidents such as the mauling of Ben 
Silcock in the lions' den at London Zoo in early 1993, have 
added to the concerns. The most recent response from the 
Secretary of State for Health has been to announce a 
contentious new ten-point plan for developing "successful and 
safe" community care, including new legislation to provide for 
supervised discharge of psychiatric patients (DH Circular 
H93/908). However, it is judged by some authorities that the 
case for new legal powers is not proven and that the new plan 
gives undue emphasis to health care needs as distinct from 
social care, overlooks key issues of administrative and 
managerial lead and ignores resource issues (eg White 1993). 
In short, community care for the mentally ill is the subject 
of on-going controversy. Yet, why has community care in mental 
health taken so long to develop? Why has it been so unpopular 
and received the most explicit political criticism and where 
does the future of community care policy for the mentally ill 
lie, particularly for those with the most severe psychiatric 
and concurrent social problems?
It is an interesting paradox that Community Care was first 
used in a policy context and as a stated goal of government 
with reference to the mentally ill. Yet, in practical terms it 
has progressed more slowly for this client group than for any 
other. People with learning difficulties, offenders and the 
elderly have also been affected by the policy shift away from 
providing care within large institutions towards care in the 
community. What has been meant by community care in these 
areas has been fairly well defined, and service providers and 
policy makers have generally had a much clearer idea of their
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goals than their equivalents in mental health service 
provision. Clear alternative models for service delivery have 
been developed, one example being the ENCOR Model in mental 
handicap (Campaign for Mentally Handicapped People 1978). Even 
in acute mental health, accepted models of care have emerged, 
concentrated in general practitioner primary care services, 
out-patient departments and psychiatric units in general 
hospitals, but in relation to people with long term mental 
health problems, clear, accepted models of service provision 
have been lacking.
This thesis aims broadly to consider community care provision 
for the long term mentally ill in the UK during the 1980s and 
early 1990s. It is hypothesised that community care for the 
long term mentally ill was slow to develop because there was 
not a widely accepted model for service provision and because 
ideological and financial pressures have been immense. In so 
far as there has been a model, it is the Community Mental 
Health Team (CMHT) approach, widely used in the US and Italy. 
In the UK, however, utilisation of this model has been 
contentious and generally regarded as problematic. A 
substantial literature has appeared assessing the CMHT 
approach, but it is all closely aligned to professional 
practice issues and centred around ideas imported from other 
countries (Bachrach 1988b). The theoretical work has tended to 
be more general with little policy reference. In addition, 
most policy prescription has not been closely related to 
policy practice in the UK at the local level. This thesis 
therefore aims to concentrate on interchanges between theory, 
policy and local practice in one local experiment with the 
CMHT Approach, that began in the early 1980s and continued 
through to the time of writing and beyond.
The two central research aims of the thesis are to evaluate 
why community care of the long term mentally ill has been so 
difficult to implement effectively and to question whether 
CMHTs provide an intellectually viable and practically 
sustainable model of service provision to overcome past 
problems with the policy and particular problems of providing
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a community service to the long term mentally ill. Hence, the 
thesis is essentially an evaluation of change, innovation and 
implementation in the provision of community care services to 
this client group at the local level. The methodology chosen 
firstly combines inputs to the debate from the wide variety of 
complementary literatures that exist and secondly, tests this 
against a case study example of what has happened in practice 
at the local level. The field work upon which the thesis is 
based, concerns one particular variant of the CMHT model, 
pioneered in Battersea, South London, that initially provided 
a specialist service to a group of long term mentally ill 
people and then went on to prioritise work with the long term 
mentally ill within a sectorised catchment area model.
The thesis aims to be of interest to both practitioners and 
policy-makers as well as other researchers. In particular, it 
is intended to be useful and comprehensible to potential end- 
users in the field and to focus on the issues and problems 
that arise in practice on a day to day basis. In the past, it 
has been a common observation that there are obstacles to 
communication between research and practice. The subject 
material of research is often not relevant to the issues which 
are current for practitioners. Hulbert (1992) suggested 
researchers need to spend more time in practice agencies and 
gear their research to crucial issues that arise. He claimed 
that action research has an important place in observing 
practice as it happens and in defining factors which really 
help or hinder policy. Such an approach is adopted in this 
thesis.
Completing this study has been part of a personal journey. 
During my college and undergraduate days I began to develop a 
growing interest in what the so called "helping professions" 
were doing for their clients. I took part in voluntary work in 
a variety of areas including work with young offenders, the 
homeless, people with learning difficulties and the mentally 
ill. For two years I ran a "Contact" agency within Leicester 
University placing student volunteers in a broad range of 
community projects in both the statutory and voluntary
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sectors. Between 1988 and 1990, I worked for psychology 
departments in the National Health Service, firstly in a child 
and family psychiatric unit, then at a specialist unit for 
people with head-injuries and neuropsychological problems. 
Throughout this time, I was questioning the value of 
therapeutic work that seemed to make little attempt to address 
social inequalities and asking myself whether I could 
contribute effectively to working within a large bureaucratic 
organisation, or whether I would be more usefully employed 
elsewhere. I was particularly concerned about the potential 
for innovative work and became fascinated by how change comes 
about in service provision.
I began the work for this thesis while working as an 
independent researcher for a CMHT in Battersea, the team upon 
which the case study material in this thesis is based. It was 
at this time that I became particularly interested in work 
with people with chronic and disabling mental health problems. 
The questions I was asking myself fell more naturally into the 
realm of social policy than that of psychology and this thesis 
is the product of my last four years of inquiry. This research 
was therefore undertaken at a time when I decided I needed to 
gain a deeper understanding of the issues involved and the 
practical possibilities of how to start to address some of the 
entrenched problems of service provision to a historically 
marginalised client group.
Thesis Structure
The research design of the thesis is presented in chapter one. 
It details the central research questions and the different 
discourses that will be used as tools for evaluation. A multi­
method approach is used drawing on both practical and 
theoretical contributions to the study of community care for 
the long term mentally ill from a variety of perspectives. The 
thesis is structured in three parts.
PART 1
Part 1 defines the thesis subject area and explores the range 
of background literature and academic theory relating to
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community care of the long term mentally ill. Service problems 
begin with confusion over who the long term mentally ill group 
are, how they can be defined and who the community is who 
should be caring for them. What services are needed and who 
should most appropriately provide for them? What have services 
achieved in recent years? Chapter two outlines the 
"professional and practice" literature in this area and aims 
to establish an understanding firstly of how community care of 
the long term mentally ill has apparently been neglected and 
proved so unsuccessful and secondly what the CMHT approach is 
said to offer as a solution to the problems of service 
provision. Chapter three then presents theoretical literature 
analysing community care more generally from a "structural/ 
philosophical" perspective. It explores how different 
theoretical approaches have been used to explain the slow 
development of the policy in the past. Chapter four then aims 
to explore the additional contribution that can be gained by 
considering literature related to innovation and 
implementation in public policy.
PART 2
The theoretical literature presented in Part 1 is then used to 
help understand the experience of one case study CMHT. Part 
two of the thesis presents the findings of the thesis field 
work. Chapters five to twelve concentrate on one policy 
innovation, the Doddington Edward Wilson Community Mental
Health Team (DEW). This team was set up as a new development 
using an innovative approach for working with clients with 
long term mental health problems in an inner city area of 
London.
The case study utilises two different kinds of process 
material taken from practice. The first takes an
"administrative anthropological" view of the service 
(Glennerster et al 1983) and studies the process of
introducing a CMHT in one area of London, focusing on 
documentary and interview material. The objective is to
illustrate what the authorities actually did to plan services 
and how community services developed over a thirteen year
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period. This historical data is presented chronologically in 
chapters five to ten with accompanying analytical discussions 
of each period of development and the themes that were 
perceived by interviewees to have been most important.
The second approach draws on an empirical evaluative study of 
the DEW service in which the author took part. This empirical 
data is presented in chapters eleven and twelve. Chapter 
eleven considers the specialist model of working with the long 
term mentally ill that the case study CMHT developed and the 
manner in which this could be distinguished from services that 
already existed in the area. Chapter twelve evaluates whether 
the case study CMHT subsequently succeeded in prioritising 
work with long term mentally ill clients when they changed 
focus to become a catchment area team.
PART 3
Chapters thirteen and fourteen aim to synthesise material from 
theory and practice presented in parts one and two. Chapter 
thirteen reconsiders the "structural/philosophical literature" 
presented in Part 1 to evaluate how far it helps us to 
understand the structural and philosophical problems 
experienced in the formation and implementation of policy at 
the local level. Chapter fourteen reconsiders the contribution 
of the "professional practice and public policy literature" by 
synthesising the main findings from each of the case study 
chapters presented in Part 2. Conclusions about issues that 
are crucial for the future development of CMHT services for 
the long term mentally ill will be formulated and the 
relevance of the research findings for current developments in 
community care policy for the long term mentally ill will be 
explored.
During the writing of this thesis, dramatic changes were 
occurring in the UK on a national basis regarding community 
care policy, triggered by new central government directives. 
The field research covered the period 1979 to 1992, with the 
main body of empirical data collected between 1990 and 1992. 
The research was initially planned before the passage of the
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NHS and Community Care Act 1990 which followed Griffiths 
(1988) Community Care: Agenda for Action. At the time of
writing, implementation of the Act became a major focus for 
all those involved in the provision of health and social care 
for the long term mentally ill and other client groups.
No research takes place in a vacuum, particularly when it 
concerns the combination of so unpredictable a subject as 
mental health and the shifting implementation of community 
care reforms. It is important, therefore, to locate this 
thesis within the context of the overwhelming uncertainty that 
beset mental health service providers in the UK during the 
1980s and to accept that it only begins to touch on community 
care developments that subsequently gained momentum in the 
early 1990s. The implementation of these community care 
reforms has since become, in the words of Bebbington (1993) 
"something of a research industry", and the Personal Social 
Services Research Unit at the University of Kent, amongst 
other such units, is currently undertaking research to monitor 
the progress of the changes. I am presently employed by the 
PSSRU doing further research with the AIDS/HIV client group 
concerning community care and care management systems, again 
with a particular interest in innovatory care systems.
The implementation of a CMHT model in Battersea during the 
1980s in some ways anticipated changes which are now taking 
place more widely, involving statutory and voluntary agencies. 
Readers will therefore find lessons for the present and future 
in this evaluative account of the pioneering venture of a 
group of staff in one health authority. The case study 
illustrates the initial process of attempting to modernise 
community care for the long term mentally ill in the UK that 
underlies the current community care reforms. Given the 
intractability of the problems of the long term mentally ill, 
the aim of this thesis is to locate problems where solutions 
might be tried and to highlight the unresolved issues relating 
to the care of the long term mentally ill in the community 
that emerged during the 1980s and early 1990s, focusing on 
CMHTs.
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CHAPTER 1: RESEARCH DESIGN
Over the past decade, the dominant trends in community mental 
health care have not involved any dramatic improvements in 
medical technology, but instead have consisted of changes in 
outlook and approach. The two central questions of this thesis 
are concerned with the problematic nature and products of 
these changes:
1 . Why has community care of the "long term mentally ill" 
been so difficult to implement in Britain?
2. Does the Community Mental Health Team (CMHT) Approach 
provide a viable model of service provision for "long 
term mentally ill" clients?
The methodology chosen to tackle these questions is based on 
the notion that there is a need to bring together a range of 
material that relates specific instances and issues found in 
practice to wider and more general theories (Hill et al. 1979; 
Ham 1985). A multi-method approach is therefore used in this 
thesis, embracing complementary ways of approaching the 
central research questions. The aim is to evaluate or "judge 
the worth of" the CMHT model by considering interchanges 
between theory, policy and what can be learned from practice. 
Hunter (1980) suggested that the relevance of research of this 
nature is in demonstrating the need for a different, albeit 
less neat and tidy approach to policy formation and 
implementation.
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Box 1: Methodological Approaches Used in the Thesis
PART 1: THEORY- COMPLEMENTARY LITERATURES
1 ) Professional and Practice Community Care 
Literature
2) Philosophical and Structural Approaches to 
Community Care
3) Public Policy Literature on Policy Innovation 
_____ and Implementation_____________________________
PART 2: PRACTICE- THE CASE STUDY
1 ) Administrative Anthropology:
Interviews, Observation and Documentation of 
the History of a Specific Pioneering CMHT
2) Process Evaluation:
An Empirical Assessment of Service Style and 
_____ Working Patterns in the Case Study CMHT______
PART 3: SYNTHESIS
Analytical Synthesis of Complementary 
Discourses
PART 1: THEORY- COMPLEMENTARY LITERATURES
Three kinds of literature exist that help to explain why 
community care for the long term mentally ill has been slow to 
be fully developed. There are a growing number of mental 
health service evaluation studies published in the psychiatric 
and social professional journals and a body of professional 
literature surrounds these. There is also a substantial set of 
more general structural and philosophical literature on 
community care using models drawn from sociological, 
philosophical and political theory, as well as some approaches 
based in economics. In addition, there has been the 
contribution of social policy in studying innovation and 
implementation of public policy.
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1) Professional & Practice Community Care Literature
In this thesis, "professional and practice" literature refers 
to the vast volume of writing that has appeared in recent 
years clarifying professional practice issues relating to 
community care and describing the implementation of the CMHT 
model. Much of this literature first appeared in professional 
journals, research reports and conference papers. In chapter 
two, a review of this "professional and practice" literature 
will be used to introduce the thesis topic and to give an 
account of recent developments in community care for the long 
term mentally ill client group from a professional viewpoint, 
with particular emphasis on the progress of the CMHT approach.
Chapter two initially discusses definitions of the "long term 
mentally ill" client group on whom we wish to concentrate in 
this thesis and shifting definitions of "community care" 
itself. It then aims to determine what community care for the 
long term mentally ill meant in practice during the thesis 
study period. A backlash that developed against community care 
policy during the 1980s, mainly from within the psychiatric 
profession, will be briefly described. An account of what is 
meant by the term "Community Mental Health Team" is then given 
with a brief description of developments in CMHT services in 
the 1980s. Specific associated ideologies and goals of the 
CMHT approach concerning "case management" and "The Care 
Programme Approach" will be introduced.
2) Philosophical and Structural Approaches to Community Care 
On a more general level, basic structural and philosophical 
explanations have been put forward to account for the origins 
of community care policy and the subsequent difficulties in 
policy implementation. It is this literature that will be 
discussed in chapter three. A comprehensive history of mental 
health policy is not presented as this has been widely 
documented elsewhere (eg.Busfield 1986; Jones 1988; Martin 
1984). Rather it is the intention to present explanations of 
the policy's problematic nature. As Easton (1965a) points out, 
policies are dynamic in nature and change over time. It is
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therefore important to be aware of the shifting definitions of 
issues and evolving interpretations of policy. Existing 
explanatory models will be reviewed and while the distinctions 
between them are not always clear cut, in this thesis they 
will be grouped under the following six headings:
a) Traditional/Pluralist Interpretations
b) Sociological/Anthropological Interpretations
c) Marxist Interpretations
d) Economic Interpretations
e) Elitist Interpretations
f) Feminist Interpretations
3) Public Policy Literature on Policy Innovation and 
Implementation
Chapter four gives an overview of selected themes from a third 
strand of literature that has developed, which ascribes the 
problems of community care not to the origins of the policy
itself or to the structural factors alone, but to difficulties
faced in service innovation and policy implementation. There 
is a need for the inclusion of such an analysis as existing 
accounts of the closure of large institutions have had a 
structuralist bias, with more emphasis upon the impact of 
regional and national policy and on the machinery of 
collaboration than on internal politics or the effects of 
local power relationships (Korman & Glennerster 1990). Very 
little is presently known about inter-service relationships 
and dynamics at work both at the level of inter-professional 
working and inter-agency working (Smith 1976). As a corrective 
to this tendency to ignore internal dynamics, chapter four 
aims to give an overview of work on innovation and 
implementation in public policy. The overview of this 
literature deals with the following topics:
a. The Perception of the Problem
b. The Origins of Change
c. Central or Local Policy Determination
d. Decision-Making
e. Joint Planning
f. Conflicts and Constraints in Implementing Change
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The Aim of Part One
The professional and practice literature informs us of the 
specific difficulties that have arisen in providing community 
services to the long term mentally ill and the progress that 
has been made in tackling these through the use of the CMHT 
model. From structural and philosophical explanations we can 
gain some general ideas about why community care policy for 
the mentally ill has been so fraught with difficulty. However, 
little attention is devoted to the long term mentally ill in 
this set of literature. The literature on innovation and 
implementation in public policy further informs us about why 
there may be institutional reasons for the very slow 
implementation of community care policy. It is suggested in 
this thesis that a true explanation about why community care 
policy for the long term mentally ill has been problematic 
lies in an interaction between these three perspectives. The 
aim in Part One is therefore to present an overview of each of 
these largely disparate sets of theoretical literature which 
will then be used as a basis to evaluate a specific local case 
study of a CMHT in Part Two.
PART 2: PRACTICE- THE CASE STUDY
Part Two utilises a localist bottom-up approach, rather than 
the top-down approach which underpins virtually all national 
policy statements regarding the care of the mentally ill. 
Throughout the thesis study period no coherent model for 
community mental health development was being proposed by 
central government and so it would have been a mistake to view 
policy as coming in at the top, being successively refined and 
translated into operating instructions as it moves down the 
hierarchy to operatives at the bottom. The approach taken is 
hence akin to that of Barrett & Fudge (1981), who state that 
the relationship between policy and action cannot be regarded 
as a simple transmission process. Rather, it must be viewed as 
a "complex assembly job", involving the fitting together of 
different interests and priorities. The policy-action 
relationship is not seen as a linear step-by-step progression 
by which policy is translated into anticipated consequences, 
but is better described as interactive and recursive. Policy
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is not regarded as a constant -it is seen as being mediated by 
actors1 who may have been operating with different "assumptive 
worlds" (Young 1977) from those formulating the policy. Policy 
in this sense, inevitably undergoes interpretation, 
modification and in some cases subversion.
The case-study approach has been recognised by several
theorists to be of value in the study of social policies. For
example, Williams stated:
"The most useful studies have been factually dense with 
lots of information about what people actually did in 
trying to make a programmatic decision operational. Case- 
studies have been critical." (Williams, 1980, p21 )
Donnison et al (1975) argued that case study accounts of
administrative processes often make them appear deceptively
simple and continuous, but it is important to bear in mind
that the material upon which they are based is complex and
diverse. The decision process in which one has an interest,
"...more typically consists of one item at the end of a 
crowded committee agenda, a telephone call made the 
following month, a paragraph in a memo prepared over the 
weekend dealing mainly with other matters, then a hurried 
departmental meeting followed by a chance conversation 
between two people on their way to lunch. Such are the 
scattered incidents, if the researcher is fortunate 
enough to be able to trace them, which should be threaded 
together to produce what participants may later regard as 
an unrecognisably coherent story". (Donnison et al, 1975, 
p46)
In order to evaluate the entire development of the thesis case 
study team, a research period was chosen that spanned from 
1979 to 1992 and two main methodological approaches were used.
1) Administrative Anthropology: Interviews. Observation and 
Documentation of the History of a Specific Pioneering CMHT 
Development
Chapters five to ten of the thesis use an approach that has 
been described as "administrative anthropology" (Glennerster 
et al 1983) or an "academic field-trip into the administrative 
jungle". The objective was to gather material to illustrate 
how various interested parties and individuals (termed actors) 
in the case study area interpreted, perceived and responded to 
policies and how they enabled or disabled the accomplishment
22
of these policies. Emphasis was placed on understanding the 
unique characteristics of the interior of the case study 
organisation, its codification system, its elites, its 
decision-making processes, its culture, its self image and its 
history.
The administrative anthropology material aims to move from a 
description of how the case study service came to be, through 
an exploration of how it evolved. Discussions relating the 
case study evidence to the theoretical literature presented in 
Part one will be included in the second part of each chapter. 
Chapter five details psychiatric provision in Battersea prior 
to the birth of the CMHT in 1979 and chapter six discusses the 
innovation in CMHT service provision that occurred in 1983. 
The next three chapters then concentrate on themes that were 
defined as important by the actors interviewed. Chapter seven 
describes the process of "building the team". Chapter eight 
details the development of the CMHT operational policy and 
describes the way that the service style developed. Chapter 
nine considers barriers to CMHT implementation that were 
subsequently faced and chapter ten concludes the story by 
considering the battle for the future model of care that took 
place after 1988. The study period under discussion ends in 
1992. Three different methods were employed to gather the 
research material:
a) FORMAL SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS
An aural history was obtained from twenty three formal semi­
structured interviews conducted with the main actors who were 
most closely concerned with the design and implementation of 
team policies. The definition of "main actors" is inherently 
judgemental but the task was approached by following a "log­
rolling" trail. Staff members of the CMHT were interviewed 
first and each was asked to suggest other actors who had been 
involved in the CMHT development. A second round of interviews 
were then carried out with actors from this list of suggested 
contacts. These included mental health unit management 
representatives, the heads of professional departments in the 
hospital, local GPs, social services staff and other staff
23
members who had worked closely with the team or who were known 
to have strong views on the team's development. A full list of 
the actors who were interviewed is presented in Appendix 2.
It was the intention to avoid reading subjective ideas into 
the respondent's views or partially reporting the interviews. 
To minimise the possibility, the resultant documents were 
given to the interviewees for comments, with an invitation to 
talk further or elaborate in writing. Using "Respondent 
Validation", in this way it was hoped that the report provided 
a documented and agreed basis for analysis.
b) INFORMAL INTERVIEWS AND OBSERVATIONS
The author spent a protracted period working within the case 
study organisation between 1990 and 1992, with offices both at 
the CMHT base itself and in the psychology department at the 
local psychiatric hospital. Informal interviews and informal 
observations of policy in progress were carried out during 
this time in the hospital and the community. It also gave the 
author an opportunity to become familiar with the local 
services, local geographical area, issues that arose in day to 
day working and to get to know some of the CMHT clients2.
Weekly CMHT team meetings in the community were attended by 
the author for one year, as well as seminars, training days 
and conferences held within the local psychiatric hospital 
(Springfield) and the adjacent St Georges' General Hospital. 
A "typical working day" was spent with each staff member of 
the CMHT and a community psychiatric nurse from the 
neighbouring catchment area, accompanying each in their daily 
routine of home visits to clients and appointments with other 
professionals from both the statutory and voluntary sectors 
with whom they were carrying out joint work or liaison 
regarding specific clients.
Visits to local community and hospital resources were 
undertaken and further informal interviews were carried out 
with actors encountered on these visits, including some 
representatives from voluntary organisations. It included, for
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example, the hospital industrial therapy unit and occupational 
therapy department, the Cottage Day Hospital, Hazlewell Day 
Centre and local voluntary organisations such as the 
Doddington Family Centre and Battersea Counselling Service.
To obtain the views of service users and their carers, several 
of the "Community Support Groups" listed in chapter seven of 
this thesis were visited and the author accepted the 
opportunity to take part in some group sessions. These 
included attendance at the "Garfield Support Group" held in a 
local community centre, "Yorkshop" (a sheltered work group 
again held in a community centre on one of the Battersea 
housing estates), the "Sports Group" held in the local leisure 
centre and the "Relatives Support Group" held in the local 
church. Material was also drawn from a survey of user's 
satisfaction with the CMHT, conducted in 1989 (Macdonald et al 
1990).
C ) DOCUMENTATION
Historical documentation was addressed and analysed, including 
minutes of key-meetings and policy and strategic documents. 
Material was gathered to illustrate what the authorities in 
the case study area actually did to plan community mental 
health services for the long term mentally ill and how these 
services developed over the period from 1979 to 1992. 
Documents and correspondence were obtained directly from the 
"main actors" mentioned above and from local libraries and 
archives. The documents referred to in each chapter will be 
referenced and noted at the end of the relevant chapter 
throughout Part Two of the thesis and all the documents 
consulted will be listed in chronological order in Appendix 1 .
2) Process Evaluation: An Empirical Assessment of Service 
Style and Working Patterns in the Case Study CMHT 
Between January 1990 and April 1992, the author was 
commissioned as an independent researcher to conduct an 
empirical evaluation study of the case study team and their 
priority clients. The work was supervised by Professor 
Glennerster, Dr McLean and Ms Leibowitz. The ensuing results
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have been published as a separate report (Rickard et al 1992) 
and part of this will be referred to in chapters eleven and 
twelve of this thesis. Data collection batteries used are 
included as Appendix 4.
The importance of acknowledging the dimension of process in 
the design and conduct of evaluative research has been 
emphasised strongly by other researchers (eg Hammersley & 
Atkinson 1983). The empirical component of this thesis aimed 
to concentrate on process factors in the case study 
organisation, rather than outcomes. Chapters eleven and twelve 
hence aim to explore empirically some aspects of the two 
variants of the CMHT model that were developed during the 
study period in the case study area. The first is the 
specialist service for long term mentally ill clients and the 
second is the later model that was adopted based on 
comprehensive catchment area responsibilities, giving priority 
to work with the long term mentally ill.
1 ) COMMUNITY CARE FOR THE LONG TERM MENTALLY ILL IN THE
SPECIALIST CMHT MODEL: WAS IT ANY DIFFERENT TO SERVICES 
THAT EXISTED PREVIOUSLY?
The first study compared retrospectively the treatment carried 
out by the Doddington Edward Wilson (DEW) Community Mental 
Health Team, when they were operating as a specialist team for 
long term mentally ill clients, with the traditional treatment 
as carried out by the hospital-based Community Psychiatric 
Nursing Service (CPN). It was a retrospective case-note study 
of two cohorts of long term mentally ill clients, one cohort 
from each service. Essentially, two accepted research 
methodologies were combined:
a) performance measurement of the two teams on some of the 
goals and principles stated in the CMHT operational 
policy (termed "goal-directed evaluation" in the 
literature).
b) "network analysis" which documents the client contacts 
with agencies in a service system. Inferences are drawn 
from the total number of contacts and different patterns 
of agency contact regarding improved social functioning
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and alleviation of social problems.
The sample comprised 100 subjects in total, 50 from each 
service, matched for age, sex, diagnosis and ethnic origin and 
the aim was to establish whether there were any differences 
between the cohorts on selected variables of length and type 
of service contact; community group and day centre attendance 
records; liaison attempted/achieved with community agencies; 
reasons for discharge; frequency and length of admissions; and 
type of counselling undertaken.
2) PRIORITISING THE LONG TERM MENTALLY ILL IN A CATCHMENT 
AREA CMHT MODEL: WAS IT FEASIBLE?
The second study focused on an evaluation of the DEW Team when 
they changed focus to become a "comprehensive" catchment area 
team no longer specialising only in work with the long term 
mentally ill group, but still aiming to prioritise work with 
this group. The study looked at the distinction that the team 
developed between long term mentally ill and "acute" clients 
to discover whether the team's policy of prioritising the long 
term mentally ill group was observable in practice and to see
if there were any differences in the kind of service offered
to the two groups.
A major consideration in designing this second study was to 
develop a simple methodology that avoided making extra demands 
on staff and which could be used by other CMHTs with little 
access to research staff. Maximum use was therefore made of 
data routinely collected by the team. The study adopted three 
main approaches:
a) a retrospective computer study of long term mentally ill 
and acute client categorisation over time;
b) a prospective study of the time spent discussing clients 
from each group at the weekly multi-disciplinary team 
meetings;
c) a crude study of staff-client contacts with long term
mentally ill and acute clients on the "current" case­
load.
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The Aim of Part Two
It is proposed in this thesis that studies of what actually 
happens at the local level are needed to gain a more detailed 
understanding of the development of community care provision 
for the long term mentally ill, as it is necessary to do more 
than offer a general explanation of why problems may exist. 
Since there have been a wide variety of responses to the 
community care problem in the U.K., it would not be possible 
in one thesis to conduct such a study on a national scale. 
Therefore, the aim in Part Two of this thesis is to present a 
detailed case study of one particular innovative CMHT set up 
to work with the long term mentally ill in an inner city area 
of London. This constitutes but one of many such case studies 
that need to be completed to ascertain whether the theories 
presented in Part One are plausible in the local context and 
hence to learn from the experience that local innovations in 
community mental health care can provide.
PART 3: SYNTHESIS
The final two chapters of this thesis consider the possibility 
of a synthesis of this diverse material and attempt to answer 
the research questions set out at the beginning of the thesis 
on the basis of case study evidence. Chapter thirteen 
considers research question one in the light of the structural 
and philosophical literature reviewed in Part One. The 
question was "Why has community care of the long term mentally 
ill been so difficult to implement in Britain?" Conclusions 
are drawn detailing the kinds of structural and philosophical 
problems that were experienced in providing care to the long 
term mentally ill in the case study CMHT.
The first part of chapter fourteen considers research question 
two in the light of the "professional and practice" and 
"public policy" literature that was also presented in Part 
One. This second question was "Does the Community Mental 
Health Team Approach provide a viable model of service 
provision for long term mentally ill clients?" Conclusions are 
drawn from summaries of the discussions presented in each of 
the case study chapters. At the end of chapter fourteen, the
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relevance of such findings in the rapidly changing community 
care policy context at the time of writing is detailed.
Background Details about the Case Study Area and Research 
Period Chosen
As described above, the thesis is based on a case study of an
innovative CMHT in one inner city area of London. The
Doddington Edward Wilson Mental Health Team (DEW) was
established in Battersea over a three and a half year period
from 1982 to 1986, the period between which proposals were
made and the team came into being. It was in 1979 that
discussions first began which led to the creation of the team.
Hence, the period studied in this thesis takes us through the
whole development from 1979 to 1992. The team went on to
develop further after this period, but the author was no
longer directly involved with the service and so 1992 was
taken as the cut off date for this research. However, it is
important to bear in mind Donnison's words that,
"A case study is not a self-contained, static or 
completed edifice, but part of a more general and 
continually evolving collective response to the changing 
needs of society". (Donnison et al, 1975, p44)
The Battersea catchment area is in an inner city community 
whose Jarman indices for the majority of the electoral wards 
lie within the 5% most under privileged in the U.K.. It is an 
area of particularly high morbidity and before the DEW Team 
was set up, the psychiatric hospital in the area was seen not 
to be meeting the needs of the local population of long term 
mentally ill clients. The DEW Team was therefore established 
to do outreach work from a converted pram shed on one of the 
local council estates. Initially it was supernumerary to the 
hospital service and operated as a specialist service to long 
term mentally ill clients. The DEW Team as originally 
constituted, changed focus in October 1988 to become a 
catchment area team: a comprehensive CMHT for North East
Battersea.
The particular features that promoted the choice of this case- 
study team were twofold. Firstly, the timing of the team’s
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development was important. The team was initiated in the early 
1980s. It was one of the first mental health services in the 
U.K. to set up using a CMHT model, specialising in work with 
the long term mentally ill. The CMHT model had previously been 
utilised mainly in the US and Italy. Therefore, this study 
provided an opportunity to comment on the importation and 
modification of a model mental health programme into the U.K. 
and the process of its initiation and development. 
Organisations such as "Good Practices in Mental Health", the 
"Kings Fund", "Research and Development in Psychiatry" and the 
"Personal Social Services Research Unit" have been monitoring 
many such CMHT developments in the U.K. and this thesis is 
seen as complementary to their work.
Secondly, the team operated from its beginning with a strong 
commitment to self evaluation. Therefore, it was possible to 
chronicle events from its earliest days and this provided an 
ideal opportunity to reflect and learn from the team's 
experiences. Developments in British community care policy for 
the mentally ill in the past decade have increasingly moved 
towards emphasis on "priority working", "case management" and 
"care planning" and many new services based on these 
principles are being quickly and fairly widely established, in 
accordance with new government legislation. The pace of change 
is alarming, leaving little opportunity for reflection and 
assimilation of learning experiences. The case-study CMHT had 
already established a form of care planning for the priority 
long term mentally ill group six years before the introduction 
of recent government initiatives making case management and 
care planning a statutory requirement. Hence, it provided an 
ideal chance to assess the policy implementation process where 
a system had been devised and modified and was being used in 
the day to day management of the long term mentally ill.
A Note on Thesis Methodology
As a part of discussing the research design of this thesis, it 
was thought necessary to elaborate on the context in which the 
fieldwork research took place, to detail the limits of the 
research questions posed and the research design chosen, with
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particular emphasis on what it was not possible to do, and to 
qualify the way in which the results are instructive. This 
thesis aims to be sceptical in the best possible sense.
Working with theory and evidence it is important to remain 
very clear about the scope of the findings and the conditions 
under which they appear to hold true. Top-down methods of 
assessment of mental health services utilise relatively "hard" 
data that is easy to collect routinely, but has only a 
statistical relationship to individual need. The bottom-up 
approach used here is personal and can be more closely 
directed towards an understanding of the complexity of 
individual cases and the true nature of the decision making 
process. It was recognised at the outset that data gathered 
was "soft", complex, full of value judgements and difficult to 
generalise from. It is therefore hoped that this thesis 
research will provide an opportunity to complement other 
studies through its deeper appreciation of the internal 
context and policy process during the last decade. It is hoped 
that even this limited effort can dissolve many of the crude 
stereotypes and sweeping generalisations that so often bedevil 
discussion of community mental health services.
Naturalistic designs, such as the multi-method approach used, 
while lacking conventional scientific credibility do not have 
to lack rigour. Concerns about the "complexity" of technical 
problems in evaluating care, while they are undoubtedly very 
real and continually highlighted throughout this thesis, can 
detract from the endeavour to gather knowledge about CMHTs and 
community care for the long term mentally ill from every 
available source. It will be emphasised throughout the thesis 
that when service aims are translated into objective 
operational terms, such as increasing the number of clients in 
contact with local community agencies, the intentions are 
clear enough, but it cannot be assumed that fulfilling these 
targets will ipso facto reduce social disablement or improve 
quality of life. Some evidence to that effect has to be 
forthcoming. It was not possible to extend the thesis to 
include this evaluation task.
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There are some very obvious drawbacks in the methodological 
approaches used in the fieldwork research. Firstly, the time- 
scale of the empirical evaluation was far from ideal. Shepherd 
(1991) drew attention to the problem of the time-scales 
commonly feasible in an empirical evaluative study, which are 
of the order of six months to two years, and the acknowledged 
very slow progress of clients where changes become apparent 
only over intervals of three to four years. For funding 
reasons the empirical work included in this thesis was limited 
to a two year period. It is, therefore, unable to contribute 
to a discussion of change in clients' overall well-being and 
quality of life over time. In the first empirical study, only 
a very limited control measure was available in the local 
area, in comparing the DEW service to the CPN service. The 
second study was subject to a high degree of methodological 
experimentation. Also, in common with many new CMHT services 
that have been set up in recent years, the case study CMHT had 
to engage in a "hard sell" of the kind of service that it 
offered. Reporting biases resulting from such a "DEW centred" 
evaluation can only be registered and effotrts made to reduce 
their influence.
In Brief
Part 1 firstly highlights specific problems and issues in 
community care service provision to the long term mentally ill 
client group and describes the emergence of the CMHT model, by 
considering the "professional and practice" literature. On a 
macro level, it then considers the more general theoretical 
contributions of various social science theories and 
literature on innovation and implementation in public policy. 
A major proposition of this thesis is that to make the theory 
more useful, elements of each theoretical approach need to be 
extracted and tested against what is happening in practice. In 
Part 2, a case study of a CMHT in one area of London will be 
used to look at process factors in policy development at the 
local level. Material will be drawn from a detailed historical 
account of events and empirical studies of the policy process. 
Part 3 constitutes an evaluative synthesis of material from 
all the discourses considered in the thesis.
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1 . The term "actors" is used to refer to various interested 
parties and individuals involved in the policy process.
2. There is some debate in the literature about the most 
preferable term to be used. The terms "patient", "service 
user", "mentally disabled person" and "client" have been 
variously used, none of which are considered by the author to 
be ideal. However, for the sake of consistency with the terms 
used at the case study CMHT, the term "client" will be used 
throughout this thesis, except where referring to hospital in­
patients .
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PART 1 : COMPLEMENTARY LITERATURES ON 
COMMUNITY CARE
In Part 1 of this thesis, material drawn from the three 
theoretical literatures outlined in the research design will 
be presented in the form of three distinct chapters. These 
embrace three different types of literature: professional and 
practice literature (chapter two): philosophical and
structural interpretations of community care policy and its 
origins (chapter three); and more general work on innovation 
and implementation in public policy (chapter four).
The intention is to explore the main tenets of each set of 
theories and to establish what each can contribute to an 
understanding of community care development for the long term 
mentally ill. This material will then be used to evaluate a 
local case study of a Community Mental Health Team throughout 
Part 2 of the thesis and to focus the discussion in attempting 
to answer the research questions in Part 3.
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CHAPTER 2:
Community Care of the Long Term Mentally 111: 
Professional and Practice Literature
During the 1980s and early 1990s, there has been a growing 
emphasis in the professional and practice literature on the 
psychosocial aspects of psychiatric morbidity, accompanied by 
a move towards viewing mental health service provision as 
being more closely connected to the social world in which it 
is practised. This signifies a shift away from the 
concentration on medical advancements that had been the 
primary focus of the professional and practice literature in 
previous decades. Chapter two aims to review this literature 
in order to give an account of the content and range of the 
on-going professional debate about community care policy in 
the 1980s and early 1990s, specifically focusing on the long 
term mentally ill.
Definitions of the key terms used in the thesis will initially 
be briefly discussed, moving on to a clarification of the main 
issues that have driven professional assessment of community 
care as a policy. Within this discussion, it is the intention 
to map out what community mental health care for the long term 
mentally ill meant in practise during the 1980s, describing 
the ways in which it was suggested to have extended beyond the 
traditional patterns of institutional care. The emergence, 
ideological foundation and practical application of the CMHT 
model will be described, together with a brief discussion of 
the concepts of case management and care planning which have 
been closely associated with CMHT development.
The Definition of the Long Term Mentally 111 
There are an estimated forty million people worldwide who are 
severely disabled by mental health problems (World Health 
Organisation 1973, 1987: Cohen 1988). To give an idea of the 
magnitude of the problem in the U.K., Goldberg & Huxley (1980) 
showed that 250 out of each 1,000 members of the population in 
Britain will each year experience symptoms which may be 
regarded as psychiatric or psychological in nature. Of these,
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just less than two percent seek the help of a psychiatrist, 
the majority being helped by family and friends, their family 
doctor or other primary carers. This gives some indication of 
the proportion of the U.K. population who seek help with 
mental health problems from the health and Social Services. Of 
these, fewer still suffer severely disabling mental health 
problems over long periods of time. It is this relatively 
small group of the most disabled clients (referred to as the 
"long term mentally ill") who have presented the greatest 
challenge to those who devise and implement community care 
policy and on whom we wish to concentrate in this thesis .
The long term mentally ill have been variously described as 
"real lunatics", "chronic mental patients", "people with 
enduring mental health problems" and the "severely mentally 
disabled"1. In the last decade it has become common practice 
to distinguish them from those who experience more short term 
"acute" episodes of mental disturbance. In general terms, the 
former suffer from severe illnesses such as organic mental 
disorders, schizophrenia and bipolar affective disorders, 
while the latter comprise depressive illnesses and anxiety- 
related disorders that are much more likely to resolve 
spontaneously with time. Lavender & Holloway (1988) suggested 
that the issue of definition of the long term mentally ill is 
essentially concerned with the nature of the individual's 
primary difficulty. This usually involves an inner experience 
of a particularly disturbing nature that people are likely to 
have to live with for long periods during their life time. The 
primary difficulty can include any of the following:
1 . a strong feeling that people with whom you come into 
contact are against you and are plotting, sometimes with 
elaborate means, to attack or keep you under 
surveillance.
2. a distressing experience, such as hearing arguing voices 
or seeing images that no-one else can see or hear.
3. a strong belief in or idea about events in your life that 
others neither believe nor understand.
4. a feeling of great despair out of which it seems 
impossible to break.
5. a feeling of the greatest optimism and belief in yourself 
that seems to others completely unjustified by your 
circumstances and that seems to be often followed by deep 
despair.
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6. a feeling of severe isolation from other human beings 
where any contact becomes a painful experience to be 
avoided.
People with these disturbing experiences also have other and 
often related problems which interfere with their ability to 
lead "normal" lives in the community. Wing & Morris (1982) 
called these "social disablements". They may include an 
inability to hold down a job, difficulty in maintaining stable 
relationships or lack of basic skills necessary for everyday 
living. The treatments that people receive for their mental 
health problems often lead to additional difficulties, such as 
the side effects of medication and/or the effects of spending 
years segregated from other members of the community in a 
psychiatric hospital. The social implications of all these 
difficulties are profound. In particular, a link has been 
noted between homelessness and long term mentall illness. For 
example, Tantam (1991) found that between 25% and 35% of the 
homeless have a psychiatric history or display psychiatric 
symptoms at interview. He suggested that psychiatric clients 
constitute the lowest rank in the pecking order of street 
life. Van de Wijngaart (1990) showed that they were easy 
victims, easy to rob, easy to deceive, turn away and ignore.
The experience of long term mental illness is that of a 
disturbance of the emotions that affects both thinking and 
action. In the medical tradition such disturbances are defined 
as symptoms and diagnostic labels are attributed to certain 
patterns of these symptoms. For example, hearing voices 
arguing when there is no tangible source, is often diagnosed 
as schizophrenia. The International Classification of Mental 
Disorders (ICD-9)(9th edition-WHO 1978), published and updated 
by the World Health Organisation, is the official 
classification in the U.K. and is a categorical system of 
diagnosis. It defines mental illnesses as involving disorders 
of thought, memory, mood, perception or cognitive ability, 
developing in individuals whose psychological function was 
previously normal. It also divides illnesses into psychoses 
and neuroses. Psychoses are said to entail symptoms outside 
normal experience, such as delusions and hallucinations. They
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tend to be severe illnesses in which the client loses insight 
and confuses subjective experience with reality. Neuroses are 
more common, in which the symptoms are understandable as an 
exaggeration of the normal response to stress. Conditions not 
classified as mental illness but involving abnormalities of 
development or behaviour are also included. These include 
personality disorders, alcohol and drug abuse, sexual 
disorders and eating disorders.
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM III) (third 
edition- APA 1980) is the official classificatory system of 
the American Psychiatric Association and is a multi-axial 
system with five axes. It is of interest because workers in 
the U.S. have taken the lead in formulating operational 
definitions of mental disorders and the system is increasingly 
used in the U.K. in addition to ICD-9. It is less fragmented 
than ICD-9 and offers rigid, clearly stated diagnostic 
criteria in contrast to the more flexible diagnostic 
guidelines of ICD-9, although the two systems correspond and 
with new revisions they are converging quite quickly (Goldberg 
& Huxley 1992) .
However, definitions of the long term mentally ill tend to 
straddle several categories of these classification systems 
and the issue is complicated by the multiple diagnoses given 
to many in the population who cannot be placed neatly into any 
one diagnostic category. Therefore, other indicators have been 
used to distinguish the long term mentally ill from those with 
acute disorders. In the U.K., the long term mentally ill have 
often been defined by psychotic diagnosis (eg Borland et al
1989) or numerous lengthy or compulsory hospital admissions 
(eg Shepherd 1984; Franklin & Solovitz 1987) and some studies 
have taken as their criteria the presence of "a perceived risk 
of re-hospitalisation" (eg Bond et al 1988). Differences in 
definition have meant that it has been difficult to compare 
epidemiological data across the country and even within small 
geographical areas, let alone internationally.
With the move to community care, three groups of long term
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mentally ill clients have become evident, further complicating 
the issue of definition. First, there is the group of "old 
long stay patients" who have chronic problems and have lived 
in institutions for a major part of their lives. They have 
particular problems of independence in carrying out daily 
living tasks such as cooking, washing, finding accommodation 
and sustaining themselves generally with few social contacts. 
Ford et al (1987) found in their survey that 30% of this group 
were aged over 75 years and that they tended to be frail and 
socially isolated, with 74% seldom leaving hospital.
"New long stay patients" have been identified as a second 
group, those who despite the development of community based 
services and newer treatments are unable to sustain life in 
the community and hence live in hospital. Conceptually, this 
group constitutes those who began their "psychiatric careers" 
in a post-institutional climate and Mann & Kree (1976) 
identified that 52% of this group are female, the most common 
diagnosis is schizophrenia and despite their relative youth 
they have long psychiatric histories.
Third, there are the "new chronic patients", people with long 
term mental health problems who have not had the experience of 
being incarcerated in a mental hospital for years on end, but 
who nevertheless suffer enduring mental health problems with 
associated social disablement and make frequent use of a 
variety of services on a prolonged and repeated basis. Kastrup 
(1988) conducted a national study of young adult psychiatric 
patients and their need for hospitalisation and found that 
typical "new chronics" were young males, with psychosis or 
personality disorder, perhaps misusing drugs or alcohol. The 
U.K. study by Lieberman et al (1988) supports these findings.
The acute population, on the other hand, have not prompted 
such attention to definition, and are generally regarded as 
those who have had neither experience of hospital nor a 
psychotic diagnosis. It is accepted that they require services 
mainly revolving around counselling and psychotherapy, and a 
higher proportion of young adults, women and the middle
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classes are represented in the acute population (Goldberg & 
Huxley 1980).
There are presently many theories about the origins of long 
term mental health problems involving genetic, chemical, 
psychological and social explanations (for a consideration of 
the debates and current evidence see Kerr & McClelland 1991: 
Goldberg & Huxley 1992). None is definitive and simple answers 
cannot be given, but whatever the view of causation and 
diagnostic practices, it is clear that most people with long 
term mental health problems require help over long periods and 
pose the greatest challenge to those who develop community 
care policy and deliver community services. It is discomfort 
and dysfunction that bring these people to seek help from 
services, not the pathology which may underlie them and it has 
therefore started to be recognised that while practitioners 
require bio-medical knowledge, this must also be informed by 
the social sciences.
The Definition of Community Care
The term "Community Care" first appeared officially in the 
1930 Annual Report of the Board of Control (Jones 1988). It 
was used to refer to a policy then being advocated to provide 
for the mentally handicapped to live outside hospital wherever 
possible. However, Community Care for the mentally ill, as an 
explicitly recognisable policy with that name, dates from the 
Report of the 1954-7 Royal Commission on the Law relating to 
Mental Illness and Mental Deficiency (the Percy Report). From 
the early 1960s, plans were put forward to reduce the total 
number of psychiatric beds and even to phase out mental 
hospitals altogether and these plans became policy when they 
were announced in Enoch Powell's "water tower" speech at the 
1961 Annual MIND Conference. Valuable accounts of the way that 
the term community care has since diversified in its use and 
application are given in Busfield (1986), Goodwin (1990) and 
Tomlinson (1991), to name but a few, but the intention here is 
just to give a brief definition of what was meant by the term 
in the 1980s and to describe why the policy was considered 
problematic for mental health services on a general level. A
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discussion of structural and philosophical interpretations of 
community care policy as it developed will be the subject of 
chapter three.
During the 1970s it became clear that the shift to the
provision of public community care services was problematic
and the policy had met with little success. By the 1980s it
was recognised that alternative community services for the
mentally ill had still only been provided in a piecemeal
fashion (House of Commons Social Services Committee 1985). For
example, between 1979 and 1988, residential facilities in the
community increased from only 5,607 beds to 9,745, with most
of this growth (some 2,500 places) being in the private sector
(Goodwin 1990). There had been ideological and financial
retrenchment on the original intentions stated in the Percy
Report and by the mid-1980s, new definitions of what community
care meant continued to appear. In 1985 the Department of
Health and Social Security (as it then was) stated its
definition of community care as follows:
"Community Care is a matter of marshalling resources, 
sharing responsibilities and combining skills to achieve 
good quality modern services to meet the actual needs of 
real people in ways these people find acceptable and in 
places which encourage rather than prevent normal 
living." (Department of Health and Social Security, 
1985a, para 3 p1)
Underlying this definition was the basic assumption that most 
people who required long term care should and could be looked 
after in the community. The ideal was a system of care where 
people continued to reside and to receive treatment in the 
local community and if hospital admission was necessary, this 
was as brief as possible to preserve community ties and reduce 
dependency. It was being advocated that discharge should then 
be followed by careful maintenance of aftercare2 with 
continuing liaison between staff working in the hospital and 
in the community.
At the same time, new emphasis was attached to care within and 
by the family (eg Royal Commission 1979) and in a range of 
service agencies including the voluntary and private sector
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(eg Griffiths 1988). Also, policies were aimed at meeting 
individual needs with tailored services rather than at mass 
provision for the whole spectrum of needs (eg House of Commons 
Social Services Committee 1985; Department of Health 1989a). 
A low profile political campaign promoting self reliance, 
privatisation and the drive for efficiency also began to 
manifest themselves in community care policy formulations.
By the mid-1980s, it became clear that institutional closure 
was succeeding very slowly but new community provision 
remained sparse, being subject to ad hoc planning and poor 
monitoring in many cases (Hunter & Wistow 1987). In 1986, the 
Audit Commission report Making a Reality of Community Care 
highlighted the fact that community care implementation had 
been slowest with the mentally ill client group and reduction 
in hospital provision had outstripped the development of new 
community services. Gross geographical variations in services 
had arisen, with complex organisational arrangements and 
perverse funding policies, particularly at the point of 
service delivery. Failure to address the training needs of 
staff in new community services was also an issue.
The associated closure of the institutions (with attendant 
statistics about patient numbers and bed usage) was the 
subject of numerous reports, articles and planning briefs. It 
was noted with irony that it took forty years before any major 
hospital was actually closed (Korman & Glennerster 1985). 
Institutions were shrinking in size, with admission policies 
being tightened up and some services were being devolved from 
the main hospital site, but the number that had actually 
closed was small. By 1988, firm closure programmes had been 
devised for only 43 out of 178 hospital units for mentally ill 
clients in England surveyed by the National Schizophrenia 
Fellowship (National Schizophrenia Fellowship 1988).
Powick Hospital in Worcestershire, Banstead and Exminster 
Hospitals were all closed during the 1980s under the scrutiny 
of commentators. None of the three schemes appeared to have 
resulted in the worsening of service to the mentally ill, but
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the dramatic improvements which the revolutionary nature of 
the move would suggest were not in evidence (Tomlinson 1991). 
However, the extent to which hospital closure has driven 
community care developments cannot be overstated, fuelling it 
both in terms of reprovision for needs and financially. At the 
outset of the hospital closure programme and community care 
policy implementation, there was a strong belief that it would 
offer a cheaper form of care to that provided in the 
institutions (see chapter three). The reshaping of the mental 
hospitals undoubtedly did release a lot of money, on which the 
first call ought logically to have been funding community care 
programmes for the mentally ill, but in 1991 it was estimated 
that over half of the 1 .5 billion pounds spent on hospital and 
community services supported just 40,000 patients remaining in 
the large hospitals. Less than half supported the many 
hundreds of thousands of clients in the community, many of 
whom were at least as disabled by their illness as those in 
hospital (HRH Prince of Wales speech 1991). Although there was 
some expansion in private and voluntary sector care, there 
exists little information on exactly how many long term 
mentally ill clients had found their way into such 
accommodation nor what the standards of care were like.
Recent government legislation, following from the Griffiths 
Report (Griffiths 1988) introduced into the National Health 
Service (NHS) the financial and managerial efficiency of the 
business world. The subsequent period of rapid organisational 
change has been one of severe financial constraint on the NHS 
and other public services. Throughout the period that this 
thesis was being written, dramatic changes were occurring in 
government directives and legislation regarding community care 
policy in the 1990s (eg Department of Health 1990). The 
relevance of the current inquiry to the policy context that 
has subsequently developed will be explored in the final 
chapter of this thesis, but for now it is the intention to 
concentrate on the patterns of service provision that resulted 
from the policies of the last decade and their problematic 
nature.
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What Community Care for the Long Term Mentally 111 Meant in 
Practice
In the early 1980s, it was recognised in the U.S. that the 
most highly qualified psychiatrists, social workers and 
psychologists all tended to concentrate their treatment on 
people who were less ill and more likely to recover (Bachrach
1982). In hospitals the long term mentally ill always tended 
to be left to the care of nurses whether qualified or not. 
Traditionally health professionals had been looking for ways 
to cure people and when cure itself was not a likely result as 
major advances in medical technology were not forthcoming, the 
investment in care for the long term mentally ill was often 
left to the least qualified staff members. Mollica (1987) 
described this problem as "upside down psychiatry" and 
emphasised that it was ironic that the more problems a 
homeless mentally ill woman had, the less she would probably 
be served by psychiatry. Similar tendencies were observed in 
institutional and community provision in the U.K. in the 
1980s, where services drifted towards concentrating mainly on 
"acute" cases or those with less severe problems (Sayce 1987: 
Melzer et al 1991).
Concern was expressed about high morbidity in the community. 
In addition to their failure to adequately and coherently meet 
the needs of the long term mentally ill, specialist 
psychiatric services were only dealing with a small "pool" of 
morbidity that existed (Broskowski & Baker 1974) and 
significant numbers of long term mentally ill clients had 
repeated admissions to hospital. The term "revolving door" 
patients was coined to describe clients who displayed this 
cyclical pattern of hospital admissions (Hoult 1986). With 
poorly coordinated inadequate community services, the long 
term mentally ill continued to be a major strain on the 
reduced hospital services (Kanter 1989). Allen et al (1992) 
followed up 120 people discharged after short admissions in 
London and found that one year later there was evidence of 
inappropriate use of services, those with the greatest needs 
were not the most frequent service users and there were 
generally low levels of service receipt.
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Outside the institutions the long term mentally ill became 
highly vulnerable since for employment, housing, social 
security, social work and even medicine, these people seldom 
received any priority. Additional problems associated with the 
less than warm welcome that the long term mentally ill
received from their new neighbours in moving into ordinary 
houses on ordinary streets also had to be faced. While it was 
recognised in the U.K. that community mental health care 
extended far beyond the boundaries of traditional
institutional provision, this recognition was not reflected in 
the actual services that were provided. Institutions had been 
open all year round, all day and all night long. In the 1980s, 
community services were still rarely available at half an 
hour's notice or through the twenty four hours. Nor were they 
available for more than once a day, or over a continuous
period for months or years on end. Bachrach (1984) highlighted
that hospitals had functions that needed to be replaced by 
community services: accommodation, comprehensive medical care 
and monitoring, respite for families, social network and 
advocacy, and above all, safety and security. Kastrup (1988) 
concluded that asylums would always be needed for the long 
term mentally ill in terms of their function rather than the 
place. This supported similar studies in the U.K. (eg Mann & 
Cree 1976: Lieberman et al 1988).
Service delivery problems in cities were particularly 
extensive and severe. The impermanence and anonymity that are 
part of urban living almost certainly exacerbated many 
difficulties experienced by the long term mentally ill. For 
example, because such people were often forced to wander from 
one area to another in the city due to their housing and 
social problems, they were often hard to find and so case- 
finding efforts were needed to counteract the invisibility of 
many people who were most in need of help. These individuals 
would often not come to services, so the services had to find 
them and go to them. Even where people engaged with services 
initially, drop-out3 rates ranged from 20 to 50% (Baekland & 
Lundwall 1975; Gournay & Brooking 1993). There was also a 
danger of over-generalising urban problems to the country as
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a whole and in Britain, London's mental health services did 
not all compare favourably with other larger cities. Community 
care services had developed in a patchy and unsystematic 
fashion across the country (Hunter & Wistow 1987, 1988).
Traditional aftercare provision for long term mentally ill 
clients leaving hospital existed in the Community Psychiatric 
Nursing (CPN) service established at many hospitals in the 
U.K. . However, as the number and variety of community based 
services expanded in the early 1980s, it was questioned 
whether CPN provision was broad enough to cater for the needs 
of the long term mentally ill. Woof, Goldberg & Fryer (1988) 
conducted a study in Salford monitoring the work undertaken 
with individual clients by CPNs and Mental Health Social 
Workers (MHSWs) and found their work to be significantly 
different. They found that the CPN service focused mainly on 
psychiatric symptoms, treatment arrangements and medications. 
They concluded that care of the long term mentally ill living 
outside the mental hospital required more long term co­
ordinated multi-disciplinary input and attention to social 
care and the needs of relatives.
Other studies showed that clients and relatives expressed 
disappointment when they perceived that an emphasis on 
administration of injections displaced "conversation" with the 
CPN (Hunter 1978). In addition the location and type of CPN 
service delivery was found to have an influence on client 
care. Sladden (1979) found that clinic contact times were one 
seventh the length of community visit times and concluded that
the range of information which nurses could derive solely from
contacts at the clinic was very restricted. In the 1980s, the 
CPN service remained, in many areas, the only form of 
community aftercare for long term mentally ill clients, except 
where alternative innovative approaches were tried, many of 
which used the Community Mental Health Team model.
Community Mental Health Teams
Community Mental Health Teams and Centres (CMHT/Cs) were the
most visible manifestation of attempts to provide alternative
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innovative mental health care within the community in the 
1980s (Sayce 1987). They first appeared in Britain in the 
1970s, established under the NHS, Social Services or under 
joint management. According to surveys conducted in the U.K. 
by "Research & Development in Psychiatry (RDP)", there were 
probably 160 CMHCs nationally by 1990 (RDP 1990), although 
definitions varied considerably. In May 1984, the Kings Fund 
hosted a day conference on the topic and many models of 
service delivery ranging from mental health resource and 
advice centres to, in some cases, progressive day hospitals, 
were presented under this umbrella term. Several authors have 
since attempted to define the terminology and it has been 
noted that policy documents and stated service aims suggest a 
number of typical values and practices (McAusland 1985; Sayce 
1989; Huxley et al 1992). The keynotes are listed below with 
some examples of how they have been translated into practice 
in the U.K.:
1 LOCAL CARE
The centre or team-base was located in an acceptable and 
easily reached site. Decor, furnishings and overall image 
were supposed to be admissible to all sections of the 
community from tramp to stock-broker. The catchment 
population was given information about what services were 
available and where they could be obtained. A walk-in 
service was often provided in a residential or shopping 
area such as the "608" Centre in Leytonstone, London 
(Goldie & Waite 1989).
2 ACCESSIBLE SERVICE
Referrals were accepted from a wide variety of sources, 
particularly clients themselves and local GPs. Speeding 
up the process of obtaining help was also considered 
crucial. A randomised control study in Lewisham showed 
that people allocated to the CMHC achieved a faster route 
to treatment than those allocated to a traditional 
outpatients' department (Boardman et al 1987). Provision 
of a response to crisis through a crisis prevention 
service was often provided, such as that of the Lewisham 
Centre who saw people within 24 hours or faster in an 
emergency. This contrasted with a route through multiple 
"filters", such as GP to psychiatrist to psychologist, 
underpinned by a wait of four to six weeks for an 
appointment which was normal in traditional hospital 
aftercare services.
3 NON-STIGMATISING CENTRES AND STAFF
Attempts to counteract stigma, often involved use of an 
ordinary house, where staff did not wear uniforms and 
working methods addressed the social and personal, in 
addition to the medical aspects of mental health. Some
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teams made specific attempts to change attitudes, not 
through argument and indoctrination, but through 
familiarity and mutual tasks. A few centres additionally 
tried to attract under-represented groups, such as black 
and ethnic minorities or women with young children. 
Hence, for instance the creche at Gable House in South 
London (Pilgrim & Rogers 1987).
4 FOCUSED, COORDINATED SERVICE
Providing a focus for an area's mental health service and 
encouraging co-ordination between the Health Authority, 
Social Services and other relevant local agencies was 
given emphasis. For instance, the Hove Centre in Sussex 
collaborated with local branches of the National 
Schizophrenia Fellowship and The Association of Carers, 
and many centres and teams had regular liaison meetings 
with GPs and local voluntary organisations. Also, with a 
multi-disciplinary team made up of Health and Social 
Services personnel, there was apparent potential in 
overcoming fragmentation between sectors. An independent 
evaluation of Gable House in London concluded that multi­
disciplinary working was excellent (Pilgrim & Rogers 
1987). The aim of co-ordination met with certain 
successes. Some centres were notable for the extremely 
broad range of agencies with which they were in active 
contact, going well beyond the mental health sector 
(Clifford & Craig 1988).
5 EMPOWERMENT
Empowerment of service users (sometimes with the 
corollary that this required a lessening of the power of 
professionals) was also emphasised, though active client 
run programmes were rare in Britain. Empowerment was 
usually limited to advocacy on the part of clients and 
some involvement of clients in the running of day care 
centres, resource units and service user groups such as 
Nottingham's linked patients' councils and team based 
service user groups.
The CMHT model originated in the United States. Following the 
1963 Community Mental Health Centres Act introduced by 
President Kennedy, CMHCs proliferated and in an era of high 
civil rights activity, they aimed to provide a free, local, 
accessible mental health service for all. However, certain 
ideological and practical tensions characterised their 
development, reflecting social, economic, professional and 
organisational forces often working at cross purposes (Levine
1981). The radical potential of many centres was declared 
unrealised (Okin 1984; Good 1987) and in the 1980s they were 
accused of a "loss of perspective" on the grounds that they 
had avoided the task of providing the therapeutic services
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necessary to maintain the long term mentally ill in the 
community (Mollica 1983; Hollingsworth 1990; Bush et al 1990).
In Britain, such service failure was also readily apparent. 
Research & Development in Psychiatry (RDP) found that of 67 
CMHC/Ts sampled, 90% defined their target clientele in very 
broad terms like "all mental health need", but their stated 
aims did not suggest a focus on the long term mentally ill 
(RDP 1990). "Long-term treatment /support" was cited by only 
18%. Patmore & Weaver (1991) studied six comprehensive CMHTs, 
who had been given start-up funding by the Department of 
Health in 1986 and found that usually "long-term" clients were 
heavily outnumbered on the team case-loads by clients who had 
neither experience of hospital nor a psychiatric diagnosis. 
Typically they comprised around two-thirds of a CMHT caseload 
and in consequence most teams lacked space to serve more than 
a quota of their catchment area's known sufferers from long­
term disorders. There were only one or two exceptions to this 
pattern. Yet all these teams had been set up with a specific 
brief to prioritise work with "long-term" clients. In short, 
the one model to promise care for the long term mentally ill 
in this country appeared to be failing to deliver.
In the U.K., CMHTs grew in numbers during the 1980s and they 
also began to attempt wider, more ambitious roles, being 
increasingly pushed into adopting "comprehensive" roles in 
catchment area provision (Patmore & Weaver 1991). Yet lack of 
knowledge about models of practice was problematic and 
policies tended to be vaguely framed with reference to trends 
in community development advocated by key government 
publications (eg Department of Health and Social Security 
1985) and philosophical ideas, notably as expressed in 
normalisation theory4 (Wolfensberger 1970, 1984) and in
influential documents such as MIND's Common Concern (MIND
1983).
The effectiveness of the CMHT approach has been evaluated in 
its various forms in the United States, with a particularly
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voluminous literature emerging about "Community Support 
Systems"5 (for reviews see Bachrach 1982,1987; Anthony & 
Blanch 1989; Hollingsworth 1990) and in Italy under the 
"Psychiatra Democratica" reforms (eg for review, see Crepet
1990). Evidence is equivocal. The most coherent and widely 
researched form is that provided by an "Assertive Community 
Treatment Team" (Olfson 1990). However, evaluations have 
tended to concentrate on such teams' effectiveness in 
decreasing hospital utilisation as compared with control 
conditions (Stein & Test 1980; Hoult et al 1984,1986: Fenton 
et al 1982) though it is unclear whether this form of care is 
more effective in reducing symptoms and improving community 
functioning in the long-term (Olfson 1990) and whether in 
practice it constitutes a coherent alternative service model 
that fulfils its aims. The experimental services described in 
these studies showed marginal but not startling advantages 
(Rushton 1990) and British replications of these studies have 
shown similarly undramatic results (eg Dean & Gadd 1990).
In general, progress towards monitoring the effectiveness of 
CMHTs for the long term mentally ill in the U.K. was somewhat 
slower than in the U.S. and Italy (Sayce 1987). Exceptions 
included an outcome study undertaken at the Hove CMHC in 
Sussex, which found significant improvement in terms of 
General Health Questionnaire scores and clinical ratings in 
relation to the treatment programme (see Peck & Joyce 1985); 
a study of the Daily Living Programme in London comparing 
community and hospital based treatment, which found community 
treatment reduced hospital use by 80%, more input was needed 
for psychotic than neurotic illnesses and cost was 25% lower 
overall in the community but 1.0% higher for schizophrenics 
(Muijen et al 1992); and qualitative work that has tended to 
indicate success at meeting certain objectives but failure 
with others (eg Goldie et al 1989 found successes in 
geographical access but limitations in catering for the long 
term mentally ill in two London CMHCs). Outcome studies 
conducted so far suggest that knowledge of the effectiveness 
of social care is the major missing link, plus knowledge of 
predicted costs and benefits for different types of long term
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mentally ill client.
During the writing of this thesis, further case-studies of 
locally based innovations in community mental health provision 
started to appear in the U.K.. Powell & Lovelock (1992) 
carried out a study of the development of the Cosham mental 
health service in Portsmouth and concluded that it had 
substantially exemplified the diversity, informality, outreach 
and critical feedback required of new models of service 
provision. King (1991) carried out a case-study of the move 
away from hospital services in Exeter towards new community 
initiatives. He suggested that "community solutions are better 
value for money (and) people prefer them", but cited little 
actual evidence in support of this notion aside from a few 
anecdotes. Clearly, further research is required.
Essentially, CMHT/Cs that were developed in the U.K. during 
the 1980s were plagued by fears that the lessons of the 
international CMHT/C experience had not been heeded and that 
Britain may have been "reinventing the wheel" (and in many 
cases the square type). There were doubts about whether the 
CMHT was a robust enough vehicle for change and CMHTs were 
uncertain about their place within psychiatry as a whole, 
worried about the gap between their stated objectives and the 
day to day realities of their work and puzzled by the 
complexities of inter-professional coordination. It is useful 
to ask how far these problems were really unique to CMHTs, as 
similar ambiguities could be found by directing the same 
attention at the average day hospital or admission ward. 
However, the willingness of CMHT innovators during the 1980s 
to acknowledge problems and to adapt, experiment and improve 
has meant that, to some extent, they have provided a test bed 
for community psychiatry as a whole, where conflicts and 
confusions that are universal have been confronted.
Case Management
The term "Case-management" appeared in the health and welfare 
literature from the mid-1970s onwards and is, at its most 
basic, a strategy for distributing and coordinating services
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on behalf of clients (Modcrin et al 1985). A very brief 
description of the term is included here as many of the claims 
that have been made for case management closely parallel those 
of CMHTs. The aims of a case management system have been 
defined as the enhancement of the continuity of care and its 
accessibility, accountability and efficiency (Intagliata
1982). The basic functions that a case management system 
should carry out in order to achieve these aims were generally 
agreed to be: careful assessment of need; comprehensive care- 
planning; coordination of services utilising a "mixed economy 
of care"; and provision of follow-up arrangements, with 
regular reviews of outcomes (Clifford & Craig 1988; Renshaw 
1988; Department of Health 1989a). In Britain, useful reviews 
of case management became available towards the end of the 
1980s (Renshaw 1988; Kanter 1989; Thornicroft 1991).
In practice, case management amounted to the allocation of an 
individual client to one member of staff who planned and 
monitored the care to be received from a variety of sources, 
and made new plans jointly with the client, carers and health 
or social service staff. However, different kinds of system 
existed that varied on a spectrum from being individually or 
team oriented, embracing direct care or brokerage, involving 
interventions of different intensities, with different degrees 
of budgetary control, having health or Social Services as the 
lead agency, varying in status and specialisation of the case 
manager, having different staff-patient ratios and varying in 
terms of the degree of patient participation, the point of 
contact, the level of intervention and the target population 
(Thornicroft 1991).
Holloway (1991) extracted from the literature a number of
characteristics shared by effective services for the mentally
ill which undertook case management functions.
1 ) A clearly defined client group and a defined range of
options for staff to draw on when developing packages of 
care related to individual need (Olfson 1990).
2) Teamwork (Watts & Bennett 1983; Wooff et al 1988) which
in itself provided continuity of care, improved workload
management and ensured the establishment of common 
priorities (Overtveit 1986). There was evidence that when
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community-based staff work in isolation from multi­
professional teams, standards of care were poor and case­
loads, excessive (Woof et al 1988).
3) Effective working between case managers and colleagues in
other services. The relationship with the hospital
services was noted to be particularly important (Stein & 
Test 1980; Kanter 1989).
4) Realistic case-loads of case managers. Case loads ranging
from 4 to 50 clients were reported for case management 
systems (Intagliata 1982; Kanter 1989; Patmore & Weaver 
1991 ) .
5) The recognition of monitoring and management problems and 
attention paid to professional and personal support given 
to staff (Intagliata 1982).
The concept of case management was recently enshrined in
British Government policy for community care (Department of 
Health 1989a: Department of Health 1990) and the major
responsibility for its implementation was given to Local 
Authorities.
The Care Programme Approach
The NHS and Community Care Act 1990 also legislated for other 
major changes in the way in which health and social care were 
delivered, involving different approaches to resourcing and 
operational practice. In April 1991, it became a requirement 
of all mental health services that long term and more disabled 
clients (the long term mentally ill) had an "Individual Care 
Plan" agreed and regularly reviewed by the multi-disciplinary 
team. This requirement was stated in the Joint Health/Social 
Services Circular HC(90)23/LASSL(90)11 and was referred to as 
the "Care Programme Approach". The circular placed different 
obligations on Health and Local Authorities. Health 
Authorities were required to implement the Care Programme 
Approach, but Local Authorities were simply asked to 
collaborate. The 1990 guidance from the Department of Health 
specified that Health Authorities could determine the exact 
form that the Care Programme Approach should take locally, but 
must include four particular elements:
1 . Arrangements for assessing the health care needs of 
patients who could potentially be treated in the 
community, and for regularly reviewing their needs.
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2. Arrangements agreed with Social Services Departments for 
assessing and reviewing what social care would give 
maximum benefit from treatment in the community.
3. Effective systems for ensuring agreed services are 
provided to those who can be treated in the community.
4. Patients themselves and their informal carers must have 
the chance to take part in discussions about proposed 
care plans.
There was a potentially fraught relationship between the Care 
Programme Approach and case management. Two main differences 
could be identified as distinguishing the two approaches. 
First, the Care Programme Approach adopted a "key worker" 
model with emphasis put on the relationship between client and 
key worker and the recognition of this role by other workers. 
However, unlike the "case manager" the key worker never held 
a budget and remained responsible for delivering a clinical 
service as psychologist, community nurse and so forth. This 
made the Care Programme Approach a narrower and less ambitious 
model than case management. Second, whereas the Care Programme 
Approach was health-led (implemented by Health Authorities), 
case management was social care-led (implemented by Social 
Services and Local Authority services).
For many mental health teams in the U.K., embracing such 
models was a considerable departure from the ways in which 
teams had traditionally operated and it was not surprising 
that the Care Programme Approach developed fitfully. Hogman & 
Westall (1992) concluded that the policy had done little more 
than provide "window dressing" without substance. A monitoring 
report from the Social Services Inspectorate in early 1993 
found that only 49% of authorities had a system in place and 
of these, 20 said it had been implemented for all mentally ill 
patients known to the psychiatric service, 18 to in-patients 
only, and 11 cited a range of selected groups, such as new 
patients, those considered to be particularly at risk and long 
stay patients about to be discharged from hospital. Therefore, 
there is currently a need for an extension of both knowledge 
and expertise and one aim of this thesis is to establish how 
much can be learned from developments that occurred during the
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1980s.
The Backlash Against Community Care Policy for the Mentally 
111
The overview of the professional and practice literature
presented so far neglects to convey the extent to which
community care policy for the mentally ill in the 1980s
remained a highly emotive issue from a professional viewpoint.
Some psychiatrists used evidence of the problematic nature of
community care provision to argue for a return to old policies
and to old hospitals. A backlash developed against the policy
that extended to the medical profession as a whole. Both the
British Medical Association and the Royal College of
Psychiatrists called for the rundown of psychiatric hospitals
to be stopped. In an article published in the British Medical
Journal in March 1985, the following statement was made:
"The BMJ gets little satisfaction from saying that 'We 
told you so1 - but we have argued consistently and 
repeatedly since 1966 that community care had to be shown 
to be more than a politicians catch-phrase. So too has 
the British Medical Association. In 1973, we warned that 
it was difficult to believe that an existence of aimless 
destitution is preferable to the organised and structured 
life in a well run mental hospital." (BMJ, 1985, p290)
Psychiatrists protests were supported by clinical analyses (eg 
Weiner et al 1987) and many articles appeared in academic 
journals and books debating the issue (eg see Hoult 1986 and 
Turner 1986). Thornicroft (1990) conducted a survey of members 
of the Royal College of Psychiatry looking at the effect of 
widespread decentralisation on quality and organisation of 
mental health services. 20% of respondents thought services 
had deteriorated and preferred hospital-centred models of 
care, yet Thornicroft noted a general lack of interest in 
evaluation of new community services.
More controversially, the hospital closure debate was picked 
up by the national media. The National Schizophrenia 
Fellowship (NSF) supported the psychiatrists position and this 
led to a bitter public row with fellow lobbyist MIND. The 
media largely supported the protests against community care
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(Cohen 1988) and some new pressure groups were formed calling 
for the slowing down of hospital closures, such as "Concern" 
spearheaded by Dr Weller of Friern Hospital (Weller 1989). 
Although much of the content of Weller's proposals were valid 
in themselves, the theories of causation cited were 
questionable and showed a singular denial of any new community 
facilities that had emerged, such as those based on the CMHT 
model.
Hence, community care received a mixed reaction in the 
professional and practice literature of the 1980's that 
extended to the national media and one aim in Part Two will be 
to see how far local community mental health development was 
affected by this apparent backlash. The outright hostility to 
community care displayed by some psychiatrists in the 1980s 
became more muted in the early 1990s and translated into the 
more pragmatic concern of organisational functioning. One 
especially thorny issue arose concerning the location of power 
and responsibility in multi-professional teams based on a 
consensus model of organisation (Caldicott 1993; Tyrer 1993). 
Such issues of power within the psychiatric profession will be 
further explored in chapter three.
In Brief
During the 1980s, changes in paradigms for mental health care 
delivery were accelerating in the U.K., culminating in major 
shifts in government legislation and directives in the early 
1990s. Throughout this period, the CMHT movement embraced one 
of the only discreetly identifiable attempts to offer an 
ideologically distinct alternative to the institutional 
system. However, even within the CMHT model, community care of 
the long term mentally ill population continued to be the most 
problematic. This chapter has presented an account of
community service developments from the perspective of the 
"professional and practice" literature. Much of this
literature, while it includes conflict and debate, occurs
within a shared framework of beliefs that do not question the 
basic parameters. In the following chapter, it is the aim to 
broaden this outlook by considering the structural and
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philosophical theories that underlie community care 
developments.
1. There is controversy over the use of all these terms, 
since they ignore the variation that exists within the 
client group and may unwittingly be stigmatising and self 
fulfilling. The term "Long Term Mentally 111" is used 
throughout this thesis, since this was the term that was in 
common useage in the case study team evaluated in Part Two 
of the thesis.
2. The term "aftercare" is used to describe a class of 
services designed to ease the transition of 
institutionalised clients to community based service sites.
3. The term "drop-out" was used here to refer to clients not 
accepting services which they were considered to need. It 
included clients actively refusing services as well as those 
passively failing to attend services for assessment or some 
kind of planned intervention. It also took into account 
clients of community outreach services who refused contact 
with staff.
4. The principle of "Normalisation" is to enable the 
"deviant person to function in ways considered to be within 
the acceptable norms of his society" (Wolfensberger 1970). 
The development of CMHT services for the mentally ill in the 
U.K. has been influenced by ideas rooted in normalisation 
theory, which originated in the learning difficulties field. 
However, there has been no equivalent explicit drive for 
change based on this theory within the mental health field 
and the principle itself has been viewed with some 
scepticism (eg see Perkins 1992).
5. The National Institute of Mental Health defined a 
Community Support System as "a network of caring and 
responsible people committed to assisting a vulnerable 
population to meet their needs and develop their potentials 
without being unnecessarily isolated or excluded from the 
community" (NIMH 1977).
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CHAPTER 3:
Interpreting the Community Care Story: 
Philosophical and Structural Interpretations
There is a whole spectrum of interpretations that have been 
put forward to account for the origin of community care policy 
and its purported subsequent difficulties. These 
interpretations are based on alternative philosophical and 
structural positions. As such, they direct attention to issues 
which may not be the stuff of headlines in the way that 
hospital closures and distressing media stories of the plight 
of ex-psychiatric hospital patients are, but which 
nevertheless underlie attempts to provide solutions to the 
problems of community care. In this chapter an attempt will be 
made to try to disentangle such positions and present a 
framework of distinct approaches, based in different schools 
of thought. Establishing such a framework of interpretations 
is not an original approach. Allsop (1984), Busfield (1986), 
Glennerster et al (1982), Goodwin (1990), Ham (1985) and 
Harrison et al (1990) all structured their research around the 
distinctive insights afforded by such theories. The framework 
presented in this chapter is different to those used by the 
authors listed above, but draws on their frameworks as 
sources. Although there is some overlap between different 
theoretical models, six different approaches can be discerned.
1) Traditional/Pluralist Interpretations
2) Sociological/Anthropological Interpretations
3) Marxist Interpretations
4) Economic Interpretations
5) Elitist Interpretations
6) Feminist Interpretations
The accounts of each set of interpretations presented are 
necessarily brief, as detailed discussions exist elsewhere. 
The broad intention here is to discern the variety of 
different theoretical positions and provide some examples of 
the concepts that have been developed. The framework will be 
used in Part Two to try and connect macro theory to the
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specific policy issue of community care for the long term 
mentally ill.
1 ) Traditional/Pluralist Interpretations
Much of the traditional social policy literature on community 
care uses a familiar pluralistic perspective that views the 
move away from institutional provision and towards community 
care policy in a positive light. Central to this 
interpretation are three main elements. The first is the 
"Medical model"1 of care. In basic terms, this is an ideology 
that rests on the notion that mental illness is akin to 
physical illness and treatment of mental illness is hence 
located within the remit of the medical profession. The
medical task is seen as curative and it is claimed that over
the last fifty years or so, medical practitioners have been 
increasingly successful in treating mental illness, aided by 
advancements in medical knowledge and technology and growing 
confidence and specialisation within the medical profession. 
A contributory factor to account for the move to community 
care policy is located in this notion that medical knowledge 
and treatment of mental illness has improved to the point 
where care outside institutions is both possible and
preferable.
The second element is that modern society has become
increasingly humane. The development of community care out of 
the institutional system is seen as part of a general moral 
advancement, an evolutionary step in the natural progression 
towards a more civilised world. Third, the traditional 
position rests on the notion of a plurality of interests 
embracing a range of opinion from politicians and 
professionals through to service recipients and their carers. 
Each interest group is seen as having exerted different 
pressures determined by their main areas of concern and each 
is thought to have had a balancing effect on the next. The 
combination of these competing demands is considered to have 
determined the subsequent development of community care 
policy. Interests that previously had made no contribution to 
the policy process such as those of clients, carers and
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pressure groups were enabled, it is claimed, to join the 
debate by organising themselves more effectively. Community 
care is therefore thought to be an improvement on previous 
institutional policy as all interests have contributed to 
produce the most satisfactory system possible.
The most authoritative proponent of this account has been
Kathleen Jones (1972, 1983, 1988), who drew her evidence from
an historical analysis of mental health policy. For example,
she stated that the 1959 Mental Health Act was the first major
advancement in care of the mentally ill. It embodied enabling
powers to do away with the stigmatising of mental illness and
abandoned the old restrictive legislation while improving the
powers of Local Authorities to provide for patients in the
community. The Act itself specified little, but in doing so,
allowed enlightened thinking to develop. Suddenly there was
room for evangelical and radical new methods to be put into
practice, made possible by technological advancements.
"Probably the most important single factor was the 
development of the psychotropic drugs, which made 
possible the control of mood swings and hence suppression
of symptoms.....  It also made possible a massive
reduction in mental hospital beds by enabling many 
patients to be treated by their GP or in out-patient 
clinics and others to stay for much shorter periods" 
(Jones, 1983, p226).
Such a position has been supported by other theorists such as 
Martin (1984). Evidence is seen in the fact that the 
introduction of the drugs coincided with a fall in the 
in-patient population, after more than a century of steady 
increase in the numbers held in mental hospitals.
In relation to the second element of moral improvement, Jones 
provided examples from the succession of scandals in mental 
health service provision that occurred in the 1960s, when 
large scale public enquiries into poor institutional 
management took place. Horrifying stories of neglect, squalor 
and ill-treatment at Ely, Farleigh, Whittingham, Napsbury, St 
Augustine's, Normansfield and Rampton, were seen to have 
created the public concern and media attention that resulted 
in improved standards. Jones proposed that community care
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partly arose from the realisation that a further improvement 
in the quality of care would result from the closing of 
institutions and their replacement by new services in the 
community.
Jones also took up the theme of pluralism as central to the 
development of community care. Throughout her historical 
analysis, she demonstrated how different interest groups have 
bargained with each other to establish and refine policy. For 
example, she emphasised that by 1968, both political parties 
favoured a decrease in mental hospital populations and saw an 
increasing responsibility for social services (see Seebohm 
Report 1968). However, by the time of the reorganisation of 
the Health Authorities in 1974, it became obvious that Health 
and Social Services had different responsibilities, patterns 
of organisation and styles of management (Thomas & Stoten 
1974). There were some advantages to this, but it ultimately 
resulted in a lack of coordination between organisations and 
effectively delayed the full adoption of community care as a 
policy.
A further element of this theory is that service users and 
their carers have contributed to the pluralistic process. The 
belief is that community care enabled service users and their 
carers to become empowered and through the influence of 
pressure groups they had some impact in articulating and 
politicising their position. While it is recognised that such 
development has been slow, it is considered to have been 
happening gradually. The work of groups such as MIND and the 
National Schizophrenia Fellowship (NSF) is seen to have 
spurred the nation's conscience, spreading knowledge about the 
common nature of mental illness and mobilising politicians as 
spokespersons. Evidence for this position is drawn from 
developments that occurred in the U.K. in the 1950s and 1960s. 
The slow pace at which community care policy has been 
implemented is also seen as being due to the fact that this 
educational process is itself inherently slow. Yet, the 
interpretation is that knowledge is gradually spreading and 
the goals of community care will eventually be achieved.
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Pluralists do not deny that development of community care has 
been problematic. They attribute this to remediable and short 
term funding and administrative failures in providing the 
structures necessary to implement the policy, giving the 
psychiatric profession insufficient freedom to follow what it 
considered to be scientifically necessary or desirable. 
Problems with the allocation of financial resources are also 
blamed, for which a lack of specific grants for non-medical 
services are considered to provide a typical example. The slow 
pace of re-education of professionals, politicians and the 
public that was being promoted by user-groups was seen as an 
additional problem and a lack of progress in the relevant 
areas of scientific knowledge, together with scepticism based 
on a lack of evidence of the success of community alternatives 
are also recognised to have contributed.
Some evidence quoted in support of the traditional
interpretation can be questioned due to its optimistic view of
what science can offer. For example, regarding the supposedly
causal link between the development of drugs and the fall in
hospital admissions, when one looks more closely at what
happened, it becomes obvious that psychotropic drugs were not
the miracle-workers they had been perceived to be by many. It
has been noted that
"In certain progressive hospitals in Britain, active 
attention to rehabilitation and resettlement ... had led 
to a swift and drastic reduction in the number of 
in-patients . . . considerably in advance of the 
phenothiazine drugs" (Sedgwick, 1982, p198).
Such time discrepancies are even greater in other European 
countries (see Goodwin 1990).
As an interpretation, the traditional/pluralist account can 
also be criticised for failing to explain why and how some 
interest groups became more powerful than others in affecting 
policy. In response to this criticism a "neo-pluralist" 
critique has emerged. Unlike the classic pluralists, neo- 
pluralists do not see the powers of interest groups as being 
balanced and equal but rather lop-sided. Big business 
corporations and the state are seen as the major forces to
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reckon with (Lindblom 1977; Dunleavy & O ’Leary 1987). While it 
is still seen that there are a range of issues where 
democratic processes can predominate and where new groups and 
interests may enter the arena and command some influence, neo- 
pluralists concentrate their main attentions on the 
predominance of more closed, oligopolistic policy making. The 
concept is put forward of policy ’’networks" inhabited by 
government departments, professional bodies and large 
corporations where private bargaining and compromise occurs 
(Rhodes 1988; Wright 1988). Health policy examples include 
government reluctance to publicise scientific evidence of the 
health effects of certain foodstuffs, partly because of the 
pressure from agribusiness and voluntary agreements drawn up 
with drug and tobacco companies (Harrison et al 1990).
However, there are other problems with the pluralist theory. 
The extremely slow pace of community care development 
undermined the pluralist position, since pluralists assumed 
that political pressure existed to force change, yet 
implementation of community care did not occur for over forty 
years. Governments repeatedly failed to respond. For all these 
years, demands made for better services yielded little result. 
The divergence between the rhetoric and reality of the policy, 
where governments consistently failed to match policy 
statements with sufficient funding, suggests that rather than 
increasing the social rights of the mentally ill, they were in 
actuality ignored. Even the neo-pluralist account is limited 
to the foreground of political action. The focus is on 
manoeuvre, tactics and how this has affected the outcomes, but 
little is said about the deep structures such as demographic 
change, the ideological climate or the background pattern of 
ownership and control. Decision making processes therefore 
appear more indeterminate, unpredictable and open-ended than 
the actual history of outcomes indicates.
With regard to the input of user-involvement in the 
pluralistic process, evidence suggests that it is only the 
more vocal who have had any impact (Lee & Mills 1982). 
Pressure groups have supported the use of advocates to enable
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clients to have their say, but frequently they still argue the 
case only for the most articulate people. The long term 
mentally ill seldom have a voice. This suggests another flaw 
in the traditional pluralist argument. The mentally ill 
themselves are not a homogenous group. People have differing 
degrees of disability that demand a response on many different 
levels. In addition, the pressure group voice itself is 
divided between people who have different definitions of the 
problem and propose different solutions. This is amply 
demonstrated by the rivalry between MIND and the NSF over 
ideological and policy issues. So the potential pressure from 
the already weak voice of the long term mentally ill group is 
divided.
User pressure groups are not the only group to experience deep 
divisions of interest. For example, professionals in the 
mental health field are also divided. The Health and Social 
Services have not agreed on solutions to the problems of 
community care, and there have been particular difficulties 
reconciling the views of social workers and psychiatrists 
(Ramon 1988). The evidence for the pluralistic process is 
therefore fraught with generalisations about homogenous groups 
working together.
Most of the pluralist literature is at the level of national 
politics and does not consider local examples. The intention 
in Part two will therefore be to see how applicable the theory 
is at the case study level. Despite all the evidence negating 
its general utility as a policy interpretation, the 
traditional pluralist position remains probably that most 
widely held.
"There is a sense in which, because of the multi-causal, 
indeterminate character of the theory, pluralist accounts 
can degenerate into blow by blow story-telling from which 
it is very hard to extract any larger patterns of 
constraining and enabling forces" (Harrison et al, 1990, 
p1 7)
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2) Sociological/Anthropological Interpretations 
In contrast there have been many "micro" studies concerned 
with the anthropology of institutions for the mentally ill. 
The introduction of a sociological dimension to the debate 
became particularly well documented in the 1960s when it was 
seen to result in a movement often referred to as 
"Anti-Psychiatry". Within this movement there was considerable 
theoretical and political diversity, but broad themes can be 
extracted concerned mainly with the problem of definitions of 
mental illness. Anthropologists objected to the cultural 
relativity of such definitions, while sociologists pointed to 
a lack of consensus about them and the difficulties of 
distinguishing mental health from social conformity and 
nonconformity. Together they criticised psychiatry for viewing 
mental illness as a form of socially unacceptable, rule- 
breaking behaviour and for retaining a medical focus on 
organic processes in the conceptualisation and treatment of 
mental illness (thereby making a moral judgement under the 
guise of a scientific one), while failing to recognise this. 
Psychiatry was considered as an institution of "social 
control"2.
One application of this set of interpretations can be found in
the work of Goff man, who wrote Asylums in 1961. He
concentrated on studying mental hospital inmates, and analysed
the way that they were controlled and manipulated in the
interests of the maintenance of staff power. He believed
mental illness was seen as a form of deviance from "normal"
human behaviour, but rather than disrupting societal
stability, as commonly believed, it maintained it. The
implication of this model for the history of mental illness
policy was that institutions were not curing the deviant, but
perpetuating the deviancy by reinforcing a sense of alienation
from the rest of the community. This was embraced in his
concept of "Total Institutions", defined as:
"...a place of residence and work where large numbers of 
like-situated individuals, cut off from the wider society 
for an appreciable period of time, together lead an 
enclosed, formally administered round of life." (Goffman, 
1961, p11)
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Goffman went on to describe institutional patient-hood as a 
"downward career" with the person assigned to the patient role 
being forced into "Secondary Adjustment" and "Personal 
Extinction". So Goffman was concerned with the negative 
effects of the institutional environment on patients and 
suggested that institutions were forms of social control 
perpetuated by the state to enable easy maintenance of social 
order. Such practices, he claimed, were designed to strip away 
elements that previously constituted the patient's social 
identity and replace them with institutional ones. Evidence 
for his theory was based on data drawn mainly from his work in 
a Washington hospital in 1955, much of which was highly 
selective and concentrated exclusively on the failures of the 
system.
The sociological studies of the 1960s and 70s were by no means 
confined to the study of mental illness. For example, Terence 
and Pauline Morris used a similarly sociological approach 
attacking institutions, the focus of their study being a 
London prison (Morris & Morris 1963). The Morrises postulated 
that although responses were not homogenous, prisoners were 
manipulated into conformity through a process of 
"prisonisation" (the taking on in greater or lesser degree of 
the folkways, mores, customs and general culture of the 
penitentiary) caused not by the tyranny of official control 
but its pettiness and triviality. Furthering these ideas, 
Pauline Morris went on to publish "Put Away", a study that 
aimed to examine the range and quality of mental handicap 
homes (Morris 1969). General conclusions were that physical 
living conditions were appalling, being deficient in both 
space and comfort. The dominance of the medical model in 
institutional practice was noted, inspiring uniform methods of 
treatment that encouraged a child-like dependency in patients.
At the same time, labelling theorists such as Scheff (1966) 
expanded upon the social control theme in attempting to 
formulate a theory to integrate individual and social systems 
of behaviour. He attempted to show the relevance to studies of 
mental disorder of findings from research in diverse areas of
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social science such as race-relations. His conceptual tools 
included the idea of "Residual Rule-breaking" that referred to 
social norms for which society had no social label. The idea 
was that mental illness was a social role and that people 
labelled as such were rewarded for that role and punished when 
they attempted to return to a normal role. Hence, psychiatry, 
rather than helping to cure sickness, became its creator. By 
the early 1970s the "anti-institutional" movement was losing 
momentum and the work of Kittrie (1971) helped revive the old 
debates through his lawyer's perspective on the power of 
therapists to mould and change human behaviour in mental 
hospitals.
In sum, the sociological/anthropological interpretations 
suggested that the increasing recognition of the anti- 
therapeutic nature of institutional care, highlighted by a 
diverse range of studies, led to general support for policies 
of shifting care away from the mental hospitals towards the 
community. This enhanced a reconceptualisation of therapeutic 
activity away from the positive value given to the social 
order of the institution towards treatment that focused on the 
individual and included psychological and social approaches to 
care. The sociological/anthropological interpretations have 
hence been important in questioning the philosophical and 
political basis of care and did have an impact in forcing 
changes in the institutional environment. In suggesting the 
perpetuation of the sick role for purposes of social control, 
they also had some impact in making people question how far 
clients needs were manipulated to fit in with treatments 
available.
Yet, like the traditional interpretations, they did not 
account for why community care for the long term mentally ill, 
in particular, took so long to develop or why the introduction 
of community care policy for the mentally ill was so 
problematic. A further problem is that they might establish a 
good case against institutions, but not for any particular 
alternative solution. Also, it would be a mistake to identify 
the negative effects of institutions exclusively with large
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hospitals and the professionals who staff them as similar 
problems can also occur in small units not staffed by 
psychiatric professionals (King et al 1971: Allen et al 1989). 
Sociological/anthropological interpretations are negative and 
sceptical accounts, from which it can only be concluded that 
the language used to conceive of mental illness, the way it is 
dealt with and the question of who is given responsibility for 
it, is essentially a political matter.
Also, concepts of social control need to be more precise. For 
example, some authors have hypothesised that in the same way 
that the groups who had an interest in sustaining institutions 
and did little to help the mentally ill, retain those 
interests in controlling community care policy (eg Holland 
1988). Alternatively, others have suggested that in modern 
social networks individual idiosyncracies in behaviour or 
beliefs are easily respected and the general reluctance not to 
get too much involved or invade the other’s privacy leads to 
isolation of the patient to be and an exacerbation of bizarre, 
dangerous, suicidal or psychotic behaviour. In this latter 
sense, it has been suggested that social control is not so 
much corrective as evasive in nature resulting in withdrawal 
(eg Goffman 1971).
Fears have been expressed that care in the community has
turned out to be a total institution turned inside out. For
example, Schnabel stated:
"Now it is not the institution itself, but the 
bureaucratic system that tries to tend to the needs of 
each individual patient by way of differentiation of 
functions, specialisation in treatment and categorisation 
into groups" (Schnabel, 1992, p60).
Schnabel envisaged city councils setting up institutions to 
comply with the community's demand for the control of 
troublesome people, proposing that the long term mentally ill 
are seen to be putting others at risk and are at risk 
themselves from the intolerant behaviour of normal people. It 
is necessary to look to case study evidence to consider such 
ideas.
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3) Marxist Interpretations
Another set of interpretations embrace those based in Marxist 
theory. Like the sociological schools of thought, theorists 
who set their ideas in a Marxist context concentrated on the 
idea of power and social control. However, this control was 
seen as an integral part of a class based capitalist society. 
The capitalist class was seen to have shaped and moulded the 
development of medical practice, with medical practitioners 
acting as agents of social control. Hence, power was
conceptualised as essentially economic, concentrated in the 
hands of those who owned the means of production and who 
formed the ruling class. It is difficult to classify theorists 
into this school of thought, because many have a broadly 
Marxist basis to their ideologies. This section will start by 
considering the work of the French philosopher, Michel 
Foucault, since his work straddles the sociological
interpretation described above and a more Marxist conception 
of events, although it really exists in a category of its own.
Madness and Civilisation (1975) was the British translation of
Foucault's Histoire de la Folie (1961) and represented a
structuralist interpretation of historical events concerning 
the treatment of the mentally-ill. His main concern was to 
analyse the inter-related structures of ideas about mental 
illness, rather than to explain them in causal terms, and he 
set his work within a broad range of ideas about the 
historical period. He looked back to a time before the Middle 
Ages when he postulated that there was a split in the Western 
world between "Reason" and "Unreason". Foucault claimed that 
until 1800, insanity was considered part of everyday life. It 
was at this time that the mentally ill began to be perceived 
as a threat and asylums were built for the first time, 
erecting a wall between the insane and the rest of humanity. 
He called this "The Great Confinement" and claimed that this 
was replaced in the nineteenth century by the "even more 
sinister regime of 'moral treatment'". Evidence for his 
interpretation was made up of arguments based on supposed 
historical events, with reference to artistic and cultural 
records, but he was criticised for the dubious factual content
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of these. The significance of his work was more in raising 
disturbing questions about the symbolism attached to mental 
illness, which changed radically over time and in introducing 
ideas about the interests that medicine served as the major 
locus of power over the mentally ill. His work was hence 
important in challenging conventional assumptions.
Navarro (1976,1978) was the most prominent Marxist to comment 
on the power of the medical profession to support and sustain 
capitalist society as agents of the ruling class. He
distinguished a hierarchical class structure within the health 
services, and found that the "corporate class" was
disproportionately represented amongst the controllers of 
resources. He drew attention to the role and position of a 
range of health service workers, considering the social
backgrounds of those who made up the medical hierarchy and 
concluded that the health care system was controlled by the 
ruling classes and the health care structure provided a way to 
contain the stresses of the existing capitalist order. In 
addition, he argued that the health care system dealt with 
sickness arising from the misery and alienation of the
capitalist society itself. He claimed that medicine acted as 
an ideological and practical panacea, transforming structural 
exploitation into individual sickness.
Such orthodox Marxism often took a very mechanistic view of 
the relationship between the state and society. For "neo- 
Marxists", the picture was both more complex and more plastic 
(Harrison et al 1990). The class structure itself was 
conceived in more fractured and variegated terms and the state 
was seen as a battleground over which various class interests 
struggled (Poulantzas 1978). The state was ultimately viewed 
as the captive of capitalism. For example, if the state wished 
to increase welfare spending on community care it had to 
increase taxes, which impacted on the business community who 
lost confidence, failed to invest and thereby provoked 
economic crisis. The likely electoral consequences obliged the 
government to scale down spending on community care. "Neo- 
Marxists" therefore, still saw the capitalist class as
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exercising strong constraints on the state's ability to expand 
public expenditure, but they began to make important 
distinctions between different categories of such expenditure 
(strongly criticised by some theorists- see Dunleavy & O'Leary 
1987). Interests were said to be divided, for example, between 
industrial and finance capital, or between local and 
international capital. The state was seen as a force in its 
own right, but it was thought that it could only manoeuvre 
within certain limits or its economic underpinning would 
collapse.
Recent attempts to assimilate a Marxist ideology into a 
practicable theory of mental illness have tended to co-opt 
psychoanalytic models. For example, Banton et al (1985) 
presented a psychoanalytical account of individual development 
understood within a general Marxist perspective. Undertaken at 
a self-critical level, the authors placed a heavy emphasis on 
a dynamic concept of the unconscious and proposed that the 
class-based power structures that existed at the institutional 
level also existed at the inter- and intra- personal level. 
Their main conceptual tool was the idea of "essentialism", 
which is the concept that every individual born inherits a set 
of attributes that are pre-existent and constructed outside 
society. The authors proposed that this idea was deeply 
embedded in the medical power structure and in the 
organisation and practice of mental health services.
The specifically Marxist content of this theory was that the 
motivation for perpetuating the essentialist position was 
rooted in class control. The authors proposed that community 
care would not be a success until non-essentialist ideas were 
taken on board and since personal and political change were 
intertwined, a distinctly political approach was required at 
all levels. Traditional Marxist theorists would argue that 
therapy is wrong because it ameliorates pain rather than 
allowing it to fester and eventually break out in revolution. 
The authors' belief in an idea of the split in the 
unconscious, meant that they did see a role for therapy, in 
healing this split, but therapy itself was seen in the context
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of class struggle and they proposed that it should be 
performed in a way that challenges social structures.
Evidence for this interpretation was taken from an in-depth
analysis of the authors' own therapy sessions. The example was
cited of a depressed women who was given tranquilisers to
alleviate anxiety generated by the burden of caring for her
husband and children. This was seen as an adherence to the
essentialism of the medical model. A more successful therapy
would have been to give the woman emotional support and
encouragement to perceive her difficulties as a product of the
appalling social provision of child-care in this society and
the isolation of young mothers, thereby actively seeking to
change the foundations on which society was based. On this
account, the move towards community care in the U.K. only
represented a change in the nature of control of the state
over the individual. Responsibility for care was transferred
from the state to the family or to smaller institutions,
without a change in the fundamental concept of mental illness
itself. A community version of essentialism was therefore
created, which was inherently unsuccessful. The authors
proposed radical therapy as an effective and implicitly
political alternative. They stated:
"There is no world outside politics - neither the macro 
world of public life or the micro world of the caring 
caress". (Banton et al, 1985, p175)
Like the sociologists, the problems concerned with community 
care were attributed by those with a Marxist slant to a 
fundamental misconception about the ideological framework of 
mental illness itself. But it was more than this, because the 
problems of community care could not be seen in isolation from 
the macrocosm of the political world. As a solution, Marxists 
prescribed a radical increase in political participation in 
relation to community care. The "new left" lost some of the 
traditional Marxist scepticism concerning elections and 
representative democratic institutions and demanded the 
introduction of direct democracy particularly in the workplace 
and local community (Held 1987). They proposed that highly 
paid medical expertise should be made accountable to the 
public. Such major change was said to require a period of
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class struggle during which sustained and organised pressure 
would be brought to bear on the existing power structure. 
Crisis and conflict rather than planning and debate were seen 
as the true authors of transformation (Harrison, et al 1990).
As with the other interpretations discussed, Marxist and neo-
Marxist concerns have also been peculiarly macro in their
focus. They were built very much on a theoretical
understanding with little application to local examples,
except where attempts were made to incorporate psychoanalytic
models. Overall, Marxist interpretations are possibly the
broadest, most ambitious and most complex set of
interpretations to be considered in this chapter, claiming to
show how whole societies grow and change. While this is
understandable when concentrating on dominant ideologies on an
economy wide level, their practical value is limited and the
area of local medical politics has been largely neglected. To
apply the Marxist notions of the importance of class
divisions, on control over the means of economic production,
and on the subtle role of ideologies in shaping issues and
agendas, is a difficult task. From the Marxist stance,
empiricism is seen as a naivety ■ and most Marxist writers
continue to concentrate on macro-theoretical predictions about
the conduct of the capitalist state and the behaviour of
governments. As Harrison et al pointed out,
"Detailed empirical testing is rare, and it is therefore 
hard to judge how consistent Marxism is below the macro 
level of analysis." (Harrison et al, 1990, p30)
It will be the intention in Part 2 to see how far 
interpretations based in a Marxist ideology can inform local 
CMHT policy development. Extending the set of Marxist 
interpretations discussed so far, three further traditions can 
be distinguished that have adopted a Marxist emphasis and have 
had a particular impact on thinking about community care. 
Within the thesis framework, these have been treated as 
separate sets of interpretations that will now be presented in 
turn.
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4) Economic Interpretations
First, a distinct school of thought has developed around the 
idea that the history of institutions and the origin and 
problematic nature of community care can be explained solely 
in terms of economics and finance. One major proponent of this 
approach was Andrew Scull (1977, 1979, 1984). Scull considered 
the economic and political roots of the movement towards 
deinstitutionalisation that took place in the U.S. and U.K. in 
the post war period. He introduced the word "Decarceration" to 
refer to the move to empty institutions and explained the 
policy shift towards community care in terms of the economics 
of capitalism.
Scull claimed that institutions were built in the 1850s 
because at that time increased professionalism and scientific 
advance enabled the objectification of social control and 
administrative techniques were developed that could cope with 
the demands of large residential units. Of greatest importance 
however, was that at that time substantial financial resources 
were available and due to the rising wage-earning economy, it 
was an economic necessity to separate those suitable for work 
from those unsuitable for work. An added incentive was in 
decreasing the pressure on the Poor Houses. However, the 
introduction of the Welfare State in 1948 meant that 
segregative modes of social control became too costly and 
institutions became difficult to justify financially. A 
massive expansion in the role of the state in other sectors 
decisively transformed the social context and community care 
was implemented as a policy of "phase out before we go 
bankrupt". Scull's argument was that the development of 
welfare systems made "decarceration" feasible and the relative 
cheapness of this policy compared to institutional care made 
it, for the state at least, a desirable policy.
Scull suggested that the subsequent problems with community 
care occurred when it became obvious that the hoped for relief 
to the state fiscal system did not happen. Community care 
proved to be as expensive as, if not more expensive than, the 
old institutions. As a result, patients were rehoused in poor
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areas, which lead to their growing "ghettoisation" as they 
were effectively dumped in the community. Scull's 
interpretation suggested that the fiscal crisis was therefore 
solved, but it meant a sad, hopeless situation for the 
mentally ill, brought about by their dependence on economic 
trade in Britain. Scull's account of the move to community 
care was therefore negative. He saw it as a move from 
segregation in the asylum to misery and neglect in the 
community.
Scull drew evidence for his theory from a historical analysis 
of mental health policy in relation to economics. For example, 
he pointed out that the official peak of the residential 
population in British mental hospitals of 148,000 occurred in 
1954. By then many hospitals had inherited the "Victorian 
barracks" of the nineteenth century which were in a state of 
decay. It would have taken "thousands of millions over many 
years" to restore them, involving a massive capital investment 
plan and so began a race to discharge patients. There was 
inevitably a subsequent decrease in the number of residents.
Methodologically this interpretation was avowedly Marxist and 
emphasis was put on the single determining factor of the 
requirements for continuing capital accumulation. As with many 
Marxist based accounts, Scull's interpretation displayed a 
tendency towards fundamentalism and he inspired a deluge of 
criticisms based on this inadequacy (eg see Lee & Raban 1988). 
His argument was reductionist, explaining almost everything in 
terms of the "needs" of capital accumulation, but the manner 
in which he assumed that the needs of capital would 
necessarily prevail in state policy formation, has been 
accused of losing any sense of dialectical method that most 
Marxist writers employ (eg see Coates 1984).
Commenting on Scull's thesis, Goodwin stated:
"He tends to ride roughshod over much of the data,
imposing a theoretical structure without sufficient
regard to the complexity of the processes involved."
(Goodwin, 1990, p21 )
For example, a key proposition for Scull is that community
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care was adopted as policy since it was cheaper than 
institutional care. Concern with the cost of mental health 
services provision has played a major part in influencing the 
development of services but this does not imply a functional 
necessity. If it were so, it would be impossible to explain 
why the cost of mental health service provision in England 
continued to rise during the post-war period (see Goodwin 1990 
for figures). Also there is a timing problem in Scull's 
analysis. He argued that the principle spur to decarceration 
was the fiscal crisis yet the mental health population peaked 
in 1954 and then began to decline, many years prior to any 
"fiscal crisis" (Sedgwick 1982a). Scull's interpretation has 
also been criticised for failing to account for the 
development of some community services outside the mental 
hospital, and the skewed pattern of these developments. As 
described in chapter two, it is not the case that all mental 
health services have been run down under the guise of 
community care, rather that aggregate expenditure on mental 
health services has increased, being channelled mainly into 
services for those with "acute" needs and neglecting services 
for the long term mentally ill.
Scull has, therefore, been criticised for being deterministic 
and too simplistic in stating that the fiscal relationship is 
so automatic and inevitable, but he has undoubtedly raised an 
important consideration for any understanding of community 
care. His contribution is important in showing the need to 
locate analysis within prevailing socio-economic conditions 
and the need to challenge the state's presentation of social 
policy as simply a process of reform intended for the common 
good. Overall, this interpretation suggests that proper long 
term care of the mentally ill in the community will never 
happen because it is expensive. However, allied to this point, 
one would expect that no money would be spent to try and 
improve community services. It is at the local level that such 
propositions need to be tested.
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5) Elitist Interpretations
An alternative contention is that community care policy has 
been dominated by the entrenched power of the medical 
profession who have successfully resisted its full 
implementation through an elitist position and influence over 
government thinking. Since community care implies a broadening 
of participation in decision making, psychiatrists are said to 
have resisted the ideology and implementation of the policy in 
order to retain their elitist power. The problematic nature of 
community care is hence ultimately attributed to the continued 
elitist domination of mental illness policy by the psychiatric 
profession.
A major theorist in this area has been Ramon (1988). Her 
method was to undertake a detailed analysis of the
professional and political debates over the last forty years,
since community care policies first appeared. One theme of the 
theory that she developed concerned the development of a
backlash against community care policy that she suggested had 
thwarted its implementation. Ramon proposed that major 
developments took place in the field of psychiatry in the
1950s, when after the introduction of the NHS the role of 
psychiatry expanded and became increasingly "psychologised and 
professionalised”. Right up until the 1970s, the majority of 
psychiatrists desired to be recognised as clinicians within 
the mainstream of medicine and saw the promised transfer of 
their centre of work from isolated mental hospitals to new 
units in the community, situated alongside their medical and 
surgical colleagues, as tangible evidence of such recognition. 
Public demand for treatment nearer their homes, predicted 
decline in bed usage and progressively developing patterns of 
multiple, short-term admissions all contributed to the 
positive response given to community care plans at this time 
(Clare 1980).
However, Ramon contended that even in the 1970s, within 
psychiatry little was being done to actually promote the 
change. Community care involved threatening positions of power 
of a number of "sacred cows" and the necessity for new
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relations between professionals, non-professional providers of
care, service users and their carers was being resisted. Ramon
suggested that the British psychiatric establishment gradually
instilled a resilience to change into government thinking and
their influence on politician's perception of the community
care issue lead to conservatism and paternalism in policy
making3. It was further suggested by Holland (1988), that the
development of CMHTs during the 1980s was
"the stepping stone on to which psychiatry has made its 
territorial move out of the hospital and into the 
community." (Holland, 1988, p127)
Holland argued that by accepting CMHTs, psychiatrists adapted 
some of the language of social, causal methods of mental 
illness, but failed to acknowledge the issues. This implies 
that CMHTs have to some extent broken the deadlock of 
resistance to community care from psychiatrists, but only 
because the CMHT model could be moulded to accommodate the 
elitist practices of the psychiatric profession.
That some elitism exists in mental health service provision 
seems an almost trivial hypothesis, but the notion that every 
sphere is elite dominated appears to be too crude. A criticism 
of Ramon's analysis is that she has not paid enough attention 
to distinctions between different levels of analysis. The 
psychiatric profession, may be an elite, but it is also 
internally divided. The government, the BMA and the RCP may 
strike deals at the national level, but this may contrast 
starkly with the views and actions of the rank and file who 
implement policy at the field level. Also, service change 
depends on change in all the professions, not just psychiatry 
(Brown 1985) and it is not only the psychiatric establishment 
that have been responsible for the problematic implementation 
of community care policy. There have also been considerable 
shortfalls in the planning process at all levels and no other 
profession has really tried to assert an alternative position.
Furthermore, over the past decade, the power of psychiatry 
does seem to have been diminishing in some respects, 
particularly with the introduction of general management into
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the NHS in the mid 1980s. Several practitioners have called 
attention to the fact that the psychiatric profession of the 
1980s and early 1990s has, to some extent, had to struggle for 
its survival (eg Clare 1982). The Conservative Government in 
power since 1979 has exerted pressure for change in medicine 
generally. Perhaps the most recent example is the
recommendations of the Tomlinson report (1992) upon which 
action awaits. In the mean time, health authorities in London 
have been amalgamated into larger Area Health Authorities and 
one of the main purposes of this exercise was to reduce the 
control and influence of the teaching hospitals over health 
provision. Such activity suggests that while Ramon's
contention that the elitist domination of medical
professionals has prevented community care service development 
in the past may be partially true, this is now being 
challenged to some extent. It is to case study evidence that 
we need to look to consider whether this challenge extends to 
policy for the long term mentally ill client group.
6) Feminist Interpretations
The interpretations considered so far have payed little 
attention to issues of gender in considering the development 
of community care. From the beginning of the 1970s, a 
considerable feminist literature has emerged that is 
presenting a challenge that none of the major schools of 
thought has been able to meet adequately. Work dealing
specifically with gender issues and the mentally ill has
concentrated on five particular broad topics.
First, it has begun to consider gender differences in patterns 
of health and sickness and in the use of mental health 
services. Women have higher levels of admission to psychiatric 
beds, form a higher proportion of residents, make more use of 
out-patient clinics and have more contact with GPs regarding 
mental health issues (Busfield 1983). Research has shown that 
one in eight women will be treated for a mental condition at
some time in their lives compared with one in twelve men (eg
see Goldberg & Huxley 1980). Two explanations have been 
forwarded to explain this situation. On the one hand, the
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label of mental illness has been seen as a means of oppressing 
women who deviate from their traditional role. The idea is 
that women who have not defined themselves in terms of men and 
serviced men in the manner expected, have been defined as 
mentally ill. Some of what has been called "hysteria” and 
"personality disorder" and most "sexual dysfunction" might be 
seen in these terms (Chesler 1973: Perkins 1992). Drawing on 
the models developed by the sociological theorists, mental 
illness was seen as a label incorrectly applied to women as a 
means of social control. Psychiatric services have been 
criticised by feminists for attempting to sustain women in 
male-defined roles. On the other hand, mental illness has also 
been viewed as a product of oppression (Chesler 1973: Bachrach 
1988c). It was seen as a product of women's disadvantageous 
social situation and a measure of it. Both these ideas have 
led feminist theorists to reject the "medicalisation" of 
mental illness and to see the psychiatric enterprise as a 
means of patriarchal control (eg Chesler 1973, 1989: Penfold 
& Walker 1984).
Second, some work has concentrated on women as professionals 
and workers within the health and social services and the 
questioning of equal opportunities between the sexes. Research 
has suggested that women have been over-represented in the 
health service labour force as nurses, domestics and 
technicians, but poorly represented as doctors and consultants 
at the top of the hierarchy (Stacey 1981; Oakley 1983). It has 
been suggested that this unequal situation has arisen due to 
patriarchy within the medical profession and, utilising a 
broadly Marxist framework, feminist writers have suggested 
that it is tied to the overall sexual division of labour 
within society.
Third, the role of women as unpaid, informal carers in the 
implementation of community care policy has been questioned 
from a feminist perspective (eg Finch & Groves 1983). 
Community care was seen to have been flawed because of the 
failure to consider these variables and the thrust of Finch 
and Groves argument was that the burden of such neglect
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primarily affected women. Community care was seen to have 
legitimised minimal state activity in the private sphere of 
the home and family and to have disguised the minimal activity 
of men. It was postulated that historically, the underlying 
aim of community care developed to become the exploitation of 
the free labour of women and to disguise the sexual division 
of labour disadvantageous to women, both as unpaid carers and 
as professionals. For instance, both Ungerson (1985) and 
Dailey (1988) made statements in support of the community care 
idea that was being put forward in the 1950s and 1960s -that 
of reduction of the size of institutions and a move to smaller 
residential units in built-up areas, but saw a failing of 
community care policy, when the emphasis shifted by the late 
1960s and 1970s, to the idea of community involvement that 
unfairly exploited the work of women as unpaid carers.
Fourth, feminist writers have analysed the Welfare State in 
relation to the family. For example, Dailey (1988) suggested 
that "informal networks" were seen as "low-cost solutions" in 
the 1976 DHSS document (para 1.20), but in fact their implied 
existence grossly failed to calculate the personal, financial 
and social costs which fell on individuals rather than 
institutions. By way of explanation, Dailey argued that the 
principles on which thinking was based were the principles of 
"familism" and "possessive individualism". She described 
"familism" as the link between individuals' circumstances of 
caring and society's organisation of welfare. The idea was 
that the family ideal was seen as the standard against which 
community care developed and all non-family forms were seen as 
deviant or subversive. The argument was that because of the 
hegemonic nature of familism, individuals subscribed to or 
internalised values of that ideology even though its dominance 
ran counter-productive to their interests. Men were seen as 
the possessive individuals and the concept was perceived to 
represent the source of women's subordination. It was 
suggested that these principles should and could be replaced 
by the principles of collectivism, abandoning notions of the 
nuclear family and changing the way that society thinks, and 
that community care cannot work until the old ideological
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foundations are challenged.
Fifth, the ideology behind community care service provision
has been further questioned from a feminist perspective. Brown
& Smith (1989) drew a series of parallels between experiences
of people with learning difficulties and people who used
mental health services, with women in our society. They
developed a feminist critique of the normalisation ideology
that was seen to underpin community care, and discussed the
mechanisms whereby people with learning difficulties, mental
health problems and women generally were accorded second class
status and hence experienced similar oppression. Brown & Smith
suggested that the good intentions contained within the
normalisation principle, themselves constituted an oppressive
facade which encouraged people to:
"deny their own suffering and to normalise their 
situation, thus maintaining the existing structures of 
social organisation and of work." (Brown & Smith, 1989, 
pill)
The authors went on to challenge the "fashionable" liberal 
reaction to deny all differences that exist between people, 
whether in regard to mental illness or sex. They and other 
authors (eg Kitzinger & Perkins 1993) believed that the 
experience of the feminist movement has shown that it is 
unhelpful to camouflage stress or underplay the reliance of 
the mentally ill on other people, by merely pretending that 
they are like every one else. They believed that community 
care has been problematic because it has attempted to hide and 
muffle the differences that exist between those classed as 
mentally ill and the rest of the population, providing an 
excuse to cut services and leave the burden of care to women, 
who after all are perceived as "natural" carers. Community 
care was seen to have inspired a situation where people with 
disabilities received services from people who themselves were 
exploited and discriminated against. Clients and their carers 
have hence become "ghettoised together". Brown and Smith 
(1989) proposed that community care policies cannot be 
successful until the tension between power over people for 
whom one cares and powerlessness to meet one's own needs are
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dealt with.
Feminist writers have been criticised for the accuracy of the 
historical detail that they provide, and for re-creating women 
as a stereotype that transcends the real nature of human 
complexity and variety. Sedgwick (1982) suggested that 
feminist critiques have deflected attention away from 
campaigning for better facilities for the mentally ill, 
especially for the long term mentally ill. In general, it is 
true that most of the feminist literature on mental illness 
has tended to concentrate on those with acute disorders (eg 
Chesler 1973, 1989: Penfold & Walker 1984), though more
recently some attention has been given to women with long term 
mental illness (eg Perkins 1992: Bachrach 1988). The
historical shift in services (that was described in chapter 
two), from long term mental illness towards catering for those 
with acute disorders has largely been reflected in the 
feminist literature until recently.
However, in general many feminist writers have tended to deny 
the existence of long term mental illness and assumed that all 
problems are essentially remediable with the correct 
therapeutic approach, the elimination of patriarchal 
oppression, or both. This assumption that all difficulties are 
an invention or product of oppression seems dangerous, as it 
is difficult to conceive of the processes by which all long 
term mental illness will be eradicated along with patriarchy. 
Yet, gender must be brought into any analysis of community 
care and case study evidence must be considered to see how far 
the feminist arguments can be supported and what relevance 
they have for the future of community mental health services.
In Brief
The aim in this chapter has been to establish and present a 
framework of different interpretations of the origins and 
purported failings of community care policy for the mentally 
ill client group. They are each essentially competing 
accounts, although no one perspective can really be isolated 
from the next. Both the traditional/pluralist and
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sociological/anthropological interpretations implicitly 
suggest that community care has been a move forward in policy 
and provide a positive account of the changes. Then there are 
the more sceptical interpretations, the most extreme view 
being the Marxist interpretation, with a slightly weaker 
exposition in the related economic, elitist and feminist 
interpretations. Some commentators such as Foucault, cannot 
obviously be defined as contributing to any one set of 
interpretations.
Hence, no one interpretation provides a sufficiently coherent 
and comprehensive explanation of events on its own. However, 
they provide insight into the nature of the problems, the 
history and the development of services for the mentally ill. 
Taken in combination, it is contended that they have value in 
providing the basis for a much more critical analysis of the 
issues, which can be used to assess local case study evidence. 
However, a discrete set of literature has also arisen around 
implementation problems which contrasts with the structural 
explanations discussed in this chapter. It is the aim in the 
next chapter to review this other kind of literature to give 
a further handle for analysis of local community care policies 
for the long term mentally ill.
1. Several authors oppose the use of the term "medical model" 
since it has become vague and imprecise. For example, Busfield 
(1986) prefers the term "liberal-scientific" approach and 
Ramon (1988) uses the "clinical-somatic" perspective. The term 
is used here to refer to the broad ideology upon which both 
the tasks and methods of the practise of psychiatry are based 
and their perception of the nature of mental illness, 
recognising that this changes over time.
2. Social control means control by others in their own or 
society's interest.
3. This draws on the notion that politicians look to the 
psychiatric profession as "experts" for overall directives 
about community care, with dialogue being maintained through 
various professional bodies such as the British Medical 
Association (BMA) and the Royal College of Psychiatrists (RCP) 
(eg see Castle 1980; Crossman 1977) and at the same time see 
themselves as the ultimate decision-makers.
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CHAPTER 4:
Innovation and Implementation in Community Care:
Public Policy Literature
Problems encountered with making community care policy a 
reality, not only reflect structural considerations discussed 
in the previous chapter, but are also related to the politics 
and constraints of the policy process itself. In the U.K., 
they are intimately bound up with the way that the National 
Health Service (NHS) and Personal Social Services (PSS) are 
organised and operated through the Department of Health and 
Social Security (DHSS) or more recently the Department of 
Health (DH) and Department of Social Security (DSS). It was in 
the mid-1970s that a distinct set of literature began to 
emerge around these issues in British health care, that had 
both an explicit policy focus and an analytical intent. The 
texts differed in their focus, ranging from concentration on 
political dynamics to analysis of detailed institutional 
arrangements. For our purposes, this literature will be termed 
the "public policy" literature.
The aim in this chapter is not to present a thorough overview 
of all the "public policy" literature, but to extract themes 
which will inform our particular interest in innovation and 
implementation in community care. Much of the literature 
concentrates on party politics and the role of central 
government in policy determination and implementation. This 
level of analysis has generally been well-documented (see Hill 
1980; Ham 1986; Webb & Wistow 1987). Since local level 
analysis constitutes the broad basis of this thesis, readers 
are referred to these other sources for consideration of the 
macro political perspective. Also, the policy process is not 
only a matter of central government responding to political 
demands. Local institutional realities impose limits on the 
extent to which central government can carry through 
innovatory change, and most central government health and 
social care initiatives derive from local experiment (Davies 
1993).
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Few locally based studies of community services concentrating 
on service provision for the long term mentally ill client 
group had been completed when this thesis research began. Most 
of the existing work centred on the elderly (eg Hunter et al 
1988; Challis & Davies 1986) and to a lesser extent, people 
with learning difficulties (eg Booth et al 1990; Glennerster 
et al 1983). A broad aim of this chapter is hence to provide 
an overview of the literature to be considered in extending 
analytical debate to the long term mentally ill.
The Perception of The Problem
There has been some debate in the public policy literature
about the means by which situations come to be defined as
social problems. Becker (1967) noted that social problems have
two components: a set of objective conditions and the
definition of these conditions as problematic. However, these
conditions are not sufficient in themselves alone, as they
will receive no consideration unless an individual or group
draws attention to them. Solesbury (1976) argued that issues
must pass three tests if they are to survive. They have to
command attention, claim legitimacy and invoke action. He
points out that:
"public resources for dealing with issues are relatively 
scarce in many terms - money and manpower obviously since 
public finance and public servants are finite quantities, 
but scarce also in terms of legislative time, media 
coverage, political will, public concern... Political 
systems can only cope with a limited number of issues at 
once and these are always subject to displacement by new 
emerging issues of greater appeal and force." (Solesbury, 
1976, p397)
Ham (1982) illustrated this point by reference to the relative 
neglect of hospital services for the mentally ill, mentally 
handicapped and elderly in the 1950s. Paradoxically, it was 
only in the late 1960s, when overcrowding and staffing 
conditions had improved a little, that the issue was placed on 
the political agenda. This occurred as a result of a number of 
hospital enquiries, extensive media coverage, pressure group 
activity and ministerial concern. Scandals created around 
conditions in particular institutions in the 1960s, reported 
by authors such as Robb (1967), came to symbolise the problem
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areas of the NHS and were generalised into a wider concern 
with social justice and humanitarian values, thereby drawing 
the interest of established political groupings. Yet the 
problems had existed a decade earlier in a worse form and had 
not prompted concern at that time. Ham (1982) hence went on to 
suggest that issues also require "particularity" and 
"generalisability" to command attention. The extent to which 
these notions are helpful in relation to community care of the 
long term mentally ill at the local level will be considered 
in part two of this thesis.
Manning (1985) argued that a social problem is what the
powerful define it to be. It can therefore be summised that
since the long term mentally ill are not a powerful group, the
definition of their problems and scrutiny of the effectiveness
of local policy for them has not yet occurred. Davies (1993b)
supported this idea in relation to community care in general
and contended that:
"Arguably, community care suffers from the weakness that 
its beneficiaries are marginalised and dispossessed. 
Policy areas whose benefits are for the more powerful and 
articulate will create effectively democratically 
accountable systems for ensuring the effectiveness of 
local policy systems." (Davies, 1993b, p27)
Ham (1982) also suggested that issues must invoke action and 
"avoid suppression, transformation into other issues and token 
or partial responses". This concerns the more subtle business 
of preventing some issues from reaching the agenda in the 
first place (Bachrach & Baratz 1970; Lukes 1977). Edelman 
(1971) developed the notion of "symbolic policy-making" to 
describe action intended to demonstrate that something is 
being done about a problem, rather than action that is a real 
attempt to tackle the problem. Again, Ham (1982) illustrated 
this by showing that despite successive attempts to give 
greater priority to groups such as the mentally ill, the 
allocation of additional resources and budgetary shift towards 
services for this group have not accompanied their raised 
profile. Also, the sought after shift of resources from 
general and acute hospital services to the long term care of 
the mentally ill in the community has not occurred. A strategy
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of policy maintenance rather than policy change has been 
observed to have been pursued, and it has been suggested that 
much of the activity of the DH and lower levels in the NHS is 
not in fact concerned with policy making or implementation 
(Webb & Wistow 1987; Ham 1982). It is the intention to see 
whether such insights are reflected in the thesis case study.
The Origins of Change
There is a huge literature on the origins of social policy 
change (eg Hall et al 1975). Some writers have concentrated on 
party politics and ideology (eg Beer 1969), others on external 
pressure groups (eg Downs 1967) and some on administrators. 
Increasing interest has however focused on the origin of 
policy within professional groups. Donnison et al (1965, 1975) 
were the first to clearly contend that the origin of health 
and social service policy was primarily located in the 
professional group. This work was based on case-studies of 
social services carried out in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Innovations were found to be most likely to happen amongst 
professionals who were trained and skilled and given 
considerable discretion in the practice of their own work and 
when the services they provided depended largely on their own 
direct contacts with those served, rather than on costly 
capital investment and provision of cash payments. The main 
local implication of this, is that it suggests formally 
approved changes in policy announced by the governing body 
often simply recognise and codify a process worked out over 
several years by people at humbler levels of the providing 
group.
Similar observations have been noted in other areas of public 
policy. For example, Heclo (1974) in studying the history of 
social insurance programmes in both Britain and Sweden, 
proposed that policy-making was a form of collective 
puzzlement on society's behalf. Heclo, however, contended that 
the central actors in this process were not professionals, but 
"policy middlemen", intellectuals, policy experts and civil- 
servants. Banting (1979), in his work exploring poverty and 
politics, suggested that policy making was essentially
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confined to a small number of innovative thinkers.
Only one similar study of the process of innovation in mental 
health services had been carried out at the time of writing. 
Towell (1981) undertook a three year study of Westville 
psychiatric hospital, exploring the complex agency networks 
involved in developing better services for the mentally ill 
based in the community. Like Banting, he proposed that while 
innovatory activity was initiated by the professional group, 
it primarily involved only a small number of individuals 
operating at the periphery of the organisation. Amongst the 
main body of professionals, he found examples of different 
professionals dealing with common problems in isolation or 
passing issues up the organisation, rather than confronting 
them on the spot. He encountered a pessimistic climate within 
the institution in which the staff were more aware of the 
constraints against establishing community based services, 
rather than the possibilities and opportunities. Innovatory 
activity was confined to a small number of forward-thinking 
individuals operating outside the main stream activity of the 
professional organisation.
Dunleavy (1981) extended Donnison's work in his study of 
policies of mass housing. He concluded that professionals act 
as ideas brokers, who monopolise knowledge and subsequently 
become important power brokers in the determination of policy. 
Such an assertion has been observed to be equally applicable 
to the development of mental health policy. For example, Ramon 
(1986) described the creation of the diagnostic category of 
the psychopath. She observed that while both the government 
and the psychiatric profession recognise the incongruity of 
the concept of the psychopath, neither are averse to the 
continued existence of the category or to the incorporation of 
those diagnosed under it within the umbrella of mental 
disorder. She proposed that the function of the term is to 
enable psychiatry to maintain its mandate over those whose 
conduct is socially undesirable but who do not fall within the 
criminal justice system. Hence, this constitutes an example of 
how professionals create and sustain policy via their claims
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of elitist knowledge.
Several authors suggest that locating the source of innovation 
in the professional group, confines policy control to an elite 
amongst service providers. Wilding (1982) saw this as being 
highly problematic in three respects. Services may only be 
introduced where they serve professional interests rather than 
public interests, services are organised around professional 
skills instead of client needs and biases develop in policy 
implementation because dominant groups in particular 
professions are able to control policy. Wildavsky's work on 
"change-agents" (1972) also contributed to these ideas. He 
recognised that the maintenance of higher rates of change 
depend critically on the ability of those who produce it to 
make others pay the associated costs. The needs of the members 
displace the goals of the organisation. The public processes 
that the organisation was supposed to serve give way to its 
private acts and its own hidden agendas start to dominate. 
Lipsky (1980) argued that the decisions of "street level 
bureaucrats", the routines they establish, the devices they 
invent to cope with uncertainties and work pressures, 
effectively become the public policies they carry out. He 
claimed that their policy-making roles are built on two inter­
related facets of their positions: relatively high degrees of 
discretion and relative autonomy from organisational 
authority.
A brief look at the professional psychiatric journals and 
reports considered in chapter two, provides a good indication 
that it is within the professions themselves that emerging 
trends in expert opinion relating to services for the long 
term mentally ill are located. Such expert opinion goes far 
beyond the reaches of traditional medical expertise, 
commenting extensively on policy planning and objectives 
(Crossman 1977). The policy debates and criticisms that are 
heard in Parliament and the press regularly originate here.
The Donnison notion of professionals taking the lead in 
innovation fits in well with the suggestion that it is often
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one individual who adopts and champions a particular 
innovation in service provision. Williams (1980) stated that 
the best "game plans" for innovation only take one so far. The 
need is for a guide (or fixer) who can keep the group headed 
the right way by figuring out where to go and how to proceed. 
Other authors have suggested that it is inevitable that an 
individual service entrepreneur will start to identify 
themselves with a policy initiative at the local level.
Levin (1976) studied the urban planning process in relation to 
new towns and town development schemes and subsequently 
developed a concept of "commitment in planning". This is the 
idea that during the evolution of a plan, people who take 
decisions become attached to them and defensive of them. To 
have a previous decision reversed is to lose, or to perceive 
you will lose, self-esteem, sovereignty of your discretionary 
area of control and perhaps credibility in the organisation. 
Also, as plans become more specific and detailed, so the 
commitment grows. The drive to see through alternative 
solutions increases proportional to the frustration. Levin 
suggested that it is not merely individuals who become 
committed to past plans or ways of proceeding, but whole 
departments. Often a "departmental view" will emerge which 
once hammered out and enshrined in an official document 
survives changes in personnel. Past plans and current practice 
cast a long forward shadow, not least because they are usually 
capital plans which have engaged people's time and energy for 
a long period of time. They are highly specific and very 
costly to reverse in pure financial terms in relation to past 
design costs, penalty clauses in contractor's or 
professional's contracts and having an empty site.
As can be seen this later literature, that began to appear in 
the 1970s, was more sceptical, also seeing professionals as 
the source of innovation, but implying that this related to 
their own self-interest rather than a response to observed 
needs. The economic arguments of the "public choice" schools 
also began to become more influential at this time (see 
Dunleavy 1991J1. From this perspective, innovation is seen
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essentially as professional aggrandisement and innovations in 
service provision are hence expensive devices that imply 
budget expansion. In this view, the welfare state has become 
an unsustainable burden on the economy as a whole and in 
addition, its organisation and processes (particularly 
concerning professionals) have become a threat to the liberty 
and freedom of individuals (Harrison et al 1990).
Public Choice theory is usually associated with the values of 
the new right (Dunleavy & O'Leary 1987). A strand of this 
theory asserts a fundamental hostility to the welfare state. 
For example, Niskanen (1971) suggested that public sector 
bureaucracies had an almost universal tendency to over supply 
their services because senior officials attempted to maximise 
their own utility in the form of maximising the size of their 
departmental budgets. With the world economic crisis of the 
mid-1970s, in Britain and the U.S. attacks on the parasitic, 
costly, self-interested bureaucracies of health care and 
personal social services became rife (Pollitt 1990).
The public choice remedies for the problems of community care 
include weakening the monopoly power of professionals by 
changing their terms and conditions of employment and by 
subjecting them to the quasi-market disciplines of performance 
indicators and other types' of managerial monitoring and 
control. Yet, with reference to professionals, the public 
choice theorists have little to say about such concepts as 
altruism, professional ethics or public service. They argue 
that the sphere of planning must be diminished and that of the 
market mechanism increased, encouraging private health care 
and giving individuals the right to exit the welfare system 
and choose to go elsewhere (Hirschman 1970). In addition, it 
is suggested that public services should be required to charge 
for the benefits they offer to deter "free riders". Such 
policy proposals were the applied tactics of both the Reagan 
and Thatcher governments during the 1980s and constituted the 
foundations of the 1989 White Paper (DH 1989b).
The literature discussed at the beginning of this section
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suggested that innovation rooted in the professional sphere 
was a good thing, but the public choice schools of thought 
suggest that this is not necessarily the case. They see 
innovation, not as good or bad, but as a systematic bias in 
public service organisation towards professional interests 
rather than the interests of individuals in the wider society. 
Case study evidence presented in part two will be used to 
comment on the validity of these alternative contentions.
Central or Local Policy Determination?
Central departments see policy implementation as a process in 
which local agents adapt central guidance using local 
knowledge (eg DHSS 1976a). However, the theme of many local 
studies is that what happens at or near the point of delivery 
is as important, if not more important, than what is dictated 
by central government. There has been an appreciation that 
local health and social service administrations do not simply 
act as transmitters of national legislation and guidance 
(Barrett & Fudge 1981: Ham 1981) and central government
possesses little direct operational control over the 
implementation of most national policies (Haywood & Alaszewski 
1980). Evidence on the nature of the implementation process 
across a range of varying policy contexts has lead to an 
acceptance of the "bottom-up" approach to policy, rather than 
the "top-down" approach (Ham & Hill 1984).
Central government has more potential power in a service that 
it funds directly, like the NHS, than in a service that is 
funded indirectly. Ham (1985) and Pollitt (1984b) emphasised 
that central government has exercised considerable influence 
through its control over the global sum of resources going 
into the NHS, the allocation of this total between health 
authorities, specific approval of large capital schemes and 
the increasing practice of "earmarking" revenue funds for 
particular purposes. Several authors suggest that there are 
"strategic highs" or key policies that central government is 
always willing to enforce strongly (eg Palmer 1985). Examples 
given of such action include the recent experience of 
ancillary services within the NHS where the government
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required services to be put up for tender. Ministers 
effectively determined the course of implementation rather 
than local administrators (Ham 1986). Evaluation of the extent 
to which such influence has affected innovation in community 
mental health service provision at the local level will be one 
theme of the case study presented in part two of this thesis.
Decision-Making
In the 1960s and 1970s it was widely suggested that health 
care politics was "incrementalist". The notion originated from 
the work of Lindblom (1959), who criticised "comprehensive 
rationality" (see below) as a method of decision making and 
put forward the notion of muddling through, both as a better 
description of actual organisational life and as a preferable 
alternative, especially in a tight budget climate, such as 
that which existed in the health and social services in the 
1950s. "Incremental budgeting" was the norm. This meant that 
changes in emphasis from, for example, acute hospital medicine 
to community based care, tended to be slow and of narrow 
scope, rather than systematic or radical (Brown 1979; Lee & 
Mills 1982).
The incremental method of decision making is characterised by 
what Lindblom (1965) termed "partisan mutual adjustment", 
where no one actor or institution can impose change though 
several may be able to veto it (Ham 1985; Klein 1983). Webb & 
Wistow (1986) referred to this notion in contending that 
health policy
"is best understood as contingent and residual: it is
not....a coherent and efficient application of resources 
in pursuit of agreed outcomes; it is more usually the end 
product.... of conflicts and ad hoc bargains." (Webb & 
Wistow, 1986, pi 58)
Within this process, several authors have noted that 
bargaining often results in small changes in the status quo, 
and this tends to be to the advantage of established interests 
(eg Brown 1975). The medical profession, for example, wields 
influence by frustrating those who wish to alter its 
conditions of service, training and patterns of practice 
(Allsop 1984; Haywood & Hunter 1982; Klein 1983). Clinicians
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and senior managers hence hold positions of power over lay 
health authority members (Allsop 1984; Ham 1985; Hunter 1980) 
and even more so over users and user organisations (Lee & 
Mills 1982). The role of health authority managers in these 
conditions has been reactive. The emphasis has been on 
avoiding conflicts, being diplomatic and seeking concensus 
(Ham 1985; Hunter 1980). Klein (1983) suggested that the 
policy inertia resulting from this process has been further 
exacerbated by the extreme occupational complexity of the 
health service as a whole and underpinned by an extremely 
durable political consensus reflected in the high and 
continuing public popularity of the NHS.
The "Rational Comprehensive" model of decision making is the 
opposing paradigm to these incrementalist ideas (eg Patten & 
Pollitt 1980). On this view decision making is planned and 
systematic. Tensions and clashes of interest are perceived as 
irrational and are defined as technical problems such as 
failure of communication, poor information and cognitive 
failure (Ham & Hunter 1988). Several authors have suggested 
that while the incrementalist model does seem to apply to the 
policy process conducted by health authorities (Harrison 
1988a), this is not so true of central government intentions 
and is becoming less and less so (Harrison et al 1990). For 
example, the initiatives and changes relating to community 
care that originated in the 1983 Griffiths Report and the 1989 
White Paper (DH 1989b) frequently emphasised the need to state 
clear objectives, cost alternative means and monitor 
performance. These elements of reform appear to reflect a 
rational framework. Hence, the accuracy or usefulness of the 
notion of incremental politics has been difficult to assess as 
it appears to fit some levels and issues better than others. 
One aim in part two of this thesis will be to see how well it 
accounts for decision making in community mental health in the 
case study area during the thesis research period.
Joint Planning
In the 1970s, governments in the U.K. put increasing emphasis 
on planning as a main instrument of policy making and
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implementation. In the health and local authority services 
this involved a particular stress on the importance of joint 
planning and collaboration (DHSS 1973). The idea was that if 
there was a determination for different organisational 
authorities to work together, many of the problems of 
community care could be solved. A variety of organisational 
arrangements and inducements were, therefore, established to 
achieve this purpose, but the general experience of these 
efforts was widely judged as disappointing (Glennerster et al 
1983).
Joint planning in the health and personal social services 
encountered severe handicaps. In part this can be understood 
as reflecting inadequacies in conceptions of planning which 
were adopted. Booth (1979) found that there was a tendency to 
regard planning as being associated with the availability of 
extra resources. However, he contended that this was 
inappropriate in a period of severe financial constraint. This 
weakness was magnified where attention focused too narrowly on 
creating new facilities rather than developing services. In 
fact, planning was a means by which central government sought 
to contain and direct local agencies within the limits of its 
public expenditure controls. It was never a good vehicle for 
joint working because different central departments each ran 
their own separate planning systems (Glennerster et al 1982).
Further problems with joint planning in mental health arose 
from important organisational differences between Health and 
Local Authorities. Many authors suggest that the government 
too readily assumed that shared goals and priorities could be 
arrived at locally (eg Towell 1981; Hunter & Wistow 1988). 
Webb & Wistow (1986) pointed out that the complex 
organisational structures and lack of coterminosity caused 
considerable difficulties for many local planners. Problems 
were often exacerbated by the latent tensions in the network 
of relationships between agencies and tiers involved in the 
total mental health services. Mutual scape-goating and 
defensive rigidity were observed, where having someone to 
blame when things went wrong became more important than trying
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to get something right. Both Ramon (1988) and Glennerster et 
al (1983) contended that in the case of community care, the 
DHSS was not able to articulate community care policy 
sufficiently clearly to lead innovation. Professional 
organisational politics meant that innovations during the 
1980s were usually health and medical service driven.
Conflicts and Constraints
Implementation of community care policy has already been noted 
in chapter two to have been significantly problematic. Hence, 
concern with the ineffectiveness of the policy, requires the 
asking of questions not only about the source and character of 
the policy and the way that policy innovations were introduced 
but also about what is wrong with the implementation process 
itself and the receiving environment. The public policy 
literature identifies a wide range of general constraints on 
the implementation of policy.
In practice any new policy will be adopted in a context in 
which there are already many other policies (Hill 1980). 
Additionally, innovations seldom have a clear start and finish 
and it is rare that there is only one innovatory activity 
going on at any one time (Donnison et al 1965). Local social 
policy innovations develop in an environment where competition 
is endemic and service providers always have rivals competing 
for resources. Downs (1967) called these competitors 
"Allocational rivals"(those who compete within a service) and 
"Functional rivals" (those who can win customers away from the 
service). Such rivalry inevitably leads to constraints and 
mistrust in implementation.
Implementation problems also arise from policies that express 
their goals in general or unclear terms. Donnison et al (1965) 
found that the aims of the social services and the agencies 
responsible for them were ill-defined and noted that there was 
no dominant, comprehensive social ideology on which all the 
actors involved agreed. Barrett & Fudge (1981) suggest that 
usually innovators do have an ideology of some sort, but this 
is seldom explicit at the outset and does not evolve
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simultaneously and uniformly. The implementation literature 
suggests that however strong the thrust behind a new policy, 
if there is a weak link in any part of the implementation 
process this can be seriously detrimental to the new policy. 
Donnison et al (1975) gave the example of lack of 
administrative support for new services blocking their 
successful implementation. Sometimes the political ambivalence 
about a policy is reflected not so much in the policy itself 
as in the constraints that are set upon the implementation 
process. The simplest form of constraint is the failure to 
provide the means, in money, staff and organisational space, 
to enable the policy to be implemented properly (Hill 1980). 
Bardach (1977) developed an extensive analysis of the various 
implementation games that may be played by those who wish 
policies to be delayed, altered or deflected.
Before an innovation begins, providers of a service tend to be 
fully employed in coping with their existing responsibilities 
(Donnison et al 1965). Their work has expanded or compressed 
to fit the time and other resources available to them. Often 
they have difficulties in redeploying existing resources 
without upsetting someone. Innovation in service provision is 
hence necessarily disruptive. It requires changes in the way 
people work and think, and subjects cherished ideas to re­
examination. Literature suggests that attitudes to significant 
social change are characterised by ambivalence, even when 
supported, and displaced policies retain a residual potential 
strength (Billis 1984). New ideas lead to anxieties about the 
disruption of familiar patterns and relationships. Innovating 
groups can easily become isolated from their colleagues and 
their innovations put at risk, unless it is possible to 
sustain a dialogue in the implementation phase between 
"progressives" and "traditionalists" within the wider 
management structure which supports and contains open debates. 
Several authors have pointed out that a great awareness is 
needed of the sometimes unrecognised aspects of tensions and 
relationships between individuals and groups (eg Barrett & 
Fudge 1981). As mentioned above, new policies are implemented 
under the close scrutiny of a broad spectrum of local actors.
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Consequently, advantages must be made plain to those who 
receive, deliver and pay for them.
An inevitability of the involvement of multiple actors is that 
conflicts develop in the implementation phase. Pressman & 
Wildavsky (1973) drew attention to the way in which the mere 
quantities of agreements necessary may, even when all parties 
are committed to a policy, undermine or delay effective 
action. Donnison et al (1965) noted that when an innovation 
was activated, caseloads or overtime increased, rumours 
circulated, personal relationships deteriorated and other 
signs of stress appeared. Different interpretations of the 
situation arose and divergent views, when unreconciled, 
created conflict. Where conflict arose, contending groups then 
sought the support of those responsible for taking decisions. 
He observed that this was often the first that senior staff 
had heard of the conflict. It has been suggested that some 
conflicts can be settled by negotiation from which all parties 
can derive satisfactory outcomes and these are termed 
"Positive Sum Games". Alternative scenarios are "Negative Sum 
Games" where the gains of the winners are only achieved 
through a cost to the losers. Inaction results as this is 
deemed to be preferable to wrong action.
Hardy (1985) observed that conflict over the ownership of the 
original policy and the leadership of it challenges the 
legitimacy and authority of different actors. There is often 
conflict over who are the "change-leaders". For example, McKee 
(1988) found disagreements between managers and consultant 
psychiatrists over the source from which projects arising from 
community care policy were perceived to spring. She also found 
that this collision in perspectives was significant in 
revealing differences in the time-frames of the two groups. 
Consultant psychiatrists were concerned with long term change, 
but managers were often only in post for one or two years and 
were only concerned about short term solutions. The case study 
presented in part two will find some of these constraints 
operating more strongly than others.
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In Brief
In this chapter, particular themes were extracted from the 
public policy literature which can be used to analyse 
innovatory activity in community mental health service 
provision for the long term mentally ill. The literature 
suggests that community care policy is difficult to implement. 
As a policy area, it suffers because its beneficiaries are 
weak, the conceptualisation of the policy is ill-formed and 
much of the power to innovate lies at the local level in the 
hands of professionals. Major changes in local power and 
resource distributions have been contemplated which are 
difficult to achieve, even in a favourable climate. However, 
public policy literature that discusses mental health policy 
is sparse, especially in relation to the long term mentally 
ill client group and so the intention in this thesis is to 
contribute to it.
Using the analytical concepts and ideas generated in these 
last three chapters, the aim is now to evaluate a specific 
pioneering development in mental health policy at the local 
level. Rather than systematically deducing a set of hypotheses 
from a well articulated body of theory and then seeking to 
test them by attempting to disprove them, the complementary 
literatures presented in part one of this thesis will be used 
to engage in a process of generating discussion from observed 
phenomena in the case study location.
1. "Public choice" theory straddles the disciplines of 
economics and political science and focuses on public or 
collective choices as opposed to the private choices of 
individuals analysed by conventional micro-economics.
100
PART 2: THE CASE STUDY
Part two embraces the case study fieldwork on which this 
thesis is based. The aim is to test the consistency of the 
theory presented in Part one with evidence taken from day to 
day practice. Since the case study evidence is itself 
conditioned by underlying theory, does it "fit"? Given the 
current rapidly changing context of community care, do events 
that occurred in the policy environment in the last decade 
provide any fundamental clues as to the future of community 
mental health service provision for the long term mentally 
ill?
The history of the case study CMHT will be presented 
chronologically from 1979 to 1992 in chapters five to ten, 
with analytical discussions at the end of each chapter. 
Chapters eleven and twelve will present empirical evaluation 
data collected over a two year period between 1990 and 1992. 
This data concentrates on process factors in the 
implementation of a CMHT approach for the long term mentally 
ill. The aim is to consider in detail the process of 
introducing an innovatory idea regarding service provision for 
the long term mentally ill and sustaining this throughout the 
implementation phase.
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CHAPTER 5 :
Mental Health Service Provision in Battersea Prior to the
Birth of A 
Community Mental Health Team
This chapter introduces the case study area. It aims to 
examine the basis from which the issue of community mental 
health services arose in Battersea and to assess local policy 
progress up until 1979, since the advent of community care as 
a national policy. The first part presents an account of the 
background setting from which subsequent developments in 
community psychiatry developed in Battersea, South London. It 
briefly documents the policy planning environment that existed 
in London in 1979, describes the health service local 
organisation in the case-study area of Battersea, and presents 
an account of what existed in service provision for the long 
term mentally ill.
A discussion of local mental health service patterns that 
existed in 1979 is presented in the second part of the 
chapter, within the framework established in chapter three. 
The aim is to see whether the structural and philosophical 
interpretations identified in this earlier chapter can 
usefully be applied at the local level to give us a clearer 
understanding of the policy background for innovation. As will 
be seen in later chapters, innovation in service provision did 
occur in Battersea in later years in the form of a new CMHT 
service. The Doddington Edward Wilson Community Mental Health 
Team was established in Battersea, over a three and a half 
year period from 1982 to 1986. However, its origins and its 
ideologies lie further back in time and in order to fully 
understand them and evaluate the resulting form of care 
provision, it is important to consider the context in which 
they emerged during the 1970s.
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The Policy Planning Environment- London Service Problems in
1979
The intention is to begin by looking briefly at the general 
political climate and the problems that were particular to 
London at the start of the study period in 1979. It is 
important to recognise that this case-study was carried out in 
London and results probably would not apply in rural areas and 
indeed in many other cities. The policy planning environment 
for health services in London was characterised by the 
following seven factors:
1) POPULATION CHANGES
In the 1960s it became apparent that the population of London 
was declining, one factor having been migration to the Home 
Counties after the war (Prochaska 1992). Expected population 
changes between 1971 and 1988 were large. The population of 
inner London was expected to fall by 1/5 and outer London by 
1/10, while the numbers living in county areas outside Greater 
London were expected to increase by 6%. Central London was 
unusually well supplied with acute hospital beds (London 
Health Planning Consortium 1979), and this implied that there 
was a need for a shift of acute speciality resources to the 
outer fringes of Regions. The Tomlinson Report (1992) was 
later to restate this same problem in making recommendations 
for the re-shaping of London's hospital provision to provide 
a better balance of resources to the different care needs of 
the population.
2) ELDERLY SERVICES
The acute bed supply in hospitals was good, but London had 
always been poorly supplied with long stay beds for the 
elderly in particular (Ministry of Health 1954; DHSS 1981b). 
This meant that more elderly people were admitted to acute 
wards and stayed there longer. Many also stayed in their own 
homes or old peoples homes and this resulted in a great strain 
being exerted on social and health services. The numbers of 
frail elderly living alone in London was unusually high and 
likely to increase (Bebbington 1979). In 1977 the number of 
socially isolated old people per 1000 over 65 was 351 in Inner 
London, 226 in Outer London and 128 in the remainder of
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England (Snow 1981).
3) PRIMARY CARE
Primary Care services were particularly unsatisfactory. In 
Inner London more residents were not registered with a General 
Practitioner (GP) than in the remainder of the Greater London 
area, there were more single-handed practices, more elderly 
GPs and they were more difficult to contact. The London Health 
Planning Consortium (1981) stated in the Acheson Report on 
primary health care in London that only 43% of GP practices in 
inner London were directly contactable during the working day.
4) COMMUNITY SERVICES
Other community services in London, such as community nurses 
and home helps were suffering recruitment difficulties due to 
alternative job opportunities and relatively poor salaries in 
an area where it was more expensive to live and work than the 
rest of England (Jarman & Bosanquet 1992).
5) FAMILY NETWORKS
The informal family support system was weak and movement of 
households was high. There was poor housing, poor health and 
a 50% higher rate of suicide in London than elsewhere in the 
country (Office of Population Censuses & Surveys 1982).
6) ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLEXITY
Community care services, particularly in the "Chronic Sector" 
were noticeably bad (Community Health Councils 1980) and 
"greater coordination" between agencies was frequently stated 
as the solution (London Health Planning Consortium 1981). In 
1974, Local Government in England and Wales had been 
reorganised but London was left as it was, with a complexity 
of hospital provision. This resulted in a Byzantine system of 
health districts and areas being superimposed on the existing 
pattern of local authorities (Glennerster et al 1983). In 
London, few administrative boundaries and hospital catchment 
areas matched, whereas between 1974 and 1982 in the rest of 
the U.K., Area Health Authorities shared the same boundaries 
as Social Service Departments.
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Consultant psychiatrists were clustered in London and the 
reasons for this were complex. The perception from within the 
psychiatric profession according to one respondent interviewed 
for this thesis, was that it was partly because that was where 
the rich patients were, but also the social power was there. 
The big psychiatric committees were all based in London and 
this, together with the strong link with private practice 
attracted the intellectual elite amongst consultants. London 
was the influential place to be for consultants, where they 
could keep abreast of and have influence on the development of 
the profession. Civil Servants and journalists rarely looked 
outside London for advice and information since such liaison 
was always of an urgent nature.
7) FINANCIAL CRISIS
Since the National Health Service was formed, London had done 
relatively well in terms of financial allocation. There was an 
uneven focus on the large Teaching Hospitals and cash tended 
to follow the existing pattern of services (Prochaska 1992). 
Between 1974-1979 the Labour Government tried to reverse that 
pattern, albeit gradually. The Resource Allocation Working 
Party (RAWP) (DHSS 1976c) provided an allocation formula that 
would give more resources to less wealthy regions and less to 
those who had most such as the Thames Regions. This formula 
was much criticised, especially in London (Avery-Jones 1976). 
The outcome was that the Thames Regions had a cash allocation 
that was virtually held static while other regions were to 
grow.
Regions had to allocate money to services knowing that they 
had to reduce services in London and extend them in outer 
areas. Cash limits and inflation eroded the value of 
allocations and by 1979 Wandsworth Health Authority was in 
deficit, like several others, and the deficits were growing. 
Cuts had to be made to get the authorities back in balance by 
1981. Also a comparable situation existed in the Local 
Authorities, who had done relatively well under the Labour 
Governments Rate Support Grant (RSG) formula, but were treated 
more harshly under the new conservative legislation (See
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Glennerster et al 1983). Sharp cuts in central government 
support were experienced also by other major urban areas.
The Health Service Local Organisation in Wandsworth 
The policy planning environment in the inner city areas of 
London was affected by a number of quite dramatic service 
problems, as a result of general London-wide developments. The 
inner city areas had these problems in the most concentrated 
form. They were readily apparent in Wandsworth. Wandsworth was 
part of the Merton, Sutton and Wandsworth Area Health
Authority (AHA) (Teaching) and was covered by two of the AHAs 
3 health districts (District 1 covered 26% of Wandsworth and 
22% of Richmond: District 2, 74% of Wandsworth and 27% of
Merton).
Wandsworth was the second largest of the Inner London
Boroughs. It bordered Richmond on the West, Hammersmith,
Kensington and Chelsea and Westminster across the Thames,
Lambeth on the east and Merton on the south. The borough
covered a total area of 14 square miles. Despite its proximity 
to central London there were 160 acres of completely vacant 
land in 1972, mainly the result of declining traditional
industries. By 1978 a quarter of this land had been developed 
with the completion of large projects such as the Nine Elms 
Market that replaced Covent Garden Market and much council 
housing. The majority of the remaining vacant land was
concentrated in North Battersea and the Wandle Valley, along 
the Thames and around Clapham Junction. A considerable 
proportion of this land was derelict and polluted. The
remaining industrial and manufacturing enterprises were also 
concentrated in the north and eastern parts of the borough.
Politically, the Borough of Wandsworth was created from the 
amalgamation of Battersea (solidly Labour) and Wandsworth 
(mixed). The Council had a Conservative majority in the 1968 
election: it swung massively to Labour in 1971 (53-7) and back 
to Conservative in 1978 (on a bigger swing than the rest of 
London) leading to a 36-25 Conservative majority. So the 
Borough had a chequered political history and Glennerster et
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al (1983) suggested that this was a reflection of its mixed 
social composition and the changes it had been undergoing.
Battersea remained the area of greatest deprivation in the 
Wandsworth Borough. In 1980 the Battersea population was 
estimated to be 68,000 adults and 10,000 elderly people1. 
Battersea had and continues to have all the characteristics of 
the most difficult inner city areas: high unemployment
(approx. 12.2% in 1985), a high proportion of the population 
from ethnic minorities (approx. 20.6% in 1985) and a large 
number of single parent families (approx. 5.81% of all 
families in 1985)2. Using the Jarman criteria of social 
deprivation, which gives a composite score from eight 
demographic variables, the average score for the Battersea 
wards is 37 (range 22.59 - 57.11) putting the area within the 
most underprivileged 2% of all wards in England and Wales3. 
In relation to the rest of the Wandsworth borough, Battersea 
stood out as the most problematic area and the area most in 
need of significant service provision by the Local and Health 
Authorities.
Mental Illness Services in Battersea
Springfield Hospital4, London SW17, was a psychiatric hospital 
of approximately 1,000 beds and was part of the Wandsworth and 
East Merton Teaching District, closely linked with St. 
George's Hospital, SW17. It provided the catchment area 
services for the District's mentally ill population, which 
came from a total population of 280,000, together with 
services to adjacent local areas, and some residual areas 
North of the Thames5. In 1974 the first form of catchment 
areas was introduced in Battersea and on 1st April 1975, the 
Battersea catchment area, which had previously been under the 
care of Tooting Bee Hospital, was transferred to Springfield 
for administrative convenience.
From 1968 to 1975, one consultant psychiatrist was responsible 
for mental health services in Battersea. In 1975, a second 
consultant was appointed and the two consultants had half of 
the area each, with the Battersea catchment area of 85,000
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being divided arbitrarily into North and South, using the 
railway line as the main boundary. In 1979, the catchment 
areas were altered slightly to cover a reduced catchment area 
of 81,000, with one of the above mentioned consultants being 
made responsible for North Battersea and one for South 
Battersea. Although the former had a smaller catchment area 
population, the work load was much heavier. In June 1979, a 
third consultant was appointed with special responsibility for 
the care of the elderly mentally ill, and although this did 
not at first include Battersea, when it eventually did, it 
meant that there was very little acute elderly work for the 
catchment area consultants.
a) In-patient Care
In 1979, the two consultants responsible for the mentally ill 
in Battersea, including the elderly, had access to six wards 
providing nominally 180 beds. However, for practical purposes 
the position was much less generous6. Three wards provided 
facilities for the elderly, but the majority of patients on 
one of these were admitted originally from Mitcham (out of the 
Area Health Authority catchment area) and on another one, 
about half of the patients came from North of the river (also 
out of the area). All the beds were occupied by long-stay 
patients, over 50% of whom had been resident for more than two 
years, and vacancies (estimated at about 2 a year) arose only 
on the death of a patient. This had a knock on effect in the 
acute and rehabilitation wards.
There were two rehabilitation wards, with 68 beds and one 
admission ward with 39 beds (Aster) that was the only ward 
with no "old long stay" patients that hence could be used as 
an active admission ward. However, it was accepted that when 
consultants were faced with an elderly patient in the 
community who was no longer able to continue without hospital 
care, then there were considerable pressures to use an 
admission bed. This had an adverse effect on the admission 
ward and was disturbing for patients and staff who saw 
themselves in an active therapeutic role. It was estimated in 
July 1979 that there were up to 4 elderly patients on the
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admission ward at any one time7. This also had an effect on 
GPs who were reluctant to admit young patients to wards 
containing elderly long stay patients.
Using DHSS recommendations, the calculated bed needs for the 
Battersea populations (approx 80,000) in 1979 were for a total 
of 99 beds: 40 Admission beds; 26 New Long Stay Beds; and 33 
Psychogeriatric beds. However, it was recognised that there 
was an argument that Battersea was an area of high morbidity 
and therefore provision should have been more generous than 
this8. Certainly indicators of social stress which had been 
shown to be associated with psychiatric morbidity, such as 
percentage of one-parent families, level of unemployment and 
severe financial problems were high in Battersea. An NHS 
service profile9 compared admission rates to Springfield 
Hospital for a three month period (April to June 1979).
Battersea admissions 55 - 80,000 population ==> 6.9 
per 10,000
Remainder of catchment 167 - 270,000 population ==> 6.2 
per 10,000
The Battersea admission rate was the highest of all the sub­
catchment areas served by Springfield Hospital, demonstrating 
in part the weakness of community provision in the area.
The two Battersea consultants each had working with them a 
registrar or senior house officer appointed as part of the St 
George's Hospital 3-year training scheme and rotating to 
Atkinson Morley's Hospital, and also a part time senior 
registrar. They also had some support from clinical 
psychology, occupational therapy and a community psychiatric 
nurse, with an attached local authority social worker also 
involved with patients from the catchment area.
b) Out-Patient Clinics
The following out-patient clinics were provided for 
Battersea's mentally ill clients following the 1975 catchment 
area changes: one at St George's Hospital in Tooting (the 
District General Hospital); one at Bolingbroke Hospital in 
South Battersea (which was originally a private subscription
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hospital that was taken over by St George's and run as a 
general adult hospital, before being turned into an in-patient 
geriatric hospital in 1980); and two at St James Hospital in 
Wandsworth (a general hospital which was originally a Poor Law 
Hospital serving the workhouse population). These clinics were 
considered sufficient at the time to meet the demands placed 
on them10.
Also at St James' Hospital, the consultant psychiatrists 
provided psychiatric cover to the general medical and surgical 
wards. One of the Battersea consultants saw surgical 
amputation patients there who were thought to be suicidal and 
would then take them into Springfield. The other Battersea 
consultant provided cover to casualty at the very active 
Accident & Emergency Department. Psychiatric liaison links 
were kept up with the other Tooting Bee consultants, who also 
held out-patient clinics there.
c) Psychiatric Emergency Clinic
The Psychiatric Emergency Clinic was a 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. walk- 
in service on the St George's Hospital site which was manned 
by nurses. Medical assessments were done by whoever was 
running the day's clinic. Later, the service improved from the 
consultants' viewpoint, as nurses were given more 
responsibility and became more selective in choosing the
patients who necessarily needed a consultant's expertise. 
However, in 1979 the clinic was considered to be over­
stretched and for some long term mentally ill clients
attendance at the clinic was inappropriate, but without
adequate community services, the clinic was often their only 
option.
d) Dav Hospitals
There were two Day Hospitals on the Springfield site providing 
facilities for the catchment populations. The Jubilee Day
Hospital was a 25 place unit for the elderly (75+) mentally 
ill. There was no fixed allocation of places for each 
catchment area, but inevitably the limited nature of the 
provision influenced the referral patterns of consultants. In
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July 1979 there were 4 Battersea clients attending this unit. 
Also at this time, this service was being seriously 
handicapped by the problems besetting the London Ambulance 
service and their inability to accept more commitments to 
transport day cases. This inadequate provision increased the 
demand for inpatient care and as described above, had an 
adverse effect on the care offered to the under 65 year olds.
The Cottage Day Hospital accepted up to 70 patients, many of 
whom were mobile and could get to the unit (though public 
transport to Springfield was not good). Again there was no 
rationing system for the catchment teams and in July 1979 
there were 17 Battersea patients attending. The Cottage Day 
Hospital had never had much of a support role to long term 
mentally ill clients and no role at all in the activities of 
.rehabilitation and resettlement. It had always been an acutely 
oriented service, with three main functions: to act as a
bridge between being an in-patient on the ward and going back 
home (people could attend there for two weeks or so when they 
left the ward as a stepping stone to returning to their homes 
full time); to replace in-patient admission (it was doing this 
increasingly, particularly for depressives, neurotics, 
occasionally schizophrenics and a select few personality 
disorders); to serve "multiple problem" clients, who had 
social and housing problems and required liaison work. The 
number of these type of clients seen was very small and 
numbered may be two clients a year. The Health Authority 
Strategic Review indicated that the recommended provision for 
the total Springfield Hospital Catchment Area was 234 adult 
day places and 171 elderly day places11. Actual provision fell 
far short of this and Battersea's quota was particularly low.
e) Community Psychiatric Nurses
A Community Psychiatric Nursing Service was established in 
North Battersea in 1975. This was a hospital based service and 
as such 99% of referrals came directly from consultant 
psychiatrists. Each of the hospital consultants had an 
attached community psychiatric nurse (CPN) who followed 
clients discharged from Springfield Hospital and cared for
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mentally ill people living in the community. They attended 
ward rounds and then worked fairly autonomously in the 
community. Each CPN carried a case-load of between 30-50 
clients, the vast majority of them having suffered with a 
psychotic illness. Approximately 40% of the CPNs clients were 
referred following a domiciliary visit by the consultant or a 
client attendance at the out-patient department in the local 
psychiatric hospital. The other 60% were referred for after 
care following hospitalisation12.
The CPNs brief was basically to medicate and give family 
counselling, but very little was offered in terms of work 
towards social reorientation and their work was done with 
little formal supervision, though they did attend ward-rounds 
when relevant, and kept up a regular correspondence with the 
consultant and other professionals. It was a very stark form 
of chronic care. However, it had a very important role to play 
in keeping clients out of hospital. One consultant interviewed 
pointed out that for example, Hammersmith Health Authority had 
no CPN service at this time and had 3-4 times the number of 
in-patient admissions.
In addition, in 1978 a state enrolled nurse joined the CPN 
service and accepted responsibility for some of the more long 
term clients, to allow the CPN to accept new cases. This SEN 
was not full-time for the Battersea Teams but spent about one 
third of her time in other areas. Essentially then there were 
three staff, who between them carried a case load of over 90 
community cases.
f) Social Services Provision
Social Services' facilities for mentally ill people in 
Wandsworth at this time were the following13: hostel
accommodation in two ten place hostels in Putney and two 
twelve place hostels in Wimbledon and North Balham, with a 
further 29 place hostel under construction in Tooting ; one 
"Group Home" was operating, with six more planned to be opened 
in 1980-1981, two of which were to be specifically for Carr 
Gomm members; there was also a housing commitment of 20 units
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per year for mental health purposes that was planned to be 
increased to 30 units, borough wide; and there were two Day- 
Centres, one in Bolingbroke Grove (between Balham and 
Wandsworth) that had 35 places, and one in Hazlewell Road 
(Putney) that also had 35 places.
It was apparent that the Hazlewell Day Centre provided a 
valuable service but at Putney it was not well placed to serve 
people living in Battersea. The Bolingbroke Grove Day Centre 
was better placed but its operational policy concentrated on 
the younger communicating clients, offering a social and 
therapeutic community rather than work rehabilitation 
programmes. The emphasis was very much upon a 
psychotherapeutic way of working. This day-centre was not 
fully used, and the day centre staff thought that referrers 
sometimes avoided making day centre referrals because of 
transport problems.
The consultant led psychiatric team at Springfield Hospital, 
comprising the consultant and the nursing staff also had a 
liaison social worker working between the hospital and 
community. This was a "joint appointment" social worker who 
was a half time member of the multi-disciplinary team in its 
earliest form. The Battersea Area Social Services Office at 
Lavender Hill had 14 social workers, 7 working in North 
Battersea, and 7 in South Battersea and this system continued 
from the early 1970s until the early 1980s when Social 
Services re-organised with an emphasis on generic working. 
Individual social workers were in contact with the consultant 
psychiatrists and there was a well established emergency 
service, where both would provide emergency home visits.
This system was being operated long before the catchment area 
teams were introduced, but not without problems. For example, 
a problem identified at a Joint Care Planning Team meeting in 
1979, was that of social work support at the clinic at St 
James'14. This was seen as a difficult problem to solve. At 
Springfield there was a social worker assigned to work with 
the Battersea teams and that worked well. If problems were
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encountered in the out patient clinic at St James' then either 
this social worker had to be called across or a social worker 
from the wards in St James'. Referrals to community social 
workers at this time met with long delays, but the number of 
times such help was needed was not seen as sufficient to 
justify asking for a social worker to be present at the 
clinics. Similar problems were being experienced at 
Bolingbroke and St George's hospitals.
g) Non-statutorv provision
Voluntary community based organisations were also in existence 
in Wandsworth in 1979. For instance, there was the Balham 
Action and Counselling Centre, the Family Welfare Association 
and the Doddington Family Centre, which catered for disturbed 
and depressed people who did not feel that their needs were 
met by the statutory services. They undertook a great deal of 
preventative work in the mental health field. In 1979, these 
organisations were considered to merit more support from the 
statutory bodies and as yet had no use of joint finance 
monies. Essentially in Battersea little account of these 
services already in existence was taken in any Health or 
Social Service planning briefs and there was no joint use of 
resources15.
h) General Practitioners
Responsibility for the mentally ill was sometimes accepted 
completely by the General Practitioner, but the extent to 
which this was possible reflected only the interests and 
abilities of the individual GP and also the range and 
accessibility of supporting services. An Emergency Service was 
provided for GPs, by the hospital consultants, where home 
visits were made within twenty four hours and usually on the 
same day. GPs could also make emergency referrals to the out­
patient clinics or occasionally send clients up to the ward. 
In these days, referral procedures were very informal. More 
people were admitted to hospital directly without specialist 
assessment and much relied on the GPs word.
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j) Rehabilitation and Other Services
In the early 1970s the Senior Hospital Medical Officer at 
Springfield took on the task of rehabilitating all those 
patients who he considered to be capable of leaving 
Springfield. This was a big and efficient rehabilitation push 
which ended around 1974. Therefore, those left in hospital 
were the very difficult "old long stay" patients and the "new 
long stay". Two hospital consultants started the 
rehabilitation work again in the early 1980s and very little 
was done in the intervening period. Therefore, there was no 
specific rehabilitation service in place in 1979. Clients 
needing rehabilitation had been maintained by the hospital 
ward nursing staff, which entailed very little in the way of 
rehabilitation work. There was an industrial therapy unit 
(ITU) at Springfield Hospital, but this was used mostly by 
long term hospital inpatients rather than community clients. 
Hence, rehabilitation work with long term mentally ill clients 
living in the community was almost non-existent. The sole 
provision was of a few client support groups utilised by 
Battersea clients such as a "Friday Club" and several luncheon 
clubs.
General Mental Health Service Problems in Battersea 
The above account of the Battersea services in 1979 gives some 
indication of the gaps in services that existed. However, 
further consideration of interview material gives additional 
details of the key areas that were considered problematic.
1 ) QUALITY AND FOCUS OF EXISTING COMMUNITY PROVISION 
What existed essentially was a skeleton community psychiatric 
emergency service with some follow up by community psychiatric 
nurses. The work was not multi disciplinary in the sense that 
the word is now most commonly used (see later discussion in 
chapter seven). Junior medical staff and nurses did not work 
out of the hospital and there was no community occupational 
therapy. Staff and management perceptions during this period 
were that the follow up of clients who dropped out of care was 
not rigorous and was usually left to Social Services or the 
GPs. Follow up was very sporadic and only the more articulate
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and demanding clients were followed through and continued to 
be seen in the community. Many clients dropped out of care on 
discharge from the hospital and little support was available 
until the client's situation deteriorated to a level where 
they relapsed and were readmitted to hospital.
Therefore, the quality of the services provided was very 
variable, as much depended on the attitudes and commitment of 
individual GPs. There were more beds available in the hospital 
than under later arrangements, so more people were admitted 
for in-patient care than in the following decade, but there 
was a major problem with "revolving door" clients who were 
frequently admitted, time and time again. Admissions on the 
acute wards were gradually getting shorter. There was some 
successful work in rehabilitating some of the "old long stay" 
clients in the early 1970s, but there was no structured 
approach to rehabilitation after this time.
Out patient clinics and the work of the community psychiatric 
nurses were essentially the only form of community after care 
organised by the mental health service. There were many 
clients who were very long term attenders. There was no drop- 
in centre or formal crisis intervention and crises were dealt 
with mainly by hospitalisation of the person regarded as ill. 
One consultant interviewed pointed out that there was at the 
time immense pressure on hospital beds and a major instruction 
was to reduce length of stay, as well as admission rates, with 
little emphasis on developing alternative services. There was 
an increasing workload and this had to be coped with by the 
existing staff establishment. No extra staff were provided and 
inherently this situation was resulting in low morale among 
the staff group. Also it was recognised that the 
psychogeriatric population produced a great stress on the 
service.
2) NEEDS AND DISTRIBUTION OF LONG TERM MENTALLY ILL CLIENTS 
An overwhelming feature of community care services as they 
existed was that there was no apparent matching of community 
provision with areas of particularly high morbidity. This was
116
the pattern in many other Health Authorities across the U.K. 
at the time. In relation to particular medical services and 
interventions, variations in service provision did not appear 
to correlate strongly with differences arising from 
characteristics of populations or geography. It was clear in 
retrospect that mentally ill people needed health services, 
social welfare, social security, housing, employment, 
training, rehabilitation, transport and social activities. 
Services were not adequately addressing these needs. 
Interviewees stated that from a client treatment view point, 
little attention was paid to preventing serious conditions 
from getting worse or to consistently maintaining helpful 
treatments. Traditionally, services had been based in the 
medical model of care and this continued to be the prevailing 
model, despite its perceived short comings.
3) CO-ORDINATION AND RANGE OF EXISTING SERVICES
It was clear that there was little co-ordination between or 
within services and such co-ordination would demand a 
tremendous psychological step forward. Joint working between 
the health and Social Services was very limited and there was 
little consultation with local voluntary initiatives. Also 
there was no assessment of need for services. Clients were 
generally being treated as an amorphous mass. No attention was 
paid to the differing needs of people with the more severe 
condition. There was no targeting of services to those who 
needed them most, such as the long term mentally ill. Little 
preventative or educational work was being done in the 
community. No provision was being made that was adapted to the 
needs of people from different ethnic backgrounds and social 
class and the range of community services was generally very 
limited.
4) CONCEPTUAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE BARRIERS
There were myths about the difficulties of providing services 
in the community rather than the institution. Those working in 
the hospital were reluctant to work outside the closed 
community of the hospital environment. It was thought that 
community work was more time consuming because all the
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facilities were not provided on one site as in the hospital 
situation, and this may have led to the unwillingness of some 
to move more towards a model of community working. For 
community services that were provided, administrative 
structures were rigid and there was no flexibility. There were 
no common community psychiatric patient notes, only In-patient 
and Out-patient notes, and the community psychiatric nurses 
and social workers each kept their own individual notes as 
well. This caused much duplication of work and communication, 
link and liaison problems. However, the situation was 
inevitable due to the different office locations of the 
various workers and photostatting facilities were less 
accessible at this time, compared with present day 
arrangements. The CPN notes were spearheads for the multi­
disciplinary notes that were later developed.
DISCUSSION
Before 1979, community mental health in Battersea was not a 
major issue on the planning agenda. The poor service provision 
detailed above mirrors the pattern that had developed in many 
other areas of the country at this time. There were general 
problems, many of which were not specific to Battersea but can 
be observed with hindsight in this area in a particularly 
acute manor. Despite the fact that community care had been 
officially enshrined in government policy eighteen years 
earlier, community services were weak, particularly those 
provided by the Local Authority. The social context of North 
Battersea was creating exceptional demands for services and 
the social fabric, in terms of family support, was too fragile 
to respond. The generalised accounts of the problems with 
community care policy presented in chapter three find echoes 
in the history of service provision in the case study area. It 
is now the intention to see which interpretations contribute 
in accounting for this pattern of provision at the local 
level.
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Traditional/Pluralist Contribution
The first element of traditional/pluralist accounts of 
community care was identified in chapter three to lie in the 
"medical model" of care. Traditional/pluralist accounts 
suggested that adoption of the policy partly occurred as a 
result of an overall improvement in the treatment of mental 
illness brought about by advances in medical technology and 
increasing professional specialisation. It was claimed that, 
for the first time, decarceration of patients into the 
community was possible because they were being cured more 
quickly and effectively. However, while this may have been 
true for people with milder "acute" mental health problems, 
case study evidence suggested that there remained a pool of 
clients who were not and could not be "cured" (the long term 
mentally ill). The impression was that after eighteen years of 
community care policy these clients were as vulnerable and as 
"mentally ill" as they had ever been. There may have been 
improvement in drug therapies, but these were of little 
relevance when the social disablements of clients were so far 
reaching and when client management mechanisms for the long 
term mentally ill were so obviously poor. Only the most basic 
follow-up provision was being offered, and this was not the 
result of a deliberate policy developed to meet the needs of 
a changing client population, consisting of more clients who 
were generally "better" and required less further help. This 
suggests that one reason why community care for the mentally 
ill was so difficult to implement in the U.K. in the 1970s, was 
that the ideological foundation of the community services that 
were provided did not give adequate attention to addressing 
the social disablements of clients and too readily assumed 
that people with mental health problems formed a homogenous 
group. The "cure" focused model tended to provide too few 
services and to lead to "block treatment" which was 
particularly inappropriate to the needs of the long term 
mentally ill client group.
The second element noted in traditional/pluralist accounts of 
community care was that modern society had become increasingly 
humane and community care had developed out of the
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institutions as part of a general moral advancement. Case 
study evidence suggested that it could only have been 
perceived as more humane if the services that had originally 
been provided in the institution had been re-provided in 
community settings. As highlighted in the literature presented 
in chapter two and in the account of services that existed in 
the case study area before 1979, community care offered little 
in the way of "asylum", long term maintenance or social and 
welfare support. This suggests that community care was also 
difficult to implement at the local level in the 1970s because 
community services provided were not comprehensive and was not 
a wide enough range.
The traditional/pluralist interpretations also suggested that 
the lack of central government directives regarding community 
care in the 1970s allowed enlightened thinking to develop. 
This may have been the case in some areas of the U.K., but 
there was no evidence that such enlightened thinking had 
developed in the case study area before 1979. People were 
aware that problems existed, but there were no formal plans to 
isolate and address them. Service provision was drifting. Any 
community services that did exist were there by default rather 
than by planning. Community psychiatric nurses had existed 
alongside the institutions since 1975 offering a minimal 
amount of support to those leaving hospital and little was 
being done to give new ideological emphasis, improved staff 
training or financial support to boost this service. Services 
were not naturally developing to supersede those that had 
previously been provided in Springfield Hospital.
In chapter three, traditional accounts were also noted to rest 
on the notion of a plurality of interests who contributed to 
the formation of local community care policy. Yet the 
description of community services that existed before 1979 in 
the case study area suggested that service structures were 
dominated by medical interests, Local Authority and voluntary 
sector input was minimal and the interests of clients and 
their carers were simply not represented. No evidence was 
found of any local pressure group activity. There was no
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evidence that the service pressures resulted in any action to 
force change on the part of professionals, other community 
agencies, clients, carers or anyone in the political or
management spheres. Therefore, at this time there was in no
sense a pluralist response to the service problems. Also, 
decision making was not unpredictable and open-ended, as 
suggested by the pluralist position, rather it appeared 
completely dominated by the existing state of affairs. Changes 
that did occur were reactive, but did not to any degree spur 
real change in service provision.
In addition no evidence was found in any of the documents 
analysed to indicate a positive reaction to the
deinstitutionalisation of the "old long stay" mentally ill
from citizens in the community. Stories were found in the 
local press of local people protesting vehemently when they 
discovered that new tenants in their street had previously 
been occupants of Springfield Hospital. The "community", it 
seems, was not developing a new liberal attitude towards 
people with mental health problems based on growing knowledge 
and acceptance. In fact the same prejudices were still being 
attached to the mentally ill in the community as had been in 
the mental hospital. The stigma of mental illness had not 
diminished as far as the general public was concerned.
Sociological/Anthropological Contribution
Sociological and anthropological accounts of the move to 
community care suggested that the increasing recognition of 
the anti-therapeutic nature of institutional care, highlighted 
by a diverse range of studies, led to a re-conceptualisation 
of therapeutic activity towards treatment that focused on 
individual psychological and social approaches to care. Yet, 
there was little case study evidence that suggested this had 
occurred before 1979 at the local level. Community service 
structures still focused primarily on medical care and 
institutional provision. This suggests that a further reason 
for the problematic implementation of community care policy 
during the 1970s was that social models of care were not 
adopted across the board at the local level. Also, there was
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little attempt to shift services away from the hospitals and 
the "institutional" attitudes of staff were transferred into 
the community.
The social control question raised in chapter three prompts a 
range of considerations in relation to the case study 
evidence. There was seemingly no formal attempt at social 
control of clients in Battersea, aside from the continued 
powers of consultant psychiatrists to section people in the 
community, legally requiring clients to be removed from that 
setting and returned to the institution for treatment. Then, 
as now, there was no community treatment order forcing people 
to continue to take their medication in the community. 
However, one could argue that the mentally ill were being 
socially controlled in another sense. They were being 
discharged into a largely hostile community, many with a 
reduced ability to take care of themselves, facing enormous 
problems with finances, housing and social relationships. They 
were not empowered in any way for their life "back" in the 
community and it was only the more vocal amongst them who were 
able to secure the help they needed with benefits, employment 
advice and on-going social support. In this sense they were 
essentially still controlled socially as it was virtually 
impossible for them to do anything much more than "scratch an 
existence" and they were hence indirectly encouraged to 
withdraw socially.
The sociological approach does appear to help us in our 
analysis in identifying a key problem illustrated in this 
chapter, namely the relationship between social structure (the 
prevailing socio-economic organisation of society) and social 
action (the behaviour of individuals and groups within that 
structure). This mismatch was one of the central problems in 
the case study area. The social fabric of the area was weak, 
housing provision was poor and Health and Social Services were 
minimal. Before 1979 there were no concrete plans to redress 
the obvious faults of the system. This chapter has illustrated 
how those suffering from mental illness in Battersea 
(particularly the long term mentally ill) were essentially
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forced into a position of lower social status through 
environmental pressures and rendered politically powerless by 
the lack of any action to improve their position. Proponents 
of the sociological accounts would argue that mental illness 
is socially constructed and must be understood in terms of the 
interaction of sufferers with their environment. Consideration 
of this position further suggests that the model of mental 
illness utilised in community care policy formation at the 
local level before 1979 was too restrictive.
Also administratively, community services were hopelessly 
inefficient as there was little coordination between different 
services from the statutory and non statutory agencies. It has 
been shown that catchment boundaries between statutory 
services did not match and consequently it was difficult for 
these services to work together. There could not be a "whole 
person" response to individual clients within such a dis­
jointed system.
Marxist Contribution
Marxist interpretations of community care suggest that it has 
been problematic due to a fundamental misconception about the 
ideological framework of mental illness, and its role to 
contain the stresses of the existing capitalist order under 
the control of the ruling classes. Material presented in this 
chapter suggests that at the local level, the Marxist position 
is too crude and mechanistic to contribute much to the 
analysis. The capitalist basis of service provision was not 
questioned in any of the documentary material studied or by 
any of the subjects interviewed. It may well be true to say 
that services had developed in such a way as to perpetuate the 
class-based divisions in society, but no definite proof for 
this position was forthcoming and it does not help us in 
approaching practical problems at the local level.
However, the account of services that existed before 1979 did 
generally highlight that there was a need to address social 
and political issues in relation to housing, employment, 
nutrition and education and underlined the lack of
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coordination between different types of service agency. It 
seems responsibility for the care of the long term mentally 
ill was transferred from the state to informal community 
networks without a change in the fundamental concept of mental 
illness itself. Since in the case study area informal 
community networks were so weak, this provides a further 
reason why implementation of community care policy was so 
problematic. Responsibility was essentially transferred into 
a virtual social and political vacuum.
A further contribution of the Marxist interpretation may also 
lie in its emphasis on the need to politicise the nature and 
methods of service provision. Documentary and interview 
evidence from the period before 1979 suggested that clients 
and their carers were passive recipients of the services that 
existed. No attempts were made through the provision of 
services to empower them or to make them aware that anything 
could be done to change the mental health system. In addition, 
there was no case study evidence that the power structure 
amongst service planners and providers was being questioned or 
that any mechanisms existed whereby the professionals and 
service planners were made accountable to the public.
Economic Contribution
The economic interpretations discussed in chapter three 
suggested that the origin and problematic nature of community 
care can be explained solely in terms of economics and 
finance. It could be claimed that community care services at 
the local level were poor because insufficient financial 
support had been provided for the creation of new services. 
Yet case study evidence demonstrated that some community 
services existed, but the biggest problem was that they did 
not adequately cater for the needs of those with long term 
mental health problems. A purely economic analysis of this 
situation appears too simplistic.
The scale of the problem of financial control was growing 
rapidly before 1979. With the move towards community services, 
increased emphasis was generally being placed on the expanding
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role of psychiatric treatment and there was growing concern 
regarding the financial feasibility of making psychiatric 
services more widely available. Services were being extended 
to serve a group of individuals with less severe problems and 
who tended to be more vocal about their needs (acute clients). 
This excluded from service provision those too socially 
chaotic to seek out services. Additional finance was obviously 
required to modernise existing services and to develop 
alternative new services in the community and although money 
could have been made available before 1979, there was no push 
to shift financial allocation from hospital to community 
services. It has been illustrated throughout this chapter that 
resources were still largely tied up in hospital based 
services. The underlying reason for this under-funding of 
community services appeared to be the lack of any political 
will to address the issue. Community mental health provision 
for the long term mentally ill was not at this time high on 
the political agenda. Staff and management were aware of the 
problems but no-one was promoting the cause and so there was 
no pressure for planners to seek out additional funding. 
Hence, it seems that the real contribution of the economic 
perspective is in highlighting the need to consider financial 
allocation problems. Service change was being prevented, not 
because the money was not available, but rather because the 
money was distributed in a bureaucratic system that did not 
allow for the use of joint finances in any way or for the free 
movement of money from one area to another area of higher need 
to allow new community services to be set up.
If cost reduction was the supposed motive behind community 
care, one would have thought attention would have been paid to 
keeping costs to a minimum. Interview evidence suggested that 
the local mental health system was in fact operating on a 
financially inefficient basis. For example, it would have cost 
the Health Authority more to accommodate "revolving door" 
clients who were continually in and out of hospital than to 
provide them with minimal levels of support to stay in the 
community. Keeping others in hospital for longer than 
necessary because they did not have adequate housing to return
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to on discharge or because their self care skills were poor, 
was probably more expensive than providing services in the 
community. This however did not motivate service change at the 
local level before 1979.
Elitist Contribution
Elitist accounts of community care presented in chapter five 
suggested that policies were being dominated by the 
psychiatric profession who successfully resisted policy 
implementation through their monopoly control over service 
provision. Case study evidence demonstrated that before 1979, 
service provision in the case study area was very much in the 
control of the psychiatrists. For example, the account of the 
formation of catchment areas showed that these arrangements 
were largely based on the preferences of individual consultant 
psychiatrists, and other services were subsequently fitted in 
around them. It was the consultant psychiatrists who retained 
the power to determine how Health Authority services were 
shaped and since the majority of the community services listed 
in the first part of this chapter were health services, this 
gave the psychiatrists virtual elitist control over community 
mental health provision. GPs were noted to have had some power 
in acting as the main filter for clients to access these 
services and hence had some control over client eligibility 
criteria, but psychiatrists retained the final word. Social 
Services and voluntary sector services were minimal. 
Interviewees reported poor inter-service coordination, 
particularly between Health and Social Services, but also 
between statutory and non-statutory providers. Professionals 
worked along side each other, but there was no multi­
disciplinary team working.
Interview evidence also suggested that, particularly amongst 
psychiatrists and nurses, there was a backlash against 
community care before 1979. Comments indicating an 
unwillingness to disperse services in the community were heard 
repeatedly during interviews about the situation before 1979, 
a common belief being that it was only when services were 
provided on one site that staff could organise themselves
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effectively. Any changes that occurred were reactive and there 
was no specifically stated drive to develop new services or to 
shift the emphasis away from medical domination, rooted as 
they were in a fairly insular standard pattern of well-tried 
approaches. The policy planning environment had been somewhat 
stagnant for several years.
However, the evidence presented in this chapter is not 
extensive enough to be able to comment on the nature and 
extent of the psychiatric elitism that was observed. It does 
not demonstrate whether there were any internal divisions 
within the local group of psychiatrists and nor does it 
describe the manner in which the different professions and 
interested groups related to each other in the formation of 
policy. Therefore, it can be said that at first sight the 
consultant psychiatrists at the local level did seem to have 
an elitist control over service determination and because 
community services were so weak, it could imply that there was 
some resistance to developing a more community-oriented 
service from within the psychiatric profession, but it will be 
necessary to continue this theme in later case study chapters 
to determine its overall impact at the local level.
Feminist Contribution
Feminist accounts of community care presented in chapter three 
contended that the policy is rooted in the patriarchal control 
of women and the exploitation of women’s labour, both as low- 
paid, low status professionals and as unpaid informal carers. 
Hence, in broad terms, feminists attributed the problematic 
nature of community care implementation to male social control 
over women as professionals, carers and clients resulting in 
the provision of inadequate community services that were 
overly reliant on informal social networks. In terms of 
professionals, those in positions of power in the case study 
area (the consultant psychiatrists) were nearly all men. 
Amongst other professionals, interview evidence suggested that 
there was a fairly even mix of males and females, but females 
were predominant at lower levels of all professional 
hierarchies. While this situation was undeniably unequal in
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terms of gender, it is impossible to locate any evidence 
suggesting that male domination of the professions was the 
direct reason for the poor community services that existed, 
since no situation existed where the reverse was true.
In terms of women as carers, the description of service 
provision showed that women were given little specific 
community support, except through low profile voluntary sector 
projects like the Family Welfare Association. As clients, 
documentary evidence revealed that especially amongst the long 
term mentally ill, there was an over representation of young 
men rather than of women as clients. However, women were over 
represented amongst those suffering from neurotic based 
disorders. Perhaps the main contribution of the feminist 
interpretation here is to highlight that attention should have 
been paid to the differing needs of the various sub groups 
within the spectrum of mental health service users, as these 
were being grossly overlooked at the time.
This applied to minority and marginalised needs in general, 
not just to women. Services were not tailored in any way to 
the needs of the individual service user and the long term 
mentally ill clients were particularly poorly catered for. 
There was no attempt to target those from different ethnic 
backgrounds and to tackle the specific problems that they 
faced. The disproportionately high morbidity of the North 
Battersea area was not formally recognised as creating a 
greater strain on Battersea services than other areas. Neither 
had the presence of a high number of single parent families 
living in the Battersea area stimulated a change in services 
provision to meet their particular needs for child-care and 
social support. Social support services generally were 
lacking.
In Brief
This chapter has described the basis from which community 
services in the case study area evolved and has explored the 
initial contribution of the various structural and 
philosophical interpretations to an understanding of this
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process. Several reasons were suggested to explain why 
community care for the long term mentally ill had been so 
difficult to implement at the local level during the 1970s. 
The ideological foundation of services that were provided did 
not give adequate attention to addressing the social 
disablements of clients and too readily assumed that people 
with mental health problems formed a homogenous group. Also, 
the quantity and range of community services was too 
restricted and they were not comprehensive. Financially, 
resources continued to be centred on the institution and there 
was an absence of any ideologically distinct new approach to 
service provision or political commitment to bring about 
change. Local consultant psychiatrists appeared to have 
monopoly control in determining local service structures and 
were resistant to change. In the following chapter the phases 
of development that occurred after 1979, that lead to the 
subsequent formation of a CMHT will be presented and 
discussed.
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CHAPTER 6:
Innovation in Community Mental Health Service Provision in
Battersea
The intention in this chapter is to consider how perceptions 
about potential gaps in services began to be formalised in the 
case study area and to document the actions and motivations of 
the actors involved in policy change. How was the issue of 
community provision put on the agenda and defined in the case 
study area? Where did the innovative ideas for reform come 
from and what factors shaped people's decisions about them? 
Why did it take so long before the CMHT model was taken on 
board and why was the implementation process so slow?
A detailed account of events will initially be presented. The 
predisposing factors for change in service provision will be 
drawn out and the debates that followed will be documented. 
This will encompass the positions of the main actors involved 
and the subsequent gelling of ideas towards an innovative idea 
being realised. In a discussion section in the second part of 
the chapter, the public policy framework established in 
chapter four will be used to analyse the origins of change and 
the institutional constraints within which the actors 
operated.
Perceived Gaps in Services
In August 1979 a meeting was held as part of the Wandsworth 
Joint Care Planning Team (JCPT) at Bolingbroke Hospital in 
Battersea, to discuss services for the mentally ill. This was 
the first such meeting that was organised in the area and 
signified a change in the forum by which planning aspects of 
services were to be discussed. It was attended by twenty one 
people: a range of senior psychiatrists, administrators,
community physicians, the chairman of the division of 
Psychiatry, representatives from the Community Health Council, 
local General Practitioners, the Nurse Director, the Local 
Authority Hostels Manager, a senior registrar in Community 
Medicine and three Social Services representatives1.
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In preparation for the meeting, Wandsworth Social Services 
Department distributed a brief background paper on the 
facilities offered to mentally ill people by the Borough2. The 
paper contained the suggestion that a day hospital should be 
provided for the mentally ill in Battersea. It stated that 
this had been in the plans for a long time, but had hitherto 
foundered on a lack of suitable premises and it was stated 
that during this time, the brief had been changed from 
offering a programme of rehabilitation to a range of people 
suffering from mental illness to long term containment of 
older mentally ill people. In addition, it stated that the 
social service's two existing day centres were not being fully 
used and it was therefore hard to make a strong case for 
increasing capacity.
A further paper was introduced at the meeting from the Health 
Service side that identified the problems in community mental 
health in Battersea3. It was suggested that if the need could 
be more clearly demonstrated for increased day provision in 
Battersea, this might be a joint health and Social Services 
venture, using capital from joint finance monies and then 
joint revenue funded by both Wandsworth and East Merton 
District and Wandsworth Social Services to build a new day 
hospital. It was hoped that such a venture would both provide 
a focus within Battersea for mental illness services and 
provide for the whole spectrum of day attenders by including 
some medical and nursing input and a work rehabilitation 
programme. There was no mention at this time of anything 
connected with a CMHT approach.
Pressure Points Under Discussion at the 1979 Meeting 
At the 1979 JCPT meeting, arguments for and against the day 
hospital proposal were put forward. These can be summarised as 
follows:
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Arguments For:
1) Community provision at the time was inadequate leading to 
unnecessary admissions. Many wards were still occupied by 
clients from catchments outside the Merton, Sutton and 
Wandsworth Area Health Authority.
2) There were problems in services for the elderly mentally 
ill. The need for emergency admission of elderly mentally 
ill clients on to acute assessment wards had implications 
for both staff and clients, and had an impact on GPs 
readiness to admit young clients to the hospital wards.
3) The high morbidity in the area (as detailed in chapter 
five). It was accepted that the provision by both health 
and local authorities was below the norm for day hospital 
and day centre provision in relation to Borough 
population.
4) The inaccessibility of the existing day hospital on the 
Springfield site for residents of Battersea and 
accompanying poor public transport links.
5) The unwillingness of some clients to go to Springfield 
because of the stigma attached. It was thought that 
facilities on a separate site might well be more 
attractive.
6) The need for work-place experience for short stay clients 
in Springfield and those attending the Cottage Day 
Hospital. It was recognised that there was a need for 
Department of Employment support for any sizeable work 
rehabilitation programmes.
Arguments Against
1) Reservations were expressed about the staffing of a new 
day hospital. At the time, clients in the Cottage Day 
Hospital were seen by a consultant once a fortnight but 
more regularly by junior staff on the site. Also the 
junior staff were on call at all times if needed in the 
Day Hospital. To provide the same sort of cover in a 
Battersea day hospital would require an additional 
registrar on that site.
2) It was felt that much of the success of a new day 
hospital would depend on the nursing staff and it was 
questioned whether an outlying day hospital unit in 
Battersea would attract the right calibre of staff.
3) The revenue cut-backs faced by both health and local 
authorities at the time were perceived to preclude new 
developments.
4) It was recognised that there would be a problem in 
finding any site at all for a new day hospital in 
Battersea, especially in finding a site that was 
accessible to both the North and South Battersea 
catchment areas.
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Resultant Plans for Action from JCPT Meeting
From the JCPT meeting, a plan was made for future action4. The 
Social Services Department would review the operational policy 
of the Bolingbroke Grove Day Centre and enter into discussions 
with the Area teams at Springfield Hospital about the clients 
considered to be in need of day centre referral and thought to 
be unsuitable for Bolingbroke Grove. The Area Health Authority 
would draw up a planning brief for the new day hospital
project. A quantitative statement of need would be prepared, 
using information collected from attendants at the meeting. So 
in 1979, the idea of a new Battersea day hospital was back on 
the agenda after appearing in several planning documents over 
the previous few years, but the plans for action were
tentative.
There were several people at the meeting who felt cynical
about the idea and had reservations. Two of the local
consultant psychiatrists pointed to the weak justification for 
the idea and the main objection that they voiced was on the 
grounds of staff shortages. They emphasised again that the 
medical registrars were already overworked and more junior 
staff were needed. They proposed that there was no way that a 
new day hospital could be run just with existing Springfield 
Hospital staff. No one put forward any ideas about how to 
resolve this issue and the day hospital idea was subsequently 
shelved on the strength of this objection.
With hindsight, one consultant suggested that there was also 
a hidden agenda. Consultant psychiatrists did not want a 
shared facility with Social Services, because of the bad 
experience at Bolingbroke Grove. This was a mental health 
after-care day centre which was run by some very good social 
workers but was managed by a person absolutely committed to 
the idea of the therapeutic community, who aimed to effect 
permanent changes in the lives of the clients. The centre 
eventually closed as it was felt that it was not catering to 
the client group who really required the service. A Social 
Service day centre was opened to replace it in Balham, but 
there was no question that this could have been a joint Health
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and Social Services initiative.
Reflections on the First Planning Stage
These kinds of problems have been identified in the 
administrative literature, as one of the major failings of 
joint planning, as referred to in chapter four. For the mental 
illness services in Battersea, joint funding proposals served 
only to act as an impetus to think about required changes. The 
only joint funding money that was ever actually forthcoming 
for the mentally ill as a priority group was to fund one 
senior social work post in 1987. Yet it was through the joint 
planning machinery that increased provision for the mentally 
ill in Battersea was first raised as an issue. Hence, this new 
idea originated from proposals considered when it was thought 
that money might be available. The day hospital project was 
one of the many old projects drawn from existing plans that 
was given rather higher priority to be built sooner than it 
might have been in the absence of joint funding. This pattern 
closely resembles that reported by Glennerster et al (1983), 
who identified joint funding as "Face Money", untied to a 
service proposal, which allowed new ideas to take shape. 
However, the debates about medical cover to the proposed new 
day provision could not be resolved and no site was found for 
the proposed centre so the scheme was dropped. In essence, it 
was the local consultant psychiatrists who blocked the 
proposal, but the idea had been brought back into circulation.
Precipitating Factors that Helped Crvstalise the Ideas 
It was not until 1981, two years after the initial suggestion, 
that the issue of a new day hospital was again formally 
raised5. Five precipitating factors prompting its return to 
the agenda can be identified:
1 ) THE SUDDEN INTEREST OF A DETERMINED ACTOR 
Between 1979 and 1981, one of the Battersea consultant 
psychiatrists had become more intrigued with the day hospital 
idea. She was beguiled by the way that the Cottage Day 
Hospital on the Springfield site was run and was starting to
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explore ways that it could be improved. Her thoughts at the 
time were concerned with the philosophy of patient care and an 
awareness of the financial situation of service provision. She 
felt that the day hospital should be a more humane form of 
care and should also be cheaper than the existing provision. 
This consultant thought about the original meeting where she 
had decided not to have anything to do with the proposed day 
hospital and decided that it had been a mistake. Indeed she 
did want something to do with it, especially if she could have 
a major say in how it was run. And it was at this point that 
her ideas began to take shape. The sudden determined interest 
of this particular actor had a great impact on subsequent 
developments.
2) PERSONNEL AND PROFESSIONAL CHANGES
The Battersea consultant mentioned above had begun working in 
the Wandsworth District in 1976 and became a consultant in 
1979. In 1982, while the day hospital negotiations were in 
progress she became Medical Administrator of Springfield 
Hospital. In those days this position held more planning power 
than it did later. Essentially there were three people who ran 
the hospital: Medical Administrator, Lay administrator and 
Chief Nurse. They made up the Unit Management Group who 
spearheaded all developments. Therefore, the consultant was 
suddenly in a very influential position. Also, a new 
administrator was appointed who demonstrated considerable 
ability and enthusiasm for new developments.
3) MORALE BOOSTS
By 1981, Springfield Hospital had been given control of their 
budget for the first time, which had previously been the 
responsibility of the District Health Authority. This did not 
have much to do with the day hospital itself, but meant that 
morale in the hospital improved, along with a feeling of 
management empowerment. Suddenly, some of the day to day 
frustrations of hospital life were ameliorated in terms of 
organisational efficiency. For example, one consultant 
interviewed recalled a time when she was a ward registrar when 
it took two years to get a new door put in. Such issues had in
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the past been a significant drain on morale. When Springfield 
Hospital became budget holders they were able to improve their 
organisational efficiency and were also able to develop some 
new ideas. For instance, the hospital was allowed to put their 
obligatory 2% savings to fund a psychotherapist post for 
Springfield among other things, rather than feed it straight 
back into a Regional Health Authority account.
4) POLITICAL & FINANCIAL CHANGES
Also at this time, there was a lot of discussion and planning 
related to the closure of the South London Hospital for Women 
(one of only two women's hospitals in London). It had been a 
standard bearer, a place where a lot of women doctors could 
get senior jobs that were not made available elsewhere. As the 
first of the credit squeezes began to bite in the early 1980s, 
the Health Authority pinpointed it for closure as it was under 
utilised and was not being well run. This caused mass public 
outrage. Plans had been made to close it in four years time, 
but eventually a decision was made to close it in 1980 to save 
four years running costs. This money was to be safe-guarded - 
"ring-fenced"- for Springfield Hospital so that the hospital 
could build better accommodation for the elderly mentally ill 
at a ground floor level. There was also some money becoming 
available from the sale of other hospital land.
Needless to say, all the money disappeared into an account at 
Region and was subsequently given to other hospitals for other 
projects. However, the existence of this supposedly large 
amount of money, did spur the making of plans for a new day 
hospital. The previous Medical Administrator at Springfield in 
1979 had been exploring the day hospital idea and had 
suggested that it should eventually become self funding in 
terms of capital expenditure. This was an added politically 
popular incentive for pursuing the day hospital project.
5) GOVERNMENT POLICY
The 1974 Government White Paper stated that "The day-activity 
area is the hub of the (psychiatric) unit" (p30). It put 
forward national norms with the accompanying adjunct that
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these were "no more than a considered assessment of the
requirement", and went on to suggest that "the day place ratio
in particular may (have needed) to be raised" (p31). Given
that the current provision of day places in Battersea was at
least 150 short of the requirement, the increase in these
facilities had taken on a considerable degree of priority for
the management. The White Paper had suggested that
"where the hospital serves a large geographic area it may 
be appropriate to provide an additional separate day
hospital  a peripheral day hospital might be provided
in association with a community hospital" (DHSS, 1974, 
p31 ) .
Hence, the day hospital proposal fitted in with central 
government thinking.
The Gelling of Ideas - Down to Practicalities 
In a report of a meeting held in December 19826 there appeared 
an article by the Battersea consultant entitled "Getting the 
Psychiatrist Out of the Hospital". It embraced the Battersea 
consultant's thoughts and ideas at the time as to how she 
planned to tackle the task of addressing the needs of the 
mentally ill in Battersea. She wanted to change the focus of 
attention from getting patients out of the hospital, to 
associated changes required in the staffing establishment. She 
drew on the ideas that had been circulated previously and 
supported the setting up of a day hospital in a large 
building, where up to ninety clients could be cared for on a 
daily basis, provided families could care for them at night 
and at the weekends. It was the first time that anyone had 
started to talk about the practicalities of who the day 
hospital would be serving and in what manner. A persuasive 
argument supporting such a development was put together by the 
consultant. This argument was more specific than the general 
advantage points that had been raised in 1979.
It was argued that a day hospital would be a cheaper form of 
care than institutional provision in terms of expenditure on 
salaries. It was stated that 75% of health care costs went on 
salaries and if ninety people were cared for full time in a 
residential establishment, it would take four to six times the
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number of staff. A list of 25 full time professionals, whom it 
was felt would be a necessary minimum for the proposed day 
hospital, was drawn up. This included: 13 Psychiatric Nurses; 
8 Occupational Therapists; 2 Psychiatrists (with psychotherapy 
skills); 1 Psychologist; 1 Senior Social Worker; and 2 Full 
time Secretaries. Earlier objections to the day hospital plan 
on the basis of staff shortages were not considered and 
somehow assumed no longer to be relevant.
With sufficient care-taker staff, evening use of the new day 
hospital premises was also envisaged. For example, a club for 
ex-patients who had largely recovered but still needed some 
support was suggested. Therefore, the idea was that the centre 
would offer ongoing support to ex-patients; a service that was 
not provided by the Health Authority at this time. Full time 
use of the proposed building was hence being suggested, so 
maximising its utilisation and cost efficiency. At the same 
time, it was believed that a small unit would lead to better 
morale of staff than in the larger unit at the hospital, with 
obvious benefits to the clients. A group of individual 
activities for clients were outlined, some practical, some 
therapeutic. The centre would be a place to come to where 
people were interested in you. This would serve a similar 
function to that of people who go to work everyday. It would 
get them out of the house and give them an interest away from 
home. This was perceived to be potentially invaluable for 
people with no alternative, who were at great risk of 
breakdown such as mothers kept at home by pre-school children. 
No evidence was cited to support any of these claims.
Subsequent Planning Activity
In January 1982, the Battersea consultant initiated the 
setting up of a Battersea Day Hospital Project Team where 
draft terms of reference and a constitution were drawn up7. 
The membership of the project team was as follows: the three 
Battersea Consultant Psychiatrists, an administrator in 
planning and client services, the District Works Officer 
(Engineering Representative), the District Building Officer, 
the Divisional Nursing Officer in Psychiatry, a Senior Nursing
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Officer from Springfield Hospital, an Occupational Therapy 
representative from Springfield Hospital and a Springfield 
Hospital administrator. It was agreed that the Project Team 
would also seek the views of other interested professions by 
co-option, including the District Catering Manager, District 
Services Manager, Principal Psychologist and Principal 
Psychiatric Social Worker. This project Team remained 
relatively stable in membership and continued to meet over the 
subsequent years.
By October 1982, a revised planning brief was drawn up with 
the objective of providing day services for the adult mentally 
ill and the elderly severely mentally ill in the Northern part 
of the Springfield catchment area on the principles stated 
below8.
Box 2: Wandsworth Health Authority Adult Psychiatry
Principles-1982
1) A psychotherapeutic milieu in which problems of 
loneliness, bereavement, inappropriate patterns 
of making demands on friends and relatives, 
soft drug and alcohol abuse could be explored 
and support given during the therapeutic 
change.
2) More traditional rehabilitation procedures for 
institutionalised patients struggling out of a 
long illness.
3) The drawing together of community resources 
(often relating more to physical than to 
psychiatric illness) to help disabled people 
who are ill at home without appropriate 
support.
4) Assessment, subsequently allowing well informed 
referral to other agencies eg Henderson 
Hospital, the Regional Alcoholism Unit, Local 
Authority Day Care facilities.
5) Containment and treatment of neurotic and 
psychotic illness, avoiding the necessity for 
hospital admission.
It was envisaged that the planned day hospital would be newly 
constructed and would rely upon support from the District 
Health Authority and its hospital services as a whole. In
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April 1983, a suitable name for the Battersea Day Hospital was
researched, that would render it acceptable to local
residents9. It was discovered that Edward Wilson (1872-1911);
naturalist, artist, doctor and Arctic explorer had lived in
Battersea when he came down to St George's Hospital in 1895 to
study medicine. The Battersea consultant felt that the name
"Edward Wilson House" was
"... extraordinarily appropriate combining as it does the 
St George's connection, the Battersea connection and the 
implied reference to the pioneering spirit which took 
Wilson to the Antarctic."
The naming of the proposed day hospital at this point raised 
the profile of the project. No longer was the day hospital 
part of an abstract plan.
Building Proposals
Throughout 1982, the Unit Management Group at Springfield 
Hospital became involved in a series of discussions at 
Regional level and negotiated with the Department of Health, 
who began to get very excited about the proposed day hospital 
development. It embraced the Thatcherite ideal of cooperating 
with the private sector and energy was put into planning and 
looking for a tender from a private company.
A site had been suggested on the corner of Battersea Park, 
where the former Battersea General Hospital had been10. The 
site was too big for what was required, and too small for half 
of it to be sold and the other half retained. Therefore, the 
idea was to offer the site to a private company for 
development with the payment being that at the same time that 
development must include the building of a new day hospital
which would then be given to the Health Authority. With the
acceptance of the day hospital plans in 1982, the DHSS in 
consultation with the District Valuer proceeded to arrange the 
allocation of part of the site for the construction of a 
psychiatric day hospital in partnership with a private
developer. Under DHSS Circular HC (80)10 a private hospital
development required planning permission and authorisation 
from the Secretary of State for Social Services if certain 
medical facilities were to be provided and the development was
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to be of 120 beds or more.
The council stated their requirements for a successful 
planning application. It was keen to emphasise that in view of 
its history the site could be redeveloped for residential and 
or institutional uses, but in the predominantly residential 
area they would prefer residential use. The council also 
emphasized that the residential density and mix must meet 
certain council requirements (a high density of up to 100 
h.r.p.a or 247 h.r.p.h. provided that more than 50% of the 
units were non-family units) and that the development must 
also meet certain design objectives to satisfy the demands 
made by its prominent location11.
A joint day hospital and residential plan was drawn up by the
DHSS, that proposed a building that would be a copycat of
other buildings in the area in terms of design and an
application for planning permission was submitted. In
September 1983, the Development Control Committee of
Wandsworth Borough Council met to consider the application.
All agreed that the room density was excessive, the height and
bulk of the buildings very much out of scale and the likely
on-site congestion and on-street parking extremely damaging.
The committee therefore unanimously opposed the application
for planning permission. A letter from the Wandsworth Health
Authority District Administrator stated:
"In all the circumstances, there really was no room for 
manoeuvre and, although both majority and minority party 
members would have liked to have cleared the way for 
these much needed extra day places, there was no 
alternative but to oppose the scheme"12.
It can only be guessed why such a proposal was put forward in 
the first place. An interviewee stated that it was known that 
Wandsworth Council would have to give planning permission and 
there was no way the proposed room density would be acceptable 
to them. Whatever the reason, the result was that the project 
was proved not to be viable and ideas were set in motion to 
sell off the site as no other agency within the health 
authority wanted to utilise it and it was considered to be
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surplus to health authority requirements. The day hospital 
plan was put back in limbo and alternative options had to be 
explored.
At a meeting in October 198313, the Regional Capital Planning 
Services asked the Wandsworth Health Authority Planners to 
consider the alternative options listed in Box 3:
Box 3: Alternative Dav Hospital Planning Options - 1983
1) A smaller day hospital on the Battersea General 
site.
2) A development on the St John's Hospital Site. It was 
pointed out that decisions on the disposal of this 
site could not be made before 1989. There was a 
geriatric day hospital already on the site which 
would probably remain there and psychiatric 
facilities could be housed in an existing block or 
be purpose built following demolition.
3) Development on a new empty site to be designated 
within North Battersea.
4) Development in domestic houses bought by the Health 
Authority.
5) Adaptation of the day hospital scheme to make it 
suitable for operation from other existing 
properties that might become available.
None of the alternatives was considered suitable and in 
November 1983 it appeared that the whole proposal had been 
shelved yet again and the issue went quiet. In April 1984, the 
Health Authority then decided to conduct an option appraisal 
and cost-benefit analysis14. Explanations of the ranking of 
each option concentrated on staff environment, stigma 
concerned with large establishments, acceptability to the 
public who prefer the status quo but failing that favour 
smaller developments, staffing and timing. One consultant 
commented at interview that the scoring process of the cost 
benefit analysis was really a guessing game.
The question was still to explore the most appropriate site 
for the provision of the day hospital and Wandsworth Health 
Authority produced a further discussion document entitled 
"Services for the Mentally 111 in Wandsworth and Merton -
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Review and Outline Strategy". The District Management Team 
recommended that the Authority choose the original option to 
develop the day hospital on the Battersea General Hospital 
site. The arguments had gone full circle. However, as an 
issue, the day hospital had gained organisational commitment.
A Committed Local Champion of Change? Salvage or Dump the 
Plan?
The Battersea consultant was not happy about the decisions 
that resulted in the stagnation of plans15, and on her own 
initiative contacted an old school friend who had married into 
a large building firm, and asked them to take a look at the 
site and comment on whether it really was financially viable 
to build a day hospital there out of the proceeds of a 
commercial share16. Permission was then obtained from the 
Health Authority for this firm to draw up a new proposal, 
which they did, and confirmed that the project could indeed be 
a financial success. This information was then taken back to 
the Regional administrators and planners stating that an 
opinion had been gained that it was possible to use the site 
for some kind of commercial share.
In April of 1984, a further meeting of the Battersea Day 
Hospital Team (now down to 8 people) was held17. Wandsworth 
Health Authority agreed to proceed with a new proposal to 
build a 60 place day hospital on the Battersea General site, 
and therefore the planning group had to go away and re-draft 
the planning brief. By the end of April, the alternative 
option was accepted at Regional level, and a tender was put 
out to see which private companies were interested in the 
deal. Two to three schemes were put forward and one was 
chosen- that of Servite Housing Association. The new building 
was to be smaller than the original 1982 proposal, providing 
thirty residential places for the elderly mentally ill with 
another seventy places for sheltered accommodation and two 
interconnected day hospitals, one for the elderly and one for 
the mentally ill.
It took eighteen months to complete the deal because after the
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tender was accepted, the regional planners then proceeded to 
change the elements of the tender, greatly to Servite's 
disadvantage. There were many doubts expressed as to whether 
the contract would be retained. However, the confusion was 
eventually resolved and Servite remained interested. This 
brings us up to June 1985. It had originally been envisaged 
that the Day Hospital would open in 1986. Servite had already 
said that they would need half the preparation time to draw up 
plans, before construction actually began, so there was no way 
the Day Hospital was going to open in 1986 or even the 
following year as the plan was to construct a completely new 
development18. The old building had already been demolished 
but the vacant site was squatted by a second hand car dealer 
who had to be evicted by the Health Authority at great 
expense.
The Birth of the DEW Community Mental Health Team 
Wandsworth Health Authority at that time made detailed plans 
for expenditure for the coming year and for one year ahead. 
Therefore, they had put aside money to open the Day Hospital 
in 1986 and it was quite clear that this opening was not going 
to happen. The plans were not even completed, let alone 
starting the building work. The Battersea consultant therefore 
approached the Health Authority with a completely new 
proposal19. She pointed out that the money had been earmarked 
for fifteen to twenty staff that was not going to be used and 
requested that in the intervening time, while the Battersea 
Day Hospital (EWH) was being built, she could use some of that 
money to set up a community support service in Battersea for 
the adult mentally ill. The Health Authority still stood to 
make a profit as only four members of staff were being 
requested.
Factors were put forward promoting the establishment of a 
community mental health team. Money had been earmarked for the 
staffing of Edward Wilson House (EWH). Also, training in the 
new way of working would be necessary if EWH was to provide 
genuinely new departures in client treatment. A pilot project 
in community occupational therapy had already been running in
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the hands of an occupational therapist in the Battersea area 
and, therefore provided a starting structure for future 
work20. The psychiatric out-patient clinic and consultations 
at Bridge Lane Health Centre were another root of community 
psychiatry to be built upon. Social Services had demonstrated 
their willingness to co-operate with the venture by the input 
they had made to the recently opened Garfield Drop-in Centre 
and the voluntary sector was providing important social 
support on the Doddington Estate through the family centre 
there. That centre was acutely in need of mental health 
support.
It was proposed that these factors together suggested the 
establishment of a CMHT as "a shadow day hospital team" which 
could draw on and develop initiatives to enrich the community 
aspects of their eventual work in Edward Wilson House. The 
brief of this team would be to experiment with ways of working 
in clients' homes and in community venues to treat and support 
both new referrals and existing clients with long-standing 
disorders. At this time there was also a proposal for a 
"Battersea Drop-In" Centre that would be staffed alongside the 
Shadow Edward Wilson Team. In December 1983, a discussion 
paper was drawn up for a proposed "Shadow Battersea Day 
Hospital Team". The aims of such a team were proposed as 
follows:
"The team intends to provide treatment in, or 
geographically near to, the patient's world including the 
major "family" figures from his world. They expect to 
provide group activities which will fulfil diagnostic, 
treatment and supportive roles. They expect to make 
assessments, as often as possible in the patient's home. 
They aspire to provide crisis cover either on a twenty 
four hour basis or on the basis of assessment early the 
next working day. They will need to meet at a secure and 
reliable base where information is held by a permanent 
secretary/receptionist. Team meetings must be such that 
enough information is exchanged and enough mutual support 
received. In addition to meetings which deal with current 
work there should be a structure of team meetings set 
aside for reviewing strategic issues. At the team base 
there must be a system of written reports such that 
recent information can be reliably retrieved. Time and 
facilities must be provided to foster communications with 
the patch Social Services and local GPs."21
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A working pattern was suggested to be divided between group 
activities at suitable venues, home visits for planned or 
emergency assessment and management, team meetings, routine 
reporting to base and manning the emergency cover 
arrangements. The proposal was approved in principle and the 
minimum initial team was envisaged as one community 
psychiatric nurse, one occupational therapist, one junior 
doctor and a part time secretary. The importance of a central 
office base was also emphasised and it was pointed out that 
there would be major advantages in siting this office on the 
Doddington Council Estate to develop the mental health aspects 
of the Family Centre already functioning there. In April 1984, 
the Health Authority agreed to the shadow day hospital 
proposal and so the seeds of the Doddington Edward Wilson 
Community Mental Health Team (DEW) were sown.
Research Initiatives
The background research for both the day hospital development 
and the proposed CMHT was extremely sparse. At the time, the 
value of such research activities was not widely recognised. 
A small survey was carried out at Springfield Hospital on 
clients admitted from Battersea/Central Wandsworth over a six 
month period22. 66 in-patients (aged 16-70) were sampled and 
ten day patients (aged 16-54). It was found that 27% of 
clients could have been treated at a Day Hospital in Battersea 
instead of being admitted, and 73% could not. 42% could have 
been discharged earlier if a Battersea Day Hospital place had 
been available, (58% could not). 3 out of 10 Day Patients 
would have been treated at a Battersea Day Hospital if a place 
had been available. This survey was unstructured and set up by 
the hospital administration.
Also the consultant at the emergency psychiatric clinic at St 
George's Hospital was asked to record all clients referred 
from the Battersea catchment areas over a six month period, to 
provide suitable statistics for the likely emergency service 
required in Battersea23. This was done from October 1985. The 
General Manager also passed to the Battersea consultant a 
policy document of Haringey Health District describing their
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concept of a CMHT for information and this was used as a 
reference when compiling the DEW Team Operational policy.
The DEW Mental Health Team - An Innovative Idea is Realised 
The DEW CMHT became a shadow day hospital team working in the 
North and South Battersea community from an office-base in a 
converted pram shed adjoining a health centre on the 
Doddington Council Estate. In the initial policy statement of 
the team24, it was stated that they had two main aims as a new 
project.
Firstly, they wished to reach clients whose psychiatric needs 
were not being satisfactorily met by the existing service, and 
had already identified two such groups - people with long­
standing mental health problems who had repeated admissions to 
hospital and were believed by the team to have had inadequate 
support between admissions, and depressed young mothers who 
did not wish to be registered as psychiatric patients. 
Secondly, they stated that they wished to explore ways of 
treating and supporting such people to minimise their use of 
institutions and maximise their use of voluntary and other 
resources available in the community and used by healthy 
people. A primary feature of the team was to develop a close 
working relationship with staff of the many Battersea projects 
who were already undertaking work with the mentally ill in the 
area.
At this time, it was a stated policy that the staff of the 
team aimed to teach themselves a genuinely community-based 
approach, with a view to the eventual opening of Edward Wilson 
House, when the staff would move in to become team leaders and 
teach their skills to the staff there. This was also one of 
the original justifications for the team having an office base 
only and it was requested of referrers that if the clients 
could not be seen in their own homes then the referrer should 
make available an interview room in which the client could be 
assessed.
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DISCUSSION
The developments described in this chapter provide classic 
examples that illustrate and reinforce much of the literature 
on policy innovation and implementation discussed in chapter 
four. The aim now is to try and extract those that can further 
understanding of the issues involved and help us to explore 
the institutional barriers to innovation that the literature 
suggests are experienced all too often. The whole historical 
picture of the innovation in its implementation phase will be 
developed in the remaining chapters of the thesis, but this is 
a useful point to step outside the proceedings and evaluate 
key features that relate to the innovation process itself.
The Perception of The Problems of The Long Term Mentally 111 
The issue of how day hospital provision to the long term 
mentally ill was initially put on the agenda and defined, was 
described at the beginning of this chapter, but it is now our 
purpose to discuss how the CMHT proposal came to be accepted. 
Six main factors can be established. Firstly, the CMHT 
proposal was intimately linked to the day hospital plan, as it 
was to be a shadow team for the new day hospital. At no time 
was it suggested, independent of the day hospital project, 
that there was an explicit need for a separate CMHT 
development. The proposal was given political clout only 
because of its proclaimed link with the day hospital project.
Secondly, the CMHT proposal served the function of the 
"symbolic policy making" described by Edelman (1971). By 1983, 
the problems in service provision for the long term mentally 
ill had become a sensitive political area. Support for the DEW 
Team innovation was significantly connected with the idea that 
something was being seen to be done about these problems, 
without demanding the allocation of significant additional 
resources or initially expecting any dramatic successes in 
clinical care. Thirdly, the CMHT policy innovation partly came 
into being as a result of good timing. The historical account 
that has been presented so far has taken us through seven
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years of discussion and planning about the day hospital and 
out of the frustrations with the length of time that such 
activities took conflict arose tied to operationalisation, 
timing and control of the day hospital project. The managers 
were not motivated to make the day hospital project time 
limited in the short term but the clinicians found it 
difficult to have to work to a received and constantly 
extending time-schedule which was managerially determined 
rather than professionally informed. By 1983, this conflict 
had become acute and the managers had to address the problem.
Fourthly, it was not until 1983 that one particular individual 
championed the CMHT idea and became dedicated to seeing it 
through, with the support of her fellow professionals. This 
was a vital turning point, as for the first time, the long 
term mentally ill issue invoked action and this element cannot 
be understated. Fifthly, the CMHT proposal also gained support 
because it was a fresh idea. It was the first time that any 
idea had been considered as to how to give additional support 
to the long term mentally ill outside a mental hospital or day 
hospital setting. The CMHT model was not put on the agenda 
earlier simply because no one had considered it as a 
possibility. All planning activity concerned with provision of 
services to the long term mentally ill group was for many 
years centred on bringing the day hospital plan back into 
circulation. The CMHT was a completely new idea in Battersea. 
It had not been part of any plans but was a new solution that 
initially was proposed as an interim measure. As a fresh idea, 
it therefore commanded attention, claimed legitimacy and 
invoked action, so passing Solesbury's (1976) three tests. 
Lastly, local senior psychiatrists indirectly controlled 
decision making activity and interview evidence suggested that 
initially their main goal was to resist change that would 
necessitate truly joint initiatives with the other concerned 
agencies, particularly Wandsworth Social Services Department. 
This was not formally stated at any point in the proceedings, 
but was identified by interviewees to be part of a significant 
sub-agenda and since the CMHT proposal was a Health Service 
led initiative, this factor aided its acceptance.
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The Origins of Change
Where did the innovative ideas for reform come from and what 
factors shaped people's decisions about them? In Battersea, 
the innovative ideas for reform came from professionals 
working at the interface of service provision. As detailed in 
chapter four, Donnison et al (1975) and others, found that 
major initiatives for change often begin with the 
professionals working in a service. This is amply demonstrated 
in this case study. It was a professional who pushed through 
the day hospital proposal and then, more significantly for our 
purposes, came up with the later idea to establish a CMHT. 
There was a notable lack of hospital management involvement in 
the process of establishing ideologies for both these 
innovatory ideas, and two reasons can be suggested for this, 
based on interview material collected from the actors 
involved.
Firstly the main policy innovator was herself not only a 
consultant psychiatrist and hence a professional working in 
the field, but she was also at the outset of discussions, the 
Springfield Hospital Administrator, and therefore in a strong 
management position herself. Secondly, the remainder of the 
management team wanted innovation in service provision, but 
were happy to let the consultant do the work while they 
occupied themselves with other facets of the mental health 
service based around the institution and concentrating on 
"acute" provision. They remained supportive of the consultant 
but contributed few innovative ideas themselves.
The Battersea consultant psychiatrist acted as a catalyst. The 
professional frustrations with inadequate service provision 
would probably not have borne any new development had it not 
been for her interest and dynamic thinking. She was a 
professional opportunist with a clear idea of the way she saw 
the needs and unusually put together feasible options. She 
fulfilled the role of what Williams (1980) would term a "top- 
level fixer". She moved the paper exercise into an actual 
project and the DEW story provides a good example of how a 
professional can do this in a way that results in innovation
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in service provision.
Levin's contention that as a plan progresses, and is thwarted 
at various stages, so the drive to find alternative solutions 
and see them through increases proportional to the frustration 
(Levin 1976), is supported by the DEW Team example. The 
consultant had heard the day hospital plans being discussed 
for years and was familiar with the frequent pattern 
observable in all large organisations, but particularly in the 
Health Service in the 1970s and early 80s, of seemingly 
suitable projects never getting any further than the drawing 
board due to the amount of "red tape" involved and blocking by 
other vested interests. She knowingly took on the challenge to 
tackle these, and was in essence promoting the transfer of the 
vested interest of psychiatrists into the community sphere, as 
suggested by Holland (1988).
This fits in well with the Donnison notion of professionals 
taking the lead (Donnison et al 1975). However, the case study 
evidence is more specific than that. It does not suggest that 
any professional could have taken the lead. It was significant 
that it was a psychiatrist and this point gives us an 
indication of how the development of community care in mental 
health has been different from developments in allied 
disciplines such as mental handicap and services for the 
elderly. The developments described in this chapter suggest 
that in practice, at this time, policy change in community 
mental health could only be shaped by the consultant 
psychiatrists. It was no coincidence that the policy innovator 
in our example was a psychiatrist, and this demonstrates an 
elitist power at the local level in determining policy 
innovations. No alternative models of practice were 
considered, other than those promoted by the consultant 
psychiatrist.
The consultant, who championed the day hospital plan and later 
the CMHT plan became committed. Personal pioneering of a 
project gave a strong motivation to want to see it through for 
the sake both of the ideological reasons for starting it (in
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this case the perceived failures of current services for the 
mentally ill and the seemingly obvious solution that providing 
a CMHT and giving people suffering from a mental illness 
ongoing community support would be both preferable to them and 
to the strain imposed on the current hospital services) and 
for personal reasons contingent on having a purpose in life 
and fulfilling personal goals to achieve job-satisfaction. 
These kinds of motive are absent from academic discussions of 
bureaucracy as Dunleavy (1981) has pointed out, but they are 
shown by our case study to be important.
The question of the degree of self interest of the key 
psychiatrist involved suggested by public choice theory, is a 
difficult issue to tackle. The interview material suggested 
that the consultant psychiatrist, in particular, was very 
eager to promote both the day hospital and CMHT developments 
on the grounds that she had a controlling interest, yet the 
impression gained was that this was not altogether negative. 
Altruism, professional ethics and the concept of public 
service most certainly featured significantly in dictating the 
actions of the consultant and the support of her immediate 
colleagues. Such issues were prominent in all the discussion 
documents produced by these individuals at the time and from 
becoming acquainted with them and working alongside them 
during the fieldwork research, the author was reassured that 
such proclamations were genuine. Yet, it cannot be denied that 
such evidence is highly subjective.
Government or Local Policy Determination?
The impact of government policy in the case study area during 
the period 1979 to 1986 was assessed in this chapter through 
documentary analysis and interviews with key actors. The 
overall impression was that central government directives had 
only a minimal influence on the decision-making process and 
innovative policy outcome. Only four direct references to 
central government impact were noted in the historical account 
presented in this chapter:
a) In 1979, the Wandsworth Joint Care Planning Team played 
a consequential part in developments that followed. This 
factor is discussed in more depth below.
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b) In 1981, central government norms for day hospital
provision stated in the 1974 Act were cited as one of 
five precipitating factors that helped to crystallise the 
Battersea Day Hospital proposal. The reference was used 
to make a case for the proposed day hospital plan, yet
this was by no means the main impetus for the
operationalisation of the day hospital idea. In all the
1979 documents prepared for the JCPT meeting, reference 
was made to the fact that the day hospital idea was being 
put back onto the agenda, having been proposed on several 
previous occasions. The 1974 Act had been previously used 
as a supporting argument for new day hospital provision 
yet no direct action had resulted.
c) In 1982, the stated principles of Wandsworth Health
Authority regarding psychiatric care (see Box 2) were
loosely based on government community care rhetoric. Yet 
these statements were vague, ambivalent and not
particularly relevant at an operational level. The only 
reference to the long term mentally ill was in stating 
the need to avoid hospital admissions for psychotic and 
neurotic clients.
d) Later in 1982, the proposal to make the planned day
hospital a joint project with a private sector company
inspired interest and enthusiasm from the Department of
Health, since it embraced the Thatcherite ideal of
decreasing reliance on the public sector. This fitted in
generally with central government policy.
These references all concerned the proposed day hospital 
project. Policy innovation in the form of the DEW CMHT 
development, involved no references to central government 
directives, other than as an offshoot of the day hospital 
proposal as a "shadow day hospital team". Evidence was hence 
found for the "bottom-up" policy determination described by 
Barrett & Fudge (1981). Certainly, no reference was made by 
any of the actors involved or in any of the documents analysed 
to the CMHT idea even being discussed at central government 
level, let alone causing a policy chain transmitted from the 
top of the organisation down to the frontline. In the case 
study area, the CMHT innovation was almost solely the result 
of local initiatives.
It is interesting to observe from the DEW Team example, that 
the CMHT model eventually utilised was not implemented from 
first principles. There was little research carried out into 
this working style, and the staff team were mainly 
experimenting with their own solutions to the problems that
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they observed from having worked in the area for many years. 
The staff became increasingly aware that the style of service 
that they were trying to adopt fell into the realm of the CMHT 
model, but only vaguely set out with this model in mind. This 
supports the contention stated in chapter one that the CMHT 
model was not a widely known and recognisable model of service 
provision at the local level. It was being implemented in a 
patchy fashion across the country and the dissemination of 
information about the model was erratic. As far as the policy 
innovators were concerned, no model existed. They were 
pioneering a totally new approach based primarily on their own 
perceived needs of service problems that existed.
Decision Making
The concept of "non-decision-makingM discussed in chapter four 
is a useful tool to invoke in considering the obstructive 
passage of the day hospital plan. As has been pointed out 
repeatedly, the day hospital issue had been discussed on many 
occasions prior to 1979, but no action had resulted. In 1979, 
it looked as though the same institutional barriers to change 
that had constantly been used to prevent the idea from taking 
shape were again going to cause the idea to dissipate. The 
arguments that initially prevented the day hospital plan 
invoking any action were listed at the beginning of this 
chapter. The first two related to staff input to the new day 
hospital. The problems envisaged concerned the organisational 
upheaval of relocating clinical staff and attracting the right 
calibre of nursing staff. Financial and site location problems 
were also stated. However, a consideration of these arguments 
with hindsight suggests that they had power because of the 
controlling interests of the psychiatrists who proposed them, 
rather than because of their content.
When the day hospital plan was finally accepted, the first two 
problems relating to staffing were solved by the sudden 
interest of the consultant psychiatrist and other personnel 
changes. It seems the arguments concerning staff originally 
put forward against the plan had either been wrongly perceived 
or they were deliberately presented with a sub-text. The
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problems really concerned the perceived lack of commitment and 
motivation for staff to work in the community. The financial 
and site location problems were similarly misinterpreted. 
Later developments showed that the problem was not that 
finances did not exist, but that a reorganisation was needed 
to attach specific money to specific projects. The site was 
available too, but the series of flawed planning applications 
showed that the real problem was in planning rather than in 
resource scarcity.
The historical account of the way decisions were finally made 
in the case study area conveys the distinctive "yo-yo" style 
of proceedings. Decision-making was essentially based on a 
fairly haphazard and at times, unorthodox bargaining procedure 
between a key individual actor (the Battersea consultant) and 
the District Health and Local Authorities. Hence, there was 
evidence of incrementalism at work as suggested by Lindblom 
(1959).
The case study also supports the literature in observing that 
the decision making process was limited to a small elite. No 
attempt was made to gain a hearing from clients who were to 
receive the service at any stage of the planning of the new 
day hospital or the CMHT. The only concession was that a 
representative from MIND was invited to the Battersea Day 
Hospital Planning Meetings to speak for the interests of the 
non-statutory sector.
Joint Planning
In Battersea, the JCPT itself did not overcome any of the 
institutional barriers to implementation, but it did provide 
an opportunity for managers and professionals to consider 
where they were going and to look at the gaps in services. 
This was a positive direct result of the government framework. 
Out of it came a perceived need and an appreciation of the 
gaps in service provision. As observed earlier, this supports 
the evidence in the literature referred to in chapter four 
(Booth 1979; Glennerster et al 1983). The original central 
government model relationship was of two coterminous 
authorities sitting down together to decide the shape of
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services in their areas. Webb & Wistow (1982) have pointed out 
that the complex organisational structures and lack of 
coterminosity presented by this idea caused considerable 
difficulties for many local planners. Yet, Merton, Sutton and 
Wandsworth Area Health Authority found a partial solution. It 
created bilateral planning by dealing with general allocations 
of joint finance separately and doing much of its work in 
specialist subgroups such as the Battersea JCPT.
However, the day hospital plan that resulted was not actually 
a joint initiative but was Health Service driven and the 
Social Services demonstrated no equivalent commitment or clout 
to follow through the project. This reinforces the contention 
put forward by both Glennerster et al (1983) and Ramon (1988) 
that Social Services operating in the 1980s found it difficult 
to interpret community care to innovate. In later chapters 
further evidence will be explored concerning the extent to 
which this dictated the style of service provision that 
resulted as being dominated by health service interests.
Conflicts and Constraints
The history of the DEW Team development emphasises that there 
were political and financial conflicts over both the day 
hospital and CMHT developments. For example, the council had 
clear ideas about the preferred residential use of the old 
Battersea Hospital site and the day hospital plans had to be 
adapted to this. Also, in considering the size of the proposed 
development, plans had to be redrafted from the original 
proposal for a ninety place facility to a smaller seventy 
place facility with lower room density. A good illustration of 
the political barriers is seen again in the consultants resort 
to privately consulting an old school friend about the 
building proposals that the council had condemned for being 
unrealistic.
Yet, there was a strong sense that all parts of the system 
were in some way ready for an innovation in service provision 
to take place. Gaps in services had been repeatedly 
demonstrated and discussed and there was a general sense that
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resources could be made available. Two main interest groups 
were at work at the local level, namely the Health and Local 
Authority services, but differences in ideologies and 
organisation constantly prevented any new development actually 
crystallising and mobilising enough support to get it off the 
ground. Initially, everyone either wanted a controlling 
interest in a new development or no development at all, 
although no one was specifically stating this.
In addition, services were already over stretched and no one 
person would initially actually take on the responsibility, as 
it was but one part of their already very busy schedules. It
seemed to many that there were just too many hurdles to be
overcome, instilling a sense of lethargy and hopelessness with 
respect to the proposed day hospital plan. So while certain 
actors wanted to control the new development but did not 
perceive themselves to have the time to do it, they would 
rather prevent any new development taking place at all. This
is reminiscent of scenarios described in the literature as
"negative sum games". The literature suggests that such a 
situation results in conflict between those with policy 
interests that must be reconciled before an innovation can 
emerge (eg Donnison et al 1975). However, this case study 
gives rather a different picture. Conflict existed, but it was 
a very cynical kind of conflict. The actors involved were not 
fighting each other with action proposals, rather they were 
seemingly competing to destroy the policy proposals with 
reservations and general mistrust. When the day hospital 
proposal was finally accepted, it was not on the basis that 
different views had been recognised and reconciled. The 
innovation only became a reality when one individual "rode 
roughshod" over the objections and came up with new solutions 
to overcome problems that stood in her way.
In Brief
This chapter provides an account of one policy innovation in 
local mental health services during the 1980s, which supports 
much of the public policy literature. The issue of CMHT 
provision to the long term mentally ill was put on the local
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agenda due to its direct link with the proposed day hospital 
project and it was one particular consultant psychiatrist who 
invoked action and together with her professional colleagues, 
defined the boundaries of the CMHT innovation. At this time, 
the CMHT model was not widely known about or explicitly 
understood as a coherent model at the local level. The next 
three chapters will now explore specific themes of the CMHT 
implementation process, initially considering the way that the 
team developed and the importance of personalities in team 
building.
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CHAPTER 7:
Implementing a Community Mental Health Team:
Building the Team
The factors that shaped the formation of the DEW Mental Health 
Team have now been considered. The next task is to see how the 
plans were carried into practice. In this chapter, interviews 
with the main actors were used as the main source material, 
supplemented by further documents, reports and correspondence. 
In order to access key features in the implementation process, 
it was the intention to allow the actors themselves to 
identify the topics that they felt most important to discuss. 
Three key themes emerged which were, team building, service 
style development and barriers to implementation. These themes 
have therefore been used as a basis for the following three 
chapters.
This chapter concentrates on team building. It considers the 
development of the staff team and the involvement of other 
local actors. How was the DEW Team put together? What 
approaches to planning, management and staff participation 
were required for effective service development? How did the 
other key personnel working alongside the DEW service relate 
to the Team and to what extent did they perceive their own 
roles to have been eroded? Was there further evidence of the 
elitist practices of the psychiatric profession? What was the 
input of professionals from other disciplines and how 
successful was the team's multi-disciplinary approach? The 
discussion section at the end of the chapter further explores 
elements of this first theme, that add to those discussed in 
the previous two case study chapters.
The Setting Up of the DEW CMHT
It was assumed that office space for the new shadow day 
hospital team would be available in October 1985. On this 
basis, a scheme of phased recruitment was proposed, whereby 
each member of staff appointed would spend the first six 
months of their time working in a relevant induction setting. 
For nursing and occupational therapy staff, it was suggested
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that this setting should be within Springfield Hospital in 
order to establish the community links that the workers would 
need at a later stage. The Battersea consultant planned to 
take her whole service out to the community base in February 
1986, but building on the pram shed conversion was delayed and 
the team could not move until April 1986.
The briefing for staff1 indicated that the shadow team members 
would aim to develop a carefully selected caseload of clients 
who would be representative of social, ethnic and age groups 
living in Battersea. This was thought to be an enabling factor 
in allowing the team members to familiarize themselves with 
local housing conditions, living standards and to assess the 
interaction of different cultural and social backgrounds with 
the delivery of mental health care. As far as possible, the 
new services provided by the shadow team would be those that 
could appropriately be moved to Edward Wilson House when it 
was opened. The shadow team would be involved in the planning 
and commissioning of the day hospital in conjunction with the 
project team members. Also the shadow team would be required 
to undertake certain research projects. These were identified 
to include a neighbourhood study, a directory of local 
resources and an exploration of transport arrangements.
The Initial Development of the DEW Staff Team
As explained in chapter six, the funding of the DEW Team came
from revenue funding put aside for the staffing of the new day
hospital, and the finance was deliberately tailored so that
the DEW staff team was set up gradually over a number of
years. When interviewed, the DEW Team Consultant stated:
"We were aware that it would not be a good idea simply to 
move staff from the institution straight into the 
community. Such an attempt would just have resulted in 
the transfer of the institutional framework into the 
community, rather than providing a new approach to care".
This phased development had implications for the way the 
service developed. It meant that there was no real opening 
date for the DEW service, rather a transitional period between 
1985 and 1987 in which the team was built up. The team 
considered that they were not working from a borrowed
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traditional pattern. The concept was that the staff recruited 
would gradually train themselves in a new non-institutional 
way of working. Therefore, the characteristics of team working 
that developed reflected the strengths and weaknesses of the 
key staff members.
As stated in chapter six, the original proposal for the DEW 
staff team, which was to act as a shadow team for the new day 
hospital, was put forward by the consultant psychiatrist. She 
requested eight initial staff: a full-time secretary, two
nurses, 3 occupational therapists, one junior doctor and part 
time input of a consultant psychiatrist. She envisaged that 
there was also scope to eventually include two further staff 
members (a psychologist and social worker), once the Team had 
developed an identity2. The following description of team 
building demonstrates that it received fewer staff than had 
been suggested as a minimum in this original proposal.
The team personnel evolved from a core group of three, all of 
whom had already had some experience of working in the 
community. The consultant psychiatrist was the first to take 
up her post in 1986 and an occupational therapist (OT) 
officially started a few months later, closely followed by the 
appointment of a community psychiatric nurse (CPN). A
psychologist, clinical assistant and a senior registrar were 
appointed later that year, with additional input from a 
registrar on the hospital training rotation, and a social 
worker was appointed in 1987.
The Moving Spirits
1) The Consultant Psychiatrist
The DEW Team Consultant Psychiatrist had worked in Springfield
Hospital for twelve years and had been running out patient
clinics in General Practice since 1977. She became a
consultant in 1979 and soon became aware of the reactive and
"unthinking" style of service provision.
"While working as a consultant psychiatrist it is easy to 
loose ones thinking power. It is a high pressure position 
and there are so many things that should have been done 
yesterday, that one does not have a chance to stop and 
assess the situation".
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She went on to take up the post of Hospital Administrator at
Springfield between 1982 and 1986. In setting up the DEW Team,
she drew on this experience. Her job as Medical Administrator
made her realise that:
"...the people with the worst illnesses, people on the 
back wards and their equivalents in the community, 
received the least input".
She saw this as a direct result of the "unthinking" she 
described.
"They (long term mentally ill clients) may have had very 
faithful CPNs but these workers had very little 
supervision and no multi-disciplinary discussion at all. 
The serious solemn discussions of issues that took place 
at the hospital ward rounds were generally not available 
to the CPNs, as CPNs only attended when one of their 
community patients was in relapse and hence had become an 
in-patient".
This Consultant, therefore, became dedicated to involving CPNs 
and other staff more appropriately in client care. She was 
driven by her frustration with the hospital service and her 
perception of its seemingly obvious failings. Her personality 
and experience added to her controlling interest in the DEW 
Team project meant that she naturally became the DEW Team 
leader. In relation to team leadership, one management member 
commented:
"In the past Wandsworth teams have been nearly always set 
up to be led by consultant psychiatrists. This may seem 
unnecessary, in that the services are unduly dominated by 
one profession, but there are several good reasons why it 
has been the case. The psychiatrist is nearly always the 
most experienced member on the team and decisions about 
individuals require experience and generic knowledge. 
There is no reason intrinsically why other disciplines 
should not become team leaders, but it has to do with the 
career structures that other professionals seldom stay 
in one area for long periods of time. Anyway, I do not 
understand why it is such a big jealousy issue when most 
of the psychiatrists job is deadly boring - who wants to 
do those things?"
2) The Occupational Therapist
The Occupational Therapist (OT) was also a key figure in the
DEW Team development. She stated:
"The Team was mainly initiated by the Consultant but 
since I was there and very interested, it soon became a 
mutual decision between the two of us to make the project 
work".
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She had developed a keen interest in community working, 
previously having worked for eight years, part time, as the 
Battersea Ward OT at Springfield Hospital and prior to this, 
in day centres in community settings in Wales.
At Springfield, she felt that she was always seen as being 
very different by the other occupational therapists. She had 
strong views and frequently clashed with hospital OT policies. 
However, her head of department was very supportive of her 
community interest and she was left to get on with what she 
was doing and establish her own ways of working. She began 
work in the Battersea community several years before the DEW 
Team was started. In 1982, she started making a few home- 
visits to Battersea patients who were suggested by the 
consultant and then in 1983 she set up two community support 
groups in Battersea. She felt that such groups were a great 
help for the initial work of the DEW Team, because staff and 
clients could see the kinds of things that the team was trying 
to do.
First, together with a social worker who was the senior 
practitioner for mental health in North Battersea, she set up 
the "Garfield Group" which met once a week in a community 
centre in Battersea. This was a support group for people with 
long term mental health problems. Each week the group would 
meet and do an activity together. Such activities ranged from 
cooking and eating a meal together, playing games, holding 
discussions, inviting speakers and going on outings to places 
of interest. A second group was then started by the OT towards 
the end of 1983. She had been working with a number of very 
isolated young mothers and believed that there was a need to 
form a group to offer them the chance to meet others in a 
similar position and have some form of social support. So a 
"Mother & Toddlers" group was set up meeting once a week at 
a Family Centre.
3) The Community Psychiatric Nurse
The Community Psychiatric Nurse was the next staff member to 
join the DEW Team. She had previously been the Battersea Ward 
Sister and, like the OT had an interest in community work. She
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also started setting up and running community groups in 
Battersea before the team officially existed. She was involved 
in the Garfield Group mentioned above and she also helped set 
up a "Relative Support Group", holding meetings in a Battersea 
church hall. She knew many of the Battersea clients and had 
already developed strong relationships with them in the 
hospital, before moving to work in the community setting.
Interviews with a member of the nursing management suggested 
that the local nursing hierarchy was not particularly 
supportive of the key DEW Team nurse, expressing concern about 
preserving the role of CPNs. By tradition, nurses had been 
very poor at defining the boundaries of their jobs and had 
tended to take on board any tasks that others were not 
prepared to perform. The nurse management sought reassurance 
that the DEW Team would protect the CPN role, but when 
interviewed later, the nursing management representative 
commented that the real intention in voicing this concern was 
to delay the scheme. Yet, the DEW Team CPN was prepared to act 
fairly independently, and this was of critical importance at 
the outset of the DEW Team development. The DEW Team forced 
the nursing managers to become more flexible. The DEW Team CPN 
commented that one of the more important achievements of the 
DEW Team was to achieve regular multi-disciplinary supervision 
of case-loads
"...particularly for the more chronic group, which 
traditionally had not been given to CPNs isolated in the 
community".
The Completion of the Staff Team
A senior psychiatric registrar working in the Cottage Day 
Hospital on the Springfield hospital site from 1985 to 1986 
was approached by the Battersea consultant psychiatrist at the 
end of her year and encouraged to apply for a supernumerary 
part time senior registrar job created at the DEW Team at the 
time. She did so and worked for the DEW Team from 1986 to
1987. After a year, she had to go to work in Epsom as part of 
the senior registrar rotation. At the end of this placement, 
having completed her senior registrar training, she decided 
that she did not want a consultant job because of family
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commitments and was attracted back to work at the DEW service 
as a Clinical Assistant. Her motivation was that the job was 
part-time, and she wanted to work in the community, seeing 
people in their own homes. Also, she had enjoyed her year 
working at the DEW service as part of the senior registrar 
rotation. In the intervening time, another Clinical Assistant 
had been appointed for a year who was also very able and 
committed to the DEW Team style of working.
The Clinical Assistant helped to set up and run a Women's 
Group on the Patmore estate in 1988 and was jointly 
responsible for writing the DEW Team operational policy with 
the psychologist, who was next to be appointed. The Clinical 
Psychologist joined the DEW Team in February 1986. Previously, 
she had been working in a day hospital in Kent, but had become 
frustrated with the journey time in travelling there from 
London. From her experience in the day hospital, she knew she 
wanted to work within a multi-disciplinary team and was 
excited by the idea of a newly developed project. She liked 
the DEW Team policy of concentrating on priority groups and 
not trying to provide everything to everybody, something that
had been a failing of the day hospital where she had
previously worked. Also, she was impressed by the commitment 
of the other team members.
Initially, she was the only psychologist working in Battersea, 
so she took some straight psychology referrals from the 
Hospital in addition to her DEW Team work and was never just 
working with the DEW Team. However, she made a great effort to 
research the team's work more thoroughly. She was primarily 
responsible for researching a client assessment and review 
policy and formulating assessment forms. Also she helped run 
the Garfield Group for a time, initiated the setting up of a
"Befriending Scheme" and helped to run the Relative Support
Group.
In July 1985 Wandsworth Social Services were approached to 
find out whether they wished to see social work contributing 
to the mental health services at Edward Wilson House. The
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Department stated that they welcomed the idea but the 
difficulty in funding new posts was pointed out, and it was 
suggested that such a post would be appropriate for joint 
funding. Bearing in mind that only small bids that had no 
recurring consequences could be considered for the next 
financial year it was stated that it would be unrealistic to 
expect that an exception would be made for this post in 
1986/7, but that it would be promoted in 1987/8 in the hope 
that the financial situation may have improved a little by 
then. By February 1986, the bid for the post had been working 
its way up the priorities of joint financing and a draft 
proposal was accepted. In the spring of 1987, after a long and 
delayed series of correspondence, the post was finally 
accepted for joint funding between the Health and Local 
Authority.
The Senior Social Worker who initially took up the DEW Team 
post, was making a sideways career move. Previously she had 
been working as a senior social worker in mental health in the 
South Battersea Area Office and was based at Springfield 
hospital. At the time the DEW service was increasingly making 
itself felt in the community. The Social Worker had been 
finding it difficult to work with children and families in a 
generic role and wanted to become more specialised and to do 
community work within a multi-disciplinary framework. The DEW 
Team presented such an opportunity and she remained working 
there for a year until she left on maternity leave. Another 
Senior Social Worker then joined the Team in August 1989, who 
had previously worked for six years as a mental health area 
social worker in neighbouring Lambeth, after completing her 
last six months training at Springfield Hospital. In Lambeth, 
she had constantly been involved in re-sectioning mentally ill 
people and was concerned about the frequency of this activity, 
caused by the lack of after care provision for people leaving 
hospital. She perceived that the DEW Team offered an 
alternative approach.
As part of the DEW Team, this Social Worker later helped to 
establish a "Doddington Estate Link", in which there were
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community representatives from the library, the church, family 
centre and local college. The group met once every three to 
four months and offered an excellent forum for general 
discussions of problems on the council estate where the DEW 
Team was located. She also started the "Autumn Colours Group" 
for the elderly.
From the outset, the DEW service also became a split placement 
in adult general psychiatry for Senior Registrars and 
Registrars training at St. Georges' Hospital and throughout 
its development received such staff on a six month rotation. 
There were 16 senior registrar jobs on the St Georges 
rotation, only 5 of which were at Springfield Hospital. Senior 
Registrars tended to aim for the core jobs and of the 5, only 
2 were in adult general psychiatry and one of these was the 
DEW Team job. The DEW Team was seen as the most desirable of 
these positions and hence benefitted from a stream of very 
able medical staff.
The Team personnel worked together as a multi-disciplinary 
team, to provide "patient-centred" care. In addition to their 
day to day clinical responsibilities to clients on their case­
loads, each team member was also encouraged to involve 
themselves in innovative forms of care delivery ranging from 
the running of community support groups to the design of 
operational policy. Each person learnt from the people already 
in post, as well as bringing their own ideas. This principle 
was partly conscious and partly circumstantial.
Other Actors Directly Involved in the DEW Team Development
1) Hospital Ward Staff
The DEW Team had access to beds on one in-patient ward at 
Springfield Hospital. The ward manager pointed out that on a 
day to day level, their main contact with the DEW team was 
through the registrar, who came to the ward more often than 
any other member of team. He felt that the biggest problem for 
the ward was the fact that it was a shared senior registrar. 
Also, they felt "a bit out of it". The ward staff did not feel 
part of the community in any sense of the word. They felt
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isolated in a very different sort of world. Problems with the 
hospital ward staff will be further explored in chapter nine.
However, some ward staff related to the DEW Team better than 
others. For example, the Charge Nurse on the Battersea 
Hospital Ward during 1982 and 1983 worked closely with the DEW 
Team from the ward. Before the Team was established he had 
helped set up the Relatives Support Group which started by 
meeting on the ward. Initially, relatives came to help out on 
the ward and occasionally organised social evenings, but there 
were a few problems with the ward being so busy and eventually 
the group moved out to the community.
2) Professional Hospital Departments
The DEW Team was formed with a multi-disciplinary structure.
This meant that each professional on the Team was also
answerable to their own professional department within
Springfield Hospital. The Heads of the Psychology,
Occupational Therapy, Social Work and Nursing Departments were
therefore, also involved in the initial recruitment for the
DEW Team and in supporting its on-going development. All of
them were interested in the team's progress and remained
flexible throughout the development period, allowing staff
high degrees of independence. However, to some extent the DEW
service created a need for department heads to challenge
traditional work philosophies and staff management structures.
An interview with a member of the nursing management suggested
that the DEW service had been seen as quite threatening to the
different professions, particularly nursing, but in fact no
conflict occurred in this respect. One department head
interviewed commented:
"Team building has proved to be an important issue, with 
the need for managers from different professions to agree 
on philosophies. One of the greatest blights of the 
mental health professions at the moment is increasing 
professionalisation. Numerous arguments are going on 
about what is whose job. For instance, in the psychology 
department there is an ongoing debate about psychologists 
ring-fencing their skills. People often seem to forget
that what is really important is to look at the needs of
patients. DEW seemed to be doing this more than other 
services at the time".
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3) Hospital Management
The Wandsworth Services Manager was involved in the 
development of the DEW Team, although not at its inception. 
His role was as overall responsible manager for Wandsworth and 
the DEW service was a small part of this. After the initial 
day hospital plans were finalised, he saw his role very much 
as a servicing task, taking an enabling role and simply trying 
to respond to equipment requests. He also had involvement with 
all the catchment area teams with regard to ward 
reorganisation and the DEW Team was a part of this. He was 
consulted on assessment and referral procedures and tried to 
make these systems and styles of work consistent. He pointed 
out that
"There were some apparent tensions, particularly in the 
early days of DEW, as some managers felt that their role 
was being eroded".
The DEW Team was initiated by key local actors, the catalysts 
who mobilised innovative local professionals. The DEW Team 
staff were largely already in post working in Battersea with 
knowledge and experience. When they grouped together and 
wanted to do something new it was in the interests of 
management to support them, otherwise they risked losing high 
calibre staff or at least suffering a distinct slump in morale 
and possible movement to other jobs that were perceived to be 
more malleable to accepting new ideas and philosophies. The 
feasibility of recruitment and training was never a problem 
because the staff were already mostly working in Battersea, 
each with a personal interest in community working and were 
willing to experiment with training themselves. The Team was 
also willing to try to soak up the need for increased 
administrative capacity themselves, although this later proved 
to be a pressure point with which they would struggle.
The Wandsworth Nurse Manager, became involved with the Day 
Hospital plan on a very ad hoc basis in 1983. At this time she 
held the post of "Senior Nurse Projects" and had coordinating 
responsibilities for considering practices throughout the 
health service that needed to be updated or changed. She went 
to meetings when no other management members were available to
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attend and at this stage was not well informed about the 
detailed plans and remained on the periphery. In 1985 she 
became more firmly involved and recalled a series of regular 
meetings occurring throughout 1986 when the Servite bid for a 
partnership in the new day hospital was accepted. She worked 
on themes such as the design of the building, contents of 
rooms and general details of the project. Regarding the DEW 
Team itself which evolved as an off-shoot of the day hospital 
plan, she had little direct involvement, except in safe­
guarding the interests of the CPN on the DEW Team.
4) Social Services
It was felt by many of those interviewed, that it was very
positive to have people from Social Services working jointly
with the Health Service as part of the DEW Team. Such joint
working had been something of a rarity in the past. One social
worker stated:
mDEW was unique in its multi-disciplinary aspect because 
it gave a joint consultative knowledge base between the 
Health and Social Services. There were advantages for 
DEW, for instance, in being able to feed into the social 
work information system about clients and in having easy 
access to consultative work about clients who had no past 
history of contact with the health services, but who were 
well known to Social Services".
Problems emerged later in the implementation phase regarding 
the involvement of Social Services in the DEW Team development 
and these will be discussed in chapter nine, but Social 
Services staff largely supported the initial work of the team. 
In a consumer satisfaction survey conducted in 1989 (MacDonald 
& Ochera 1990) 20 local social workers and community workers 
were interviewed about their views of the DEW service. All 
knew what the DEW Team was. 15 stated that they had never had 
any difficulty in contacting the Team, although 3 sometimes 
had difficulty in contacting specific DEW Team workers. 85% 
thought that their clients had a good relationship with the 
Team: and 90% felt that they themselves had a good 
relationship with the Team. 90% also identified that they felt 
the DEW Team had a positive effect on their own professional 
activities.
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"My clients always speak very warmly about DEW staff and 
about how approachable they are. They appreciate that the 
staff seem to care. They appreciate that staff go and 
visit them if they don't turn up at groups."
One reported a poor client/DEW Team relationship:
"The patient was very angry. He felt he was badly treated 
by the psychiatrist. He was black. He was told he was mad 
and therefore didn't know what he was saying."
90% felt that they themselves also had a good relationship
with the DEW Team and 90% felt that the DEW Team had a
positive effect on their own professional activities.
"It's easy to co-work with them. We've stripped away 
stereotyped expectations of each other."
"It makes it much easier. I've got a referral point. 
Back-up, advice, supervision. Any difficulty with a 
mental patient and I can get them to visit."
15 of the 20 social workers interviewed thought that the DEW
Team gave the best individual care possible in the
circumstances. 2 said it was not helpful. Several felt that
the DEW Team were restricted by a lack of resources and one
felt that there were not enough black workers, particularly
doctors. 8 social workers welcomed the Team's efforts to
realise the principles of community care:
"I like best their willingness to liaise with us. They 
get away from the medical model and get involved in the 
social aspects of mental illness."
5) Local General Practitioners
The Team members made a particular effort to involve local GPs 
in their initial plans and to keep them closely informed of 
developments. Some GPs took a keen interest and developed 
close personal links with the team, regularly referring 
clients. Others did not use the team at all. A survey of GPs 
satisfaction with the DEW service carried out in 1988 showed 
that GPs use of the service varied and all those who referred 
were very happy with what the DEW Team could provide for 
clients. However, it was found that some did not have a clear 
conception of the value of multi-disciplinary assessment and 
preferred to refer cases only to the psychiatrists on the 
team. The survey was therefore additionally used to further
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inform GPs about the DEW service, the referral system and the 
kinds of problems that they could best deal with.
MacDonald & Ochera (1990) also interviewed 28 GPs as part of 
their DEW service user satisfaction survey. 57% said that in 
general it was not difficult to contact the service in office 
hours. The majority were positive about their client's 
relationships with DEW Team staff. Just one was completely 
negative and consistently critical of the Team, saying:
"They're totally unhelpful, hopeless and unresponsive."
13 said the DEW service was supportive, reducing the GPs
workload and stress of the job. 8 thought that the DEW Team
provided a more appropriate service for the mentally ill than
they could and 4 that it was somewhere for them to turn to in
a crisis with a mentally ill client. Lack of knowledge about
the Team's work was fairly widespread:
"I'm not sure of the scope of what they do. If I knew 
what they did I might be able to use them more."
4 GPs liked best that the DEW service's location meant that 
the Team were in touch with local conditions and the client's 
living environment. Several mentioned that they would like to 
learn more from the DEW Team and others suggested that they 
should help more with psychiatric emergencies and crises and 
should respond more quickly.
Features of the Team Building Process
Several key features of the team personnel were drawn out from 
the interviews, which contributed to the initial successful 
establishment of the DEW CMHT:
1 ) RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING
The DEW Team innovators were already trained and skilled 
before embarking on their innovatory activity. The Team 
initiator essentially collected about her people that she knew 
she could work with and who shared her ideological 
convictions. The core team was formed from a group of 
individuals who were prepared to act independently of their
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professional departments. They disengaged themselves gradually 
from the institution and manufactured their own organisational 
space, to replicate on a bigger scale community work that they 
had already begun individually in a small way. Together they 
operated in the "twilight world" described by Banting (1979), 
between the professional academic and political worlds. The 
three initial members of the team were all closely involved in 
choosing the remaining team members.
2) SENIORITY
Several team members commented at interview that it was 
important that all the staff were senior people, with 
confidence in their clinical training. It promoted a dynamic 
working environment. Also, each held a senior position within 
their own professional departments at Springfield Hospital, 
and could thereby influence the spread of information and the 
promotion of policies via this route. It was also considered 
by team members themselves, that it was an advantage that the 
team leader was Medical Administrator at Springfield Hospital, 
for it meant that the team was at the centre of discussions 
about planning and the team leader had access to some 
important administrative information.
3) STABILITY
Everyone on the core team was female and it was commented that 
they all had a certain kind of lifestyle in common, meaning 
that they were much less likely to move out of the area and 
change jobs. Senior registrars and registrars came and went on 
rotation but the core team remained incredibly stable.
"As a core team DEW works very well and there is a good 
atmosphere".
This was the representative view of most of the team members 
interviewed.
4) DEVELOPMENT OUT OF HOSPITAL SERVICE
The majority of staff (with the exception of the Clinical 
Psychologist and Social Worker) came from the Springfield 
Hospital service. They knew many of the clients, they knew the 
geographical area and had already had dealings with local
175
voluntary groups and Social Services. This was considered an 
advantage by most of those interviewed. For example, one of 
the Battersea consultants who had been working in Battersea 
for many years, referred many clients to the DEW Team at its 
inception. He saw it as a very useful resource that took some 
of the workload away from him and thereby did something to 
relieve his work pressure. He was well versed with the high 
morbidity of the area and had experienced the extremely heavy 
workload that resulted, so he saw the DEW Team as offering an 
opportunity to address quality of life issues for staff, in 
reducing the strain experienced by the over-stretched hospital 
based services.
5) MULTI-DISCIPLINARY WORKING
All the team members interviewed commented that the multi­
disciplinary aspect of the DEW Team was one of the most 
rewarding features of the set up. One team member said:
"A major pro of the team is the community team spirit and 
camaraderie. In other teams, people remain too loyal to 
their own disciplines and this creates communication 
problems and duplication of work, with things put off 
until the team meetings. At DEW, discussions take place 
in a variety of settings and people really share things".
A management member commented that the DEW Team encouraged the 
development of multi- disciplinary team work in other areas of 
the mental health unit by presenting a strong, unified image. 
She added
"it has also made it apparent that although multi­
disciplinary teams often like to think they are 
leaderless and there is true democracy, there always has 
to be a leader and if the team leader is weak, the team 
is weak".
There were some areas of multi-disciplinary working for which 
the DEW Team staff were criticised during interviews. One team 
member felt that the team had fallen down on the training 
function with regard to multi-disciplinary working. She felt 
that they ought to have been more structured in including 
students as part of the team. She felt that working on the 
team was a unique experience and it should have been 
proselytised to junior staff. The senior registrar and 
registrars on the team felt that they had a recognisably
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different position from other team members. They recognised 
the camaraderie that existed within the team, but one 
interviewee commented that as a senior registrar he felt 
"peripheral to all that". The official policy of the team was 
that the Senior registrar and registrar were not part of the 
core team and so did not take part in team support meetings. 
This was seen as a disadvantage.
6) CULTURAL ISSUE
The CPN was a permanent black worker on the team and there was 
a black Clinical Assistant initially. Several team members 
commented that this was a tremendous advantage. However, 
interviewees stated that the issue of the need for more black 
workers was not addressed. Several felt also that there was a 
general lack of training of others on the team in how to deal 
with cultural issues and work with black people. Problems were 
dumped on the CPN and not shared by the team. It was felt that 
this was a general problem across the board in service 
provision, but Social Services tended to be better than teams 
like the DEW Team which were Health Service led. However, the 
fact that the Team had some black workers was considered a 
significant and positive feature of its development.
7) LOCAL CLIMATE
An immense advantage for the DEW Team was that other Battersea 
services welcomed the new team for the long term mentally ill. 
The general climate was very receptive, as previously services 
had been poor. Suddenly there was a new service that was 
bending over backwards to deal with the most difficult 
clients, while also consulting local organisations about their 
needs and making definite observable attempts to address 
relevant issues. For example, a DEW Team representative 
attended the housing forum and link-persons were set up with 
organisations such as the Family Centre on the estate and the 
team members also fostered less traditional links with 
institutions such as the local library. The ability of the DEW 
Team staff team to initially exploit receptive local feelings 
and to develop new service networks in this way was vital to 
their development.
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DISCUSSION
Reflection on the team building process now provides part of 
the basis for analysing further the dynamics of learning and 
change in establishing a CMHT in the 1980s. The multi­
disciplinary features of the team are particularly relevant to 
our earlier discussions of the source of innovation in service 
provision and the possible operation of an elitist policy. By 
extrapolation from this analysis, approaches to planning, 
management and staff participation required for effective 
service development can be identified in more detail.
Division of labour in mental health is such that client 
treatment entails drawing on skills of different 
practitioners, each organised in their professional 
specialisms claiming some right to control their own work. The 
literature discussed in chapter two, suggested that multi­
disciplinary teams are needed where different professions 
recognise the interdependence of their respective roles in 
providing care to a particular set of clients and where
participatory ways of working are established to ensure 
various contributions are appropriately mobilised and to 
encourage maximum commitment to realise objectives shared by 
the team. It was claimed that teams also need sufficient
autonomy for staff to use their knowledge and initiative in 
responding to problems which arise and to establish
collaborative ways of working with other services (Woof & 
Goldberg 1988).
The DEW Team example suggests that it is possible to establish 
such a multi-disciplinary way of working and this factor in 
itself contributed to the maintenance of the DEW Team as a 
cohesive group of service providers. It is interesting to note 
the features that made the success of the multi-disciplinary 
approach possible. The staff team were all committed
individually to community working and to working together to 
achieve their jointly agreed aims. They were all highly 
motivated and respected each other's clinical abilities. They 
also shared a positive outlook. Other studies have shown that
178
this element is frequently lacking in team development. For 
example, Towell (1981) encountered a pessimistic climate in 
which staff were more aware of the constraints than the 
possibilities and opportunities. Examples can be seen in the 
DEW Team experience, where the Team were united in ideology 
and optimistic about their role.
Towell (1981) also noted from his evaluative study that there 
were several problems with a uni-disciplinary style of 
working. He observed different professions dealing with common 
problems in isolation or passing issues up the organisation, 
rather than confronting them on the spot. He also found that 
each individual could feel that a large institution would 
diffuse or nullify his or her personal efforts to make things 
better. The DEW Team case study shows that community care 
organised on a truly multi-professional basis appears to 
address some of these failings of the old institutional 
system. It is important here to describe what is meant by true 
multi-disciplinary working. The interview evidence suggested 
that it goes far beyond the realm of different professionals 
working together. In addition it embodies much which reflects 
a sense of collective worth. Collective action through shared 
concerns, set against the initial indifference and mistrust of 
the wider community of service providers gave the DEW Team a 
sense of the reaffirmation of the value of joint human 
experience and hence intrinsic worth. Key features of multi­
disciplinary working will be further explored in the following 
chapter.
It was noted in the previous chapter that the main initiator 
of the DEW CMHT innovation was the consultant psychiatrist. 
However, the description of the development of the staff team 
in this chapter shows that other professionals also had a 
strong influence, particularly the occupational therapist. She 
had been trying to establish her own community mental health 
ideology for several years. For example, she had set up 
community groups and had separated herself almost entirely 
from in-patient work in the hospital. She was doing her own 
version of community care quietly on her own, without tackling
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the establishment with a formal proposal for policy change. 
She had a strong personality and strong views, but as an 
occupational therapist was not in a position to instigate an 
innovation like the DEW Team. This further supports notions 
that psychiatrists formed an elite amongst mental health 
service providers in the 1980s, both in the hospitals and in 
the community. Other professionals simply did not have a 
countervailing ideology. The occupational therapist was doing 
innovative work in the community but this was not formally 
recognised by the management. An occupational therapist would 
never have had the power to innovate by forming a CMHT. 
However, interviews with the DEW Team OT also showed that she 
would not have wanted the political and administrative 
responsibility of setting up the team alone. She was 
interested in working with clients and not so much in taking 
management initiatives. It was a good partnership for her that 
the psychiatrist performed these tasks which were more distant 
from hands on work with clients.
However, the personality of the individual psychiatrist in the 
DEW Team example was also an important factor in the 
initiation of innovation and the implementation task that 
followed. There were other consultant psychiatrists working in 
Battersea who were well aware of the problems in service 
provision to the long term mentally ill group. For example, 
another Battersea consultant had worked in the area longer 
than the DEW Team consultant, knew all the clients and was 
very pleased that the DEW Team was developed as it eased his 
workload, but he would never have instigated it himself. He 
was nearing retirement and did not have the same academic 
interest and drive for change or the desire to make a name for 
himself.
The proposition about the elitist power of the psychiatric 
profession appears to be weakened. It is not as monolithic as 
Ramon (1988) suggests. The fact that the chief catalyst came 
from the psychiatric profession is important, but it is also 
significant that she had a strong personality, personal 
ambition, a commitment to exploring new ideologies of the CMHT
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approach, and was already in a position of power as hospital 
administrator. Also she had a keen awareness of the practical 
problems that she would face, being familiar with the barriers 
traditionally expounded against change within the hospital 
system and an ability to constantly bargain for new solutions 
to these problems.
In Brief
The aim of this chapter was to extract from a detailed 
description of the development of the DEW staff team, factors 
that helped its implementation and defined it as a cohesive 
team. Features of the team building process that characterised 
the development of the case study CMHT were noted to lie in 
recruitment and training practices, seniority of staff, 
stability of the team personnel, development out of the 
hospital service, the establishment of true multi-disciplinary 
working and the receptiveness of the local climate. It was 
found that the psychiatrist was the most powerful actor in the 
DEW CMHT development, but other professionals had an important 
role and the elitist practices of the psychiatric profession 
were not found to be as monolithic at the local level as 
implied by the earlier case study evidence. The paramount 
importance of the personalities of the actors involved and 
their joint ambition to make the CMHT project succeed in a 
multi-disciplinary framework was noted. The next chapter will 
now explore how the team defined their activities.
1. Shadow Edward Wilson House Team Briefing For Staff, 10th 
March 1986.
2. Wandsworth Health Authority Circular: Staffing Proposals, 
November 1984.
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CHAPTER 8:
Implementing a Community Mental Health Team:
Service Style Development
This chapter aims to be primarily descriptive and to 
concentrate on the second theme identified by interviewees, 
that of service style development. What kind of service did 
the DEW Team provide? How was the team's operational remit 
defined and what were the key elements of the operational 
policy that was initially developed? How was this translated 
into practice and how did the users of the service respond to 
it? An account is given of the operational policy and team 
style that was developed, detailing clinical achievements 
during the first year of working. A brief discussion is 
presented at the end of the chapter.
Developing an Operational Policy
When the Team began work, they had no operational policy. They 
had an administrative policy1, but it did not say anything 
about clinical care. They were given a brief to serve a 
population area of 68 000 across the Battersea catchment areas 
and were operating as a supernumerary team to the existing 
psychiatric services described in chapter five. The area 
included North and South Battersea and small areas of Balham 
and Wandsworth. This incorporated the catchment areas of three 
consultant psychiatrists, one of whom was the DEW Team 
consultant. At this time the team did not have any specific 
definition of their desired client population, but had set up 
with the broad intention to particularly concentrate on the 
problems of "revolving door" patients (and in practice the 
spectrum of long term mentally ill clients). Decisions about 
which clients came into this client group were made on a basis 
of personal knowledge of clients. Many of the long term 
mentally ill clients were already well known to the team from 
their work in the hospital service and were clients with whom 
the health services were having difficulty.
During 1986 an operational policy was written by the team 
psychologist and clinical assistant2. The need for the writing
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of the policy became apparent to the Team once all the staff 
had been appointed and they started extending their 
educational work with other mental health workers in the area. 
Also, it was not until then that they had the manpower to 
spare the time to develop the policy. The new policy stressed 
the DEW Team's intention to prioritise work with long term 
mentally ill clients and detailed aims in service development 
and clinical functions, and specific referral policies. 
Emphasis was placed on working closely with hospital 
departments and local community agencies, to promote a 
coordinated network of support services.
The DEW Team were keen for their work to be based on an 
assessment of local need and saw themselves as having an 
educational and support function to other service providers, 
clients and carers, investigating and improving quality of 
care. The multi-disciplinary nature of the DEW Team was 
highlighted and the policy stated that the Team aimed to be 
accessible and encourage use of community alternatives to 
hospital services. The referrals accepted were mainly to be 
second referrals. Initially also, referrals from GPs that were 
not strictly suitable were taken on in order to gain a 
reputation for the team and to allow GPs to adjust to the idea 
of the existence of a specialist team for the long term 
mentally ill.
Implementing the Kev Elements of the Operational Policy
1) Clinical Service
The DEW Team aimed to develop an efficient procedure for 
dealing with referrals, case discussion and regular individual 
client reviews3. The key elements of this included the 
development of a key worker system, where each client was 
assigned a particular individual DEW worker who would 
coordinate their care requirements. Multidisciplinary notes 
were used to record all dealings with each client: workers 
from different professions did not have separate notes. Weekly 
multidisciplinary case-discussions were held when key-workers 
fed back information to the whole team about the clients on 
their individual key-worker case-loads and the team discussed
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developments with the key-worker and offered advice, support 
and help where required, about the best way to proceed with a 
case. There was also an emphasis on improved information 
collection. Each key-worker was responsible for carrying out 
a detailed assessment for each new client referred and 
ensuring that this information was entered in the multi­
disciplinary notes, together with data about the subsequent 
care planning arrangements. Many people interviewed commented 
that it was an important pillar of their work that the DEW 
Team specialised in work with the long term mentally ill. One 
comment was:
"Other teams end up with a never ending case-load and run 
the risk of attempting to do everything badly. Other 
teams get snowed under by people with minor complaints 
who attract a lot of time and attention. Those who can't 
shout get ignored or shout in a maladaptive way and are 
rushed into hospital. GPs prefer this as it lightens 
their workload, but it means largely that the people who 
should be being served are not".
The DEW Team was perceived by several interviewees as being in
a position to do some serious work with people with long-term
problems that had not been possible in the past. It was
recognised that they had the time to set up community support
groups, to work with other agencies and to support clients and
staff in the group homes and hostels. Interviewees generally
had a fairly clear understanding that very obvious (previously
un-met) needs were starting to be addressed by the DEW Team,
(although this statement will be qualified in chapter nine).
The perception of one management member was that
"The DEW Team showed that you do not just have to work 
with the acute population in order to obtain job 
satisfaction. This was a good brick to build on for other 
teams and supported the management's philosophy of 
prioritising support to long term clients".
The DEW Team was also seen as having some impact on changing 
the way that the needs of the local population were perceived. 
One interviewee recognised that the DEW Team achieved a 
definite shift in the philosophical basis by which needs were 
addressed. For the first time, there was more than a purely 
medical input. Joint identifications of health needs being
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related to societal issues was starting to be taken on board,
such as the importance of ameliorating the conditions of
tenants in poor housing as a crucial part of the DEW service.
Another person mentioned that the DEW Team had very good
strategies for providing continuity of care to clients and was
successful in not allowing clients to slip through the net.
Also, there were advantages for clients in that the DEW Team
was seen by many as being very accessible, with its
advantageous location right in the middle of the patch and its
ability to reduce some of the client-staff barriers that
traditionally exist in services. One team member commented:
"Stigma is a problem but self esteem is improved by 
seeing professionals outside in the community. You can 
pretend you are a family friend and people like this".
2) Duty System
A duty System was established in May 1986. It involved one 
worker being available each weekday, via a bleep, to answer 
queries and deal with new referrals, either seeing people 
within a few days or taking the referral to the weekly team 
multi-disciplinary team meeting for allocation. A record was 
kept of work done by the duty person and the results after 
eleven months showed very varied use of the system. A total of 
85 queries were recorded altogether, 8 of which resulted in a 
visit by the duty person on that day. On 72% of days no 
queries were recorded4. The team felt that the system had been 
useful both to ensure that someone was available to discuss 
potential referrals and to help relatives, clients and other 
agencies find their way around the mental health system. The 
system could not have coped with too much of a workload for 
the duty worker but it was found that this was generally not 
a problem, and it was decided that the system would be 
reviewed again when the Team became more widely known and the 
possibility that the duty workload would increase could be 
assessed.
3) Information Collection
The Team decided early on that it was necessary to improve the 
collection of clinical data. After the first year, the DEW 
Team computer had been used to store basic information about
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all the DEW Team referrals and Battersea admissions to 
Springfield since 1981. Copies of all Battersea Springfield 
Hospital discharge summaries were routinely sent to the DEW 
Team, and the team continuously collected all data available 
on local resources.
In 1987, the first DEW Team Annual Report was published. It 
concentrated on presenting long descriptions of the DEW Team 
way of working and presenting client data recording; total 
numbers of clients seen; referral rates (stated as 10-15 per 
month, with 42% referrals from the hospital service and 33% 
from GPs); demographic characteristics of clients (66% female 
and 33% non-white, half aged between 25 and 44); distribution 
of clients across the area served (Battersea); clinical 
characteristics; category of intervention offered; diagnosis 
(over 60% of clients were noted as having long term mental 
health problems); problems reported by clients; and inpatient 
data. The ability to provide such data marked an advancement 
for services in the district.
One management member commented that he thought this aspect of 
the DEW Team was exemplary, the DEW Team enabled the building 
of a better historic picture and improved information about 
demand levels became available, together with data about where 
the "heavy" areas were. One senior management member commented 
that he suspected that when the day hospital was first being 
planned there were very few reliable estimates of such demand 
levels. It was only in retrospect that it had been realised 
how such indices could be established.
4) Inter-aaencv Liaison
The team developed a link person system to liaise with 
relevant local authorities organisations and establishments. 
Where possible, appropriate other agencies were involved in 
joint projects with the DEW Team. These included the Battersea 
Befriending Scheme. This was set up with Social Services, 
Wandsworth Volunteer bureau, Wandsworth Association for Mental 
Health and other voluntary groups. Its aim was to train and 
support volunteers in befriending people with long-standing
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mental health problems who were lonely and socially isolated. 
The DEW Team was centrally involved in initiating this scheme. 
Also a Housing Group was established. This was a liaison group 
with the Housing Department of the Local Authority, initiated 
by the DEW Team.
A further project was the "North Battersea Network". This was
an attempt by a number of local groups including the DEW Team,
to improve communications and increase joint working. Projects
arising out of this group included a local exhibition of
community groups and a training day on "Work and the Mentally
111" for workers across agencies. Specialisation was perceived
to offer the possibility to introduce new types of work that
were greatly welcomed. One interviewee commented:
"The fact that they worked with staff too was very 
positive and on this front they provided a very good 
service to Battersea as a whole, particularly to the 
hostels and the housing department. The development and 
training function was very successful".
5) Community Group Philosophy
It became an explicit, verbally agreed policy of the team that 
each team member should be involved in the running of a 
community group. Every team member did this throughout the 
team's history, except for the junior doctors. In the April 
1987 Annual Report, the principles behind the group philosophy 
were expounded. Priority was given to groups aimed at the 
needs of the long term mentally ill and their carers, 
reflecting the team's clinical experience that the needs of 
these people were poorly provided for. A number of these 
groups had a social and long term support function, reflecting 
the finding that for people with long standing mental health 
problems, loneliness and social isolation were very common 
reported problems (eg Wing & Morris 1982).
Wherever possible the groups were set up jointly with other 
organisations/ agencies. The groups were set up in response to 
perceived needs identified by the team and other relevant 
agencies in the area and were run in a variety of community 
settings such as community centres and churches, selected to
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be as non-institutionalised as possible. So right from the 
very beginning the team saw themselves as having an 
educational and support function. This was high on their list 
of priorities. The Community Groups are listed in Box 4.
MacDonald & Ochera (1990) reported on users views of community
groups related to the DEW Team. The most frequent response
from clients was that they had the company of others who were
understanding because they had similar problems:
"You talk to people. It's something you achieve. People 
outside don't understand but the people there have been 
in the same boat".
Several clients commented that they liked to have something to
do in an informal atmosphere:
"It's something to do. It's not structured or
disciplined. It's not therapy but more social".
"It's doing something interesting- occupying my mind - 
meeting people".
Some seemed unsure of what benefit they received or made 
comments such as:
"It passes the time."
"It's somewhere to go out to. It's the only time I ever 
go out."
Most of the more negative comments concerned the stigma of
associating with mentally ill clients:
"I don't want to mix with mental people. I don't go to 
any mental places".
"I don't know. It was good. I liked it, but the people 
there were really sick and I didn't want to mix with 
them."
GPs and social-workers views of the community groups were also 
collected. Ten GPs said they did not know what benefits 
clients derived from groups or what they did there. The others 
said the main benefits were the social contact and support 
given to clients, and felt that the groups were more 
accessible to clients and less stigmatising than hospital 
groups:
"It's local. They can just pop in. It's not a hospital - 
there's no stigma".
"They're fantastically supportive. They prevent chronic 
relapses. If a patient is deteriorating, the group 
anticipates this. There is much closer control and 
contact".
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Social workers interviewed gave similarly positive feedback
about the community groups. It was thought that the groups
provided a good way for clients to keep in contact with DEW
workers and other professionals. Staff were able to monitor
clients and help to avert crises and breakdowns. Five social
workers said that participation at the groups gave some
structure to the client's lives and four that they were a way
of helping clients to integrate with the local community and
to break down the stigma attached to mental illness:
"Their network of contacts builds up. They're not 
isolated. The clients know their health is being 
monitored in a relaxed way".
"It's a chance to move out of the mentally ill world. 
There are other groups going on here. They're part of the 
community."
Several social workers made the point that the groups were not
liked by or suitable for all clients:
"They sometimes work well, sometimes not. In one case it 
was helpful for meeting others with the same problems. 
They also got information. Two others seemed ideal 
referrals but they fell apart. We couldn't understand 
why."
"(One client) was afraid that her affairs would be known 
all over the estate."
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Box 4: DEW Team Community Groups -1987
GROUP VENUE LIAISON ACTIVITY
Garfield Contact 
Group
Community
Centre
Run jointly with 
Social Services
Social support and group 
activity for long term 
mentally ill clients
Black Carers 
Group
Health Clinic 
on Housing 
Estate
Run jointly with 
Social Services
Information and discussion 
about mental health issues 
relating to black people aimed 
at black people with long term 
mental health problems and 
their carers
Autumn Colours Local
Authority Day 
Centre
Run jointly with 
Community Elderly Team
Social support and group 
activity for elderly people 
with long term mental health 
problems
Relatives Support 
Group
Church Hall Run jointly with 
Social Services
Information, discussion and 
support for the relatives of 
people with long term mental 
health problems
Sports Group Leisure
Centre
Run in conjunction 
with ILEA Youth Worker
Sporting activities primarily 
for young people with long 
term mental health problems 
(under 30s)
Out of Bounds 
Group
Church Hall Run jointly with 
Psychology Department
Treatment and support for 
people with agoraphobia
Mother and 
Toddler Group
Social 
Services 
Family Centre
Run jointly with 
Social Services
Social support and activities 
for young mothers with long 
term mental health problems 
and their children
190
GROUP VENUE LIAISON ACTIVITY
Befriending
Scheme
Client Homes 
- Volunteer 
Training in 
Social 
Services 
venues
Joint project with 
Volunteer Bureau, 
Social Services, MIND 
& Psychology 
Department
Recruiting, training & 
supporting volunteers in 
befriending people with long 
term mental health problems
Patmore Women1s 
Group
Community
Centre
Run Jointly with 
Social Services
Information, discussion and 
support for women with long 
term mental health problems
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Users Views on the DEW Service
The User Satisfaction study conducted in 1989 also aimed to 
find out which aspects of the DEW Team its users found most 
helpful or unhelpful and unnecessary (MacDonald & Ochera 
1990). 110 DEW Team clients were taken from the DEW Team
caseload and 103 successfully interviewed. 33 GPs taken from 
client case notes, were also interviewed together with 23 
social workers. There was found to be a high level of 
satisfaction among clients, GPs and Social Workers and the 
majority found the team accessible and available when needed. 
The main reservation was that there was not enough care 
available, but that the DEW Team gave a good service within 
the constraints of their resources. Carers were generally less 
satisfied with the service, less aware of what it offered and 
how to use it.
About two thirds of clients knew how to contact the DEW Team 
and had never had any difficulty. Most were satisfied with the 
quality of communication. The main dissatisfaction was with 
information about and participation in treatment. Up to a 
third felt that the psychiatrist, CPN and OT did not give them 
enough information or encourage their participation in 
treatment. The prevailing themes of loneliness, isolation, and 
lack of support, while they may be inherent in the mental 
health of some clients, were felt not to be approachable 
without more staff and facilities. Clients also noted a need 
for more practical support. Lack of information about the 
service and its aims was reflected in the responses of all 
groups. A small minority of clients and carers could identify 
a named key-worker. Several GPs were unable to answer all the 
questions because they felt they lacked information about the 
DEW Team and would have liked to have known more. Both GPs and 
social workers requested more information and desired closer 
collaboration with DEW Team staff.
About two thirds of GPs knew how to contact the DEW Team and 
within certain constraints, such as that they would not use 
the service in an emergency or outside office hours, had 
experienced no difficulty in reaching a DEW Team worker. About
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four fifths of the social workers knew how to contact the Team 
and had no difficulty. A large proportion of the people 
referred to the team's accessibility when asked what they 
liked most about the DEW service. Less than a third of carers 
(31%) knew how to contact the Team. In general, the users of 
the DEW service liked and respected the DEW Team staff. There 
were many references to staff shortages and the fact that 
staff were sometimes rushed and overworked. Nearly all the 
staff who had contact with the DEW Team had good relations 
with them.
A Review of Progress after One Year
In its formative years between 1986 and 1988, there was a lot 
of discussion about the DEW Team throughout the Mental Health 
Unit. The team was widely referred to in debates about 
different forms of service provision and retained a high 
profile. The DEW Team undoubtedly became the centre of 
attention for a few years and managers were supportive. They 
often quoted the practice as a model. Others became fed up 
with hearing about it. The development of the Team was stated 
to have played a significant part in formulating later 
perceptions about good practices in service provision, unit 
wide. In many ways, the DEW Team was part of a change in 
thinking and attitudes that was happening anyway, but it was 
seen as a testing ground for new ideas, new philosophies and 
the practical corollaries that accompany such change.
One management member said he thought people regarded the DEW 
Team very well because it was accessible and quick in giving 
a response. Their very nature of being out of the hospital was 
felt to mean that the team were more aware of other community 
facilities and were therefore able to "plug people in" better. 
The idea that evening classes could operate as an alternative 
to Day Hospital admission was very appealing. It avoided 
labelling and disability. It was slowly being realised from 
the management side, that professionals could be highly 
effective service initiators if they were given more autonomy 
and encouraged to make decisions without asking permission 
from management, but keeping them informed. The DEW Team was
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considered to have encouraged professionals who were a bit 
more far-sighted, to look within their own catchment areas at 
how teams need to develop and what they can do. It had shown 
what it was possible to do and also highlighted the pitfalls.
A major section of the DEW Team 1987 Annual Report was devoted 
to future developments and longer term objectives of the 
service. The forthcoming opening of the day hospital in four 
years time was emphasized and various suggestions were made as 
to the planning that needed to be carried out in the mean 
time. At this stage the team still saw itself as developing a 
bridge to the opening of the day hospital and its objectives 
for the subsequent year related to further development of its 
research and evaluation components, liaison and training 
functions and ideas about the extension of the service.
Features of the Service Style Development Process 
The DEW Team became a unique innovation in service provision 
in Battersea at the time for reasons that were intimately 
linked with its origins as a professionally defined 
initiative:
1 ) DISCRETION and AUTONOMY
The DEW Team were given considerable discretion and autonomy 
in the design and practice of their own work. Its ideology was 
initially established almost without any policy restrictions 
from management, political bodies or professional departments. 
The staff team were given a free rein in decision making 
regarding operational policy, the DEW Team introduced new 
forms of care based on community support, embracing practices 
of home visiting, community groups, liaison with families and 
networking in local community agencies. These forms of service 
delivery were loosely based on the CMHT model described in 
chapter two, but aside from broad ideological notions defined 
in the literature, the service was designed purely on the 
basis of professionally defined need.
2) DISTINCTIVE STYLE
The DEW Team style of working was very different from other
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services, partly because it was the first community mental 
health service in Wandsworth to target the long term mentally 
ill population. Also, released from the strictures of 
comprehensive catchment area work, it had supernumerary status 
and hence was better able to respond to the individual needs 
of both the clients themselves and other service providers in 
the area. Whether or not the other actors affected by the 
development in the local area fully understood its role, they 
did perceive that the Team was offering something new and a 
style that was more personal and more indulgent than services 
that had existed previously. The extra time available to the 
team members also enabled them to establish new organisational 
patterns. They were able to develop an information system and 
establish multi-disciplinary case notes. They were able to 
account for their existence by preparing detailed annual 
reports and feeding back data to the Mental Health Unit and 
other local providers.
DISCUSSION
This chapter aimed to consider what kind of service the DEW 
Team provided and to establish the key elements of the 
operational policy that they developed. In this way, its 
function has been primarily descriptive and analysis is 
restricted to evaluating the extent to which the DEW Team's 
service style met with the broad constituents of CMHTs 
identified in chapter two and assessing the initial impact 
that the DEW Team had in changing service delivery patterns in 
the case study area5.
Returning to the service problems identified in chapter five, 
the pattern of community care service provision in Battersea, 
prior to the existence of the DEW Team, essentially 
constituted a skeleton psychiatric emergency service, with 
CPNs and the out-patient clinics forming the only means of 
client follow-up. With the setting up of the DEW Team, this 
pattern began to change. The DEW Team provided a specialist 
service that to some extent complimented services already in 
place and particularly addressed the problems of "revolving
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door" long term mentally ill clients. The literature reviewed 
in chapter two identified a national need to concentrate more 
fully on how to ensure that long term mentally ill clients 
receive adequate services and to improve knowledge about 
models of practice within which such an ambition can be 
achieved. The DEW Team appeared to be addressing this need at 
the local level6. Their operational policy put into practice 
their commitment to prioritise the long term mentally ill 
group, proposing a defined range of options for staff to draw 
on when developing packages of care.
The DEW Team engaged in an active programme of service 
development. The key to this seems to have been that they 
began with a strong philosophical commitment to development 
and were granted the extra resources necessary to give life to 
this philosophy. Targeting the long term mentally ill group 
was a politically popular solution at the time. Other service 
providers generally noticed the reduction of strain on their 
own workloads that resulted and perceived that the DEW Team 
were doing something new in care provision for the long term 
mentally ill group.
The DEW Team operational policy fulfilled some of the typical 
values of a CMHT service identified in the literature 
presented in chapter two. Their service was undeniably local, 
accessible, reduced stigma to some degree and encouraged 
coordination between the Health Service, Social Services, GPs 
and other relevant local provider agencies. Their high profile 
served to change some of the myths about the difficulties of 
providing a community based service. For example, they showed 
that multi-disciplinary working between professionals from 
different disciplines was possible and indeed rewarding for 
both staff, clients and other professionals with whom they 
dealt. Key features of the DEW Team's multi-disciplinary style 
included their very high community profile, their commitment 
to work with a client indefinitely, the strong advocacy role 
that they adopted in working alongside rather than opposite 
clients and the sense that no job was "beneath their skills". 
The DEW Team also challenged administrative structures that
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had previously proved problematic (This adds to the definition 
of true multi-disciplinary working developed in chapter 
seven). They developed a new information system and introduced 
multi-disciplinary client notes. The DEW Team had also gone 
some way towards challenging traditional treatment approaches, 
especially for the long term mentally ill clients. Their 
treatment philosophy emphasised the importance of social and 
environmental influences on client well-being and concentrated 
resources on providing on-going support and maintenance. The 
community groups were particularly well received by service 
users and as a team, the DEW Team presented a cohesive team 
identity and were well respected in the local community.
However, there was room for improvement, particularly 
concerning the empowerment of service users. The user group 
most dissatisfied with their service was the carers. Many 
service users, including other professionals, felt there was 
a need for improved information about the services that the 
DEW team could offer. Several also stressed the resource 
constraints under which the team worked and the fact that they 
often seemed rushed and short staffed. The DEW Team did not 
initiate any programmes run by clients or involve clients in 
planning and decision making in any capacity. They did not 
attempt to empower clients through the creation or direct 
involvement in sheltered work schemes and were unsuccessful in 
aiding many clients to enter open employment. Also, they 
offered little in the way of crisis intervention and missed a 
valuable opportunity by conceding to only operate in 9-5 hours 
on week days. The use of an "out of hours" answering machine 
was promoted by the team to forestall this criticism, but it 
could be surmised that with knowledge of this scheme, clients 
would merely have turned elsewhere for help or tried to deal 
with problems alone. The DEW Team's assertion that this was 
all that was needed could be questioned. The resultant impact 
of such pressures in sustaining the DEW service development 
will be described in the following two chapters.
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In Brief
The key elements of the DEW Team operational policy were 
providing a multi-disciplinary clinical service, a duty 
system, an information and monitoring system, inter-agency 
liaison and client community support groups. The distinctive 
style of service that developed was defined by the 
professionals themselves, under conditions of high discretion 
and autonomy. The DEW Team was perceived to be distinctly 
different from what had existed in service provision 
previously as the team aimed to specialise in providing 
services to the long term mentally ill and to explore methods 
through which this aim could be achieved. They operated within 
a defined range of care options. The following chapter will 
now explore some of the barriers to implementation that were 
faced by the team in their early years.
1. Brief Outline of DEW, issued October 1986.
2. Doddington Edward Wilson Mental Health Team Operational 
Policy (Draft), February 1987.
3. DEW Annual Report 1986/87, circulated in April 1987.
4. DEW Annual Report 1986/87, circulated in April 1987.
5. The features of service provision will be reassessed in 
chapter eleven when the specialist DEW style of service will 
be compared empirically with the traditional service style 
that existed previously.
6. Empirical evidence to test the DEW Team's success in 
prioritising the long term mentally ill will be presented in 
Chapter Twelve.
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CHAPTER 9:
Implementing A Community Mental Health Team:
Barriers to Implementation
This history presented of the DEW CMHT has so far covered the 
positive aspects of team and policy development. Chapter six 
described barriers that were faced in setting up the team and 
in making a reality of the original innovative proposals. This 
chapter aims to explore further problems that were faced in 
the implementation stage. What were the constraints 
experienced in gaining resources and establishing territory? 
What impact did they have on the development of the DEW Team 
and from where did they arise?
As described in chapter four, policy is often discussed in an 
abstract sense, yet it is the practical problems of 
implementation that can tell a lot about the priorities within 
an organisation and the barriers to making innovations work. 
By again utilising interview and documentary material, this 
chapter will give an account of the problems that were of most 
significance to the actors themselves in sustaining the DEW 
CMHT development. Ways that the DEW Team dealt with criticism 
will also be described. It will be shown that barriers to 
implementation are often experienced as the flip side of 
policies that also have positive features. The constraints 
described here, range from the practical to the more 
fundamental, and although some problems described may appear 
minor at a first reading, hidden within them lie important 
structural problems that are often faced by policy innovators. 
These will be drawn out in the discussion section at the end 
of the chapter.
Practical Implementation Problems
1. Office Space
At its inception, the DEW Team were given use of a filing 
annexe in the top of the Cottage Day Hospital on the 
Springfield site, as their office space. Here, they held team 
meetings on a fortnightly basis, taking most of their 
referrals from the hospital ward round. However, it
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increasingly became obvious that a team base in the community 
was required. The hospital administration were slow to 
respond. Finally, an individual administrator took on 
responsibility for this project. She found a small office 
space on the side of a health centre, on one of the high 
morbidity council estates in Battersea and proceeded to push 
the building work through.
The office was supposed to be ready in February 1986, but the 
team actually moved in on 1 April 1986. Due to this delay, the 
Consultant was left with three months extra time without a 
team in the community. The community staff could not 
officially be appointed until the office was ready. 
Resourcefully, she used this spare time to teach herself 
computing skills which later proved invaluable. However, she 
and the team to be found the delay extremely annoying and 
disruptive.
Even when the new office was opened, problems continued. The 
office consisted of three rooms; one small room for the 
consultant, a secretary's room and one room for all the 
remaining team members that was also used as a staff meeting 
space. At interview, everyone on the team mentioned that it 
was a valuable objective for the DEW team to be centrally 
located in the area of highest morbidity in Battersea. 
However, all team members recognised that there was a problem 
with the allocated office space being so small. For staff 
members who did not run out-patient clinics, space to see 
clients was lacking, when it was inappropriate, inconvenient 
or obviously dangerous to see them in their own homes. There 
was an associated safety issue about clients visiting the 
office base unannounced and there were occasional run-ins with 
staff in the adjacent health centre baby-clinic on occasions 
when disturbed clients turned up and created a scene.
The positive aspect of the lack of adequate office space was 
that it forced the DEW Team to work purely in an outreach 
style. Many commented that it also united the workers and 
provided good conditions for multi-disciplinary working. One
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interviewee commented:
"I believe that the team office base is of tremendous 
importance as every team should be together. 
Communication is good as people are always around at the 
base and it gets around trying to find people in the 
hospital grounds, with loads of failed phone calls or 
having to write letters".
2. Secretarial Staff
The team had no secretarial staff until the office base on the
Doddington Estate opened. The team were given extra funding
for a half time secretary. The consultant combined this post
with the funding for her personal half-time secretary at
Springfield Hospital (a move that she later regretted as it
cut her off from all secretarial support at Springfield
Hospital). At this time a secretary was appointed, but she
left to have a baby. Therefore, the post became vacant and
despite constant advertising, was not filled for another
eighteen months because it was funded at a low grade. Hence,
the team had a series of temporary secretaries, which proved
to be a very serious problem.
"Due to the nature of the outreach work with highly 
vulnerable patients, in conditions where staff were 
always very busy and working to full capacity, the role 
of such a person carried a high degree of responsibility 
and organisational ability as well as a veritable list of 
personal qualities."
From May 1988 to the end of July 1988 a long series of letters 
were sent by the consultant to the Unit General Manager 
bemoaning the situation of trying to run an effective 
community team with many months of changing and unsatisfactory 
secretarial/receptionist cover at the DEW Team base1. The 
correspondence began when the consultant returned to work 
after a period of sickness partly caused by work pressures, 
and at this time she recognised that a significant 
contributory factor to her difficulties was the perpetual 
turnover of temporary office staff and the lack of a regular 
visual display unit in-putter to keep the computer up to date.
The consultant put forward a proposal which would in her
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belief provide a way of keeping the office going without a 
regular experienced receptionist. It included a common 
telephone system between the DEW Team and the other Battersea 
mental health services, an ansa-phone and "fax" machines and 
a regular visual display unit in-putter for one half day per 
week. She suggested that the funds for such equipment might be 
obtained from a small vacancy factor in the DEW CMHT budget, 
represented by the two clinical assistant sessions not used by 
the current person in post.
The result of this correspondence was that the office did not 
receive any new equipment, but by mid-July the personnel 
department had advertised an up-graded Office Manager post. It 
was then possible to employ someone, so from 1988 the team had 
a full-time secretarial post in the community. The secretarial 
problem had lead to a revised proposed response, which in turn 
resulted in a compromise solution. It was felt by many at 
interview that the DEW Team had demonstrated the importance of 
having strong secretarial support.
Conflicts with External Interests
1) Hospital Services
The DEW staff were aware that they would have to make a case 
for their existence, separate from the hospital, but they did 
not find this easy to do. The first real signs of conflict 
came from the Springfield Hospital ward staff, when the DEW 
Team requested that they should come to do a secondment in the 
community, working as part of the DEW Team. This never 
happened, partly as a result of ward staff shortages but also 
because of resistance to the idea. There was an element of 
professional jealousy. Community workers were seen to have an 
easy time "swanning about around town", and teamwork was 
perceived to result in demarkation and role loss.
In July 1987, the ward staff and other Battersea CPNs stated 
that they did not know when and why the DEW Team worked with 
one client and not another. This occurred after a period when 
the team felt they had spent considerable time and effort 
explaining things to them and operating a very sensitive
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liaison function. The DEW Team consultant was very upset. She 
said:
"I knew there would be splitting difficulties with the 
hospital and thought the team had done everything 
possible to stop it happening. For instance, it was 
always ensured that a DEW team member attended all ward 
rounds including those at the Cottage Day Hospital. But 
it was impossible to prevent such conflicts. All one 
could do was know when they were coming and be prepared 
to work on them, which is what the DEW team had to do".
When the issue came to a head, the consultant was told by 
management that she was demoralising staff and wasting 
valuable resources by offering an expensive service and the 
money would be better spent elsewhere. The importance of power 
relations became very obvious. The DEW Team consultant gave up 
her post as Medical Administrator in February 1986, resigning 
six months before the end of her official term of office. She 
stated that the reason for this was that she wanted to have an 
active part in the development of the DEW CMHT. However, she 
felt that had she still been Medical Administrator, the split 
with hospital staff would not have been so acute, as the 
management would not have faced her with such damaging 
comments.
The team decided to counter the attack and wrote a position 
paper for discussion, which stated a very clear vision of the 
difficult issues and the supporting philosophies2. Again it 
was emphasized that the DEW Team was an attempt to work with 
the mentally ill in a new way and as such it was recognised 
that it was bound to encounter difficulties with existing 
services that had their set routines. It attempted to shift 
the emphasis from therapeutic places to therapeutic people and 
to reach some clients who were previously given a minimal 
service, namely, the revolving door "chronics" and the "social 
chaos" group.
Between February and April 1986 the consultant had spent her 
time learning how to use the computer. After the split with 
the hospital, she was able to take them lists of clients who 
had previously been in-patients and who were now doing well in
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the community and she took hospital ward staff out to the 
community groups to see for themselves. Eventually the ward 
simmered down and even started to attend a few community Team 
meetings, which they had never done before.
The splitting problem was with the acute ward staff at the 
time (Heather Ward), who rightly saw themselves as very 
overworked and saw community work as the easy option. It is 
interesting to consider their opinions of the problems. They 
stated at interview that they were enthusiastic about the DEW 
Team and would have liked to have been more involved, but they 
recognised that there was "a bit of a communication problem" 
and thought this stemmed from the fact that the two services 
were situated on two different sites. They found it difficult 
to comment on what the good and bad aspects of the DEW Team 
were, because they were "too wrapped up on the ward". They 
claimed that they did not know enough about what the DEW Team 
actually did and could not accommodate its working pattern.
The ward staff were encouraged to attend the DEW Team weekly 
multi-disciplinary team meeting, but there were ongoing 
problems. They found it difficult to go to the meeting as they 
had the ward to run on a full time basis and had to be around 
when crises occurred. They constantly found that they were so 
short staffed that it was very difficult to spare a few staff 
to travel out to Battersea. Also, they felt that work was 
often duplicated in the monday ward round and even when they 
did manage to attend the DEW Team meeting, it was frequently 
just a matter of repeating the same things.
The DEW Team operated a nine to five service with each member 
of staff taking it in turns to run a duty system and with an 
answering machine operating when the office base was shut. The 
team members themselves perceived this to be a workable tactic 
and believed that the clients had adapted well to using the 
service in this form. However, the ward staff felt that it was 
they who silently suffered the consequences of this system:
"We fill in the gaps. We provide counselling and are
always here if any patient needs to come for any reason.
It is at the weekends and in the evenings that patients
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most need support, particularly the ones who are working. 
We don't get credited for this work. We are budgeted for 
providing a service to the patients on the ward: we are 
not budgeted for giving an out-patient service. It is all 
extra for us".
The community support groups run by the DEW Team did take 
place outside office hours, which went some way towards 
addressing this problem, but several team members commented 
that this was not enough and constituted an added stress on 
the over-worked DEW Team staff.
The way that the working patterns had evolved for those in the 
hospital service working with the team, was also seen to be 
far from ideal. The problem for the senior registrar was that 
the remit was not to work full-time on the DEW Team, and 
consequent difficulties were found with juggling 
responsibilities. It was felt that the team set its 
commitments and often these did not fit into the senior 
registrar time slots. For example, the psychotherapy sessions 
that took place once a month at the multi-disciplinary team 
meetings, coincided with a time when the senior registrar 
found he had to be in a meeting with his other consultant who 
"shouted louder". The senior registrar's job was an accident 
in that sense.
The net result of all these "niggles" from acute ward staff 
was that there always remained some distrust and resentment of 
the DEW Team throughout their development. However, more 
success in achieving an innovative service in partnership with 
hospital staff was experienced in working with staff on Zinnia 
ward, which was the "homeward bound" ward at this time. The 
consultant had put a great deal of effort into establishing 
good links with Zinnia ward. She engineered that the nursing 
sister and the charge nurse positions on the ward were split 
positions, so these two staff members spent half their time on 
the ward and half their time following up people in the 
community.
There was also a very able charge nurse on Zinnia ward, who 
together with the consultant, initiated and organised what was
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known as the "Zinnia Day Out". This was an arrangement 
whereby, one day each week, the ward was shut and all clients 
were taken out of the institution. The stimulating idea was 
that for many clients there was a high risk that they would 
become increasingly institutionalised, and rarely leave the 
hospital. It was decided that if a suitable venue could be 
found, there was no reason why both the clients and their 
nurses should not spend a day out of the hospital visiting 
their home community. The venue chosen was St Saviours Church 
Hall in Battersea. Generally the "day out" was planned the 
previous day and in the mornings the clients would go out to 
the shops and buy themselves some food. Everyone would then 
meet up and cook a meal together before spending the afternoon 
doing an individual task that they either wanted or needed to 
do. Some clients went back to their homes, some went to pay 
their electricity bills, while others went to the park or went 
shopping. This venture continued for about two years.
However, it was never an easy venture. Aside from the 
conceptual shifts required of institutional staff, management 
and even clients, in adjusting to this new idea, the main 
problem that constantly emerged was that of resources. Clients 
were given only thirty pence each per day to spend on their 
lunch and there was no flexibility to take extra clients. The 
consultant believed that there were a number of clients who 
would have benefitted from the day, who never had the chance 
to go. When relations were good, there was a good rapport 
between Heather and Zinnia ward, and if it was felt there was 
some reason that a Heather client should go and a Zinnia 
client not, then a swap was arranged. However, this did not 
work so well when relations deteriorated.
The issue of the money made it very difficult to keep the 
project going. Then the ward charge nurse left and the 
remainder of the Zinnia ward staff asked to stop the "Zinnia 
Day Out". The consultant commented that in many ways this was 
rather disappointing, but "these things always have a life of 
their own and it is important to let them die naturally so 
that other things can happen". However, no other such
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innovations were instigated with the hospital ward staff 
throughout the remainder of the study period.
2) Social Service Department
The position paper presented by the DEW Team to smooth 
relations with the hospital service, argued that the Team was 
essentially an extension of the service offered by the Health 
Authority to areas that would ideally be practised by a well 
staffed Social Services department with abundant mental health 
skills and immediate access to medical, psychological and OT 
advice. It was stated that Battersea had long been deficient 
in such a service. However, in trying to supply it, the DEW 
Team also roused some distrust and incomprehension in existing 
hard pressed Social Services employees. They understandably 
felt that the effectiveness of their service was being 
impugned. The Team had attempted to nurture links by running 
groups jointly with other agencies and giving other 
professionals regular access to DEW Team workers at the point 
where handover decisions were made such as ward rounds and out 
patient clinics, but this was not enough. The different 
cultures of the Health and Social Services again aroused 
conflict.
During the interviews, further general problems with the DEW 
Team style of working were highlighted by Social Service 
Department workers, that demonstrated on-going distrust and 
criticism of the team. Social Services employees were critical 
of the DEW Team’s referral procedures. One respondent from the 
Social Services side said that she believed "there is 
something about the NHS in general that consultants feel very 
beholden to respond to requests of GPs, over and above 
others". Another interviewee was also eager to highlight the 
bias that she could see towards accepting all GP referrals and 
constantly catering to the demands from GPs as fellow medical 
professionals. She pointed out that only 47% of those admitted 
to hospital have a GP involved. She felt that this point was 
not stressed enough and the DEW Team fell into the same trap. 
Mental health services often have very little to do with the 
GP as the first point of contact and it was quoted that only
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20% of Springfield Hospital admissions come via a GP. This 
interviewee also mentioned that for example, in East Lambeth, 
a neighbouring borough, 40% of the mentally ill population, 
who are under 35 years of age, turn up by themselves at 
emergency clinics and 40% come via the police. The DEW Team 
did not do enough to recognise this and change its referral 
patterns. Therefore, it was perceived that there were certain 
areas of the population that they were not picking up quickly 
enough.
Ideologically, the DEW Team was also stated by one interviewee
to be "very medical". She believed that the team model of
working was based on the idea that schizophrenia was seen as
an illness that required a drug. She stated that she saw the
initial need to stabilise clients through the use of drugs,
but did not always feel she could go along with this concept
concerning certain individuals. She stated:
"I think there is an argument for drug use, but I also 
think people have a right to say no, with discussion. I 
believe we must be more imaginative with some people - 
they may need drug treatment but that is not the end of 
the story. Very often it is the very practical problems 
that need to be the centre for attention. DEW continues 
to reinforce the idea that continuous attention to drugs 
is the main challenge. They should particularly see 
neurotics in a much less medical framework".
Social workers working on the DEW Team commented that they 
felt the other team members did not fully understand their 
skills and training. They felt that the common understanding 
was that social workers only sort out money and housing, 
whereas their perception of the main skills of a social worker 
was in assessment, family dynamics, family relationships and 
individual counselling. At interview, there was a suggestion 
that the reason for the role confusion had historical origins 
in the way that social work developed as a profession. This 
conflict between Health and Social Services employees within 
the team also concerned policies of home visiting. The team 
policy was that any member of the team could appropriately do 
a home assessment visit unless a particular professional had 
been requested. They did discuss at the weekly multi­
disciplinary meeting who might be the best member of staff to
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go, but often the social workers interviewed believed that the 
reasoning seemed contrary to the needs of the client. For 
instance, one social worker questioned the appropriateness of 
a consultant psychiatrist going round to sort out someone 
referred with a housing problem. Essentially, professional 
demarkation was becoming blurred and there was a risk of role 
loss.
The first social worker who worked on the team stated that she 
was puzzled by the fact that she was working on the team for 
one year, but never had a real crisis on her case-load. She 
felt that this was not because she managed them well, but was 
more because of the way that different types of clients had 
been shared out and saw this as an area where there was a lack 
of clarity in team working. She recognised, for instance that 
the CPN probably had many crises on her caseload in this 
period. From a social work point of view, she felt that crises 
were picked up at other points in the Social Work Department.
The social workers who had worked on the team, felt that there 
were major problems with being part of Social Services and not 
the Health Service, which was the case for every other team 
member. Each organisation formed a distinctive bureaucracy 
with its own organisational policies and ideological 
approaches. For instance, the Social Services had a waiting 
list policy, whereas the Health Service did not. One social 
worker commented that she felt caught between the two and it 
was unclear for her whose policies she should be working by. 
In theory she was working by Social Services policies, but in 
practice these were unworkable when every other member of the 
team was working under a different organisational philosophy.
Another example stated was in working with long term mentally 
ill clients who expressly requested not to be seen by the 
team. The team had a policy of putting such clients on "Safety 
Net". This meant that no client was discharged from care 
unless they remained well for a very prolonged period or their 
circumstances changed. One social worker stated that by Social 
Services philosophy, people were seen to have the right to
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reject team involvement if they wished. Health Service workers 
did not respect this right on clinical grounds and she 
believed this was an area of fundamental disagreement and 
concern. A further example stated was the issue of client's 
rights to access their own case-notes. The Social Services 
policy was that clients had right of access to files, while 
the Health Service had no such policy. (However, during the 
period of this case-study, the Health Service policy was in 
fact changed in this respect and they adopted the same rights 
for clients.) While it was recognised by the Social Services 
employees that clients hardly ever asked to see their files, 
the area office had apparently publicised the right. One 
social worker commented that she did not know of anyone who 
had actually asked to see them.
Another area of concern was that of duplication of 
administrative work. At the outset, the social worker working 
on the team officially had to duplicate all her work. This was 
very complicated. She had a workload management system whereby 
assessments and "one-offs" were filed at the community team, 
and although they probably did not realise it, clients had the 
right to see these notes. If the social worker then became the 
key-worker for a particular client, the notes had to be filed 
in the Social Work Department, while also being filed as 
multi-disciplinary notes at the team base. There was also a 
problem with referral forms, which was another demonstration 
of the different cultures between the Social Services and the 
Health Service. Social Services required much more detailed 
information. One of the most important things on the Social 
Services forms was whether or not the client was aware of the 
referral. In 1990, the DEW Team recognised this as a problem, 
but it took a long time and was certainly a difficulty for the 
social worker who was first working for the Team.
3) The Rehabilitation Team
In 1986, following a visit to Springfield Hospital by the 
Health Advisory Service (HAS)3, both the hospital and 
community services for long term mentally ill clients were 
criticised for being inadequate. This precipitated a major
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rehabilitation initiative regarding the "old long stay 
patients" who had previously been living on the long stay 
hospital wards at Springfield Hospital. The majority of the 
long stay wards within the hospital were subsequently 
abolished and Wandsworth Social Services together with local 
Housing Associations and the hospital Rehabilitation Team 
developed a series of "Group Homes" across the Wandsworth 
Borough into which the long stay patients were gradually 
rehoused. The Rehabilitation Team offered a specialist service 
to support these new community clients in their new homes.
An interviewee from the hospital based Rehabilitation Team 
stated that she had a major qualm about how the DEW Team's 
specialisation with the long term mentally ill fitted in with 
this rehabilitation service. She felt it was unhelpful to draw 
distinctions between the hospital and the community. The 
Rehabilitation Team resettled hospital inpatients in the 
community and continued supporting them, while the DEW Team 
was also there, supporting a similar client population, but 
having nothing to do with the hospital based Rehabilitation 
Team or clients who were living in group homes. The respondent 
would have liked to have seen more of a blurring between the 
Rehabilitation Services and the DEW Team and stated that the 
Rehabilitation Team viewed the DEW Team as a "funny bit in the 
middle".
4) Health Service Management
Initially the Mental Health Unit management was very
supportive of the DEW Team. Management members interviewed
felt that in the implementation of the Team the main conflict
that had been experienced concerned resentment from some
quarters, because of the apparent amount of resources that
were devoted to the Team. This resentment built up over time.
One member commented that he saw the DEW Team as a maverick:
"it did things differently from the traditional model 
which was very powerful and continues to be, although its 
influence is diminishing. DEW was very significant in 
changing this, but there has undoubtedly been increasing 
pressure on that maverick to conform in certain ways."
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Management members saw this pressure mainly coming from the 
necessity for the Mental Health Unit as a whole to be 
consistent in information systems and in service organisation. 
The DEW Team was seen as doing something different for a 
community team and was considered to have offered a good model 
for a catchment area team. It was fairly unique at its 
inception, but had become less so over the years. It was 
thought by the management side that as a model it would have 
a useful application in other inner-city areas, but they were 
not sure it could continue to be supported in Battersea in 
times of severe financial restriction.
5) Other Community Agencies
In general, the DEW Team links with community agencies were 
considered to be very good. However, there were inevitably 
some problems. Liaison with community agencies was felt not to 
be clear enough, and several people from the management side 
and from other local agencies questioned whether the Team's 
profile was high enough. The DEW Team was felt by workers in 
other local community agencies not to have convinced political 
bodies about the levels of service demands from the long term 
mentally ill population and the required response to that.
6) The Local Authority
When asked about decision making processes in community mental 
health, a management representative described a lengthy 
process involving discussions throughout the unit involving 
the catchment area teams, colleagues at ward level, community 
and Local Authority. But both in the evolution of the DEW 
service and in general across services, it was recognised that 
the role and involvement of the Local Authority remained 
unclear and their only real role was in terms of financial 
allocation. The interviewee commented that in Wandsworth there 
were pretty good links with the local authority, yet the 
Health Service were dealing with the mental health side 
completely.
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Problems of Ideology: Specialisation in Work with the Long
Term Mentally 111
The interview material reported in the previous chapter 
suggested that on the whole, the DEW Team was well respected 
for its specialisation in work with the long term mentally 
ill. However, some people felt that although the Team was 
specialising in work with the long term mentally ill, they 
still took on a wide variety of work that did not initially 
really focus on the long term mentally ill. The team members 
themselves saw the initial taking on of some inappropriate 
clients as a necessary strategy to publicise their service. 
Through this approach they aimed to gradually educate 
referrers as to which were the more appropriate referrals and 
at the inception, they did not want to be seen to be refusing 
work. Yet, this was not a clear policy for some observers.
Several people interviewed, who were not team members, 
believed that the DEW Team had a problem with their referral 
policy, about which clients they took on and when. The staff 
on the DEW Team were extra to the inpatient staff and although 
this was seen as a good thing because it freed them to choose 
the areas of work on which they wished to concentrate, it also 
meant that it was incredibly unclear exactly who they were 
trying to serve across two and a half Battersea catchment 
areas. At the same time, other teams were increasingly doing 
a lot of work with the long term mentally ill client group as 
in-patients and as new community residents in group homes. For 
instance, one of the Battersea consultants said he used the 
DEW Team to off load his more troublesome clients, while 
others stayed with his catchment area team because they were 
well known and liked. This provides an example of how unclear 
the boundaries were.
Many felt that there were other areas relating to ideology 
where services tend to fail ’’across the board", in which the 
DEW Team was no more successful in finding solutions than 
anyone else had been in the past. One area mentioned was the 
danger of not relating effectively enough to the local 
population on issues such as ethnic minorities. One manager
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commented that it was unclear how well the DEW Team responded 
to black groups and he suspected that the answer was no better 
than others.
"We need time and a model of intervention that we do not 
have and we are always caught in providing a priority 
service. DEW hasn’t really contributed anything in this 
area".
The Team was also seen by some to have evaded some important
issues of client care. By promoting their innovative policies,
they were accused of ignoring and playing down other yawning
gaps in service provision that were essential to providing an
appropriate service to the long term mentally ill. For
example, one interviewee said:
"People will always break down no matter how much support 
you give them. There remains a need for respite care, 
either in hospital or the new day hospital, but 
alternatives are scarce and DEW has not been able to 
introduce any strategies that highlight this to the
necessary extent, because on one level they were sucked 
into pretending that this need was not there".
Problems in Service Provision: Gaps in Services Identified bv 
DEW CMHT Staff
The 1987 DEW Annual Report identified serious gaps in the 
community service the team could offer4. There was a lack of 
work facilities for long term mentally ill clients, ranging
from sheltered work places to support for people in open
employment. The only permanent placement available at the time
was in the Industrial Training Unit at Springfield Hospital. 
On several occasions, the DEW Team had tried and failed to 
employ one or two of their clients to do administrative work 
for the team, but such plans had not been successful. "Red 
tape" and confidentiality issues were given at interview as 
the reasons for the failed plans.
There was also a shortage of day places for long term mentally 
ill clients as at that time the only community facility 
offering day care was in Putney (4 miles away). The Cottage 
Day Hospital on the Springfield site only dealt with acute 
clients and the DEW Team view was that there was a need for 
placements with more of a long term rehabilitation function. 
The DEW Team also considered long term supported housing to be
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in short supply, particularly for more disabled groups and 
understood that the Social Services Hostels provided no 
permanent homes and the supported housing provided by the 
Wandsworth Association of Mental Health only catered for those 
who needed low levels of support. This information conflicted 
with that provided by the hospital Rehabilitation Team member 
interviewed and serves to again highlight the tension and 
conflict between these two groups of actors.
The DEW Team recognised that evening and weekend social 
support for clients was needed. The only such service provided 
was the Doddington and Rollo Family Centre which ran an 
evening social group, but many more such groups were needed. 
The Team felt that they still had a gap in knowledge about the 
needs of long term mentally ill clients. They needed more 
information about the community agencies involved with clients 
and their input. Alcohol services in particular needed to be 
developed. The Team were aware that improved accessibility and 
appropriateness of services for ethnic minorities was also 
needed. Also the issue of transport needed investigation. The 
Team found that people would often only attend groups if they 
were taken there at least initially.
Computer skills training was needed for DEW Team staff and 
they also recognised that they needed to establish a register 
of all DEW Team referrals for service monitoring purposes. In 
addition, feedback from referrers about their views of the DEW 
service was required. With regard to improving liaison with 
Springfield Hospital, the joint appointment of two nurses each 
to work half time in hospital and half time in the community 
was again suggested.
DISCUSSION
The literature presented in chapter four suggested that 
attitudes to significant social change are characterised by 
ambivalence, even when supported. Several authors have pointed 
out that a great awareness is needed of the sometimes 
unrecognised aspects of tensions and relationships between
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individuals and groups (eg Barrett & Fudge 1981). As can be 
seen, analysis of the DEW Team story supports many of these 
claims. The implementation problems experienced by the DEW 
Team have been described, starting with basic resource 
difficulties involved in trying to secure office space and 
secretarial staff and moving on to more fundamental 
misunderstandings of ideology and practice that were expressed 
by other actors affected by the team in the local area. All of 
these had an effect on the way that the team developed.
The implementation literature suggests that however strong the 
thrust behind a new policy, if there is a weak link in any 
part of the implementation process this can be seriously 
detrimental to the new policy. Donnison et al (1965) suggested 
that often it is a very elementary part of the service that 
constitutes such an implementation barrier. This idea is 
supported by the DEW Team case study. In the DEW Team example, 
secretarial cover was the major stumbling block in the initial 
phase of implementation. It is often a good test of 
organisational commitment to a project to analyse the 
limitations on practical resources that are supplied. The lack 
of adequate secretarial support and office base was a constant 
frustration for the Team and made it difficult for them to 
sustain their workload, achieve their aims relating to day to 
day clinical work and collect information. The secretarial 
issue caused significant stress in the work environment and 
the consultant spent a period on sick leave as a result.
More fundamental constraints were experienced by the team 
through conflicts with existing interests. These arose when 
the DEW Team attempted to carve out new territory. In 
Battersea there was a clear Health Service organisational 
structure and setting up a CMHT was like creating the State of 
Israel in an Arab world. It is well documented that 
organisational units do not like to give up resources or be 
pushed down in the pecking order; individuals in those units 
will not yield their power or prerogatives easily. What 
dominates thinking is the personal impact of changes on staff 
and their units rather than the intended substance of change
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(see chapter 4). The main conflicts experienced by the DEW 
Team were with the hospital ward staff, Rehabilitation Team 
and Social Services employees working locally in Battersea. It 
can be seen from the description that although many of their 
criticisms and complaints had some substance, compared with 
the positive aspects of the team’s work described in the 
previous chapter, some really concerned issues that any team 
would have had difficulty dealing with. In many ways, because 
the DEW Team was heralded as an important new innovative 
approach, there was pressure for them to solve every problem 
that had ever ailed mental health service provision. For some 
people, succeeding in some areas and failing in others was not 
good enough. Either the team had to get everything right or 
they were merely demonstrating how the new system could not 
work.
There were strong elements of professional jealousy involved. 
The hospital ward staff understandably resented the seemingly 
bountiful resources that the DEW Team community staff could 
initially utilise, when they themselves were stuck working in 
poor conditions. They would have liked a new office; they 
would have liked to work from nine to five; they would have 
liked to have received praise from management. However, at the 
same time, they were nervous about change, having worked in 
the institution for some time. The existence of the DEW Team 
did something to break up the "network" of hospital 
relationships. The hospital was no longer a self contained 
unit; outsiders would come and go and they had little 
knowledge of what they were up to. The new team did not appear 
to be restricted by the hospital organisational authority and 
the perceived autonomy was resented.
It took time for conflicts to develop. Initially there was 
anxiety about the new project, but it was only after a year or 
two that arguments against the team's existence began to 
really "take root". This is also well documented in the 
implementation literature. The team benefitted from a 
"honeymoon" period when they were perceived to be lightening 
the work-load of others and taking away their most troublesome
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clients. However, after a time, it was realised that the team 
were not accommodating all such clients and arguments about 
which referrals they took and which they refused began to 
emerge. Other workers became unclear as to the boundaries of 
their work and perceived that they were "choosy" in their 
choice of clients.
Hospital staff and CPNs were unlikely to accept experimental 
working patterns easily, as the implementation of innovatory 
approaches necessarily implied that the work they were doing 
could and should be improved. To some extent, the hospital 
staff had to defend the status quo to sustain a feeling of 
self worth. The DEW Team also sparked some rivalries between 
different staff members. For example, the Team developed a 
better relationship with staff on Zinnia ward than on Heather 
ward and this perceived favouritism was bound to cause 
resentment and a break up of the "family" unit in the 
hospital. As described by Lipsky (1980) service change was 
reliant on personal relationships between workers and was 
subject to "human emotion" and some degree of self interest. 
Several examples of mutual "scape-goating" and defensive 
rigidity where having someone to blame when things go wrong 
may become more important than trying to get something right, 
are illustrated in the DEW Team story.
In addition, the hospital wards did not become less overloaded 
with work. The team had done little to reduce the stress 
levels of workers and the hospital ward staff began to realise 
that the clients who were admitted to the ward were in many 
ways harder to deal with than before. What may have been 
happening was that while clients could be contained in the 
community, they stayed out of hospital where previously they 
would have been admitted. The ward staff only saw them now 
when they were in significant relapse. Their jobs were 
subsequently less rewarding as they rarely saw people through 
the recovery stages. So there were particular difficulties 
that they had with the new DEW Team that were connected with 
the long term mentally ill client group, as well as the usual 
institutional barriers to change that are cited in the
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literature. However, the scenarios described support the 
literature in suggesting that such attitudes are more 
entrenched in a bureaucracy like the Health Service, and in a 
mental hospital.
Criticism of certain of the DEW Team policies were put 
forward. In particular, the referral system, working pattern 
and opening hours, response to crises, home visiting and 
safety net policy all came under attack. More fundamental 
doubts were expressed in the way that the Team fitted in with 
other mental health provision such as the hospital, CPN and 
rehabilitation service. The DEW Team was also criticised for 
not adequately addressing long running issues in service 
provision particularly concerning provision for clients from 
black and ethnic minorities. The Team members themselves 
identified the lack of complimentary community services to 
support their service philosophy. Yet, there was never really 
a political response to any of these issues from the DEW Team.
There were long standing differences between Health and Social 
Services policies that were never reconciled. Handicaps to 
joint planning initiatives were described in chapter six and 
have arisen from important differences between the Health and 
Local Authorities involved. The DEW Team research suggests 
that the idea that the government too readily assumes that 
shared goals and priorities can be arrived at locally is 
supported. The interviews with Social Services employees in 
Battersea show that an extensive organisational miss match 
between authorities is represented in: different structures; 
links with central government; financial and planning systems; 
administrative systems; and forms of professional involvement. 
Problems were also exacerbated by the latent tensions in the 
network of relationships between agencies and tiers involved 
in the total psychiatric services, as suggested by Korman & 
Glennerster (1990). The criticism expressed about the position 
of the DEW Team in relation to other local services was the 
most well founded and culminated in an appeal to management to 
review the team's functioning. The Team's position became 
increasingly unclear as the "old long stay" were moved out of
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Springfield Hospital and the previously marked distinction 
between hospital and community services began to be more 
fluid. This had a considerable effect on the future of the 
team, as will be described in the following chapter.
In Brief
Constraints were experienced in the implementation phase of 
the DEW Team. These mainly arose in relation to practical 
constraints in gaining resources and establishing territory, 
and more fundamental criticisms of their ideology and 
operational practices highlighted through conflict with 
existing interests locally, namely hospital ward staff the 
Rehabilitation Team and Social Services employees. The 
barriers to implementation that were experienced did not 
prevent the Team from finding new solutions and battling for 
their own territory, but they had a considerable impact on the 
future development of the Team. The literature suggests that 
the interests of external bodies can eventually overwhelm 
innovatory services. To see whether this was the case in the 
DEW Team example, the following chapter will relate the next 
part of the story. Consideration will be given to the lasting 
impact of the DEW service in retrospect and the likelihood 
that it would be sustained in future years, when the Battersea 
Day Hospital was finally built.
1. Letter to Dr Bolton from Dr McLean re:"No Secretary at 
DEW", 29th October 1987. Letter to Sue Gallagher from Dr 
McLean re:"Telephone and Receptionist Arrangements at DEW and 
Other Mental Health Team Offices", 17th May 1988. Letters to 
Sue Gallagher from Dr McLean re: Secretarial Staff, 27th June 
1988, 4th July 1988, 12th July 1988.
2. Development of the Mental Health Service in Battersea, DEW, 
August 1987.
3. In 1960, the DHSS established a monitoring body entitled 
The Hospital Advisory Service. In 1976, it was renamed the 
Hospital Advisory Service and its procedure was to send a team 
of professionals, managers and Social Service inspectors to 
hospital and community facilities for the most deprived group 
of clients on an annual basis to monitor quality and
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effectiveness of facilities. The resulting reports were sent 
to the District Health Authority concerned.
4. DEW Annual Report 1986/87, circulated in April 1987.
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CHAPTER 10:
Sustaining a Community Mental Health Team:
The Battle for the Future Model of Care
This chapter aims to give an account of the final part of the 
DEW Team story that will be described in this thesis, covering 
the period 1988 to 1992. It describes a battle that took place 
between interested parties in establishing the future model of 
mental health services on a Battersea wide basis and the 
subsequent process of redefinition that occurred in the 
development of the case study CMHT. What factors prompted the 
need for redefinition? Did compromises have to be reached? 
What form of service provision resulted? Did the DEW Team 
professionals succeed in sustaining the CMHT model that they 
had developed? Did it retain the essence of innovation that 
had been embraced in the original DEW approach? Which new 
issues emerged as important for the actors involved? How did 
the DEW Team fit in to the new local service structure 
involving the day hospital, which by 1992 was finally almost 
ready to open, and how did it relate to new central government 
legislation requiring the implementation of the Care Programme 
Approach by April 1991?
By considering these questions it is possible to describe the 
main features of the DEW Team that emerged as its identifying 
character and lasting impact after six years of development. 
No attempt will be made to comment on the effectiveness of the 
approach. Rather the intention is to briefly define the 
revised CMHT model and differentiate it from the specialist 
CMHT model that had existed previously. For the purposes of 
this thesis, it serves as a demonstration that innovatory 
activity in the case study team did not dwindle but instead 
changed focus as new issues became predominant. The 
"professional and practice" literature presented in chapter 
two suggests that such background understanding is a vital 
step for the future development of good practice. The 
discussion presented at the end of the chapter further 
considers the influence of the variety of actors involved, the 
sustainability and flexibility of the CMHT model and the
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degree to which the long term mentally ill remained at the 
forefront of local service planning.
The Need for Redefinition
In 1988, the DEW Team had officially been established for two 
years and the conflicts with existing interests at Springfield 
Hospital described in the previous chapter became extended. 
The hospital management declared that the DEW Team would have 
to redefine their role and activities. Five factors were 
stated to have stimulated this intervention:
1) A MOVE TO A CATCHMENT AREA PATTERN OF SERVICE PROVISION 
WITH ACCOMPANYING RESOURCE CONSTRAINT
Firstly, the character and established working pattern of the 
DEW Team as a specialist service operating across the 
Battersea catchment areas was questioned by the management. 
They decided that the DEW Team specialist model of care did 
not fit in with a planned change to a catchment area pattern 
of services1 and questioned the extra resources that a 
specialist team would require in a catchment area model. A 
management representative stated that it was not that they did 
not see a place for a specialist mental health team for the 
long term mentally ill, but budgets were tightening and there 
was simply no money for it. The management proposed a 
blueprint strategy with a ten year perspective2. The majority 
of Springfield staff were to be deployed in community work and 
only a minority involved in inpatient care. In such a model it 
was suggested that it would be possible for staff of all 
disciplines to rotate between community and inpatient work and 
shift the balance from its heavy bias towards inpatient care. 
It was envisaged that this would necessitate developing 
catchment area provision in Battersea and the possibility of 
a second CMHT was being discussed.
2) LOCAL MEDICAL INTERESTS AND PERSONNEL CHANGES 
Secondly, predictions were being made about when the three 
consultant psychiatrists in Battersea might retire, as two 
were approaching retirement age at this time. St James 
Hospital was to be closed at the end of August 1988 and a re-
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distribution of consultant psychiatric sessions was needed. In 
addition, a new consultant psychiatrist was appointed to work 
in Battersea in February 19883. The service structure had to 
change to accommodate these actual and predicted personnel 
changes. One of the consultant posts that would be left vacant 
as a result of the forthcoming changes was part time and the 
DEW Team consultant was given the opportunity to take up this 
position. She did not want to move to another job, as many 
other consultants often did at her career stage, and so
decided to accept this part time post. Such a move by the
consultant had implications for the DEW Team as a whole.
3) RATIONALISATION
Management also wished to reorganise the catchment areas in 
line with social services boundaries to rationalise the 
populations covered. The Battersea community mental health 
services had not developed in a logical coherent fashion and 
it was felt that any reorganisation should necessarily be
planned to overcome the mismatches in service provision that
existed.
4) STAFFING
Fourthly, it was felt that the high calibre of staff on the 
DEW Team might decline with well earned promotions and natural 
movement.
5) JOINT WORKING
Lastly, the extent to which the strategic planning team, 
through its relevant locality sub-group was succeeding in 
setting up genuine joint community care with Social Services 
was questioned.
Conflict in the Process of Redefinition
The proposed redefinition of the DEW Team and reorganisation 
of services on a Battersea wide basis sparked off a further 
phase of conflict. It was a time when many hackles were raised 
and all professionals with a vested interest in the future 
pattern of services in Battersea were trying to assert their 
position. From the DEW Team's point of view, the worry was
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that in the financial climate at the time, the DEW Team was 
perceived by some to be a luxury as on a catchment area 
distribution of resources, it received an unfairly large 
allocation. If the arguments about reorganisation were to be 
resolved on a strictly '‘fair" distribution of resources 
between the different catchment areas, the DEW Team would have 
to be dismembered. The DEW Team were very concerned about the 
proposed change and wanted to have an input into discussions 
about their fate. They were particularly concerned about the 
emphasis that they had been able to place on providing a 
specialist service to the long term mentally ill and felt that 
services to this client group could be eroded if the service 
was reorganised. The psychologist on the DEW Team, therefore, 
prepared a paper suggesting alternative models for dealing 
with the long term mentally ill group in Battersea4. She 
envisaged two main possible scenarios.
The first model would be to split the Battersea mental health 
service into three catchment teams, responsible for all the 
clients in their catchment including the long term mentally 
ill. It was pointed out that it would probably be more 
efficient to have two teams in the long run, coinciding as 
much as possible with catchment area boundaries. However, the 
problem with this scheme was in maintaining sufficient input 
to the long term mentally ill, as it was felt that the 
pressure of acute needs would overwhelm the catchment teams. 
It was also thought that such a model implied duplication of 
specialist resources for dealing with long term mentally ill 
clients as each team would have to develop their own. A second 
possible model was to have two or three catchment area teams 
plus one specialist "Continuing Care" team with input to the 
whole of Battersea. This would ensure input to long term 
mentally ill clients, spread resources and enable the 
formation of a Battersea-wide network without duplication of 
specialist links and resources devoted to long term mentally 
ill clients. It was felt by the DEW Team that the first 
proposed model of catchment area teams would only work well if 
the population of people with long term mental health problems 
was small, but since the long term mentally ill population in
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Battersea was large, specialist input was thought to be 
needed.
Letters and draft documents were sent back and forth and over 
a three month period, many proposals were put forward in 
negotiating new staffing and responsibility in the proposed 
catchment area structure. The main body of correspondence was 
between the consultant psychiatrists in the area, with some 
input from the District Division of Psychiatry Executive 
Committee5. Complaints were also voiced from the department 
heads of Social Work6 and Occupational Therapy7 stating that 
they felt they had not been adequately considered in the 
reorganisation period. The DEW Team independently wrote a 
joint letter to the management expressing their concerns8. At 
the same time, the DEW Team consultant wrote to "Good 
Practices in Mental Health" (GPMH) requesting their support to 
prevent the dismemberment of the DEW Team 9. This support was 
received and GPMH wrote to the hospital senior managers as 
asked10. GPMH also publicised the DEW Team's work as one model 
of good practice in their CMHT information pack.
These developments fit in with the Arab/Israeli analogy 
referred to in earlier chapters as the time of the "Seven Day 
War". For a short time, the conflicts with external interests 
caused the whole service structure to be thrown into confusion 
and different interest groups began fighting for their own 
perceived solution to be accepted. The long term consequences 
for the "surrounding nations" of the possible new models that 
were being proposed was being considered.
The Resolution
At the beginning of June 1988, a final decision was made. The 
DEW Team was seen as inconsistent, working in its 
supernumerary form and could no longer be funded to coexist 
with the other Battersea catchment area teams as a 
supernumerary service. From 1st October 1988, Battersea would 
be divided into three catchment area teams. The DEW Team, 
rather than being dismembered, would become the catchment area 
team for North Battersea East, and would be expected to
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function as the other catchment area teams did, working with 
both "acute" and long term mentally ill clients. The eventual 
decisions that were reached were to some extent a compromise 
between the interested parties. However, interviewees stated 
that the overwhelming influence came from the District 
Division of Psychiatrists.
A meeting was convened to consider the implications of the 
reorganisation for all the Battersea mental health services 
and to identify and air issues needing detailed consideration, 
resolution or information sharing to ensure a smooth 
implementation of the new arrangements. It was attended by 
representatives from the UGM, Social Services, OT Department, 
the DEW Team, local Consultant Psychiatrists and a GPMH 
representative11. At this meeting staffing input to each of the 
new teams was put forward and decisions made about who would 
inform other local service providers of the changes, 
particularly GPs and social workers. The planned transfer of 
clinical arrangements between consultants was discussed and 
agreements were reached as to how to transfer responsibilities 
for existing DEW Team clients to their relevant catchment 
area. It was agreed that the DEW Team community groups had 
become part of a Battersea wide service and as such remained 
open to appropriate clients from all three catchment areas. 
These groups would no longer rely solely on DEW Team staff for 
their organisation and functioning, but responsibility would 
be shared across teams.
Many painful discussions ensued within the DEW Team, who were 
not happy about the decision that had been reached. Finally 
they resolved that while accepting their new catchment area 
role, they would prioritise work with the long term mentally 
ill, presenting "acute" clients with rather different packages 
of care. Management accepted this compromise. The tension 
between carrying out the day to day demands of "acute" work, 
while giving priority to the long term mentally ill was to be 
the new DEW Team challenge. For such a small team, they 
effectively mounted a high profile campaign to ensure that 
they firstly were not dismembered and secondly, that they
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would be able to continue specialist working with the long 
term mentally ill in some form. In the process, the DEW Team 
succeeded in retaining part of their former identity in a 
slightly transmuted form. The DEW Team became a catchment area 
team, dealing with all mental health referrals to their 
designated area, but they retained a say in how they worked 
with this situation and subsequently developed an approach 
through which they could continue to concentrate on work with 
long term mentally ill clients.
The Issue of Prioritising The Long Term Mentally 111 
The DEW Team realised that if the long term mentally ill were 
to be successfully prioritised, the team would need a clear 
way of defining this population. A search of the literature 
was made, looking for such a definition and several examples 
were found, mainly relying on the psychotic/neurotic 
distinction and past history of hospital use (see chapter 
two), but the DEW Team felt nothing really fitted their 
desired criteria. Therefore, the consultant and the 
psychologist published a letter in the Bulletin of the Royal 
College of Psychiatrists (McLean & Leibowitz 1989) requesting 
correspondence about this issue. No response was generated and 
so the team formulated their own criteria from a knowledge of 
the literature and their own experience. The criteria listed 
in Box 5 were chosen to distinguish between "acute" and long 
term mentally ill clients. If any one of these criteria was 
met the client automatically came into the long term mentally 
ill client group, and so would receive a different package of 
care than "acute" clients referred.
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Box 5: DEW Team Categories for Defining Long Term Mentally 111
Clients
1. Two or more years continuous contact with 
psychiatric services, including out-patients.
2. Depot medication prescribed.
3. Three or more in-patient admissions in past two 
years.
4. Three or more day hospital admissions in past two 
years.
5. DSM III "Highest Level of Adaptive Functioning" in 
past year -rating is five or more.
6. Anyone with ICD diagnosis of 295 or 297.
DEW Team Care Planning Procedure for Long Term Mentally 111 
Clients
In November 1990, the DEW Team changed their operational
policy to adapt to their newly defined role as a catchment 
area team, to ensure a retained priority for working with long 
term mentally ill clients and to register Team policy changes 
gleaned from their early experience12. They also devised and 
operationalised a care planning package for long term mentally 
ill clients. This involved an initial assessment detailing 
demographic and referral data (Form 1 ). During Team
discussions and client visits in the first month after 
referral, two main "Aims of Intervention" were agreed with 
each client and recorded along with a problem checklist
assessment and a brief record of long term aims (Form 2). At 
the same time a prediction was made of "best and worst"
possible outcome that could be expected after six months of 
client care. A form of "Goal Attainment Scaling" was used for 
this process (Endicott et al 1976). A third form (Review Form) 
was used to review this care plan at six month intervals 
following the initial assessment. This recorded outcomes and 
revised aims. In this way a modified care plan for the next 
six months was established. If for any reason the client was 
discharged from DEW Team care, a discharge plan was made based 
on review information. Long term mentally ill clients were 
only discharged if they moved out of the catchment area, died 
or remained well for an extended period of time.
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"Acute" clients were seen by individual key-workers and 
discussed with the multi-disciplinary team only when 
necessary. There was no planning and review programme for 
these clients. However, all clients defined as long term 
mentally ill were given a care plan based on the above, and 
this was reviewed regularly by the multi-disciplinary team as 
a group. It was in this way that the DEW Team managed to 
continue to prioritise work with the long term mentally ill 
and to retain the distinctive service style that they had 
developed over the previous two years13. Their other community 
activities, such as running community support groups and 
liaison meetings with other agencies continued, although their 
capacity to set up new community initiatives was much reduced. 
In relation to central government legislation requiring all 
community mental health initiatives to implement the Care 
Programming Approach by April 1991, the DEW Team merely 
continued with their existing system and replicated some of 
the information collected and monitored on new Care Planning 
forms distributed by the Mental Health Unit.
The Outreach CMHT Model
In November 1990, the DEW Team also published a reflective 
paper on their experience as a CMHT to serve "revolving door" 
clients (McLean & Leibowitz 1990). This paper included an 
analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of the outreach 
model from the DEW Team experience. Advantages identified 
included the following:
1 Outreach allowed more productive and flexible use of 
staff time because no staff were tied up in "covering" a 
Centre which may have had varying occupancy.
2 It allowed workers to provide short periods of very 
intensive input when crises occurred and, having attached 
the client to other support, to return equally quickly to 
a position of occasional contact.
3 Outreach did more to reattach the client to normal 
activities within his/her community.
4 It produced more opportunity to foster links between the 
CMHT and other voluntary agencies.
5 Outreach minimised stigma.
6 It was cheaper in capital costs and as cheap or cheaper 
in non-pay revenue costs.
Against this, the disadvantages were found to be:
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1 Clients valued having a place to go that was "their own".
2 Working in the outreach model provided no safe and 
convenient place for the emergency assessment of a 
noisily disturbed client.
3 Staff wasted time in travelling and parking.
4 Rent costs varied with activity and were not fully 
predictable.
5 Outreach work was impossible in the absence of a 
secretary/coordinator at the team base who was both 
knowledgeable and reliable.
The unresolved issues for debate within the outreach CMHT 
model for the long term mentally ill were identified to 
include:
1 Problems of "silting up" in providing long term
maintenance and support to all long term mentally ill 
clients (the DEW Team operated a "no discharge" policy 
for long term mentally ill clients unless they died or 
moved out of the area, meaning that the team caseload of 
long term mentally ill clients could potentially become 
full).
2 Concerns about how intrusive staff felt they were
justified in being in their efforts to "keep tabs" on 
their clients (again the "no discharge" policy meant that 
all long term mentally ill clients were contacted on at
least an annual basis to follow their progress and check
that all was as well as could be expected and clients
were not discharged when they refused contact with staff
or tried to drop out of care).
3 Links with the hospital service and the prevention of 
"splits" (referring to the maintenance of good 
communication with hospital services and the avoidance of 
conflicts).
4 Interface problems with other agencies concerning good 
communication, particularly with GPs.
Plans to Reconcile the DEW Team with the New Dav Hospital
By 1992, the building of the new Battersea Day Hospital
(Edward Wilson House) was almost complete and the centre was 
due to open later in that year. The DEW office base was to be 
moved to the new building, but the plan was for them to
continue working in the catchment area CMHT model. When the 
DEW Team was originally created, the issue of EWH was
dominant. It was then almost forgotten about for three years 
and it was only in early 1990, when building work was almost 
complete that the issue was again brought up. By this time ten 
years had passed since the idea of the day hospital was first 
conceived. The big question was whether the day hospital idea
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had become a "white elephant". When the original plans were 
made, there was no conception of setting up a CMHT in the 
meantime and the DEW Team's existence had negated some of the 
original purposes of the day hospital project. For instance, 
they had shown that it was possible and even preferable to set 
up community support groups and structured activity groups in 
a variety of community venues, rather than in a "mental 
health" facility. They had also demonstrated the value of a 
community outreach style of working (McLean & Leibowitz 1990).
Logically the identification and analysis of a problem 
precedes proposals for a remedy, but in reality the sequence 
is less tidy. Many authors have pointed out that solutions may 
become detached from the problems which originally prompted 
them. The DEW Team example demonstrated this process at work. 
The DEW Team began life as a specialist shadow team for the 
day hospital that was in the process of being built. Over 
time, the emphasis shifted towards it becoming a model 
comprehensive catchment area team, prioritising work with the 
long term mentally ill. The Battersea Day Hospital essentially 
became a separate venture.
DISCUSSION
Evidence presented in this chapter goes some way towards 
supporting the contention put forward by authors like Ramon 
(1988) that in the 1980s, psychiatrists continued to be major 
stake-holders in the determination of community mental health 
service patterns at the local level. However, in earlier 
chapters it was suggested that this control was not as 
monolithic as Ramon suggested. This theme can now be expanded 
upon, as later case study evidence suggested that the elitist 
influence of psychiatry varied at different stages and levels 
of service development.
The different stages of development will be considered first. 
It was at the vital juncture of service redefinition that the 
monopoly power of the psychiatric profession to control the
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drawing of new catchment area boundaries again became 
important in defining local service structures. The sense that 
consultant psychiatrists legitimately "owned" areas and shared 
out clients amongst themselves was a strong feature of the 
description of service development presented in this chapter. 
However, in the late 1980s, a new challenge to this 
psychiatric elitism appeared to be emerging from the 
management side. Final decisions on catchment organisation and 
team structure came from the management group. This could 
suggest that management were to some extent emerging as a 
challenging local elite. They did not act simply as allies of 
the dominant medical interests, but exploited competing sub­
divisions within the consultant psychiatrist group to resolve 
issues of local resource allocation to the new catchment area 
teams.
Concerning the influence of various interests at different 
levels of service development outside basic determination of 
resources and organisational structure, other professionals 
were observed to have a significant role. The multi­
disciplinary DEW CMHT insisted on retaining their commitment 
to prioritise the long term mentally ill and worked out a 
specific operational procedure to achieve this within their 
catchment area responsibilities. They did not respond by 
abandoning their previous work, but drew up an alternative 
proposal to accommodate their established care practices for 
the long term mentally ill within their new role. The DEW Team 
accepted a compromise solution that retained their priority 
work with long term mentally ill clients and hence continued 
to embrace the essence of their innovatory style of working in 
a muted form.
It has been a constant theme of the case study, that 
professionals possess the potential for exercising 
considerable discretion in the way they provide services 
within the frameworks laid down by the Health Authority. As 
"street level bureaucrats" (Lipsky 1980) they were able to 
shape the way in which the service operated and also to decide 
who should and should not receive it. The DEW Team were not
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given any choice about becoming a catchment area team, but 
were allowed to establish their own working pattern, the 
clients they were to prioritise and the packages of care that 
different groups of clients would receive. Hence, the DEW 
development continued to be heavily dependant on the personal 
strengths and experience of the staff in the team.
The DEW Team were in a strong position to bargain with 
management on issues of service style because of the multi­
disciplinary team identity that they had developed. A major 
influence on the management's decision to keep DEW as a team 
and not split up the staff amongst different new teams, was 
provided by the increasingly confident and coherent group of 
professional staff. Another asset to the DEW Team's bargaining 
position was gained by seeking the support of outside bodies 
such as Good Practices in Mental Health. However, it is 
notable that again such an influence was successfully exerted 
over service style but not over service structure.
In addition, due to the development of a computer data-base, 
the DEW Team were able to produce statistical evidence of 
their clinical record and this aided their case. This is also 
interesting from another point of view. It demonstrates a 
shift in the nature of local issues in local community mental 
health care. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, issues of 
monitoring and evaluation were taken up by the case study team 
and became a major feature of their work in a way that they 
had not been in the past. Yet the associated concern with 
effectiveness and clinical quality was entrusted exclusively 
to the local professionals in the DEW CMHT. No real attempts 
were made by management during the study period to impose 
external evaluations on community services, except when care 
planning forms were introduced unit wide in April 1991 in 
accordance with new government legislation. However, this had 
little impact on the case study team except in increasing the 
quantity of paperwork dealt with by the staff team, since the 
DEW Team were already operating a care planning procedure and 
just had to duplicate some of the data that they routinely 
collected on the new care planning forms introduced across all
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services within the Mental Health Unit. No feedback arose from 
the introduction of the "Care Programming Approach" during the 
study period. So professionals essentially retained control in 
determining and developing service monitoring criteria and 
evaluation of clinical quality.
There was also undoubtedly an institutional element to the DEW 
Team's process of adaptation to the catchment area change. 
Wildavsky (1972) suggested that any organisation that produces 
a single product or engages in a limited range of activities, 
is unlikely to abandon them willingly. Its survival is 
dependent and bound up in its programme. If the programme goes 
the organisation dies. Wildavsky observed from his studies 
that agencies are often encouraged to differentiate their 
products and diversify their outputs. The DEW Team was 
observed to be involved in this process. As a catchment area 
team prioritising work with long term mentally ill clients, 
the Team had retained their essential innovative character, 
but also broadened their range of activities.
There was also a strong financial influence observed in the 
DEW Team story. To secure the growing volume of resources it 
needs, the implementation literature suggests that those 
providing a service are compelled to enter into commitments 
that command the approval of those whose support they seek in 
competing with other potential users of the resources. In 
order to grow a service must both meet a demand and maintain 
its creditworthiness among those controlling the resources 
that it needs. The DEW Team was initially set up with money 
that was standing idle from the delayed day hospital project. 
By 1988, this surplus funding was no longer available as there 
were credit squeezes within the Health Authority. Therefore, 
the DEW Team had to compete for funding with other local 
services and as such, was logically compelled to offer a 
service style on a catchment area basis like the other 
Battersea CMHTs that were being developed. Hence, there was a 
strong element of cost-efficiency motives dominating quality 
of care motives in the change to comprehensive catchment area 
status.
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The DEW Team professionals were the only party to raise issues 
concerning specialist versus comprehensive models of care. The 
service wide problems of long term mentally ill clients in 
Battersea that had prompted the DEW Team development 
initially, still existed at the time of the DEW Team 
reorganisation. Yet, it appeared that the scope and purpose of 
the DEW service as a specialist team, caring for the long term 
mentally ill population, never really emerged clearly enough. 
The DEW story suggested that the Team did not convince those 
involved in service planning that a case could be made for 
such a specialist service in addition to the Rehabilitation 
Service that had since been developed. The value of new 
liberal approaches as embraced by the DEW service was 
questioned. The DEW Team had legitimised its existence 
initially as the Unit had to be seen to be trying to do 
something to address the problems of people with long term 
mental illness. Later, management were not convinced that the 
DEW Team had found the right method to do this and with the 
change in central government legislation in 1991, all 
community teams were made responsible for prioritising their 
catchment's long term mentally ill population. After the 
reorganisation, the team became more specific about their 
outreach working model and a stronger ideological commitment 
to the long term mentally ill was perceived by the management 
and other local service providers. The DEW service had evolved 
to re-formulate priorities left unclear in the original blue­
print. They had defined more precisely the type of clients for 
whom they intended to offer a priority service.
The reorganisation prompted extreme discontent within the DEW 
Team and a growing awareness that this was not going to be the 
only time that such service change would occur. This had 
considerable implications for their ability to provide 
continuity of care to their clients. In addition, they no 
longer had the status of being a unique team. Other CMHTs were 
being established in Battersea and mental health policy in the 
area was being planned on a Unit wide basis. Rationalisation 
had reduced the DEW Team's own potential for innovation while 
giving other local professionals the opportunity to take up
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and experiment with some of their early ideas. This indicates 
that an important feature of the CMHT model lies in its 
flexibility and adaptability. The new catchment area teams 
were modelled on the CMHT approach and so we can conclude that 
the DEW Team had helped foster local acceptance of the CMHT 
model. The model itself had gained legitimacy and aspects of 
the model that the DEW Team developed had been shown to be 
sustainable in practice.
Many authors have commented that CMHT research is often marred 
by its concentration on time limited model programmes 
(Bachrach 1980) and that it is important to wait and see if 
efforts acquire sufficient potency to be self-sustaining in 
the face of material deficiencies and wider political 
constraints. This retrospective look at the implementation of 
a CMHT model by the DEW Team over a six year period allows 
such an opportunity. It has shown that the DEW Team did not 
succeed in sustaining its role as a specialist CMHT serving 
the long term mentally ill population, but it did promote the 
adoption of a comprehensive CMHT approach on a Battersea wide 
basis.
In Brief
This chapter considered the final part of the DEW Team story. 
Prompted by conflicts with existing interests, the team were 
forced to change their status and redefine their activities. 
Changes in personnel amongst the Battersea consultant 
psychiatrists, rationalisation of catchment populations, the 
adoption of a comprehensive catchment area CMHT model, and 
resource cutbacks all played a part in this redefinition. The 
DEW Team retained the essence of their innovatory roots by 
developing a CMHT model that would prioritise work with the 
long term mentally ill. However, the political profile of the 
long term mentally ill did not pass beyond the realms of 
professional concern to enter the wider local political agenda 
until central government legislation implemented in 1991 
required all teams to operate within the care programming 
approach and to monitor their long term clients. At the end of 
the thesis study period in 1992, it was not at all clear what
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impact this new legislation had had and CMHTs in the case 
study area were all operating with different organisational 
systems, yet the CMHT model itself was observed to be 
acceptable, flexible and sustainable over a six year period in 
the case study area.
As described in the latter part of the account presented in 
this chapter, in its later years, the issues of monitoring and 
evaluation became prominent in the case study CMHT. The DEW 
Team set about the task of evaluating their work. The aim in 
the next two chapters is to extend the thesis evaluation to 
consider some of the process data that resulted from these 
efforts. Chapter eleven aims to evaluate aspects of the DEW 
Team's work as a specialist service working only with long 
term mentally ill clients and chapter twelve will evaluate 
their work when they changed focus to function as a 
comprehensive catchment area service.
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CHAPTER 11:
Community Care for the Long Term Mentally 111 in a 
Specialist CMHT Model 
- Was it any Different to Services That Existed Previously?
The DEW CMHT approach has so far been evaluated in terms of 
whether it could sustain itself over time and retain its 
identity and particular service style. It has been suggested 
from documentary evidence that differences between the DEW 
Team and the "traditional" styles of after-care provision 
described in chapter five, existed on paper and interview 
evidence suggested that in their early years, the DEW Team was 
perceived by DEW staff and other local service providers to be 
offering an alternative model of service. However, as 
described in chapters nine and ten, neither the management nor 
hospital ward staff and social service staff were entirely 
convinced that the DEW service was actually very different 
from the "traditional" service style that had existed 
previously.
In this chapter, a retrospective empirical study is presented, 
which questions whether any difference between the "new" and 
"traditional" style of service was evident in practice in 
terms of the service offered to long term mentally ill 
clients. The DEW CMHT service was compared with the Community 
Psychiatric Nursing (CPN) service, which was the established 
"traditional" community aftercare service that existed in 
Battersea prior to the DEW Team's development and continued 
operating alongside the DEW service. The CPN service style was 
briefly described in chapter five.
Rationale of First Empirical Study
The DEW CMHT claimed to have developed a treatment service 
that was distinctive to and an improvement on the existing CPN 
service in Battersea. To study differences that existed 
between the two service styles, a CPN service was selected 
that was responsible for the needs of a similar set of 
clients. At the time of the study, the DEW Team was operating 
as a specialist service supernumerary to existing services,
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working with long term mentally ill clients across the whole 
of Battersea (including the South Battersea population). The 
CPN Team chosen for comparison was the CPN service covering 
South Battersea, as defined by Health Service catchment area 
boundaries at that time.
The study was retrospective, looking at an eighteen-month 
period from 1st April 1987 to 30th September 1988. This period 
was chosen since it represented a time when the DEW Team were 
still operating as a specialist team and also there were no 
catchment area changes in Battersea during this period that 
would have confused the profile of clients. The study aimed to 
test whether DEW Team care differed from CPN care in terms of 
process factors. Essentially, two research strategies were 
combined:
a) PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT of the two teams on some of the 
goals and principles stated in the CMHT operational 
policy (termed "goal-directed evaluation" in the 
literature).
b) NETWORK ANALYSIS which documents the client contacts with 
agencies in a service system. Inferences are drawn from 
the total number of contacts and different patterns of 
agency contact regarding improved social functioning and 
alleviation of social problems.
The two services were compared on indices of whether clients 
were seen in a greater variety of locations, whether there was 
really greater continuity of allocated primary worker and 
whether DEW Team clients were successfully linked to more 
community-based activities and a wider range of community 
agencies. The effect of each service on the overall number and 
duration of In-patient Hospital admissions during the study 
period was also measured. A retrospective case-note study 
method was used to compare the service offered to two matched 
samples of long term mentally ill clients: 50 CPN and 50 DEW 
clients. First, the contrasting characteristics of the DEW and 
CPN styles of service delivery are summarised in Box 6.
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Box 6: The Contrasting Service Styles of the DEW and CPN Approaches
DEW CPN
WORK
ENVIRONMENT
Whole team & administrative staff 
located in community base
CPNs located in community base, but 
working with predominantly hospital 
based team
STAFF Team is multi-disciplinary Team 
comprises a Consultant Psychiatrist, 
a Clinical Assistant, a CPN, a 
Psychologist & a Social Worker. Team 
of 4.5 whole time equivalent workers, 
each with an approximate case-load of 
26 per whole time equivalent staff 
member
Similar training backgrounds and 
largely uni-disciplinary team. Team 
of 5 whole time equivalent workers, 
each with an approximate case-load of 
25 per whole time equivalent staff 
member
REFERRALS Team dealt only with referrals of 
clients with long term mental health 
problems from across catchment areas, 
from a variety of referral agencies
Team took any NHS mental health 
referrals from catchment area, but 
almost exclusively these were 
referrals of people with long term 
mental health problems from hospital 
consultants
CARE POLICIES A high degree of case responsibility 
with a formal key-worker system, 
multi-disciplinary assessment, 
individual care planning and regular 
review
Case responsibility, assessment, 
individual care planning and review 
left for the most part to individual 
worker. No multi-disciplinary working 
as such but "networking" arrangements 
with other professionals. No formal 
key-worker system.
MONITORING OF 
CLIENTS &
WORK OF TEAM
Monitoring via computer data-base, 
multi-disciplinary community case- 
notes and multi-disciplinary 
community team meetings.
Monitoring confined to separate case- 
notes held by CPNs, social workers, 
consultants with out-patient clinics 
& psychologists.
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DEW CPN
PHILOSOPHY Emphasis on long term support to 
clients through setting up & engaging 
clients in community groups.
No stated emphasis on long term 
support for clients. No community 
groups set up, but some client use 
encouraged of existing groups in 
area.
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Method
The sample comprised 100 subjects, who were considered to be 
long term mentally ill, based on the joint clinical judgement 
of senior clinical personnel from each team. A matched sample 
was drawn from the case-lists of the two services under 
comparison. This consisted of: 50 DEW clients (including 20 
discharged and 30 who had been in DEW Team care for at least 
eighteen months); and 50 CPN clients matched for age, sex, 
diagnosis, ethnic origin, length of history and discharge. A 
form was designed to collect data (see Appendix 4) about:
1) BASIC DEMOGRAPHY
:-sex, age, marital status, living situation, diagnosis.
2) PREVIOUS PSYCHIATRIC HISTORY 
•“type & length of past contact.
3) CONTACTS IN PROPOSED PERIOD
:-referral data, key-worker & team details
4) DETAIL OF CONTACTS IN PROPOSED PERIOD
:-number & location of staff-client contacts, medication 
compliance, attendance records at day centres, community 
groups and hospital-based activities; client contacts 
with other community agencies.
5) CARER DETAILS
:-number of carers, number of staff contacts with carers, 
support offered.
Data was collected from the case-notes of each client in the 
sample. Discussion interviews were set up with members of the 
professional staff from each service to clarify data. Out­
patient consultation contacts were also recorded where 
possible from out-patient notes. Attendance records for the 
period at structured day-activities including day centres, 
community groups and hospital-based activities were collected 
and staff ratings of regularity of client attendance were 
obtained. A coding system was designed to categorise the data 
regarding client contacts with community agencies into those 
dealing with problems in different areas of functioning. Ten 
senior clinicians from different professions were given a list 
of the twenty-seven agencies identified from the case-notes as 
having been used by clients in the sample. Each was asked to 
formulate their own list of up to ten sub-categories according 
to the nature of the help that each agency offered. Seven 
consensus categories emerged and the data was coded.
The information extracted was used to establish whether care
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given by the DEW Team differed in any measurable way from CPN 
care and whether the DEW Team was doing what it set out to do 
as compared with its stated operational policy (see Appendix
3). It was hypothesised that the DEW service would be more 
flexible and accessible in terms of direct contacts with 
clients and new elements of long-term community support would 
be evident, such as better support to carers. There was an 
expectation that fewer clients would be discharged because 
they "remained well" as the DEW Team saw themselves as 
offering long term support, with a policy of not discharging 
clients between relapses. Care from a wider range of community 
advice agencies would be interwoven and more DEW Team clients 
would be expected to be linked into structured day activities.
Results
The study samples drawn from each service were found to be 
well matched in terms of demographics and diagnosis (see Table 
1 ). The majority of each sample lived in Council accommodation 
and the proportion of clients who moved house during the 
eighteen-month study period in each sample was high (22% in 
the DEW sample and 17% in the CPN sample). 24% of each sample 
were noted as having some form of employment, but during the 
study period only 4% DEW and 2% CPN were working continuously.
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Table 1: Comparative Demographic Characteristics
DEMOGRAPHIC
VARIABLE
DEW CPN
SEX 29 Female, 21 Male 28 Female, 22 Male
AGE on 
01-04-87
Mean=42yrs, 
SD=17.7
Mean=42yrs, 
SD=15.8
MARITAL
STATUS
62% Single 
10% Married 
20% Divorced/ 
Separated 
8% Widowed
52% Single 
20% Married 
22% Divorced/ 
Separated 
6% Widowed
ETHNICITY 50% Caucasian 
42% West Indian 
/African 
4% Asian,
4% Other
48% Caucasian 
46% West Indian 
/African 
2% Asian,
6% Other
LIVING
SITUATION
48% Alone 
24% With Parents 
8% Alone with 
children 
8% Spouse & 
children 
6% Spouse
/Cohabitee 
6% With Friends
48% Alone 
18% With Parents 
8% Alone with 
children 
14% Spouse & 
children 
10% Spouse/ 
Cohabitee 
2% With Friends
DIAGNOSIS 78% Schizophrenia, 
Affective 
Psychosis or 
Paranoid States. 
22% Neurotic, 
Personality 
Disorder or 
Alcohol Dependence 
Syndrome.
84% Schizophrenia, 
Affective 
Psychosis or 
Paranoid States. 
16% Neurotic, 
Personality 
Disorder or 
Alcohol Dependence 
Syndrome.
The majority of each sample had been in contact with 
psychiatric services for more than 7 years and 86% of each 
sample had been in contact with services for more than two 
years. 66% DEW clients and 64% CPN clients had one or more in­
patient admissions in the two year period immediately prior to 
the beginning of the study period and 28% of each sample had 
one or more previous day hospital admissions. There were 
notable differences between the two cohorts in original 
referral sources; in the CPN sample most of the referrals had 
originated from hospital-based services, whereas in the DEW 
Team sample there was a wider variety of sources. The majority 
of each sample were seen at home for their first assessment
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(72% DEW: 70% CPN).
The DEW Team had a multi-disciplinary "Key-worker" system 
operating during the study period. The CPN service had no such 
explicit "Key-worker" system, although each client did 
generally have a regular primary nurse. In the DEW Team sample 
key-workers were allocated as follows: 58% of clients had a 
Community Psychiatric Nurse; 12% Psychologist; 10% Clinical 
Assistant; 8% Occupational Therapist; 4% Consultant 
Psychiatrist; 4% Social Worker; 4% Registrar or Senior 
Registrar. 21% DEW and 72% CPN clients had a change in their 
allocated primary worker during the study period. Three 
clients in each sample had a second primary worker change. 
Table 2: Staff Contacts with Clients and Continuity of
Personnel During Study Period
VARIABLE VALUE P DEW CPN
MEAN SD MEAN SD
Total No.
Visits
Attempted
t=-1.81 p=0.07 22.7 14.1 28.0 15.4
Total No.
Visits
Successful
t=-1.81 p>0.05 20.5 14.0 25.0 15.2
Total No.
Different
Locations
*
t= 3.40 p< 0.001 2.3 0.8 1 .8 0.7
Total No. 
Different 
Staff Members 
Seen *
t= 4.95 
F= 2.04
p< 0.001
p<0.05
2.3 0.9 3.6 1 .5
Total No. 
Visits Where 
Medication 
Prescribed
t=-1.68 p>0.05 18.1 14.7 23.3 15.9
Total No. 
Visits Where 
Medication 
Taken
t=-1.67 p>0.05 16.2 14.9 21 .3 15.6
Total No.
Staff-Carer 
Contacts *
t=-0.74 
F= 2.04
p> 0.05 
p< 0.05
5.1 7.1 6.6 10.2
* = Significant Difference
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Some differences were found in the number of staff contacts 
with clients. Table 2 shows that there was a trend towards 
CPNs attempting more visits than DEW staff. There was a highly 
significant difference in the number of different places 
individual clients were seen -DEW staff saw clients in 
significantly more different locations than the CPNs. 
Significantly fewer different staff members were seen by DEW 
Team clients than CPN clients and there was a greater variance 
in the number of different staff members seen in the CPN 
service than in DEW service. There was no difference between 
the two groups in the total number of staff contacts with 
carers, although in the CPN service there was greater 
variation in number of contacts. There was no significant 
difference between DEW and CPN in the proportion of clients 
with known carers (%2=0.81,p>0.05) or the proportion of 
clients with known carers where staff support was offered to 
the carer (x2=2.80,p>0.05).
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Table 3: Client Use of Structured Dav Activities and
Attendances at these Agencies during Study Period
VARIABLE VALUE P DEW CPN
MEAN SD MEAN SD
Total No. of
Structured
Day
Activities 
Used *
t= 0.80 
F= 2.27
p<0.01
p<0.01
1 .1 1.3 0.5 0.8
Total Day
Centre
Attendances
t=-0.85 p> 0.05 38.3 63.6 80.3 107.6
Total
Community
Group
Attendances
t= 0.70 p> 0.05 18.2 23.4 11.2 12.3
Total
Hospital-
based
Activity
Attendances
t= 1.00 p>0.05 47.1 79.4 25.0 39.4
Proportion of 
Clients Using 
Day Centres
% 2 = 0.75 p> 0.05 18% 10%
Proportion of 
Clients 
Using 
Community 
Groups *
X 2=8.78 p<0.05 40% 12%
Proportion of 
Clients Using 
Hospital- 
based
Activities
X 2=0.43 p>0.05 34% 26%
* = Significant Difference
Analysis of client use of structured day activities revealed 
further differences. Table 3 shows that DEW Team clients were 
involved in significantly more structured day activities in 
total than CPN clients. There was a significant difference in 
the proportion of DEW Team and CPN clients using Community 
Groups. There were no significant differences between DEW Team 
and CPN clients in total number of attendances during the 
study period at any of the structured day activities used or
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in the staff ratings of regularity of attendance.
Table 4: Client Use of Other Community Advice Agencies
VARIABLE VALUE P DEW CPN
MEAN SD MEAN SD
Total No. 
Helping 
Agencies 
Client Had 
Contact With 
★
t= 4.28 p<0.001 3.16 1 .62 1 .82 1 .50
* = Significant Difference
Analysis of client use of community advice agencies such as 
the local counselling service, job centre and citizens advice 
bureau revealed further differences. Table 4 shows DEW Team 
clients were in contact with significantly more community 
advice agencies during the study period than CPN clients. When 
agencies are categorised into those providing help in 
different areas of functioning, Table 5 shows a significant 
difference between the proportion of DEW and CPN clients in 
contact with agencies providing social support and agencies 
dealing with work or day-time occupation.
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Table 5: Client Use of Other Community Agencies sub-
cateaorised into Agencies Dealing with Problems in 
Different Areas of Functioning
VARIABLE VALUE P MEANS
DEW CPN
Daily Living X 2=0.43 p > 0 .05 34% 26%
Social Support 
*
X 2=7.77 p < 0 .01 46% 18%
Housing/Legal X
*0 II O p > 0 .05 60% 48%
Family/Relationsh 
ip
X
10 II o o o p > 0 .05 4% 2%
Work/Day 
Occupation *
X 2=7.53 p<0.01 48% 20%
Specialist 
Services 
eg Anorexia 
Clinic
X 2=0.85 p > 0 .05 16% 8%
Physical Health X 2=0.06 p > 0 .05 22% 18%
* = Significant Difference
Table 6: Number of In-patient Hospital Admissions per Client
in Study Period
NUMBER OF ADMISSIONS DEW CPN
0 25 50% 26 52%
1 11 22% 16 32%
2 9 18% 5 10%
3 5 10% 2 4%
5 0 0% 1 2%
Total Clients 50 100% 50 100%
Table 6 shows that there was no significant difference between 
the DEW service and the CPN service in the proportion of 
clients who had in-patient admissions during the study period 
(t=1 .58,p>0.05); approximately half of each cohort had one or 
more in-patient admissions and there was no significant 
difference in the length of the admissions (see Table 7).
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Table 7: Duration of Study Period In-patient Hospital
Admissions
DURATION OF ADMISSION DEW CPN
No Admission 25 50% 26 52%
Up to 1 Month 2 4% 5 10%
1 - 3  Months 8 16% 11 22%
4 - 7  Months 7 14% 6 12%
8 - 1 3  Months 8 16% 2 4%
Total Clients 50 100% 50 100%
There were very few sample client admissions to Day Hospital 
during the study period: 2 DEW Team clients and 4 CPN clients 
had Day Hospital admissions. Table 8 shows reasons for client 
discharge or drop-out. There was a significant difference 
between the two services in the proportion of clients 
discharged for different reasons (%2=8.63, p<0.05). This
finding must be interpreted with care due to small sample 
numbers.
Table 8: Reasons for Client Discharae/Drop-out
REASON FOR DISCHARGE DEW CPN TOTAL
Catchment Area Change 7 37% 1 5% 8 21%
Moved Out Of Area, 
Died, Referred On or 
Readmitted
4 21% 8 38% 12 30%
Client Refusal 6 32% 5 24% 11 28%
Client Remained Well 2 10% 7 33% 9 21%
Total No. Clients 
Discharged
19 100% 21 100% 40 100%
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DISCUSSION
The findings suggested that community care by the DEW CMHT was 
different to the traditional CPN service in practice. DEW Team 
care was found to differ from CPN care in the following ways.
i ) Number and Location of Visits /Staff-Client Contacts
The DEW Team saw clients in a greater variety of locations 
over time. This suggests that the DEW Team may have been more 
flexible at responding to the varying needs of clients in 
terms of where consultations took place and has implications 
for the acceptability of services to clients. Assuming that 
part of the accessibility of a service can be judged in terms 
of the variety of location of contacts, the DEW Team had gone 
some way towards supporting a stated aim of their operational 
policy in providing a more accessible service.
No differences were found between the DEW and CPN services in 
terms of the total number of client visits made. This finding 
has implications for the form of the care delivery system. It 
may just have been a demonstration that the two services 
studied had similar sized case-loads per whole time equivalent 
staff. Alternatively, it could have had two further 
implications. It could mean that both services were adept at 
responding to the needs of clients in terms of the number of 
visits they made, but it could also mean that both services 
studied offered a block response in the number of visits they 
were prepared realistically to make. It was not possible to 
resolve this question without further analysis of client need 
for visits.
ii) Continuity of personnel
It was hypothesised that there would be greater continuity of 
personnel in the DEW service by virtue of their key-worker 
system. This hypothesis was supported. In the CPN sample 72% 
of clients had a change in their allocated primary care worker 
during the study period as compared with 21% of the DEW Team 
sample who had a change in their key-worker. In addition it 
was found that in the CPN service some clients saw very few 
staff members while others saw very many. In the DEW service
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there was less variation between clients in terms of the 
number of staff members seen. In this context it is 
interesting to consider the results with respect to the key­
worker function and the role of the multi-disciplinary team.
As stated in chapter two, research evidence suggests that good 
quality community psychiatric care requires teamwork (Test 
1979; Intagliata 1982; Woof et al 1988). Although staff may be 
allocated to individual clients and work with them over months 
or years, they should work as a member of a team (Holloway 
1991). The above finding suggests that the multi-disciplinary 
team approach as embraced in the DEW service did facilitate 
continuity of personnel. The team thus provided continuity of 
care. Individual team members were apparently protected from 
the burden of sole responsibility (Stein, Diamond & Factor 
1990).
In the DEW Team it was judged that the key-worker system was 
operated relatively efficiently in line with team policy. 
Every client in the sample was assessed and allocated to a 
key-worker responsible for overseeing the clients total care 
and for being the personal worker in all general matters to 
that client. Where the key-worker was absent for a period, 
cover arrangements were made at the weekly team meeting and 
precisely described in the notes and also caseloads were 
monitored on a three monthly basis at the team meeting with 
any resulting planned changes in key-worker discussed and 
noted.
The CPNs did not have a key-worker system and evidence taken 
from the notes suggested that client allocation was 
considerably more haphazard. In general there was a high staff 
turn-over of CPNs during the study period, with several CPNs 
leaving. The "key-worker system" as such was operated on a 
very informal and flexible basis and clients were handed over 
to colleagues for a variety of reasons (rarely recorded in the 
notes). Examples of reasons for client hand-over were gained 
from interviews with the CPNs. It was found that:
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1 . CPNs negotiated amongst themselves, swapping clients who
lived in certain areas to rationalise their travelling 
times and distances.
2. When one worker left the CPN Team, often a new primary
care worker was not appointed for some time and the
client was shared among colleagues for this period.
3. There was no specific forum for the making of these 
decisions in the form of a team meeting and no practice 
of recording the decisions in notes.
4. Such decisions were up to the discretion of the
particular CPN involved and may have been discussed at 
the hospital ward round, but no records were available.
iii) Medication Administration on Visits
It was hypothesised that the CPN service would be more likely 
to discharge clients who refused medication or for whom visits 
did not involve the administering of medication. However, 
there was no evidence that there was any difference between 
the DEW and CPN services either in the total number of visits 
on which medication had previously been prescribed or in the 
total number of visits on which medication was taken. If the 
above hypothesis were correct, one would expect that the DEW 
Team would have a higher number of visits to clients who were 
not complying with prescribed medication. This was not the 
case.
iv) Use and Extent of Use of Dav-time Activities
The results suggested that the DEW Team were more effective at 
initially linking clients with structured day-time activities 
than the CPN service. When the types of day-activities were 
sub-divided into day-centres, community groups and hospital- 
based activities (such as the industrial therapy unit, and art 
therapy), it became apparent that this difference was mainly 
due to the DEW Team linking clients to a much higher 
percentage of community groups than the CPN service. It is 
also interesting to note that it seems as if community groups 
were not substitutes for day centres and hospital-based 
activities but were an additional support service.
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There were no apparent differences between the DEW and CPN 
services in terms of the total number of client attendances or 
the staff-rated regularity of attendance at structured day 
activities. These results, however, should be interpreted with 
a considerable degree of caution due to the small sample size 
and the poor quality of the attendance data obtained. It does 
suggest that while DEW Team staff may have been more effective 
at initially linking more clients to structured day-time 
activities than CPN staff, the DEW Team were no more 
successful than CPNs at ensuring that clients attended the 
centres on a regular basis. One might have expected 
attendances to be higher for DEW Team clients due to closer 
monitoring arrangements through support visits and closer 
liaison with the organisations involved, but evidence suggests 
that this was not the case.
v) Use of Other Community Advice Agencies
The DEW Team were found to be more effective than the CPN 
service at linking clients with a range of community advice 
agencies, particularly with agencies concerned with work or 
day-time occupation and agencies providing social support. 
This suggests that the use of resources by the DEW Team did 
show greater sensitivity to the care network as a whole and 
care from a wider range of community sources was interwoven in 
the client care package.
This supports the "enabling role" of the CMHT. In the US with 
development of case management services, the concept of the 
core agency that brings together all local mental health 
services is becoming increasingly influential (Intagliata 
1982; Santiago 1987; Lehman 1989; Stein, Diamond & Factor 
1990). The DEW Team stated in their operational policy that 
they aimed "to work closely with other locally based agencies 
to promote the development of a co-ordinated network of 
support services." The above result suggests that the DEW Team 
had some success in this respect.
vi) Discharge and Drop-out
The reasons given for client discharge were found to be
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quantitatively different between the DEW and CPN services. 37% 
of the clients discharged from the DEW Team were discharged 
due to the pending catchment area change that occurred in 
October 1988, the month after the end of the study period; 
whereas only 5% of the CPN discharged sample were discharged 
for this reason. The other striking difference was in the 
number of clients who were discharged because they "remained 
well". Only 10% of the sample discharged by the DEW Team were 
discharged for this reason compared to 33% of the CPN sample. 
The DEW Team's different approach regarding the long-term 
support function to clients was, therefore, reflected in the 
discharge data. However, it was not possible to assess this 
difference without a knowledge of the pattern of future 
relapses of clients in the sample who were discharged because 
they "remained well". Also, differences in morbidity between 
the two services, despite the matching process needed to be 
compared.
This discharge data showed the interesting effects of 
continual organisational change in the local Health Service 
administration. The particular study period was chosen because 
it was hoped that it represented a time when the services were 
not being affected by such organisational changes, but it is 
evident that there was an effect due to the pending catchment 
area change. Such a finding has implications for any 
assessment of continuity of client care and suggests that it 
is not only connected with individual team practice but also 
closely linked to Mental Health Unit organisational practices 
and the effect of changing local and government policy.
vii) In-patient Admissions
The results demonstrated that the DEW Team had no significant 
effect on reducing either the frequency or duration of in­
patient admissions and DEW Team clients displayed a similar 
admission pattern to that of the CPN service. This suggests 
that the DEW Team were not as successful as they might have 
been at reducing the need for in-patient admission. However, 
research evidence on this issue is contentious and largely 
equivocal, as described in chapter two. Studies of "case
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management" services focused on out-patient populations deemed 
to be at high risk of readmission have shown a decrease in 
hospital utilisation in clients receiving "case management" 
services (eg Jerrell & Hu 1989; Bush et al 1990), although 
some centres have not shown such expected improvements (eg 
Bond et al 1988). However, "case management" in these studies 
often referred to the provision of an intensive twenty-four 
hour support service, similar to that used in the Stein & Test 
studies (1980) and very different to the much less intensive 
input offered by both the CPN and DEW services.
viii) Staff Contact with Carers
No significant differences were found in the number of staff 
contacts with carers on visits between the DEW and CPN 
services, but a greater variation in the number of carer 
contacts was found in the CPN service. This may indicate that 
in the CPN service, staff contacts with carers might have been 
more dependent on the practice of the individual CPN, whereas 
in the DEW service, different members of the staff team had 
similar numbers of contacts. There was no significant 
difference between the two services in the proportion of 
clients with carers where support was offered to the primary 
carer.
Research suggests that community psychiatric services have not 
been very effective in the past at offering good services to 
the carers of people with mental health problems. The DEW Team 
operational policy stated that the DEW Team aimed to "provide 
a service of support and advice to users of the service and 
their relatives" and hence one would expect that DEW Team 
staff would have made more attempts to contact and support 
carers than the CPN service. There was, however, no evidence 
to suggest that this was the case. A similar result was found 
in the client satisfaction study of the DEW Team conducted by 
MacDonald & Ochera (1990). They discovered that less than a 
third of carers (31%) knew how to contact the DEW Team. It 
must be stressed that as a direct result of the client- 
satisfaction study findings, the DEW Team consequently 
attempted to address the issue by adding an additional part to
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their initial assessment of clients. This ensured that the DEW 
Team staff found out about carers and made carer support more 
widely available and accessible. Such developments were not 
picked up in this study due to its retrospective nature, but
effects of this policy change were found in a later
prospective study (described in chapter 12).
A Note on the study sample
The process of matching clients from the DEW and CPN services 
to allow comparison between them, meant that the samples 
obtained did not diagnostically reflect the total caseload of 
these services. This is particularly important with respect to 
the DEW service, as it had a much more heterogeneous caseload 
in terms of diagnosis than the CPN service. If demographic 
data from Table 1 were compared to prior data on the total DEW 
Team caseload for the year 1987-88 (McLean & Leibowitz 1990) 
there are differences in ethnicity ratios (the present sample 
had more afro-caribbean clients than the total DEW Team
caseload) and in living situation (48% of the present sample 
lived alone compared to only 25% of the total DEW Team
caseload). Lastly, a higher percentage of the present sample 
had a diagnosis of schizophrenia, affective psychosis or 
paranoid state compared to the total DEW Team caseload.
An Overview of the Service Style Comparison
Essentially, this study has served to demonstrate that in 
practice, the "new" CMHT and MtraditionalM CPN style services 
were found to be different in terms of most of the process 
factors considered, but they were not as different as would 
have been expected. The previous chapters detailing the 
history of the DEW Team gave the impression that the DEW Team 
were aiming to provide a radically different style of service 
provision, but the differences in practice were noted to be 
largely organisational. The DEW service was found to be 
distinctive in three main aspects of service provision that 
were not present in the CPN service:
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1 ) The multi-disciplinary teamwork approach as opposed to 
the largely uni-disciplinary CPN approach.
2) The key-worker system, procedures for assessment, 
clarification of aims and client review system 
established by the team. This allowed them to work 
effectively with clients and monitor progress in a way 
that was not possible for the CPN service.
3) The emphasis on developing improved methods of co­
ordinated care with other community agencies.
However, as regards measuring an improvement in care to 
clients, results were less easy to interpret, and few apparent 
differences emerged. The most striking feature was that no 
differences were found between the two services in number or 
duration of hospital admissions between the two cohorts. One 
of the main precepts of the original proposal proposing the 
establishment of the DEW Team was that they would alleviate 
the problems of "revolving door" clients and decrease the 
pressure on the hospital services. In practice, this did not 
happen. The team may have ensured that while clients were 
living in the community they were more closely monitored and 
should the need for hospital admission arise, this may have 
been better coordinated than in the more "traditional" service 
style. Yet the actual need for hospital admission did not 
notably diminish.
In Brief
With the implementation of the CMHT model of care, doubts 
remained about whether this approach really provided an 
improved service for long term mentally ill clients compared 
to the established after care services that existed 
previously. The overall findings of the first empirical study 
presented in this chapter suggested that on the indices 
measured, the service offered to long term mentally ill 
clients by the DEW CMHT did differ from that given by the CPN 
service and did potentially improve service quality for 
clients. Yet the differences were noted to be largely 
organisational in nature in improving the support role to 
clients rather than having any significant impact on reducing 
the need for in-patient admissions.
The next chapter now presents a prospective study of the DEW
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Team style of working when it changed to operating as a 
catchment area service after 1988. It considers whether the 
team succeeded in their stated aim to prioritise working with 
the long term mentally ill within their redefined remit to 
serve all mental health clients within a catchment area.
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CHAPTER 12:
Prioritising Long Term Mentally 111 Clients in a Catchment 
Area CMHT Model: Is it Feasible?
This chapter will present a second empirical study of the DEW 
Team style of working. One way that the implementation 
literature in public policy is driven is to consider whether 
or not a service achieves the objectives that it sets itself. 
This is the principle that underlies organisational audit. 
Using this theme, this chapter aims to present a study of the 
DEW CMHT when they changed to become a comprehensive service, 
serving all the mentally ill clients within a newly defined 
catchment area of North East Battersea. As described in 
chapter ten, it was agreed within the team that the long term 
mentally ill clients required a different style of service, 
with emphasis on preventing inappropriate discharges or drop­
out and providing a flexible and accessible service with 
regular multi-disciplinary reviews (at least every three 
months) at weekly team meetings, designed to provide support 
to key-workers and facilitate the involvement of different 
disciplines in care programmes as appropriate. The aims of the 
study presented in this chapter were to discover whether the 
DEW Team's policies of prioritising the long term mentally ill 
were observable in practice and whether the team were 
succeeding in their effort to provide a different type of 
service to the two groups defined (Long Term Mentally 111 and 
Acute clients).
Rationale of the Second Empirical Study
Details of studies concerning the aims and principle services 
offered by CMHTs in the U.K. were presented in chapter two. It 
was noted by Sayce (1989) and Patmore & Weaver (1991) amongst 
others, that in many parts of the U.K., even where CMHTs 
specifically claimed to prioritise work with the long term 
mentally ill group within the catchment area team model, few 
actually succeeded in serving more than a small proportion of 
their catchment area's known long term mentally ill 
population. It was also noted that there was a conspicuous 
absence of active, effective case-load monitoring systems that
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would allow such an aim to be evaluated. Hence, the study 
presented in this chapter focused on two aspects of DEW Team 
service provision. First, it aimed to discover whether the DEW 
Team definitions of two different client groups were reflected 
in the characteristics of clients. Were there any differences 
between the two groups of clients defined as "long term 
mentally ill" and "acute"? What were the proportions of "long 
term mentally ill" and "acute" clients in DEW Team care? How 
did the two groups compare in terms of discharge and period of 
time spent in the care of the DEW Team? What differences were 
there between "long term mentally ill" and "acute" clients 
relating to variables such as sex, diagnosis and source of 
referral?
The second aim was to focus on staff input to clients in the 
two groups. How far did the "long term mentally ill" and 
"acute" clients receive a different kind of service? How were 
the DEW weekly multi-disciplinary team meetings weighted in 
terms of the amount of time spent discussing clients from each 
of the two groups? What proportion of the case-load had 
contact with more than one team member? What differences were 
there in terms of key-worker allocation? A major consideration 
in designing the methodology of this study was an additional 
aim to develop a simple methodology that avoided making extra 
demands on staff and which could be used by other CMHTs with 
little access to research staff or complicated computer 
monitoring systems. Maximum use was therefore made of data 
routinely collected by the team.
Method
Data was collected from three different sources:
1) Data-base
As described in chapter eight, the team ran a computerised 
case register of all DEW Team clients. Details were obtained 
from this about how many "long term mentally ill" and "acute" 
clients DEW Team workers had on their case-load over time. 
Information was collected about the case-load on four specific 
dates spread at six monthly intervals over an eighteen month 
period (from December 1988 to May 1990). This was used to
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assess the balance of such clients on the DEW Team case-load 
at any one time. Comparisons were made across the two groups 
on the four discrete six monthly "slices”, looking at the 
following variables:
a) Numbers of long term mentally ill and acute clients in
care at discrete six monthly intervals.
b) Differences in race and sex between the two groups at
each interval.
c) Differences in source of referral between the two groups.
d) Differences in key-worker allocation between the two 
groups.
e) Number of clients in each group who continued in care 
over two six monthly periods (Dec 1988-May 1989; Dec 
1989-May 1990).
f) Numbers of clients newly referred and seen at each 
interval.
g) Number of clients discharged between each interval.
2) Team Meetings
Records were kept of the time spent discussing different 
clients at the DEW multi-disciplinary team meetings over a 
period of three months (12 meetings). These records were made 
by direct observation, with the researcher using a stop-watch 
to time discussions. Team members gave their permission for 
recordings to be made and were asked to continue meetings in 
the normal fashion. Discussion times for individual clients 
were recorded, classified into "long term mentally ill" or 
"acute" and "in-patient" or "community" client.
3) Staff Contact with Clients
An analysis was made of estimated DEW Team core staff contact 
with clients listed on the computer as "currently in care" 
over a six month period. A "current in care" list for the 
month of January 1991 was presented to team members with a 
request for each team member to indicate each client they had 
contact with over the last six months and the type of contact 
this was. There was no requirement to detail the actual number 
of contacts, as this was intended only to be a crude measure 
of approximate type of contacts and to identify any 
differences between the "long term mentally ill" and "acute" 
groups. The categories of contact were defined as follows:
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a) Face-to-Face -planned meeting between staff and client
b) Informal Face-to-Face -unplanned meetings between staff 
and client (eg on the local Council estate, at mental 
health social events)
c) Telephone -telephone calls between staff and client
d) Letter -letters written to or about or by clients to 
staff (excluding referral letters)
e) Consultation -staff consulted by another professional 
about client
f ) Carer -any contact by staff with relatives/carers (face- 
to-face, telephone or letter)
Results
1) Data-base Study
Table 9: Size of DEW Team Case-load over time: Number of DEW
Team Clients in Care at Discrete six monthly 
intervals
MONTH DECEMBER MAY DECEMBER MAY
YEAR 1988 1989 1989 1990
TOTAL 132 164 152 137
LONG TERM 116 125 117 98
MENTALLY (87.88%) (76.22%) (70.13%) (71.52%)
ILL
CLIENTS
ACUTE 16 39 35 39
CLIENTS (12.12%) (23.78%) (29.87%) (28.87%)
The total number of DEW Team clients in active care rose over 
the first six months of the study and declined again over the 
next year reflecting a reduction in the size of the team's 
catchment area in August 1989. The proportion of clients 
classified as "long term mentally ill" declined slightly over 
the first year of the study following the change to catchment 
area status in October 1988. It then remained stable at about 
70% of the DEW Team case-load. A corresponding increase in the 
proportion of "acute" clients (doubling from 12% to 24% in the 
first six months) stabilised to approximately 30% of the case­
load.
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Table 10: Diagnostic Breakdown of DEW Team Case-load over
time: Diagnosis of DEW Team Clients In Care At
Discrete Six Monthly Intervals
MONTH & 
YEAR
DIAGNOSIS LONG TERM
MENTALLY
ILL
CLIENTS
ACUTE
CLIENTS
TOTAL
DECEMBER 200s 82 (71%) 0 ( 0%) 82 (62%)
1988
300s 32 (27%) 15 (94%) 47 (36%)
0 2 ( 2%) 1 ( 6%) 3 ( 2%)
MAY 1989 200s 86 (69%) 4 (10%) 90 (55%)
300s 33 (26%) 28 (72%) 61 (37%)
0 6 ( 5%) 7 (18%) 13 ( 8%)
DECEMBER 200s 84 (72%) 2 ( 6%) 86 (56%)
1 989
300s 30 (26%) 27 (77%) 57 (38%)
0 3 ( 2%) 6 (17%) 9 ( 6%)
MAY 1990 200s 69 (70%) 5 (13%) 74 (54%)
300s 25 (26%) 27 (69%) 52 (38%)
0 4 ( 4%) 7 (18%) 1 ( 8%)
Kev: 200s = ICD9 No 290.0 to 299.9,
300s = ICD9 No 300.0 to 310.0,
0 = Other -Including No diagnosis, Not Mentally
111, Doubt or Missing Data.
Clients with a psychotic diagnosis (ICD 290.0 to 299.9)
remained at about 55% of the total case-load and about 70% of 
the "long term mentally ill" group.
Racial Mix
The racial mix of the DEW Team case-load also remained
relatively stable over time. For the "long term mentally ill" 
group the proportions were: 64% Caucasian, 26% African/Afro- 
Caribbean, 6% Asian, 4% Other. The "acute" group showed a 
slightly different distribution. From May 1989 (when the 
numbers of "acute" clients had built up on the case-load) the 
proportion of Caucasians declined over the next year from 77% 
to 69%, with a corresponding increase in the number of
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African/Afro-Caribbean clients from 21% to 26%. There were no 
Asians in the "acute" group over the period of the study.
Movement of Clients from Case-load over time
Table 11 : Changes in Number of Clients on Case-load over time
Between December 
1988 & May 1989
LONG TERM
MENTALLY
ILL
CLIENTS
ACUTE
CLIENTS
TOTAL
Continuing In 
Care
93 (81%) 3 (19%) 96 (75%)
Number Discharged 20 13 35
Number of New 
Referrals
30 36 66
Between December 
1989 & May 1990
LONG TERM
MENTALLY
ILL
CLIENTS
ACUTE
CLIENTS
TOTAL
Continuing In 
Care
88 (75%) 22 (63%) 110 (72%)
Number Discharged 27 13 40
Number of New 
Referrals
7 17 24
Between December 1988 and May 1989, 81% of "long term mentally 
ill" clients remained in care, compared to only 19% of the 
"acute" group. The six months from December 1989 to May 1990, 
showed a similar proportion of "long term mentally ill" 
clients continuing in care (75%), but an increase in the 
proportion of "acute" clients (63%). The number of new 
referrals decreased between the two periods, reflecting the 
decrease in the size of the catchment area.
Kev-worker Case-loads
Results showed that over time the "long term mentally ill" 
group continued to have key-workers from a wide distribution 
of professions, but the majority had a CPN, consultant or 
clinical assistant key-worker, with the CPNs consistently 
having the largest group (30-40%). The range of professions 
being key-worker for the "acute" group was very limited in 
December 1988 (only the consultant, clinical assistant and
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psychologist), but the distribution became wider after that 
date, although these three staff still carried the majority of 
the "acute" case-load. Interpretation of these results is 
complicated by the inevitable staffing changes that occurred 
during the study period (eg vacant OT post, psychologist on 
maternity leave, new social worker) and by the different 
number of sessions each professional group worked for the 
team.
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Referral Sources
Referral Source for Long Term Mentally 111 
Clients. Dec 1988 - May 1990
□  GP
B Springfield 
■  CPN
0  Out patient psychiatry 
B Social services
□  Relative/carer 
B General hospital 
f l  Psychology 
B Other
Graph 2:
Referral Source for Acute Clients. Dec 
1988 - May 1990
□  GP 
B Other 
B Social services 
El Health visitor 
B  Other
El General hospital 
B Self
Results showed a much wider range of referral sources for the "long term mentally ill" 
group than the "acute" group, with the majority o f the "acute" group (58%) referred 
by GP s.
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2) Multi-disciplinarv Team Meetings Study
The average duration of the weekly team meetings was three
hours (range 4 hours 5 minutes to 1 hour 40 minutes) and they 
were well attended by the core staff team with various others
attending less regularly. Approximately 62% of the whole
meeting each week was devoted to discussion about individual 
clients. About 81% of this total client discussion time was 
spent talking about "long term mentally ill" clients, with 19% 
spent talking about "acute" clients. The remaining 38% of the 
team meeting was concerned with business matters, ranging from 
policy discussions to information dissemination and the 
organisation of groups run by team members.
There were no significant differences in the amount of team 
discussion time each client received, whether they were in the 
"long term mentally ill" or "acute" group, or "in-patients" or 
"community" clients (average of about 4 minutes). However, of 
the clients discussed each week, 78% were in the "long term 
mentally ill" group and 22% were in the "acute" group. This 
roughly matched the proportion of clients on the case-load 
from each group, with a slight bias towards the "long term 
mentally ill" group.
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3) Staff-Client Contacts with "Current" Case-load
Tables 12a & 1 2b: Staff-Client Contact for six months prior to 
January 1991
Clients in care in January 1991= 149 - 92 "LONG TERM
MENTALLY ILL"
57 "ACUTE"
(Percentage figures stated in this table relate to total 
contacts in each column, for the two study groups, eg CPN 
was involved in 17% of the face to face contacts 
experienced by the team as a whole in the long term 
mentally ill group, but only 2% of the face-to-face 
contacts in the acute group.)
a) Long Term Mentally 111 Clients
STAFF MEMBER FACE TO TEL. LETTER CONSULT­ CARER
FACE CONTACT CONTACT ATION CONTACT
CPN 34 8INF 30 5 26 26
17% 31% 26% 6% 27% 41%
Clinical 23 5 INF 14 7 10 12
Assistant 11% 19% 12% 9% 10% 19%
Consultant 33 3 INF 3 8 19 2
Psychiatrist 16% 12% 3% 10% 20% 3%
Social 20 4INF 5 4 5 6
Worker 10% 15% 4% 5% 5% 10%
Psychologist 13 6INF 5 7 10 9
6% 23% 4% 9% 10% 14%
Registrar 16 4 1 2 3
8% 4% 1% 2% 5%
Senior 23 13 11 25 5
Registrar 11% 11% 14% 26% 8%
Office 18 37 12 0 0
Manager 9% 28% 15%
Research 22 9 24 0 0
Psychologist 11% 8% 31%
TOTAL 202 2 6 INF 115 79 97 63
CONTACTS 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
INF= Informal Contacts (included as separate variable)
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b) Acute Clients
STAFF MEMBER FACE TO 
FACE
TEL.
CONTACT
LETTER
CONTACT
CONSULT­
ATION
CARER
CONTACT
CPN 1
2%
1
5%
0 1
6%
1
7%
Clinical 6 4 2 5 4
Assistant 10% 20% 5% 28% 29%
Consultant
Psychiatrist
16
26%
0 12
30%
0 0
Social 4 2 2 1 2
Worker 7% 10% 5% 6% 14%
Psychologist 21 2 18 6 3
34% 10% 45% 32% 21%
Registrar 7
11%
1
5%
1
2%
0 0
Senior 6 5 5 5 4
Registrar 10% 25% 13% 28% 29%
Office
Manager
0 5
25%
0 0 0
Research
Psychologist
0 0 0 0 0
TOTAL 61 20 40 18 14
CONTACTS 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
The results showed that the "long term mentally ill" group had 
a much wider variety of types of contact with DEW Team staff 
than the "acute" group. None of the "acute" group had 
"informal" contacts with staff during the six month period, 
compared to 30% of the "long term mentally ill" group. The 
proportions of "long term mentally ill" clients about whom 
staff reported telephone consultation or carer contact were 
much greater (67%, 72% and 56% respectively) than those
reported for the "acute" group (31%, 31% and 24%
respectively). It is notable that, of all of the staff, the 
CPN had by far the most contact with carers and this was 
mainly in the "long term mentally ill" group. The "long term 
mentally ill" clients were generally in contact with higher 
numbers of DEW Team staff than the "acute" group. This was 
particularly striking for "Face-to Face" contacts where only 
15% of the "acute" group had contact with more than one core 
staff member over the six month period, compared to 54% of the 
"long term mentally ill" group.
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DISCUSSION
i) Proportion of Long Term Mentally 111 Clients on Case-load
A major purpose of this study was to evaluate whether the DEW 
Team were giving priority to the "long term mentally ill" 
group of clients. From an analysis of the case-load over an 
eighteen month period it appeared that, despite a build up of 
"acute" clients following the change to a comprehensive 
catchment area service, the proportion of "long term mentally 
ill" clients stabilised at about 70%, with the other 30% being 
"acute" clients. The only comparable data to this is from the 
evaluation of six comprehensive CMHTs carried out by Patmore 
& Weaver (1991). Their definition of long term clients which 
was closest to the DEW Team definition was anyone with a 
psychotic diagnosis or three previous admissions to a 
psychiatric hospital in the last five years, or an admission 
lasting one year or more in the last five years, or any 
compulsory admissions. They found that in all except one of 
the teams less than half of the case-load was made up of long 
term clients. The one exception showed only 59% long term 
clients.
The DEW Team were therefore carrying a significantly higher 
proportion of long term clients (70%) on their case-load than 
any other of the CMHTs studied by Patmore & Weaver (1991). 
Part of the explanation of these differences could be the 
socio-demographic nature of the different catchment areas. The 
DEW Team covered a deprived inner city area with a 
correspondingly high level of psychiatric morbidity. These 
figures do however suggest that the DEW Team were successfully 
prioritising the "long term mentally ill" group in terms of 
client numbers on the caseload.
ii) Racial Mix
The racial mix of the "long term mentally ill" clients on the 
case-load was fairly stable over the time period studied. The 
"acute" group showed a gradual increase in the proportion of 
African/Afro-Caribbean clients during this time. This suggests 
that the team was becoming more accessible to African/Afro- 
Caribbean "acute" clients over the time period. The lack of
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Asian clients in the "acute" group supports the widely 
recognised contention that Asians do not tend to seek 
psychiatric help with neurotic type disorders.
iii) Referral Sources
The "long term mentally ill" group were referred to the team 
from a much wider range of places than the "acute" group, in 
which over half were referred from their GP. This suggests the 
need for links with a wider number of agencies when working 
with the "long term mentally ill" group, whereas links with 
GPs are much more central for the "acute" group.
iv) Proportion of Team Discussion Time Devoted to Long Term 
Mentally 111 Clients
Another aspect of prioritisation that was investigated was 
team discussion time. The difficulty of controlling and 
structuring review systems was described in Patmore & Weaver 
(1991) and the authors expressed concern that discussions 
focused on current problems of new clients or dealt with 
crises, leaving very little time for reviewing long term 
mentally ill clients who may not have been causing major 
concern at the time. The DEW Team actively tried to avoid 
this by ensuring regular review of "long term mentally ill" 
clients and the results suggested that this strategy was 
successful. The amounts of team discussion time spent on "long 
term mentally ill" and "acute" clients were roughly in line 
with their proportion on the case-load, with a slight bias 
towards the "long term mentally ill" group.
v) Period of Time that Long Term Mentally 111 Clients Spent 
on the DEW Team Case-load
The second major focus of the study was to investigate whether 
differences in the type of service provided could be 
demonstrated between the "long term mentally ill" and "acute" 
groups. The results showed differences in a number of areas. 
One important expectation from the DEW Team policy of 
providing long term support to the "long term mentally ill" 
group was that they would stay on the case-load for longer 
periods of time than "acute" clients. Two six month periods
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were looked at and in both cases 3/4 of the "long term 
mentally ill" group were still in care at the end of six 
months. This suggested that the DEW Team were providing long 
term care to this group. If team policies were being adhered 
to, one would expect that a lower percentage of the "acute" 
clients would still be in care after six months. This was the 
case, although there was a large increase from 18% still in 
care after the first six months, to 63% after the end of the 
second period. This suggests an increasing tendency for the 
"acute group" to stay in care for longer than six months. 
Therefore, the distinction between the two groups was getting 
less marked over time.
It is worth noting that about 25% of the "long term mentally 
ill" group were discharged during both of the six month 
periods. This study did not investigate reasons for discharge 
(see Rickard, Leibowitz & McLean 1992b), but the results of 
the study presented in chapter eleven suggested that quite a 
high proportion were accounted for by the significant amount 
of population movement which occurred in Battersea as an inner 
city area and also in response to changes in catchment area 
boundaries which put surprising limitations on attempts at 
continuity of care.
vi) Kev-worker Allocation
Both "long term mentally ill" and "acute" clients had key­
workers from a range of professions, with CPNs and 
psychiatrists most likely to take on this role with long term 
mentally ill clients. Psychiatrists and psychologists were 
most frequently key-workers for the "acute" group.
vii) Staff-Client Contacts
Major differences in the types of contacts made with clients 
were indicated from these results. From the nature of work 
with long term clients, one would expect that a wider variety 
of types of contacts would be required to support them. This 
was in fact the case, with the "long term mentally ill" group 
receiving more telephone contact and only "long term mentally 
ill" clients having "informal" contacts with staff (eg
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unplanned meeting in the local area). The importance of carers 
for this group was reflected in the larger proportion of 
contacts with carers for the "long term mentally ill" clients. 
The proportion of "long term mentally ill" clients about whom 
staff reported "consultation" contacts was also much greater 
than for the "acute" group, reflecting the involvement of a 
lot more agencies in the care of the "long term mentally ill" 
clients. The results also showed that more members of the 
multi-disciplinary team were involved in the care of the "long 
term mentally ill" clients than the "acute" clients, with over 
half of them being in "Face-to-Face" contact with more than 
one team member over a six month period, compared to only 15% 
of the "acute" group.
An Overview of the Feasibility of Prioritising Long Term
Mentally 111 Clients in the Catchment Area CMHT Model
Patmore & Weaver stated in their study of six CMHTs that:
"A system to monitor representation of sufferers from 
serious mental illness needs at least three components. 
It needs an operational definition of "sufferers from 
serious mental illness". It needs a record system which 
can show how many people with these defined 
characteristics are on the case-load. It also needs 
some means of evaluating whether their number is 
sufficient, praiseworthy or too low - maybe a target 
quota to be achieved...." (Patmore & Weaver, 1991, p60)
This study showed that the DEW Team had been successful in 
the first two of these tasks - producing a meaningful 
definition of the long term client group and developing a 
monitoring system that could identify their numbers on the 
case-load. What was still required was the last point 
concerning clear target quotas to be achieved. In comparison 
with data from other teams (Patmore & Weaver 1991) it can be 
concluded that the DEW Team were giving priority to their 
"long term mentally ill" clients in terms of proportions on 
the case-load. The study also looked at differences in what 
the team offered to the two groups of clients ("long term 
mentally ill" and "acute") once they were on the case-load. 
The results suggested that the distinction was a meaningful 
one in that the DEW Team did offer a different kind of 
service to the two groups.
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The parameters used in this study were relatively quick and 
easy to access and required very little direct input from 
team members: characteristics which made them very useful as 
part of a regular monitoring system. In terms of looking at 
what was offered to different types of clients, the sample 
method described above for looking at types of contacts each 
team member had in relation to clients over the previous six 
months, provided a simple alternative methodology to the 
very time-consuming diary studies often used in this type of 
research. It was easily utilised without any extra "research 
time" and provided useful information as part of an overall 
review of team functioning.
In Brief
Overall the results of the study presented in this chapter 
suggested that it is feasible for a CMHT to give priority to 
long term mentally ill clients within the comprehensive 
catchment area model, both in terms of overall numbers on 
their case-load and in terms of the type of input they 
receive. The move by the DEW Team towards catchment area 
provision from specialist provision to the long term 
mentally ill was not as destructive as the team had foreseen 
and the model of working that they had devised while working 
as a specialist team was successfully transferred to the 
catchment area model.
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This thesis has been concerned with community care services 
for people with long term mental health problems. It has 
concentrated on one local experimental team using the CMHT 
Approach. It was argued at the outset that the existing 
literature was poorly adapted to answering the research 
questions, as it fell into largely separate discourses. It 
embraced macro political and sociological theory, narrowly 
professional commentary, micro political science approaches 
and in-service evaluations with little inter-change between 
each. An attempt will therefore be made in this final 
section of the thesis to synthesise material from each 
approach.
The thesis methodology was based on the idea that a 
synthesis of theoretical and practical material would allow 
us to gain a better understanding of what is really 
happening in community care policy development for the long 
term mentally ill at the local level. Chapter 13 will be 
concerned with answering the first of the research questions 
stated at the outset, and chapter 14 will deal with the 
other major question. Some comments on the relevance of such 
work with the current changes in national policy will be 
presented at the end of chapter 14.
278
CHAPTER 13:
The Structural/Philosophical Interpretations Reconsidered
The first of two central research questions that stimulated 
this thesis was:
Why has community care of the "long term mentally ill" 
been so difficult to implement in Britain?
The aim in this chapter is to answer this first question by 
reconsidering the case study evidence in the light of 
structural and philosophical interpretations put forward in 
chapter three. The intention is to start to draw together the 
threads of analysis that can be gleaned from the discussion 
sections presented throughout Part Two. In so doing, it is 
hoped that it will be possible to see to what extent the broad 
theoretical interpretations help us to understand the 
structural and philosophical problems experienced in the 
implementation of the CMHT model for long term mentally ill 
clients at the local level during the 1980s. An initial 
discussion of the contribution of these interpretations prior 
to the introduction of a CMHT model in the case study area was 
presented in chapter five. For the sake of clarity, in this 
chapter each set of interpretations described in the framework 
will be considered again in turn, building on previous 
discussion.
a) Traditional/Pluralist Interpretations:
The first element of the traditional accounts discussed in 
chapter three was identified to lie in the medical model of 
care and in chapter five it was suggested that one reason why 
community care for the long term mentally ill was so difficult 
to implement in the case study area was that the ideological 
foundation of community services that were provided in the 
1970s, did not adequately address the social disablements of 
clients. Chapter six described how the CMHT approach was 
partly embraced in the case study area as a recognition of 
this fact that services needed to depart from relying only on 
a medical input, specifically aiming to promote a more social 
and environmental perspective on the aetiology and treatment
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of mental illness. This new emphasis was reflected in the 
establishment of a multi-disciplinary CMHT, drawing on the 
skills of a range of professionals (described in chapter 
seven) and in the service style and operational policy of the 
CMHT (described in chapter eight). The fact that the CMHT 
approach was sustainable throughout the study period and that 
these basic parameters were later adopted by other CMHTs later 
developed in the case study area, suggests that the change of 
ideology towards ideas based in developmental social 
psychiatry played a significant part in the successful 
implementation of the CMHT approach during the 1980s.
The second element of the traditional/pluralist set of 
interpretations was that community care developed as part of 
a general moral improvement. However, case study evidence 
suggested that the CMHT model was not initiated as a result of 
a collective appreciation that the CMHT approach was superior 
to institutional care. There was no process evident of gradual 
enlightenment, rather an attitude of reserved distrust of 
service innovation. The institutional system was initially 
only being actively challenged by a few isolated individuals 
within the hospital, who formed an alliance as part of the new 
DEW CMHT. Others had a general sense that community services 
were to become the emphasis of future service provision, but 
not all professionals supported the new DEW Team initiative on 
liberal grounds of the possible improvements in quality of 
care for clients. Many did so on the basis that the new CMHT 
relieved their own workload or at least dealt with some of 
their more difficult patients. Hence, case study evidence 
suggested that professional self interest also played a 
significant part.
As discussed in chapters eleven and twelve, even in the DEW 
Team's later years, many were not convinced that the CMHT 
approach actually offered anything new in service provision or 
that it successfully prioritised work with the long term 
mentally ill group. The empirical study described in chapter 
eleven comparing the DEW service with the CPN approach to 
care, showed that some of these reservations were well
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founded. In the traditional way in which service quality was 
measured, little improvement was evident. There was no 
decrease in long term mentally ill patient need for hospital 
admissions, no decrease in the duration of admissions and the 
number of visits that staff in the two services were able to 
offer to patients did not differ.
However, the DEW Team did demonstrate other improvements 
relating mainly to ideology, the style of service delivery and 
the process of care. The DEW Team had some influence in 
changing staff attitudes to the goals of service provision. 
They emphasised a "maintenance" rather than "cure" approach to 
care and highlighted the importance of social support to the 
long term mentally ill group. The value of care planning was 
shown, as a structured, well thought out and monitored 
approach to care. The importance of multi-disciplinary input 
to care and the improved support to staff and development of 
a coherent staff identity was highlighted. Also, there was 
improved liaison with community agencies and the DEW Team 
undertook some forms of educational work. Yet there was no 
traditional way to measure such inputs and their value was 
underplayed by those staff who had never been exposed to them 
in their own working environment. Hence, the traditional 
interpretation of events is unhelpful as it contends that such 
improvements are noted and accepted by the plurality of 
interests. Yet, opinion remained divided on fundamental 
aspects of the structure of services at the local level.
The third element of traditional pluralist interpretations was 
noted to be the emphasis placed on the activity of a range of 
interest groups, who were said to exert pressures commensurate 
with their degree of influence to jointly determine policy. 
Case study evidence presented in chapter six showed that 
change in the provision of community care services to the 
mentally ill was initially prompted by the setting up of a 
Joint Care Planning Team (JCPT) in 1979. The representatives 
on the JCPT did represent a plurality of interests to some 
degree, but were heavily dominated by medical interests and 
the psychiatrists effectively blocked the initial proposal for
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joint day hospital provision. The potential for dialogue 
between the different interest groups was in fact very 
limited.
Innovation in service provision in the formation of the DEW 
CMHT later occurred, but this was not the result of productive 
discussions and bargaining between interested parties. Hence, 
the traditional pluralist position does not adequately explain 
the process of innovation and how change was instigated. Neo- 
pluralist writing emphasises the imbalance of power between 
interested groups but continues to stress the vital role of 
debate between a diverse range of interests in developing 
policy. Evidence presented in the later case study chapters 
regarding the reorganisation of catchment services 
demonstrated that there was heated debate between different 
Health Service professional departments and management 
representatives at the local level, but still no 
representation of client and carer interests. During the 
1980s, pluralist input into the process of local mental health 
policy formation was widened to some extent, but was dominated 
by professional and managerial interests and was influenced by 
a wider general trend for each professional group to assert 
and distinguish their particular skills and draw strict 
boundaries between themselves and other professionals. This 
"professionalisation" contributed to the difficulties of 
successfully implementing innovative care approaches for the 
long term mentally ill, as arguments did not just centre on 
which care approach was best, but were instead used as a forum 
to settle wider disputes about professional boundaries.
There was no balancing input from carers, service user groups 
or local voluntary groups, aside from consultation through a 
user satisfaction survey conducted in 1989 and this was never 
considered as a major tool for policy change. Local MIND and 
NSF groups were not involved at all and the DEW Team 
development did not arouse any interest from these bodies. The 
input from the Social Services side was reduced to the 
recruitment of one social worker to join the new team. All 
these interests were to some extent involved in highlighting
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the extent of community care problems for the long term 
mentally ill, but organised groups of particular interests 
were not observed to be putting forward proposals resulting in 
a balanced solution in which each interest had played a part.
Some traditional pluralist accounts of the problems with 
community care policy emphasise the administrative 
inadequacies, bureaucratic mismatches and disorganisation in 
providing the structures necessary to successfully implement 
the policy. Evidence from the DEW Team case study suggested 
that while these barriers existed, problems in initiating and 
implementing change in service provision were deep rooted and 
reflected personal, political, ideological and professional 
issues. Administrative difficulties were reported in chapter 
nine regarding the problems with establishing office space and 
secretarial cover, and it was suggested that the root of these 
problems lay in organisational obstructiveness. The 
traditional interpretation, while giving important emphasis to 
these difficulties attributes them to structural flaws in the 
administrative system and does not adequately address their 
complex origins.
b) Sociological/Anthropological Interpretations:
From a sociological/anthropological perspective, community 
care was said to have been adopted due to the recognition that 
institutions were anti-therapeutic, as demonstrated by a 
diverse range of studies in the 1960s and 1970s. The idea was 
that mental illness institutions perpetuated a form of social 
control. This interpretation was initially considered in 
chapter five in relation to services that existed before the 
DEW CMHT was initiated in 1979. It was suggested that the 
social control function that institutions previously served 
had become almost inverted in the community at this time. 
Clients were being discharged from the institution with very 
little follow up in the community. In particular, they 
received little help in tackling the welfare benefits system, 
had few sheltered work opportunities, often had poor housing, 
little social support and generally chaotic lives. It was 
suggested that institutions had changed since the days of
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those described by Goffman and his contemporaries. They no 
longer had a long term asylum function and clients were not 
interned for life. Most clients were treated for short periods 
within the hospital and then returned to their homes. Long 
term mentally ill clients often became "revolving door" cases 
and the main function that the institution was serving was in 
temporary crisis containment. The element of the social 
control function that the institution still fulfilled at this 
time was hence for the long term mentally ill. They were being 
controlled in the sense that it was virtually impossible for 
them to escape this "revolving door" cycle.
In 1986, the DEW CMHT was set up to particularly address these 
institutional "revolving door" problems for the long term 
mentally ill and the apparent neglect to which they were 
subjected in trying to survive in the community. Hence, the 
DEW Team could be said to have been attempting to tackle the 
two associated issues of social control in the institution and 
social withdrawal in the community. The DEW Team formally made 
some attempts to embrace an environmental and social approach 
to care and this was reflected in its operational policy 
described in chapter eight. For example it promoted home 
visiting, community support groups, the maintenance of client 
support even when clients were not in relapse, and networking 
with other community agencies. As such, the DEW CMHT appeared 
to go some way towards addressing the social withdrawal 
imposed on long term mentally ill patients in the community, 
but as demonstrated in chapter eleven, did little to break the 
cycle of "revolving door" hospital admissions. This suggests 
that a further reason why community care policy for the long 
term mentally ill was difficult to implement in the 1980s was 
that service providers did not acknowledge and accept that 
clients would still require some form of asylum that could not 
be provided by CMHTs, away from the harsh realities of the 
community.
However, the DEW Team aim to stabilise and support the long 
term mentally ill in the community could also in another sense 
be perceived to be a return to the social control function
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with the motive of maintaining societal stability. In terms of 
their direct impact on clients, the DEW Team were to some 
extent attempting to "normalise" the long term mentally ill 
and to make them more like other clients; compliant, receptive 
and less troublesome. Yet, few of the clients interviewed for 
the user satisfaction survey referred to in chapter eight 
recognised this as a problem and the majority welcomed and 
came to rely on the support offered by the team. Proponents of 
the sociological/ anthropological schools of thought may argue 
that the clients did not realise they were being socially 
controlled and were passive recipients of the new CMHT system 
of care. It seems the only evidence that can be drawn from 
this study was that clients were not found to be experiencing 
extreme personal and social discomfort as a result of the way 
that the CMHT was working, on a par with those observed in the 
past by authors considering the plight of people 
institutionalised for long periods in mental hospitals. The 
CMHT clients had their individuality, limited freedom and 
ongoing social, emotional and practical support from the CMHT. 
Hence, it is suggested here that the negative implications of 
the idea of social control in the community are not 
necessarily valid in terms of the direct perception of the 
majority of clients at the case study CMHT.
Yet the DEW approach did not really allow for much 
liberalising of patient rights and nor did it give any power 
to service user and voluntary groups. Efforts to empower 
clients through the provision of jobs within the DEW 
organisation were never successfully carried through and 
although the team members saw this as a frustration they were 
never able to make it a reality during the thirteen year study 
period. The impression gained was that professionals on the 
team came to believe that such aspects as service user 
empowerment were overly ambitious and largely impossible to 
achieve. Gradually the CMHT model was used to challenge some 
of the old principles of care but not to challenge them too 
radically and as such was to some extent imported into the 
local service and gradually modified by it at the same time. 
It is suggested that in this way, CMHTs implemented in the
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1980s acted as a stepping stone by which hospital psychiatry 
moved into the community and adopted a more social approach to 
care but retained some of its former ideological allegiance to 
the medical model of care. From this it could be implied that 
community care for the long term mentally ill during the 1980s 
was problematic because the required social and environmental 
approaches to care were only partially adopted.
Social workers, in particular, were critical of some aspects 
of the DEW approach to care, including the intrusive nature of 
their "no discharge" policy, home visiting and multi­
disciplinary assessment. This demonstrated fundamental 
ideological differences between Health and Local Authority 
professionals. Some social workers also criticised the CMHT 
for remaining too medical in their approach. Certainly, the 
DEW CMHT model whilst introducing newer methods of care as 
described above, also continued to emphasise the importance of 
medical intervention, institutionalisation when relapses 
occurred, drug treatments, electro-convulsive therapy (ECT) 
and other medical based therapies. Thus the sociological 
theories are helpful in pin-pointing ideological and 
philosophical differences that exist between different 
agencies operating at the local level, which partially explain 
why community care for the long term mentally ill has taken so 
long to be implemented and why it continues to be problematic.
The sociological interpretation was important in questioning 
the philosophical and political basis of care in the 
institutions. With the move to the community, it remains a 
valuable framework for considering the ideological foundation 
upon which services are based and for assessing the 
appropriateness of individual care policies. In the DEW CMHT, 
such a framework was used by the professionals on the team to 
consider the on-going appropriateness of the DEW Team's 
"outreach" style of service provision and the merits of 
different sections of the operational policy (see chapter 
ten). Hence, consideration of the sociological position helps 
us to remain aware of the mistakes of the past and gives a 
critical framework to assess the merits of new policies. It
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raises critical questions about where the boundaries of 
therapeutic involvement should be drawn in a move towards 
social care rather than social control or withdrawal.
c) Marxist Interpretations:
In terms of a Marxist perspective, community care is seen as 
having failed because it does not address the social, 
financial and political inequalities of a class based society 
and is used by the state as a way of marginalising the needs 
of people who suffer the consequences of chronic deprivation 
in a capitalist system. The mental health care system is 
considered to trade in protecting individuals from discovering 
the true causes of their plight.
The DEW Team case study serves to highlight the complexity of 
social and political issues that underlie community care 
services. The motivation for the DEW service to be set up lay 
partly in a recognition by existing service providers that the 
long term mentally ill were particularly concentrated in the 
Northern part of Battersea, where they experienced poor 
housing conditions, where social networks were particularly 
weak and where their mental health problems were exacerbated. 
In terms of the social class and economic power of long term 
mentally ill clients in the case study CMHT, very few clients 
had jobs, most were living amongst the working classes and 
were essentially lowest in the pecking order and highly 
vulnerable as a result. A Marxist analysis might explain this 
situation as reflecting capitalist control over mental health 
care expenditure which was kept to a minimum since the long 
term mentally ill did not register on the political agenda. 
Neglect of this marginalised group would have no electoral 
consequences and therefore they were not accorded any 
priority. Case study evidence showed that it was only 
professionals who forced the issue of long term mental illness 
onto the local political agenda during the 1980s. This 
suggests that a further reason why community care for the long 
term mentally ill was so difficult to implement was that the 
long term mentally ill did not gain sufficient political 
priority.
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The DEW approach did attempt to address some of the problems 
described above. Chapter six and eight described how the DEW 
Team located their office base in the middle of the Doddington 
Housing Estate and designed their working practices to start 
to address social, environmental, cultural, educational and 
employment issues. They started to consider clients individual 
needs in many different areas, not just in relation to medical 
needs. The DEW Team set up joint working with the housing 
department, they organised a network group of community 
representatives on the housing estate and ran social support 
groups and sheltered workshops. The DEW CMHT could be said to 
have been trying to set up more effective and accountable 
local projects that reflected a need for a response across the 
broad spectrum of social welfare.
However, the DEW Team members were never explicitly political. 
They were able to help clients tackle the benefit system and 
improve their financial situation, for some to be moved to 
better housing, for help in getting furniture and necessary 
household items and the team negotiated with the gas and 
electricity board on behalf of clients to settle debts. Yet 
they never aimed to campaign to change the structural 
inequalities that had caused clients to be living in such 
deprived conditions in the first place. This would demand a 
political reaction to challenge social structures. A Marxist 
consideration, therefore appears to be helpful in locating a 
source of problems for the long term mentally ill group in the 
environmental and political arena, but there was no evidence 
from the case study area that the suggested solution for 
professionals, clients and the wider community to become 
politically active was considered on any level other than 
within the narrow professional arena. The Marxist analysis 
hence looses some of its potency in explaining local policy 
because no large scale political struggle ensued during the 
case study period and the case study team slowly lost 
political momentum rather than widening its remit into local 
political activity.
The Marxist interpretation also suggests that change can only
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come about through crisis and conflict rather than debate and 
planning. In 1988, conflict did arise in the case study area 
over whether care for the long term mentally ill was to 
continue to be provided by a specialist CMHT or within a new 
comprehensive catchment area service. The conflict essentially 
resulted in a "luke warm" compromise rather than the radical 
and escalating organised pressure desired by Marxists. In this 
sense, the Marxist interpretation appears unrealistic 
regarding mental health service change at the local level, 
because it implies the need for constant dynamic struggle 
which is virtually impossible to generate and cannot be 
sustained. The lack of such political activity was indicative 
of further implementation problems with community care policy, 
as it suggested that with the government emphasis on moving 
towards reformed Health and Local Authority functioning within 
a market structure, the collectivist ethos of groups like the 
DEW Team was undermined at the local level.
The Marxist framework does have considerable drawbacks as an 
interpretation of the move towards innovation with the CMHT 
approach at the local level. In terms of case study evidence, 
the dynamic of class struggle was not found to be informative 
and the DEW CMHT was not seen to be part of any kind of 
dialectical process. Poor inner-city communities like those in 
North East Battersea accumulate the long term mentally ill for 
reasons of housing policies and the tendency for poor, inner- 
city areas to become transition zones. A Marxist consideration 
can only help to emphasise that tackling these problems is all 
part of the community care solution and any programme that 
does not accept this will not start to address important
needs. Where a Marxist interpretation may have more to offer 
at the local level is when considering the economic basis of 
the care system. This will be explored in the following
section.
d) Economic Interpretations:
The economic interpretations discussed in chapter three
suggested that the origin and problematic nature of community 
care can be explained solely in terms of economics and
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finance. In relation to the thesis case study, no cost data 
was sought for the period studied, as the research design 
could not be extended within the limits of this thesis. The 
contribution of the economic interpretation at the local level 
is hence restricted for our purposes to a consideration of the 
influence that assumed costs and financial expediency had on 
the case study CMHT at different stages of its development.
The DEW service was initially set up with funds from the 
delayed development of the new day hospital in Battersea. The 
money for this venture had been set aside when the situation 
was not as financially restricted as it became later in the 
decade. The CMHT was not aiming to replace institutional care 
or the meagre after-care community provision that had existed 
previously. It was initially proposed as an additional service 
to act as a "shadow day hospital team". The DEW service, 
therefore, constituted a new cost, although the capital 
investment was relatively small and the money had been set 
aside for the day hospital project anyway.
However, this evidence discounts any argument that the DEW 
CMHT was accepted purely on the grounds that it was thought 
directly to provide a cheaper form of care than the 
institution. There was no direct financial gain to the Health 
Authority in allowing the practitioners to set up the DEW 
Team, but indirectly financial savings were hoped for as a 
result of the Team reducing the need for "revolving door" 
hospital admissions. Hence, there was an indirect financial 
motive based on speculation about the DEW Team's ability to 
act as a cheaper substitute for other costly services. With 
hindsight, the data presented in chapter eleven showed that 
the DEW Team did not significantly reduce the need for 
hospital admission, but while the hope was there, the motive 
of potentially saving money was a powerful influence on 
policy.
It was a politically expedient move for the DEW service to be 
allocated extra funding at the outset, for the Mental Health 
Unit was under pressure to be seen to be doing something to
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address the problems of the long term mentally ill. The DEW 
CMHT was a professional led initiative, and as such, the Unit 
was achieving policy objectives at a minimal cost, without 
having to invest extra time and resources in researching how 
to fulfil such objectives, training new staff and creating new 
administrative structures to facilitate a new development. 
They were to some extent getting service innovation on the 
cheap and hence achieving further indirect financial gain. 
Therefore, an economic interpretation is quite powerful in 
accounting for local developments concerning the reasons why 
innovation using the CMHT approach was permitted to take 
place.
However, the economic interpretation has less weight in 
explaining the process of innovation. It does not account 
fully for the initial motivation to innovate on the part of 
professionals involved. Therefore, it only gives a partial 
account of events. The DEW Team were both lucky and clever to 
locate and exploit the additional funding required to set up 
and the economic interpretation does not offer any explanation 
of the important role of this aspect of the DEW Team story.
In the late 1980s, financial squeezes began to have a
significant influence on the future development of the case 
study CMHT. The Mental Health Unit's decision at this time 
that it could no longer support a specialist service for the 
long term mentally ill across the whole of Battersea was 
partly based on the fact that the team was continuing to use 
additional resources, and yet had grown to be a development in 
its own right, that was rather separate from the day hospital 
plan. Also, it was not seen to have effectively reduced the 
burden on hospital services. Therefore, the DEW Team's
continued existence as a specialist service was rejected 
partly on the grounds of fiscal constraint. They became
subject to the same monetary constraints as other local
services when the need arose to rationalise financial 
allocation in the cost cutting climate of the late 1980s.
The DEW Team effectively worked on the principle that long
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term mentally ill patients needed to be supported and 
maintained even when they were well. No such maintenance 
service had been provided in the past and hence, implied the 
need for the continued development of the DEW Team as a new, 
additional service with the associated increase in costs. This 
became apparent to management after the Team's first two years 
of working and they refused to continue to financially support 
the Team in this role when the Rehabilitation Service had also 
been developed with a remit that over-lapped the DEW Team's 
responsibilities. This suggests that another reason why 
community care for the long term mentally ill was difficult to 
implement during the 1980s was that innovations were 
encouraged with the hope that they would result in financial 
savings, but when these financial savings were not perceived 
to be forthcoming, the innovatory activity was curtailed 
rather than being developed.
Interview and documentary evidence suggested that the 
strengthening of the managerial position in 1988 represented 
a strategy by the state to control and contain the amount of 
local service provision that was seen to be absorbing too many 
resources. However, other motives, such as the desire to make 
mental health services across Battersea more consistent and 
rational by introducing a catchment area model, also played a 
part and these considerations are marginalised by economic 
theorists, who attribute cost to be the sole determining 
factor. Hence, as suggested in the critique presented in 
chapter three, the economic interpretations appear too 
deterministic, but consideration of the financial aspects of 
CMHT provision was important in explaining such developments 
at the local level.
e ) Elitist Interpretations:
Those who adhere to an elitist interpretation of community 
care policies attribute its problematic implementation to an 
unhealthy domination of mental illness policy by the 
psychiatric profession and their unwillingness to give up 
established medical empires within institutions to enable new 
community approaches to develop. Consideration of whether such
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psychiatric elitism existed at the local level of community 
mental health service development has already been referred to 
throughout the account presented in part two and this section 
aims to draw together the evidence.
In chapter five it was noted that before 1979, psychiatrists 
in the case study area had elitist power across the whole 
range of service organisation, from planning and the 
determination of service ideology right through to direct 
clinical provision, and were resisting change. In chapter six, 
one of the reasons quoted at interview for the failure of the 
initial day hospital plans was that the psychiatrists did not 
want a joint project with Social Services staff in which their 
clinical autonomy would be challenged. Joint provision did not 
exist and was being resisted. The psychiatrists were observed 
to have had the power to prevent the plans from becoming a 
reality.
However, the fact that the DEW CMHT was initiated by a 
psychiatrist, who was initially supported by her psychiatric 
colleagues, showed that not all psychiatrists were resisting 
community care developments at the local level. Yet, the early 
historical account of the DEW CMHT presented in chapter six 
showed that the innovating psychiatrist initiated change in 
community services on the grounds that she had a controlling 
stake and could keep joint provision to a minimum. She did 
wish to encourage joint working with other professionals and 
organisations outside the Health Service as long as she had 
clear responsibility for initiating and managing the work of 
the DEW Team, retaining an elitist influence. It could be 
argued that the DEW service proved to be a sustainable 
approach to community care, because it did not disperse the 
power base of the institution among multiple interests, being 
a primarily Health Service driven initiative. From the 
suggestion that the medical profession was resisting the 
implementation of community care in the 1970s on the grounds 
that they would loose monopoly control over care for the 
mentally ill, it logically follows that implementation was 
only accepted in the 1980s because it was realised that the
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essence of this monopoly control could merely be transferred 
into the community. The case study evidence demonstrated this 
process at work and suggests that a further reason why the 
implementation of community care policy for the long term 
mentally ill in the 1970s had not been made possible, was that 
psychiatrists had not yet discovered the potential to exploit 
such a move.
The elitist interpretation is hence useful in emphasising the 
importance of this feature, but gives little or no 
consideration to other accompanying factors such as the 
genuine altruistic concern on the part of the innovating 
psychiatrist to improve services for the long term mentally 
ill or her personal qualities and motivation to instigate 
change. She was committed and out-spoken and this was found to 
be an important element in her ability to sustain the 
innovation through the planning process. The elitist position 
does not adequately account for the importance of this 
individual's determination and strength of personality.
The case study showed that psychiatrists are in a good 
position to instigate service change within the mental health 
field. There are several reasons for this, that were 
highlighted by interviewees. For instance, psychiatrists 
generally have years of experience in one geographical area, 
with associated authority vested by their professional 
responsibilities. The professional hierarchy and promotional 
system amongst psychiatrists also encourages the championing 
of new projects. This point was emphasised in chapter seven in 
discussing the OTs involvement in the DEW Team innovation. The 
OT essentially co-founded the CMHT with the psychiatrist. She 
had strong ideological convictions on a par with the 
psychiatrist and her ideas were respected. However, she stated 
at interview that she would not have wanted the sole 
responsibility for instigating the new service and was not in 
a position to do so. The DEW Team initiative was only possible 
because the consultant involved was an experienced and 
powerful agent within the hospital organisation and was 
initially able to mobilise the support of both the management
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and her psychiatric colleagues. No representative from another 
profession was in a position to do this. Hence case study 
evidence suggested that in the early 1980s in service 
innovation at the local level, psychiatrists were in an 
elitist position over other professions, both in terms of 
influencing planning activities and initiating action.
The consideration of team building within a multi-disciplinary 
framework that was presented in chapter seven showed that the 
psychiatric elitism described may have been true of service 
innovation in the case study area, but in the early years of 
CMHT implementation and day to day working it was less 
apparent. Other professionals on the DEW Team played a 
significant role in the development of the CMHT service style, 
particularly the OT and the psychologist. This observation 
gave rise to the suggestion that while the key psychiatrist 
did draw on elitist power in order to achieve the required 
authority to innovate, this was not as destructive or as 
monolithic as the literature suggests because it enabled other 
professionals to begin to exert considerable influence over 
the style and direct provision of CMHT services to the long 
term mentally ill in the following two years. This is 
illustrated by the fact that the key elements of the DEW Team 
operational policy described in chapter eight were jointly 
defined by all the members of the multi-disciplinary team.
With the catchment area reorganisation in 1988, the Mental 
Health Unit management were partly motivated by the movement 
between posts of other local consultant psychiatrists in 
Battersea and the DEW Team consultant psychiatrist's decision 
to go part time. Hence, at the time of major service 
reorganisation, the psychiatric profession again exerted a 
considerable influence over future service provision. Yet, by 
this time, local management members had to some extent formed 
a challenging local elite and forced elements of cost 
containment and rationalisation of catchment populations onto 
the planning agenda. The extent to which management actually 
challenged the psychiatric elite is open to interpretation, 
for in some ways they acted as allies of the dominant medical
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interest, but they did exploit competing sub-divisions within 
the psychiatric profession locally to resolve issues of 
resource allocation. Hence, by the late 1980s, the psychiatric 
profession was certainly no longer the only interest group to 
have power in determining local service structure and 
distribution of resources.
Other professionals on the DEW Team reacted strongly to the 
proposed catchment reorganisation and fought independently of 
their psychiatrist team leader to retain their identity and 
continue to prioritise the long term mentally ill. They won 
this battle and were able to negotiate a compromise. 
Therefore, these non-psychiatric professionals, although 
unable to have any control over service structure, retained an 
influence over the style of the new service and succeeded in 
keeping the long term mentally ill on the local policy agenda. 
Between 1988 and 1992, they continued to exercise this power 
in determining the CMHT programme for the monitoring and 
evaluation of service quality. They also retained considerable 
autonomy and discretion in their day to day clinical work. 
Hence, psychiatric elitism was not observed to be prevalent at 
these levels of service provision.
In conclusion, a further reason why community care for the 
long term mentally ill took so long to be implemented during 
the 1980s was that it initially threatened the elitist 
position of psychiatrists in determination of service 
structure and it took the profession time to work out they 
could transfer some of their influence into new social 
psychiatry initiatives such as the DEW CMHT. At the same time, 
local management were creating new rivalry as a challenging 
elite and it took time to overcome the tensions that this new 
challenge posed in establishing new working relationships.
f ) Feminist Interpretations:
The feminist interpretation suggests that community care 
policies maintain an existing structure of social organisation 
that is sexually biased and disadvantageous to women as 
professionals, carers and clients. It is suggested within this
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perspective that community care cannot work until these 
ideological foundations are challenged. The aim in this 
section is to determine whether such challenges were apparent 
in the progress of the case study team. In chapter five it was 
noted that in 1979, before the DEW CMHT existed, women were 
under represented in the mental health planning structure and 
very few of the consultant psychiatrists were women. The 
Battersea JCPT was significantly male dominated. Whether such 
features affected the slow process of community care 
development locally can only be surmised.
The hospital consultant psychiatrists were predominantly male 
throughout the study period, and in line with earlier 
contentions regarding the elitism of the psychiatric 
profession, this was almost tantamount to male elitism. Within 
this structure, the DEW CMHT was progressive from a feminist 
perspective due to the fact that it was initiated by one of 
the few local female consultant psychiatrists at the time. In 
so far as the DEW CMHT was a "women led" initiative, it was a 
great success. Most of the core members of DEW staff that 
worked on the team throughout the thesis study period were 
women. Hence, on a day to day basis the DEW Team did something 
to champion the abilities of women as professionals within the 
health service, but had no real need to embark on debates 
about the questioning of equal opportunities between the 
sexes, as in the latter part of the 1980s they were 
increasingly privileged to work with women at all levels of 
the profession from management through to the voluntary 
agencies. It is noteworthy that Springfield Hospital became a 
particular centre of excellence when it came to women being 
given substantial responsibilities within their professions 
and many of the higher management positions were also held by 
women.
At least initially when extra resources were available, the 
DEW Team were able to identify work with young mothers and 
toddlers as one of their priorities and more generally to be 
sensitive to the needs of women with long term mental health 
problems, particularly those who were suffering from
297
depression. By developing a definition of the long term 
mentally ill that was not restricted to a psychotic diagnosis, 
the DEW CMHT were able to extend their prioritising policies 
to more women, who were over represented in the long term 
mentally ill client group suffering from severe neurotic 
disorders, a diagnostic category that was excluded from most 
definitions of the long term mentally ill used elsewhere in 
the country at the time. Through linking in with other 
community agencies and doing some advocacy work with clients, 
the Team also did something to address issues relating to the 
provision of welfare services and benefits in relation to the 
family, conferring benefits particularly on the female 
members. Attention was given to women in the caring role 
supporting relatives and dependents with a mental illness, 
particularly through the Relatives Support Group, but this was 
not confined to women. However, evidence from the client 
satisfaction survey suggested that carers were the most 
dissatisfied group interviewed and hence it can be concluded 
that during the study period, the DEW Team's work with carers 
was not extensive enough.
The case study evidence therefore suggested that a feminist 
interpretation is not useful in accounting for why community 
care for the long term mentally ill has been so difficult to 
implement. However, it does demonstrate that feminist issues 
can play an important part in the move towards community care 
that has only before been considered on the fringes of the 
academic debate. Feminist issues were certainly an element of 
the DEW Team success story, although they were never formally 
recognised as a contributing factor to their achievements. 
Maybe this fact in itself is instructive when considering some 
of the areas where as a team they could have done better. For 
example, the initial group work with the mother and toddlers 
group and the Patmore Women's group had to be gradually phased 
out in the team's later years due to other work pressures. 
This was regretted by the team and because this fact was never 
highlighted as an issue in itself it was left to fall by the 
way side.
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In Brief
An important part of the thesis methodology was the idea that 
the literature has not gone wide or deep enough to give a 
clear overall view of the dynamics of the policy process at 
the local level regarding implementation of the CMHT approach. 
It was therefore thought necessary to introduce a selection of 
broad theoretical interpretations designed to afford this 
broader perspective. The case study evidence discussed in this 
chapter could arguably be claimed to be inconclusive in not 
suggesting an explanation of events located solely in terms of 
one theory. On the contrary, it is argued here that all 
contribute something to an understanding of the local policy 
process. In combination, they suggested a spectrum of reasons 
why community care for the long term mentally ill was 
difficult to implement during the 1980s, which are summarised 
below.
However, to fully understand the difficulties involved in 
implementing a CMHT model at the local level, we need to also 
look more closely at the role of professional and political 
conflicts and organisational complexity. It is to the 
implementation literature found in the realm of public policy 
and the professional and practice literature that we need to 
return to consider these additional features and this is the 
aim of the final chapter.
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A Summary Of Case Study Evidence For Why Community Care For
The Long Term Mentally 111 Was So Difficult To Implement In
Britain During The 1980s
1. It was not until the 1980s that the required ideological 
shift towards more social and environmental approaches to 
client care was introduced at the local level, yet 
professional opinion remained divided on the value of 
these approaches. Also, during the 1980s, new community 
services based in the CMHT approach were often introduced 
without regard for the full range of client needs. 
Emphasis was placed on trying to keep clients out of 
hospital without providing an alternative to the asylum 
function of the hospital in a community setting. The 
required social and environmental approaches to care were 
only partially adopted.
2. During the 1980s, pluralist input into the process of 
policy formation was widened to some extent, but was 
dominated by professional and managerial influences and 
clients themselves were not consulted or given 
opportunity to contribute to planning or service 
development. Discussions about innovative community 
services based in the CMHT approach became a battleground 
to settle more general disputes about professional 
boundaries. This detracted from the drive to improve
community services for the long term mentally ill.
3. Administrative inadequacies and bureaucratic mismatches 
also impeded the implementation of new community service 
approaches during the 1980s. However, these difficulties 
were not solely structural in origin, but deeply rooted 
in personal, political, ideological and professional 
issues and consequently less readily resolved.
4. Ideological and philosophical differences between
different agencies operating at the local level were
often unreconciled, particularly between Health and 
Social Services. This contributed to the implementation 
problems of the CMHT approach during the 1980s which was 
predominantly Health Service driven.
5. At the local level, the long term mentally ill did not
gain a sufficiently high political profile to promote 
community initiatives that genuinely met their needs.
6. The collectivist ethos of CMHTs developed during the
1980s was undermined by wider central government moves to 
reform the Health and Social Services within a market 
structure. This had an adverse effect on the morale of 
staff who pioneered CMHT ventures.
7. During the 1980s it was hoped that CMHT approaches would
result in financial savings but when such savings did not 
become apparent, these new initiatives were curtailed.
8. The implementation of new community approaches was
dependant on acceptance of these approaches by the
psychiatric profession, due to the elitist influence of 
the psychiatric profession on mental health services. 
During the 1980s it took time for the psychiatric
profession to realise that CMHTs offered an opportunity 
to extend their elitist influence from the hospitals into 
community services and this further accounted for the 
slow implementation of new CMHT policies.
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CHAPTER 14:
Are CMHTs the wav forward?: An Innovation that will stick?
The second major research question of the thesis was:
"Does the Community Mental Health Team (CMHT) Approach 
provide a viable model of service provision?"
The aim in this final chapter is to answer this question in 
the light of case study evidence. To undertake this task, the 
intention is to synthesise the main findings from each of the 
case study chapters in turn and generate conclusions from each 
that were supported by the case study evidence. The case study 
chapters drew on the professional and practice literature 
described in chapter two and the public policy literature 
presented in chapter four. Hence, these have been used as a 
basis to evaluate the CMHT approach and identify issues that 
are crucial for the future development of community care 
services for the long term mentally ill.
A few ideas about the relevance of the research findings in 
the current national context of change will then be presented. 
Since the work for this thesis began, the community care 
agenda in the UK has moved on, with new legislation in force 
and more promised. Yet, the central issue remains, however 
financed and administered, what viable models for care exist? 
This thesis has concentrated on one highly pertinent 
innovation in health and social care for the long term 
mentally ill, that was developed and tested in the field 
during the 1980s. Drawing on the case study findings, this 
chapter aims to discuss some of the important issues that 
those on the front line of the reforms continue to grapple 
with in the changing climate.
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What Kinds of Issues Prompted The Introduction of the CMHT
Model at the Local Level in the 1980s?
In the case study area, the key issues to which the CMHT
potentially afforded a solution were identified in chapter 5
to be:
1 . The variable quality of existing services and their focus
on hospital provision
2. Particular unmet needs of the long term mentally ill 
client group in distinct areas of the inner city borough 
and the resultant strain that they presented to existing 
services
3. Poor coordination and limited range of existing services
4. Conceptual and administrative barriers
These broadly reflected the kinds of issues identified as
important at the national level, which were described in the
overview of the professional and practice literature presented
in chapter 2. However, local evidence presented in chapter 6
suggested that, with hindsight, these issues could only be
tackled within certain constraints of the local policy
environment, which were explored by reference to the public
policy literature reviewed in chapter 4. These were:
1 . The CMHT solution had to be closely linked to existing
plans for new day hospital provision.
2. The CMHT was to serve the function of symbolic policy 
making- expectations were not high, but something had to 
be being seen to be done.
3. The timing of the CMHT proposal was auspicious as delays 
with the day hospital project had been extensive.
4. A particular individual had to champion the CMHT project 
and take full responsibility for its development.
5. A fresh idea was required about how to provide community 
services to the long term mentally ill, which inherently 
suggested that the planned day hospital solution was not 
seen to offer a coherent model for community services, 
although this was not formally identified.
6. Local power relations dictated that the CMHT project was 
to be health service lead and there was a sub-agenda to 
keep joint provision with social services to a minimum.
Therefore, case study evidence suggested that in the 1980s, 
the CMHT model was introduced at the local level within fairly 
rigid criteria dictated by the local policy environment and 
not specifically driven by the ideological appeal of the CMHT 
model itself or an imperative to structurally change the 
balance of service provision on a long term basis towards
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better catering for the needs of the long term mentally ill. 
It would be foolish to suggest that the precise restrictions 
faced in the case study area are generalisable across the 
country, but case study evidence does serve to illustrate that 
significant sub-agendas underlay attempts to implement the 
CMHT approach.
Two imperatives flow from this perspective. Firstly, the 
central task of the case study CMHT was to be developmental. 
Covering a comparatively large geographical area, it was given 
the task of developing new forms of care, originally with the 
intention that these would then be transferred to the day 
hospital when it was finally completed. Secondly, it was to 
have a specialist remit of only working with long term 
mentally ill clients, protected from the every day pressures 
of routine case work with acute clients, but from the outset 
no long term financial or organisational commitment was 
extended to support this work. Hence, both the concept of the 
CMHT model and the priority afforded to long term mentally ill 
clients were introduced as a temporary, experimental solution.
This evidence supports our hypothesis that the CMHT model was 
not initially widely known about at the local level in the 
early 1980s and any changes that were being considered to 
shift the emphasis from hospital to community provision were 
of narrow scope, relying on the resurrection of old ideas 
supplemented by small, temporary, experimental projects. This, 
in turn, supports the incrementalist notion of decision making 
proposed by Lindblom (1959) and others. Central government 
directives had little local relevance or impact and the 
introduction of the CMHT model at the local level was part of 
a Mbottom-upM policy process.
The CMHT model used to achieve innovation in the case study 
area was an ad hoc local response, not an evaluated 
demonstration undertaken in a way that could be replicated 
elsewhere. Other research has shown that this has been the 
pattern across much of the UK for a range of client groups 
(Davies 1993). In this sense, it was disjointed from any
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system wide process of planned change and therefore vulnerable 
to being dismantled or corrupted at a later stage, when it 
ceased to be protected as a special project.
Under What Conditions Did The CMHT Model Act As A Vehicle to 
Achieve Innovation in Service Provision in the 1980s?
The CMHT model that was used to achieve change in the case 
study area was moulded by a definite set of conditions. 
Firstly, the innovative ideas for reform in adopting a CMHT 
approach came solely from the professionals involved. The 
factors that shaped people's decisions about them included a 
consideration of economic and political factors, and the 
appeal of a new model of service provision that could be 
championed by management, but relied primarily on the 
abilities of the DEW Team staff group to engender support for 
their ideas and activities. Professionals had an important 
role in not only defining and responding to the perceived 
needs of long term mentally ill clients, but also in the vital 
process of transmitting this need to the resource controllers. 
This largely supports the positive contention stated in the 
public policy literature that professionals play a critical 
role in innovation within public services (eg Donnison et al 
1975).
Secondly, innovation demanded professional leadership which 
was provided by the Battersea consultant psychiatrist. To 
return to our military analogy, a team from an army trained in 
conventional manoeuvres was converted into a guerilla force, 
and at least at the outset, the team's success depended on the 
skill of its local commander. She fulfilled a vital role as a 
"top-level fixer". Professional status gave her the required 
authority to innovate, and case study evidence suggested she 
drew on elitist power as a psychiatrist to push through her 
innovative proposals. This gives a strong indication that 
throughout the 1980s, without the support of local
psychiatrists, no care model could have been successfully 
implemented. However, the opportunistic approach, dynamic 
thinking and personal commitment of the particular 
psychiatrist also played a critical role, in the way she was
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able to "ride roughshod" over obstructions that presented 
rather than await resolution of conflicts.
Thirdly, as a result, decision making was haphazard and at 
times relied on unorthodox bargaining between key local 
actors. No accountability was initially sought from clients, 
carers or other local service providers and the CMHT model was 
introduced with a purely "service-led" approach to planning 
and provision. Leading on from this, the task to convince 
other local service providers of the value of the CMHT 
approach was fraught with tensions and maintaining the 
delicate balance which gave sufficient sanction for action and 
avoided outright opposition was a considerable task. The 
ideologies that were proposed as a basis for the DEW CMHT 
model were alien to what had existed in service provision 
previously and gaining an understanding of this amongst other 
service providers locally was a frustrating and on-going 
battle for the case study team. Success depended crucially on 
getting the politics right and establishing a broad consensus 
of approval. In this sense, the DEW CMHT case study does not 
tell us much that is new about the way that social policy 
innovations are developed more generally in health care 
(Haywood & Alaszewski 1980; Hunter 1980; Ham 1981; Klein 1983: 
Hunter 1988), but it does add to that limited literature.
Fourthly, case study evidence suggested that what was lacking 
in the local mental health policy arena before the CMHT 
existed, was the will to effect change. The lack of 
enthusiasm, meant that it was only a few isolated "alliances 
of ideological zealots" who tried to influence the decision 
makers to experiment with new approaches. The case study team 
were one such alliance. Nothing of significance would have 
happened at that time without their determination and 
commitment as a group to effect change. All parties to the 
change also drew on an enthusiasm flowing from the challenge 
of doing something against the trend. This supports other case 
study evidence from local level studies, such as King's study 
of deinstitutionalisation in the Exeter service (King 1991). 
He attributed overwhelming importance to the part that group
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effort played, on the part of existing staff, in effecting the 
move from hospital to community based services.
Lastly, a further condition for the acceptance of the CMHT 
model locally was the "personalisation" of the cause of people 
with long term mental health problems by a small group of 
isolated individual professionals. "Personalisation" is used 
here as a term to describe how it was a closed network of 
local field level professionals who wanted to get something 
done that led to the definition of the long term mentally ill 
as a priority group and it was they also who followed this 
with action. Hence, the long term mentally ill were chosen as 
a distinct client group at the local level for whom 
professionals pushed for new services. In so doing the long 
term mentally ill were targeted and the CMHT model was used as 
a tool. There was no research evidence sought locally in the 
early 1980s to establish that it was the best possible tool 
and confusion followed later in the decade about the 
relationship between this model and the Care Programme 
Approach and case management which were legislated for by 
central government. This confusion will be discussed in our 
later sections about service style development and sustaining 
the CMHT approach.
What Features of the Team Building Process were Important in 
Implementing a CMHT Approach?
Case study evidence suggested that the features of the team 
building process that characterised the development of the 
CMHT were:
1) staff recruitment (staff who shared an ideological 
conviction and positive out-look mainly recruited from 
within the existing hospital service) & staff training 
(the team was committed to training itself and 
researching new care approaches).
2) seniority of staff (only experienced, far-sighted 
professionals were recruited).
3) stability of core staff (individual professionals had 
similar life-styles, were committed to working together 
and had all reached stages of their careers where they 
wanted longer term jobs).
4) use of staff already employed locally (largely from 
existing hospital service).
5) development of multi-disciplinary team working (more than 
just professionals from different disciplines working
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within the same team. It embodied a sense of collective 
action through shared concern and implied the subtle 
achievement of a dynamic between professionals from 
different disciplines).
6) staff reflecting cultural diversity of local client group 
(employment of black workers).
7) ability of staff to initially engender support amongst 
other local service providers and develop new service 
networks.
These features have implications for the planning and 
management of CMHTs. Emphasis on developing the multi­
disciplinary approach has also been a strong feature of other 
research at the local level and cannot be over emphasised (eg 
Powell & Lovelock 1992: Patmore & Weaver 1991 ). The case study 
material showed that the area where there was most difficulty 
in achieving multi-disciplinary work was in the internal 
Social/Health Service interface within the CMHT, which was 
described in chapter seven. The social workers on the team 
encountered difficulties in working as part of a health 
service led team as they had a different organisational and 
disciplinary background compared with their colleagues from 
the health service. This feature is already well documented in 
the literature (eg Webb & Wistow 1986: Towell 1981). The DEW 
Team's policy of setting aside "team support" days on a 
regular six monthly basis helped in this respect and proved to 
be an important forum for airing disagreements and grievances, 
but fundamental differences remained. From this, we can
conclude that successful working within the multi-disciplinary 
CMHT model is dependent on the recognition of different 
organisational practices and ideological stand-points between 
Health and Local Authority professionals and a willingness to 
address these differences with specific action policies, both 
in terms of training and on-going inter-professional support.
Case study evidence also suggested that the cultural 
backgrounds of staff recruited were important. It was
considered crucial that the cultural backgrounds of staff 
members recruited to a CMHT reflect the ethnic diversity of 
the surrounding community and for adequate support and
training to be directed towards this issue. The fact that
mental health professionals continue to be mainly white and
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middle class has to be radically challenged and recruitment 
practices and access to courses changed to ensure that clients 
needs in the community are really addressed.
It is difficult to extract how much of the DEW Team’s 
sustaining ability arose because of the CMHT model of working 
and how much was dependant on the enthusiasm and commitment of 
individual workers involved regardless of the service model 
that they adopted. The two are inextricably connected and this 
gives us further insight into the nature of the CMHT model 
itself and the reasons why people have had so much difficulty 
in trying to formulate definitive statements about it. The 
conclusion is that the CMHT model is a useful vehicle to 
establish service change, but is not in itself a solution to 
the problems of the long term mentally ill, as so much is 
dependent on the quality of staff putting the model into 
effect and the actual methods that they choose to utilise.
What are The Important Features of Service Style Development 
In Implementing A CMHT Model?
The CMHT model by its very nature implies a high degree of 
flexibility, inter-professional collaboration and regard for 
the specific needs of a local area. As such, it constitutes a 
major experiment in social policy. As stated in chapter two, 
the goals, principles and ideals referred to in the CMHT 
literature are to establish services which are local, 
accessible, acceptable (non-stigmatising), focused and 
coordinated, and enable empowerment of clients. These goals 
are not absolutes; they are broad themes of good practice open 
to the interpretation of those who plan and put them into 
effect. As such, case study evidence suggested that they are 
not sufficiently robust to ensure provision of a good quality 
community service.
As stressed above, in the case study area, interpretation of 
these service goals by a handful of innovative staff resulted 
in a sustainable model of care. Hence, the service style 
developed using a CMHT approach is heavily dependent not only 
on the quality of the staff and the high degree of discretion
308
and autonomy afforded to them, but also on their ability to
interpret the model and adapt it to reflect local needs. The
CMHT model that was developed in the case study area began
life as a clinical model and essentially metamorphosed into a
system of care. Its characteristics grew to be:
1 . the multi-disciplinary clinical service embracing care 
planning
2. the duty crisis system
3. the development of an information system
4. inter-agency liaison
5. assertive outreach
6. dynamic social support through the introduction of
community support groups for clients and carers.
The repertoire of possible ways of developing the service 
style was vast and the approach adopted for the long term 
mentally ill by the case study team was formed from 
permutations of many detailed local arrangements. This pattern 
of provision allowed the team to start to address the broad 
range of needs of the long term mentally ill which included 
health services, social welfare, social security, housing, 
employment, training, rehabilitation, transport and social
activities. Hence, the DEW CMHT as a system of care, did 
appear to be intellectually viable and coherent when the 
features of the previously poor service provision noted in 
chapter five are considered. The case study team attempted to 
address deep seated problems in service provision that had 
existed for a long time and contributed to a change in 
thinking about the needs of the long term mentally ill. It can 
be concluded that the CMHT approach can be used as a basis 
from which to change the ideological foundations of service 
provision, but it does not constitute a model of clinical 
care.
Assessment of need for services and a clear care planning 
approach within a defined range of options was a major feature 
of the DEW Team's development. This helped to achieve co­
ordination between and within services and enabled attention 
to be paid to the differing needs of people within the long 
term mentally ill group. This new style of service embraced 
the key elements of what later came to be termed the Care 
Programme Approach, first proposed in Carina for People (Cm
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849, 1989), but in the case study area it was implemented from 
a bottom up rather than a top down perspective. From April 
1991, care programming was introduced as a national system. 
The development of the DEW system pre-dated this. This 
supports literature suggesting that national policy often 
simply recognises and formalises policy worked out at humbler 
levels of the providing group (Barrett & Fudge 1981) and that 
professionals are important power brokers in the determination 
of policy (Dunleavy 1981).
The elements the Care Programme Approach that were embraced by 
the case study team included assessment and review of client 
need, the agreement of service provision levels by other local 
service providers and monitoring of these levels and the 
formation of care plans in consultation with clients and their 
carers. These features attributed coherence and 
generalisability to the CMHT model developed. It is therefore 
suggested that it is the Care Programme Approach, that is 
precisely the model that has been lacking in community mental 
health care rather than the CMHT approach which has been the 
subject of this thesis.
Unresolved issues for debate within the outreach CMHT model 
for the long term mentally ill which apply equally to any 
consideration of the Care Programming Approach were identified 
to include problems of "silting up" in providing long term 
maintenance and support to all long term mentally ill clients; 
concerns about how intrusive staff felt they were justified in 
being in their efforts to "keep tabs" on their clients; links 
with the hospital service and the prevention of "splits"; and 
interface problems with other agencies concerning good 
communication, particularly with GPs. Such concerns are 
broadly similar to those that have been noted in several 
recent evaluation studies published in response to the 
national implementation of the Care Programming Approach (eg 
Schneider 1993).
Part of the reason for the DEW Team's success was the team's 
ability to set boundaries to the work that they were going to
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try and do. As it developed the DEW Team staff selected a few 
issues from a multitude and created specific policies to 
address them. In this way their ideology, based on the CMHT 
model was sustainable as they retained a clear focus. Doubts 
about the effectiveness of the DEW CMHT that were expressed in 
later years concerned areas where there was a blurring of this 
clarity. This point will be further explored in the following 
section.
What Barriers to Implementation are Faced in Implementing a 
CMHT Approach?
Barriers to implementation initially faced by the case study 
CMHT were manifest in practical constraints and establishing 
physical territory. The controllers of resources had stated 
that they were committed to supporting the DEW CMHT 
development, but when it came to supplying them with adequate 
office space and secretarial staff there were considerable 
delays and the Team was effectively prevented from getting 
established as quickly as had been planned. As described in 
chapter nine, this was very frustrating for the new team. Such 
political ambivalence reflected in constraints imposed on the 
implementation process has been well documented in the 
literature (eg Hill 1980; Bardach 1977). It can be concluded 
that organisational commitment to an innovative CMHT approach 
is essential. The importance of good secretarial staff and 
physical work space is paramount to the setting up and 
continued smooth functioning of a CMHT.
More fundamentally, the DEW Team also had problems in 
establishing professional territory and on-going resource and 
management commitment. Conflict with existing interests 
locally, namely hospital ward staff and social services 
employees was apparent. This occurred partly as a reaction to 
movement away from the status quo in service provision and a 
dislike of general change on behalf of some workers. 
Professional jealousy also featured, particularly concerning 
the extra resources that the DEW CMHT initially received. The 
DEW CMHT maintained the long term mentally ill group of 
clients in the community and because of this, hospital ward
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staff felt that their jobs were less rewarding as they only 
saw clients who were in a chronic state of relapse. Also, 
there was some conflict over the ownership of new policies 
that were introduced by the CMHT. For example, social services 
staff disputed the DEW Team's claim to be running all the long 
term support groups in the Battersea community. It can be 
further concluded that strong resistance driven by 
professional self interest, job satisfaction, levels of morale 
and the goals of individuals become apparent in setting up new 
CMHT services and a great awareness of tensions and 
relationships is needed (Barrett & Fudge 1981).
However, it is not suggested that case study evidence 
supported notions put forward in the literature that 
professionals are purely motivated by self interest that can 
be shaped by maximising the size of the departmental budget 
and little else (eg Niskanen 1971). Ultimately, the success or 
failure of the DEW CMHT was dictated by the efforts and 
dedication of individual professionals who, interview evidence 
suggested, were also motivated by genuine altruistic goals and 
a concept of public service. Hence, the positive line of 
Donnison (1965, 1975) is supported.
The interview material presented in chapter nine showed that 
many of the criticisms expressed about the DEW service were 
connected with aspects of service provision that the Team 
expressly stated they would not tackle, such as working 
outside regular nine to five office hours or providing respite 
care. This suggested that there were aspects of the DEW Team's 
model that were not practically robust. The service was not 
comprehensive. It was inconsistent to provide such a partial 
local service without equivalent good quality services to 
cover the aspects of care that the DEW Team could not address. 
In the original blue-print the DEW CMHT was to be the shadow 
team for the new day hospital. It was the intention that it 
would be part of a whole new service provision structure. 
However, this was considerably delayed. In the meantime, the 
Team could not develop a full range of specialist services for 
the long term mentally ill which included sheltered work
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placements, respite care and drop-in facilities. This was 
beyond their remit and capacity. The conclusion is that the 
CMHT model can be powerful enough to mobilise professional 
support, but must itself either be comprehensive or be 
initiated within a mental health care system that offers 
quality complementary services.
Can the CMHT Model Provide a Sustainable Model for Change? 
There can be no single judgement of the achievement of the 
CMHT approach at the local level. It could be viewed as a 
roaring success, a qualified success or an expensive 
diversion, depending on the definition of success employed. 
However, case study evidence suggested that the CMHT approach 
did provide a sustainable model for change during the 1980s. 
Firstly, the creation of the CMHT galvanised the health 
authority into further action based broadly on CMHT 
ideologies. Secondly, few would deny that the CMHT was 
precipitated into a virtual policy vacuum and was in effect 
successfully used as one means to develop a broader framework 
of service provision. However, it had little impact in 
influencing the direction and future definition of the 
boundaries of this broader framework.
Two years after the initial implementation of the specialist 
CMHT approach in the case study area, a battle took place for 
the future model of mental health care. The subsequent 
reorganisation was stimulated by a variety of factors: 
movement of consultant psychiatrist personnel in Battersea, a 
need for the CMHT to better define their service model and the 
clients that were to be served, a need to reorganise services 
on a Battersea wide basis with the development of other CMHTs 
and inevitable resource constraints. A catchment area model of 
service provision across the district was imposed and it was 
planned that each new catchment area team would be formed as 
a comprehensive CMHT. Hence, the CMHT system itself had taken 
hold in the case study area and proved to be sustainable, but 
it had been adopted in a comprehensive form rather than the 
specialist form developed by the case study CMHT. In line with 
this new policy, the DEW CMHT was also forced to change to
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become comprehensive.
These changes took no account of the problems of the long term 
mentally ill to which the initial DEW CMHT innovation had been 
a response and this has been the experience of many local 
initiatives across the UK in a wide range of client groups 
(Davies 1993). It was only the professionals themselves who 
pushed to retain a priority role for long term mentally ill 
clients within their new role. This suggests that in terms of 
local policy, even after the intense effort that the DEW CMHT 
had tried to exert in putting the long term mentally ill 
firmly onto the planning agenda, they remained marginalised 
and dispossessed. Quality of care motives in caring for the 
long term mentally ill group were deemed to be too expensive 
given the resource constraints and this highlights a major 
dilemma and area of confusion for those who develop social 
policy. Encouraging the development of a specialist innovatory 
service clashed with the conception of district wide planning 
that was later embraced and was not deemed financially 
feasible. This tells us a lot about why it has taken so long 
for viable models of community mental health service provision 
to be developed in the UK. It is not that hopeful new models 
have not been developed, but rather that they have been 
marginalised in the formation of district wide plans.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, community care policy 
became what Palmer (1985) would describe as a "strategic high" 
and central government legislation started to dominate the 
local agenda. It seems that local professionally driven 
service innovations, such as the case study CMHT were largely 
swept aside and it was only the determination of local 
professionals that retained lessons that had been learned. 
After six years of development, the DEW CMHT did have some 
lasting impact on other local services, as various of its 
policies were later adopted by other new CMHTs that were 
established locally, but their specialist knowledge of the 
long term mentally ill was significantly down played. The DEW 
Team's sustaining ability had its origins in successfully 
championing policies that were to become a feature of service
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provision across the country following national implementation 
of the Care Programming Approach in the early 1990s, not in 
the development of improved services specifically for the long 
term mentally ill group. This suggests that CMHTs can play an 
important role in experimentation and setting service 
standards, but it is the whims of planners and managers and 
resource constrictions that actually determine service 
structure and resource distribution. Far from the oversupply 
of services suggested by some public choice theorists (eg 
Niskanen 1971), the case study demonstrated how restricted 
resource allocation has been at the local level. Hence, there 
is no obvious connection between Tory rhetoric and the reality 
of local experience.
The team themselves recognised that the DEW CMHT approach as 
a whole would probably be applicable only in inner city areas: 
to Central Birmingham, but probably not rural Yorkshire. 
Hence, the case study CMHT model was geographically localised 
and there were some facets of the way that the DEW Team's work 
developed that meant it would be difficult to replicate 
elsewhere. For example, its catchment area was always far 
smaller than that normally required of a CMHT in order to be 
economically viable and most of its staff were part time. In 
addition, the DEW Team were never able to approach all of the 
required shifts in thinking about service provision. For 
example, the team remained largely health service dominated in 
their practices. They never really carried through the more 
revolutionary parts of the original scheme. They never had any 
client involvement in day to day caring activities or the 
management structure and they were unable to actively seek out 
clients once their caseloads grew. They were subject to the 
same work pressures as any one else when it came to quality 
and quantity of interactions with clients and inter-agency 
communication. Their initial training efforts were gradually 
eroded. Hence, it is concluded that while the CMHT model was 
considered flexible and sustainable there are institutional 
barriers within the UK mental health system which prevent 
certain aspects of the model from taking hold. Particular 
difficulties revolve around empowering service users and
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involving them in decisions about service planning.
Do CMHTs provide a service that is distinctly different from 
traditional services that existed previously?
In recent years, many questions have arisen amongst service 
providers and planners about whether the CMHT approach results 
in services that are really different from what existed 
previously. On paper, the claims for the new CMHT services 
appear startlingly different, but it is important to consider 
whether they actually imply a different kind of service 
provision, or just an intellectualised accountability, 
dressing up old-style services in fancy new terminology. 
Interview evidence at the local level suggested that many 
believed the CMHT model merely mimicked services that existed 
previously and that it was only the language used to describe 
the service delivery process that had changed.
The DEW Team claimed that their CMHT approach would result in 
improved standards of care for the long term mentally ill 
population. Chapter eleven specifically questioned whether the 
new service was really any different from the CPN after-care 
provision that had existed previously. It was concluded that 
the service offered to the long term mentally ill clients by 
the DEW CMHT did add something to what was provided by other 
established care models. DEW Team care differed from CPN care 
and offered an improvement in terms of seeing clients in a 
greater variety of locations, greater continuity of allocated 
primary worker and linking clients to more community-based 
activities and a wider range of community agencies. So it 
seems that the CMHT model is different in practice in terms of 
accessibility, effectiveness and coordinated working with 
other agencies.
However, the DEW CMHT study showed no differences from the 
point of view of hospital usage by long term mentally ill 
clients. The DEW Team had no effect on reducing the number or 
duration of In-patient Hospital admissions, the admission 
pattern being similar to that of the CPN service. A classic 
example of the confusion in the on-going reform in mental
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health care has been that it has largely been guided by goals 
such as the reduction of in-patient activities that are often 
laid down as operational objectives. Indices of in-patient 
treatment have become the most frequently used outcome 
criteria and readmission to hospital a synonym for "relapse" 
or "recidivism" (Falloon 1984). There is an economic rational 
for such measures, as in-patient care is the most expensive 
form of care. However, the DEW Team study highlights the fact 
that, for the long term mentally ill population, prevention of 
readmission is probably not a realistic goal and certainly not 
the only one that should be measured as a "success". These 
wider goals include supporting chronic clients in their 
dependence on the asylum and improving the quality of life 
that they can sustain in the community.
At the local level, the improvements that were discovered in 
this respect were mainly attributed to three components of 
service provision by the DEW Team that were not present in the 
CPN service:
1 ) The superiority of the DEW Team multi-disciplinary 
approach over the largely uni-disciplinary CPN approach.
2) The advantages of the DEW Team key-worker system and 
clarification of aims as set out in the DEW CMHT 
operational policy. This allowed the DEW Team to work
effectively with patients and monitor progress in a way
that was not possible for the CPN service.
3) The development of improved methods of co-ordinated care 
with other community services by the DEW Team.
From an ideological stand point, while accepting that the CMHT 
approach did appear to be different to what had existed in 
service provision previously, it could be questioned whether 
it was really different enough. When the plight of the long 
term mentally ill described in chapter two is reconsidered in 
terms of the case study evidence, it appears to the author 
that there are vast areas of need that simply were not
addressed within the CMHT approach at the local level. The
clients who the author met during the completion of field work 
for this study, constantly stressed that many of their 
problems arose from feelings of chronic loneliness, sexual 
frustration and spiritual dissatisfaction. Whether meeting
317
these needs lies within the remit of Health and Social 
Services is another matter, but if the CMHT model can be as 
flexible and locally accountable as some claim, such needs 
must be considered. Perhaps part of the Department of Health 
should be replaced by a Ministry of Loneliness.
Is It Feasible to Prioritise the Long Term Mentally 111 in a 
Catchment Area CMHT Model?
Throughout their development the DEW Team worked with a brief 
specifically to target the long term mentally ill, first as a 
specialist team and later as a catchment area team. The DEW 
CMHT service was targeted on those who needed it most, 
concentrating resources on the long term mentally ill, and in 
this sense, it operated with the "vertical efficiency" 
described by Challis & Davies (1986b). Despite much rhetoric, 
the literature presented in chapter two suggested that few 
CMHTs have succeeded in the task of providing care to the long 
term mentally ill client group. The case of "revolving door" 
patients was a nationally recognised problem and all the 
literature on the topic advocated a need to prioritise work 
with this group. In developing a working definition of people 
with long term mental health problems (see Box 5), the DEW 
Team made an original contribution to service development that 
was published in national academic journals (McLean & 
Leibowitz 1989).
People with long term psychiatric problems had often 
previously been defined by psychotic diagnosis, numerous 
lengthy compulsory hospital admissions or the presence of a 
"perceived risk of re-hospitalisation". However, the team felt 
that theoretical guidelines published by Bachrach (1988) which 
referred to definition along the three axes "Diagnosis, 
Duration and Disability" were more suitable for day to day 
practice than research criteria developed for exclusive 
purposes. The DEW Team definition that was developed was used 
in every assessment of long term mentally ill clients to 
determine eligibility for CMHT priority services.
It is recognised that a common problem of CMHTs in the UK has
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been a failure to distinguish targeting criteria clearly 
enough (Patmore & Weaver 1991). However, although the DEW Team 
seemed to avoid this failure, a note of caution is required. 
The development and use of alternative and widely differing 
criteria between CMHTs implies problems relating to evaluation 
of efficacy and a monitoring nightmare that negates the 
usefulness of any comparative studies. There is a need for 
standardisation of criteria that are used to define the long 
term mentally ill population.
The results of the study presented in chapter twelve suggest 
that it is feasible for a CMHT to give priority to long term 
mentally ill clients within the catchment area model, both in 
terms of overall numbers on the case-load and in terms of the 
type of in-put that they receive. This study was carried out 
in 1992, a time when the DEW Team had been in existence for a 
period of six years and they were no longer operating as a 
pilot project, so it seems that the positive effects found do 
actually indicate the existence of a community mental health 
service that is adapted to the realities and possibilities of 
local care provision to the long term mentally ill group.
The above discussion suggests that the DEW service as a 
specialist CMHT was intellectually sustainable in a world 
where there were relatively ample resources, but the ultimate 
test was whether this could be translated into practice in the 
longer term. The story of the DEW Team development described 
in this thesis suggests that the catchment area team model 
adopted in the Team's later years was practically more 
realistic than the specialist model adopted earlier, but it 
was less ideologically convincing. It is when practical 
considerations are taken into account that one realises to 
what extent it is not enough for a service just to be 
intellectually viable. The DEW Team as a specialist CMHT was 
seemingly preferable for long term mentally ill clients but in 
the long term was politically and economically unsustainable. 
This demonstrates that it is not enough for a CMHT just to be 
professionally sustainable -it must also be economically and 
politically sustainable.
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A Wav Forward for Community Services for the Long Term
Mentally 111: The Relevance of Thesis Findings in the Current 
National Context
The White Paper Carina for People (DH 1989b) appeared just at
the beginning of the fieldwork period of this study and the
NHS and Community Care Act (DH 1990) followed shortly
afterwards. These developments indicated a recognition of the
problems experienced in setting up community services,
problems that motivated the formation of the DEW CMHT a decade
earlier. In 1990, for the first time, the policy directives
were firmly located in new legislation. The DEW Team research
had already been planned and so the specific content of the
new legislation and guidance could not directly influence the
thesis itself. However, a number of key points emerged from
this research which might usefully inform the implementation
of current national policy changes and reference to the
experience gained in field programmes has been one aim of
recent government documents. For example, Griffiths stated:
"I have the occasional sinking feeling that there is 
nothing so outdated as to provide today's solution to 
today's problem. It is however a necessary preliminary to 
thinking ahead and a precaution against ensuring that 
nothing is recommended which is inconsistent with 
tomorrow's scene." (Griffiths, 1988, para 39)
1 ) Finance
The cost of services and the critical relationship between 
resources, needs and outcomes has become a major research 
topic in recent years (eg Knapp et al 1993). Thesis evidence 
suggests that to provide quality community services and the 
motivation for service providers to seek out new initiatives, 
extra money is needed. Innovative good quality services for 
the long term mentally ill are expensive and largely 
additional to services that have existed in the past. It is 
suggested that a separate budget and departmental management 
division is needed, devoted purely to services for the long 
term mentally ill. This would create a group politically 
committed to and accountable for the long term mentally ill 
and "ring fenced" funding should be provided to ensure that 
the long term mentally ill receive the amount of funding 
required.
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The "Mental Illness Specific Grant (MISG)" has been operative 
since April 1991, but some authors claim that the sums of 
money it entails are too small to effect any lasting change on 
service provision (eg Sayce 1989). The recent monitoring 
exercise carried out by the Social Services Inspectorate (SSI) 
suggested that the MISG has funded creative initiatives in 
mental health care and has had considerable impact (SSI 1993). 
The case study material suggests that in order for service 
innovation for the long term mentally ill to come about and to 
be sustained in a cohesive form an ongoing financial 
commitment is required, that extends beyond the three year 
period of the MISG.
2) The CMHT Approach and Care Programming
Case study evidence suggests that there is a risk of 
duplicating much of the work about appropriate local care 
models because of obvious confusions between the different 
solutions that are being proposed and the problems of defining 
boundaries and differences between them. The Care Programme 
Approach (CPA) was only implemented just before the end of the 
thesis study period, so observations regarding its 
effectiveness at the local level cannot be made. However, case 
study evidence did suggest that the CPA policy is being 
adopted selectively and in some cases (as in the case study 
area) this is because existing systems of care almost fulfil 
the requirements of care programming. The CPA offers an 
opportunity to standardise such systems, but considerable care 
must be taken to implement the CPA so as not to alienate staff 
who have already developed effective local care planning 
packages and so that it adds more to existing services than 
additional paperwork.
3) Lead Responsibility for Service Planning and Joint 
Working
Another major element of the new legislation is the proposed 
partnership between Health Services, Local Authorities and 
independent sector services. It was legislated that from April 
1993, Local Authorities would take a lead role in the 
development of mental health services, working jointly with
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these other interests. The DEW case study material strongly
suggests that Social Services are not well equipped to deal
with the new responsibilities imposed upon them (described in
Caring for People and the considerable implementation guidance
from the DH that has followed). This is supported by other
research evidence (eg Hunter 1992). Davies (1993) stated that
the community care reforms have been led by the Department of
Health and evidence about how far behind the Local Authorities
have been during the early 1990s is now beginning to appear.
In monitoring the community care reforms he noted that among
Social Services staff,
MIn almost all instances, the grasp of issues was 
unsophisticated even among top managers in the first 
period of implementation: and much less lower down the 
organisation." (Davies, 1993, p27)
Achieving pluralism in service provision in the new "mixed 
economy of care" has also became a major aim of community care 
policy in recent years. However, thesis evidence suggests that 
gaining the voice and involvement of the service user is one 
of the biggest challenges to services in the U.K. . In this 
respect, lessons can be learnt from progress in CMHTs in the 
U.S. (eg see Perkins 1993). Clear acknowledgement is also 
needed of where lead responsibilities for the long term 
mentally ill group rest. This study suggests that community 
care of the long term mentally ill should be firmly placed in 
the hands of the Health Service. Professional expertise, 
appropriate service models and money do not appear to exist in 
Local Authorities. Good practices in multi-disciplinary 
working are now being developed after a very slow and fraught 
start and the elitist domination of policy by the psychiatric 
profession has begun to lose its hold. The positive features 
of joint working that are now developing at the local level 
are encouraging a reflective and considered approach to care 
that was difficult to instill in the institutional framework.
4) Emphasis on Policy and Organisational Change 
This case study also raises genuine concern that the emphasis 
on policy and organisational change embraced in recent 
legislation could lead to the dissipation of progress already
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made in local contexts like Battersea towards innovation in 
service provision that is adapted to the local context. This 
case study has demonstrated the extent to which service 
development can be initiated and driven by professionals 
themselves. The new legislation seems to overlook such a 
valuable resource. A key determinant of success in community 
care policies for the long term mentally ill, as for many 
other client groups, is the recognition of this will, 
determination and commitment.
Also, if local projects never lead to actual change in long 
term service provision, the professionals themselves will 
loose faith and because of the power that they hold in 
defining needs at the local level, any nationally dictated 
policy will be perverted. Similarly, with the recent hive of 
activity in developing monitoring systems, quality targets and 
evaluation, results must be used to inform policy and this 
information must be fed back to the people at the front line 
of service provision. The potential for conflict in ideology 
between the collective view of service provision being 
promoted at the front line of service provision and the 
individualist ideal of government, cannot be ignored.
The new legislation implies rapid and extensive change. The 
case study material suggests that in the face of this, it is 
important that services do not become so pressurised that they 
cannot take time for reflection as to where developments are 
going. The DEW Team's ability to sustain itself over time was 
based in a constructive use of the reflections of individual 
professionals on the team. It was important that staff played 
a distinctive role in developing their own policy and 
regularly collectively made sense of their experience in order 
to learn from it during team support days and general multi­
disciplinary working. Ignoring such a feature could have a 
significant effect on further front-line service development.
5) Targeting Resources on those with the Greatest Need and 
the Degree of Concentration of Resources 
With current changes in community care policy, it is being
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questioned whether CMHTs can bear the whole burden of client 
care that the mental hospitals once carried, especially in the 
case of the long term mentally ill. Thesis evidence suggests 
that prioritisation of the long term mentally ill in local 
services is essential and although specialist services are 
ideologically preferable, prioritisation within the catchment 
area model is possible if the service is supported by a 
comprehensive range of other quality local services. However, 
there appears to be a continuing need to concentrate resources 
on those most in need and to monitor progress in priority 
working.
6) Future Research and Dissemination of Ideas 
The Griffiths Report (1988) highlighted the principle of 
learning from local innovations to inform mainstream practice. 
Ultimately, the case study example presented in this thesis 
offers a positive example of what can be achieved in community 
care of the long term mentally ill and indicates some areas 
that require future attention. It is contended that a number 
of case studies are required, of which this study is but one, 
in order to match the amount and quality of data that was 
amassed about institutions. In short CMHTs have provided a 
vital source of energy for future development, but knowledge 
about CMHT developments throughout the 1980s and early 1990s 
remained very localised and patchy and there was little 
reference to the CMHT approach at the central government 
level. A clear national policy needs to be adopted about the 
role of CMHTs in the current decade.
In Brief
Case study evidence suggested that the CMHT approach does 
provide a viable model of service provision to the long term 
mentally ill as a system of care. However, the development of 
CMHTs during the 1980s was bedeviled by ambiguity about the 
precise nature of the approach and its relationship and 
relevance firstly to district wide planning at the local level 
and secondly to new legislation implemented from central 
government in the early 1990s promoting the Care Programming 
Approach. Case study evidence suggested that policy makers
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need to address the lack of real commitment that was extended 
to the long term mentally ill group during the 1980s and to 
sharpen their focus about specific models of care. The British 
CMHT movement could be improved upon with determination to 
address the complexities involved in enhancing service 
provision.
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APPENDIX 1: DOCUMENTS CONSULTED
Springfield Hospital: Statistics for month of May 1975 -G.0. 
240 (Revised Sept '74)
Springfield Hospital: Statistics for month of January 1976 - 
G.O. 240 (Revised Sept '74)
Letter to Battersea Consultant from Senior Registrar in
Community Medicine, RE: Mentally 111 in Battersea, 7 August
1979.
Letter to Battersea Consultant from Area Specialist in
Community Medicine, Health Services Information Planning and 
Evaluation, RE: Mentally 111 in Battersea, 5 November 1979.
Wandsworth Social Services- Background Paper on Facilities 
offered to Mentally 111 people by the London Borough of
Wandsworth, 24 July 1979.
Minutes of the Joint Care Planning Team Meeting RE: Services 
for the Mentally 111, held at Bolingbroke Hospital 3 August 
1979.
Wandsworth Health Authority- Services for the Adult Mentally
111 in Battersea, 25th July 1979.
Wandsworth Social Services: North Battersea Area Map.
Wandsworth Social Services: South Battersea Patch Boundaries
Map.
Wandsworth & East Merton Community Health Council's Annual 
Report, 1980.
Wandsworth Health Authority Pamphlet- District Division of 
Psychiatry Plans for Psychiatric Services in the 1980s, 1981.
Springfield Hospital Joint Steering Group- Day Hospitals, June 
1981 .
Rota: Psychiatric Cover for St James' Casualty and for
Emergency Wards, May 1981.
Wandsworth Health Authority- Psychiatric Day Facilities for 
Battersea: A Planning Brief, 10 June 1982.
Wandsworth Health Authority- Psychiatric Day Facilities for 
Battersea: A Planning Brief, 10 August 1982.
Wandsworth Borough Council Planning Department- Development of 
the former Battersea General Hospital Site, September 1983.
Correspondence between Medical Administrator and Professor 
Crisp RE: Naming the Day Hospital, 5 April 1983.
Correspondence between Medical Director, Priory Hospital and 
Springfield Medical Administrator RE: Battersea General
Hospital Site Development, 28 September 1983.
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Letter to Wandsworth Health Authority District Administrator 
from Chairman of Development Control Committee, RE: Battersea 
General Hospital Site, 6 September 1983.
Circular: Battersea Day Hospital; Further Options to be
Considered by Project Team, 24 October 1983.
Discussion Paper: Battersea Day Hospital Team, December 1983.
Letter to Principal Architect from Battersea Consultant RE: 
Development of Springfield Hospital, 16 June 1983.
Letter to School Friend from Battersea Consultant RE: Private 
Housing Joint Project for Battersea Day Hospital, 1 September 
1983.
Wandsworth Health Authority- Springfield Hospital Survey of 
Patients Admitted from Battersea/ Central Wandsworth RE: 
Battersea Day Hospital, 1983.
Battersea Day Hospital Project Team- The Day Hospital, Further 
Options, 1983.
Wandsworth Health Authority- Shadow Day Hospital Team: 
Discussion Paper, August 1983.
Wandsworth Health Authority- Health Authority Day Hospital 
Option Appraisal and Cost Benefit Analysis, 1984.
Wandsworth Health Authority- Staffing Proposals: Circular,
November 1984.
Letter from Medical Administrator to Specialist in /Community 
Medicine, DHA, RE: Social Worker Appointment for the Battersea 
Day Hospital: Possible Bid for Joint Finance, 2 May 1984 & 15 
May 1984.
McLean E.K.- Draft Paper "Shadow Edward Wilson House Team", 9 
August 1984.
Minutes of Battersea Day Hospital Team Meeting held on 27th 
April 1984.
EWH Operational Policy and Procedures, June 1985.
Correspondence about Negotiations regarding Private Sector 
Involvement in the Battersea Day Hospital Plan, 1983.
July 1985 - Correspondence regarding Transport Problems for 
Springfield Patients.
October 1985- Correspondence regarding "Use of Emergency 
Clinics by Battersea".
A Joint Project for Mental Health Falcon Grove Resource Centre 
(Social Services) and DEW (NHS): Battersea Mother & Toddler 
Group, K Scrimshaw, Community Occupational Therapist, April
1985.
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Correspondence between Social Service Principle Officer to 
Mental Health Service Development Officer RE: Edward Wilson 
House Operational Policy, 31 July 1985, 4 September 1985, 26 
September 1985.
Wandsworth Health Authority- Mental Health Services Annual 
Report, 1986.
DEW Operational Policy 1986.
Letter from DEW Consultant to Social Services Principle 
Officer RE: Social Work Staff for EWH, 20 February 1986.
Proposal re- Shadow Edward Wilson House Team and Staffing for 
the Proposed Drop-in Centre in Battersea, 26 November 1986.
Briefing Paper- Shadow Edward Wilson House Team Briefing for 
Staff, 10 March 1986.
Circular to Hospital Consultants from General Manager, RE: 
Edward Wilson House Shadow Team Terms of Reference, Aims & 
Objectives, 17 March 1986.
Minutes of a Meeting to Discuss Progress with Edward Wilson 
House Held on 4 September 1986.
Correspondence between consultant psychiatrist and social 
services manager re- Bid for Social Work Post, May 1984, July
1985, September 1985, February 1986.
Wilson- Neighbourhood Study, Community Psychiatric Nursing, 
unpublished, 1986.
Wandsworth Health Authority- Summary of Mental Health 
Developments: Scheme for Phased Recruitment of Staff, January
1986.
Circular: EWH Briefing for Staff from Springfield General
Manager, May 1986.
Correspondence from Springfield Managers to DEW Team 
requesting Team Aims and Objectives and providing details of 
Haringey CMHT.
Wandsworth Health Authority- Minutes of Meeting of EWH Project 
Team, 1986.
DEW Circular- A Brief Outline of DEW, October 1986.
Correspondence with Acute Ward MDM Members, Springfield 
Hospital: Re-Development of an Integrated Community Mental 
Health Service for North and South Battersea, 8 December 1986.
Correspondence between Wandsworth Health Authority and 
Wandsworth Social Services regarding disputes over social 
services staff involvement in DEW, October to November 1986.
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McLean E.K.- "Doddington What?": Doddington Edward Wilson
Mental Health Service. Article for St Georges' Hospital 
Review, June 1986.
Wandsworth Association of Mental Health- Wandsworth 
Association of Mental Health Annual Report, 1986.
DEW Circular: Battersea Community Resources, 1987.
DEW Circular: Proposed Community Groups, March 1987.
DEW Circular: The Opening of DEW, 1987.
Wandsworth Health Authority- EWH Operational Policy, 1987.
"DEW News": Newsletter for Battersea Mental Health Staff, 2nd 
February 1987.
"DEW News": Newsletter for Battersea Mental Health Staff, 9th 
December 1987.
"DEW Drops the Mental Illness Stigmas", Person to Person, 
Issue 6, October 1987.
Development of Mental Health Service. Letter from DEW to Unit 
General Manager, August 1987.
Letter from Dr E.K. McLean to Dr J. Bolton, Springfield
Hospital, 24 April 1987.
DEW Annual Report 1986-87, submitted April 1987.
Correspondence between Consultant Psychiatrists, Springfield 
Hospital: Re- Interim Arrangements for Joint Working between 
the Rehabilitation Team and Edward Wilson House, 24 April
1987.
DEW- Position Paper arising from DEW Review, 30 July 1987.
Correspondence between DEW and Mental Health Unit Managers: 
Re- Use of St Saviours by DEW Team, 25 March 1987.
Battersea Groups and Links, November 1988.
Walton R. & McLean E.K.- A Survey of the Use Made by GP's of
a Community Psychiatric Service. Unpublished, 1988.
DEW Circular: The Garfield Group.
DEW Circular: The Relatives and Carers Support Group.
Letter to potential referrers, 20th March 1987: Autumn Colours 
Group.
The DEW Team's Core Statement, 2 August 1988.
Wandsworth Health Authority- Paper to the Development Control 
Committee, 25 March 1988.
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DEW- Information relating to the future use of Zinnia Ward, 
12th July 1988.
Smith H.- Who has Priority? An Evaluation of the Priority 
Given to Patients with Long Standing Mental Illness by the DEW 
Team. Unpublished paper by Community Registrar, June 1988.
Wandsworth Health Authority- Services for People with Mental 
Illness in Wandsworth: Interim Report of the Strategic
Planning Team, amended October 1988.
Wandsworth Health Authority- Adult Mental Health Services: 
Strategy for future provision within Wandsworth and Merton 
1988-1994, 1988.
Correspondence between Unit General Manager and DEW Consultant 
Re- Secretarial Cover. 27 October 1986, 29 October 1987, 17 
May 1988, 27 June 1988,4 July 1988, 12 July 1988.
Wandsworth Health Authority- North Battersea West Consultant 
Psychiatrist Job Description, 1988.
Leibowitz J.- Some Options for the Care of Long Term Patients 
in Battersea. Position Paper, February 1988.
McLean E.K.- North and South Battersea Catchment Areas (based 
on populations in Social Services Patch Teams), 1988.
Correspondence between Unit General Manager, Dr Bolton & Dr 
McLean RE: Kitson/McLean Consultant Post, 15 January 1988.
Letter from DEW Consultant to Unit General Manager RE: 
Preserving DEW against attacks from Hospital Department Heads, 
20 May 1988.
Letter from Social Services Principal Officer in Mental Health 
to Unit General Manager RE: Battersea Consultant Changes, 20 
May 1988.
Correspondence between DEW and Good Practices in Mental 
Health, RE: Future of DEW Mental Health Team, 28 March 1988.
Letter from Good Practices in Mental Health to Unit General 
Manager, District General Manager and Chairman of District 
Division of Psychiatry from Senior Information Officer, Good 
Practices in Mental Health, 26 April 1988.
Letter from Dr Hollyman to Dr McLean RE: Proposed job
description, 15 March 1988.
Letter from Head III Occupational Therapist Wandsworth 
Division to Wandsworth Services Manager, RE: Plans for new 
Wandsworth Consultant Catchment Areas, 16 May 1988.
Wandsworth Health Authority- Proposals for the Future 
Provision of Psychiatric Services to the Battersea Catchment 
Area, 15 April 1988.
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Letter from DEW to Unit General Manager, RE: New Consultant 
post to replace Dr Kitson's catchment area work and half of Dr
McLean's post, 16 February 1988.
Circular from Wandsworth Divisional Manager, RE: Battersea
Catchment Areas Reorganisation, July 1989.
Letter to Unit General Manager from DEW Team members RE: Draft 
Proposals for Kitson/McLean Replacement Consultant Job 
Description, 1988.
Wandsworth Health Authority- Data from Battersea Survey - 25 
November 1987 to 24 February 1988.
Letter from Battersea Consultants to GPs and Social Workers 
RE: Reorganisation of Catchment Areas.
Minutes of Meeting to consider Implications of the 
Reorganisation of the Battersea Catchment areas held on 
Tuesday 21 June 1988.
DEW Report 1988-1990
DEW Circular, March 1989.
Battersea Groups (Mental Health) Update- September 1989, 
K.S./P.R.R.
Autumn Colours Group: Minutes of Meeting held at Elmwood Court 
on Thursday 15th June 1989.
DEW Leaflet: Battersea and Central Wandsworth Befriending
Scheme.
Evaluation of the Anxiety Management Group DEW, P. Prakesh & 
R. Short.
DEW Circular- How DEW Developed (a community mental health 
team in Battersea), 1990.
"DEW - A Vote of Confidence", Person to Person, Issue 22, June 
1990.
Correspondence between Unit General Manager, Social Workers 
and Consultants: Re- Financial and Staffing Assumptions for 
the Edward Wilson House Day Facilities, 28 September 1990.
DEW Operational Policy, November 1990.
Letter from Head III Occupational Therapist to Wandsworth 
Services Manager RE: Plans for the New Wandsworth Catchment 
Area Teams, 16 May 1988.
DEW- Community Mental Health Facilities Used by the DEW Team, 
March 1991.
Report from Wandsworth Social Services: The Mental Health
Sector, February 1991.
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Newchurch & Co.'s Report on Catchment Area Teams, 1992.
Wandsworth Health Authority- A Proposal to Reorganise the 
Wandsworth Catchment Area Service, 1993.
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APPENDIX 2
INTERVIEWS COMPLETED
DEW Consultant Psychiatrist
DEW Clinical Psychologist
DEW Occupational Therapist
DEW Social Worker
DEW Clinical Assistant
DEW Senior Registrar
DEW Community Psychiatric Nurse
Central Wandsworth Community Psychiatric Nurse
South Battersea Consultant Psychiatrist
Central Wandsworth Consultant Psychiatrist
Rehabilitation Team Consultant Psychiatrist
2 Area Social Workers
Principal Social Worker
Head of Social Services Department, Mental Health.
Head of Springfield Psychology Department.
Principal Clinical Psychologist, Springfield Hospital 
Rehabilitation Team
Yew Ward Manager, Springfield Hospital
Wandsworth Mental Health Unit Services Manager
Wandsworth Nurse Manager, Springfield Hospital
Community Worker, Doddington & Rollo Family Centre
Social Responsibility Missioner, Association for the Pastoral 
Care of the Mentally 111
Local Battersea General Practitioner
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APPENDIX 3
THE DEW TEAM OPERATIONAL POLICY - Feb 1987 
1 . PHILOSOPHY AND AIMS 
1 .1 Service Development Aims
1.1.1. To promote the development of a comprehensive mental 
health service in Battersea, which incorporates both hospital 
and community based facilities and is based on an assessment 
of local needs.
1.1.2. To work closely with other locally based agencies to 
promote the development of a co-ordinated network of support 
services in the area for people with mental health problems.
1.1.3. To develop methods of investigating and improving the 
quality of care provided by the service.
1.1.4. To educate people in the area about mental health 
issues and promote a less stigmatising attitude towards people 
with mental health problems.
1 .2 Clinical Service Aims
1.2.1. To provide an easily accessible, locally based service 
which is responsive to local needs and takes into account the 
fact that Battersea has a high level of social deprivation 
(which is known to contribute to mental health morbidity) and 
also that it is a multi-racial area.
1.2.2. To make the needs of people with long-standing mental 
health problems living in the area a priority and attempt to 
minimise the effects of long term mental illness and prevent 
inappropriate admissions to hospitals for this group.
1.2.3. To encourage, where possible, the use of locally based 
alternatives to the existing out-patient, day patient and 
hospital facilities.
1.2.4. To improve the continuity of care between hospital and 
locally based mental health services.
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2. FUNCTIONS
2.1 Direct Clinical Service Functions
2.1.1. To provide treatment, rehabilitation and support 
programmes as appropriate. These will vary with identified 
needs and may include work with individuals, families and 
groups.
2.1.2. To provide a multi-disciplinary assessment service 
which is responsive to local needs and which can refer people 
on to appropriate agencies as necessary.
2.1.3. To provide regular monitoring of cases by multi­
disciplinary reviews and also by the development of a 
computerised case-register of all DEW referrals.
2.1.4. To provide a service of support and advice to users of 
the service and their relatives.
2.2 Indirect Clinical Service Functions
2.2.1. To liaise closely with all NHS services involved in the 
provision of mental health care in Battersea (including 
psychiatric hospitals and GP's) to improve co-ordination and 
continuity of care.
2.2.2. To liaise closely with non-NHS agencies working with 
the mentally ill in Battersea (including Social Services and 
voluntary organisations) to improve co-ordination and 
continuity of care.
2.2.3. To provide a consultation and advisory service for 
locally based groups working with mentally ill people in 
Battersea.
2.2.4. To allocate to each relevant establishment, 
organisation or institution in the area one member of the team 
as Link Person to liaise between that group and the DEW Team 
to improve communications and bring back information about any 
unmet needs. (The Link Person is not responsible for meeting 
those needs).
2.3 Service Development and Monitoring/Evaluation Functions
2.3.1. To monitor the work of the Team and evaluate the 
service on the basis of its stated aims and to develop changes 
in policy and practice in the light of these findings.
2.3.2. To collect up to date information on local resources in
336
the area relevant to mental health.
2.3.3. To contribute to the further development of mental 
health services in Battersea by developing methods for 
investigating the effectiveness of the service, pointing out 
gaps in existing services and identifying needs for resources.
3.OPERATION OF THE CLINICAL SERVICE
3.1. Target Patient Group
3.1.1. Patients will be from amongst the adult population of 
Battersea (covered by the catchment areas of Drs McLean, Gundy 
and Kitson, which includes all of SW11 and some of SW8 & SW4). 
They will predominantly be between the ages of 16 and 75.
3.1.2. A priority group will be people with long-standing 
mental health problems living in the area.
3.2.Exclusions
3.2.1. The team will not normally provide a direct clinical 
service to the following groups, but will provide an 
advisory/consultation service where appropriate:
a) People over the age of 75.(see Appendix for comment)
b) Children & adolescents under the age of 16.
c) People for whom alcohol or drug abuse is the primary 
problem.
d) People suffering from senile dementias.
e) People who have a mental handicap.
f) People who have a significant forensic history or a history 
of violence.
These groups will usually be referred on to the appropriate 
part of the service.
3.3 Referrals
3.3.1. Referrals will generally be accepted from any 
professional person or body (such as GP, Social Worker, CPN, 
Psychiatrist, Psychologist, Voluntary Organisation) seeking 
the advice of the team concerning people living in the area.
3.3.2. At present the Team will not normally accept self 
referrals, but flexibility will be maintained and individual 
cases will be dealt with as appropriate.
3.3.3. Referrals (by telephone or letter) will be responded to
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by one member of the Team who is on duty each weekday from 9am 
to 5pm. The duty worker will either deal with the referral 
herself if it has to be responded to quickly (within a few 
days) or will bring it to a weekly multi-disciplinary meeting 
for allocation to an individual worker on the basis of 
individual skills and case load.
3.3.4. The Team is not a Crisis Intervention Team and 
emergency referrals should be sent direct to the emergency 
clinic at St Georges Hospital or to the appropriate consultant 
for an urgent domiciliary visit.
3.3.5. If appropriate an assessment is made by a member of the 
Team and this is discussed at a multi-disciplinary meeting and 
a key-worker is allocated as appropriate.
3.3.6. For each person taken on by a key-worker an individual 
care plan is drawn up which specifies the aims of 
intervention. The key-worker is responsible for co-ordinating 
this and keeping records up to date.
3.3.7. Cases are reviewed at regular intervals, the next 
review date being decided each time the case is discussed.
3.3.8. The person's GP will be informed when a referral is 
made to the DEW Team and the GP and/or referrer will be kept 
informed of progress.
3.3.9. Where a psychiatrist is involved, medical 
responsibility will transfer to the appropriate consultant 
psychiatrist. In some cases where another mental health 
professional has the major clinical involvement, medical 
responsibility remains with the GP.
4. SUPPORT SERVICES
4.1 . The secretary/receptionist is available at the DEW office 
for clerical support and to take telephone messages from 9-5 
on weekdays. She can contact the duty worker via a bleep if 
necessary. A 24 hour answering machine takes messages while 
the office is closed.
4.2. A computerised register of all DEW referrals and 
Battersea Hospital Admissions is kept at the DEW office. (The 
information stored complies with the requirements of the Data 
Protection Act, 1984).
4.3. Individual files are kept on all DEW patients at the DEW
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office. The key-worker is responsible for keeping these up to 
date.
5. SITE AND LOCATION
5.1. The DEW Team has an office base at 311 Battersea Park 
Road, London. SW11 4LU (at Doddington Health Clinic).
5.2. Patients are not generally seen at the office base. They 
are seen in a variety of settings as appropriate including 
their homes, community centres and health centres.
6. THE CORE DEW Team
6.1. The DEW Team is a multi-disciplinary Team of 
professionally qualified personnel.
6.2. The core Team establishment consists of:
7. POLICY DEVELOPMENT GROUP
7.1 . A policy development group will be set up which meets at 
regular intervals to update the policy and working practice of 
the Team and define objectives.
7.2. The group will be initially composed of the core DEW Team 
and an administrative representative for the Adult Mental 
Health Unit (probably the Manager of Wandsworth Services). The 
membership of the group may be modified as necessary, but will 
include representatives from all senior professionals involved 
in the DEW Team.
7.3. This group could function as a pilot scheme for a similar 
Policy Development Group looking at the whole of the Battersea 
Service.
Appendix: Comment on 3.2 Exclusions. Part a
When the DEW Team was originally planned it was envisaged that
Whole-Time Equivalent
Community Psychiatric Nurse
Senior Community Occupational Therapist
Consultant Psychiatrist
Clinical Assistant
Senior Clinical Psychologist
Senior Social Worker
Secretary/Receptionist
1 . 0  
1 . 0  
0.5 
0.9 
1 . 0  
1 . 0  
0.5
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it would provide a limited service to the elderly (over 75 
years). The experience of the Team, however, has shown this to 
be impractical and the elderly get a more effective service 
via the community elderly Team. The inclusion of people over 
75 in the list of those for whom the DEW Team does not 
generally aim to provide a direct service reflects this change 
in policy.
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APPENDIX 4
CASENOTE STUDY DATA COLLECTION & CODING FORM
Completed for 100 subjects for the period 01-04-87 to 30-09-88
:a r d 1
1. Study Code Number:
Code last 2 digits 2-3
2. Sex:
0=Male, 1=Female 4
3. Age on 01-APR-87:
Code actual age 5-6
4. Marital Status:
a) Married/Cohabiting - 0 b) Single
/
- 1
c) Divorced - 2 d) Widowed - 3
e) Separated - 4
5. Ethnicity:
8
a) Caucasian - 0 b) West Indian/African- 1
c) Asian - 2 d) Other Europe - 3
e) Other eg Mixed Race- 4
6.Living Situation:
77
a) Alone (inc Hostel) -00 f) Lone Adult with child-05
b) with Friends -01
c) with Spouse/Cohabitee -02
d) with Spouse &child(ren)-03
e) Lone Adult & child(ren)-04 
-Any under 18 yrs
7.Type of Housing:
a) Owner-occupied House/Flat
b) Private Rented House/Flat
c) Council House/Flat
- Any 18 or older
g) with Parents/Siblings-06
h) Other -07
10
-1
-2
-3
d) Housing Assoc. House/ -4 
Hostel(with Residential Staff) 
/Group/Shared Home/Sheltered House
e) Hospital Ward -5
8.ICD9 Diagnosis: _
11
a) 295.* -1
b) 296.* -2
c) 297.* -3
d) 300.* -4
e) 301 .* -5
f ) 303.* -6
g) 309.* -7
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9.Employment Status:
1 2 - 1 3
a) F/T Employment -00 f) Off Sick- has Job-05
b) P/T Employment -01 g) Student -06
c) Occasional Employment -02 h) Retired -07
d) Sheltered Work -03 i) House-Wife/Carer -08
e) Not Working -04 j) Other -10
k) Voluntary Work -11
10. Duration of Past Psychiatric Problems
-Year Onset of Problems:(last 2 digits)
1 4 - 1 5
11. Total Past Psychiatric (Code actual Number)
In-patient Admissions:
12. Type of Past Contact:
a ) None - 0
b) Continuous since first referral - 1
c) Intermittent for long periods - 2
(More than 6 months contact at a time)
d) Intermittent for short periods - 3
(Less than 6 months contact at a time)
e) One previous contact only - 4
13. Admissions in Study Period: (Code actual Number)
No. In-patient Admissions: _ _
19-20
14. Total Duration of Study Period _ _
Admissions 21-23
(List no. of days as in-patient in study period)
1 6 - 1 7
18
15. Type of Patient:
1= Discharged 2= Continuous
24
16. Discharged/Drop-out:
25
a) Not Discharged -0
b) Moved Out of Area -1
c) Catchment Area Change -2
d) Patient Refusal/Failed Appointment -3
e) Patient Remained Well -4
f) Patient Died/went on long holiday -5
g) Patient Referred on to Specialist -6
h) Carer Refusal -7
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17. Total Number of Attempted Visits in Whole Period:___
26-27
18. Total Number of Successful Visits in Whole Period:__
28-29
19. Total No of Different Places each Person was seen: _
03
20. Total No of Different staff seen over period: _
13
21. Total No of Visits on which there was carer
contact:________________________________________ ___
32-33
22. Total No of Visits on which medication
Prescribed:________________________________________
34-35
23. Total No. visits medication was being Taken:_____
36-37
38
39
40
24 Total No. Day Centres Used:
25 Total No Community Groups Used:
26 Total No. Hospital Activities Used:
27 Average Reliability Rating for Day Centres: __
a) None - 0 41
b) Once Only - 1
c) Very Erratic - 2
d) Regular for Part Period - 3
e) Regular for Whole Period - 4
28 Average Reliability Rating for Groups:
29 Average Reliability Rating for Hospital 
Activities:
42
43
30 Total No. Day Centre Attendances in Period: ___
44-45
31 Total No. Group Activity Attendances in Period:___
46-47
32 Total No. Hospital Activity Attendances in
Period: _ _
48-49
33 Total No. Community Agencies
Client in Contact with: ___
50-51
34 Total No. Agencies Staff Involved with on behalf of
Client: ___
52-53
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Total No Agencies Client in Contact with in each 
Category:
35 DAILY LIVING
54-55
36 SOCIAL SUPPORT
56-57
37 HOUSE/ADVICE/WELFARE
58-59
38 f a m i l y /r e l a t i o n s h i p s
60-61
39 WORK/DAY OCCUPATION
62-63
40 SPECIALIST TEAMS
64-65
41 PHYSICAL HEALTH
66-67
42 Carer Data:
68
0 = None,
1 = Yes & Not Live With
2 = Yes & Live With
43 Type of Support Offered to Primary Carer :
69
a) None -0 f) Liaise Through SW
Department -5
b) Telephone Contact-1 g) Letters -6
c) Relative Support -2 h) Family Therapy -7
Group
d) Advice on Alcohol-3 i) Help contacting -8
Services other agency
e) Seen with Patient-4
44 Total No. Non Mental Health Carers:
(o=None) 70
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